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ABSTRACT 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to question 
the value of the use of models regarding decision- 
making as it effectively operates within the 
environment of US armaments procurements. For 
example, conceptual framework models such as 
bureaucratic politics, organisational outputs, 
incrementalism, and others are far too simplistic 
in their application to this subject - they only 
tend to distort reality. The thesis argues that 
the process is far too complex with decisional 
centres shifting throughout the life of any one 
given system, thus necessitating a more realistic 
conceptual approach. Evidence of this is provided 
throughout the discussion of the organisational 
processes and the roles of those involved in the 
procurement process. Moreover, it becomes apparent 
that those in the highest positions of decision- 
making (for example, Presidents, Secretaries of 
Defense, etc. ) are at times least likely to be 
involved in decisions, dependent on the stage of 
development of the weapon system. Further, other 
groups (for example, Congress, Joint Chiefs, etc. ) 
commonly perceived as the decisional centres have 
little, if any involvement during the earlier 
stages in the life of a weapon system. The 
possibility of their involvement increases as the 
system enters what the author refers to as the 
hardware phase, when monies must be appropriated. 
In other words, the system becomes politicised and 
the expertise of those in higher positions becomes 
salient, because they are chosen for their political 
and managerial skills - not their expertise in 
detailed defence matters. Even the weight of their 
decisions during the hardware phase is questionable 
due to the fact that lower level "experts", referred 
to as DoD Components, with longer periods of tenure, 
are consistently directing upwards their appraisals 
of new systems requirements, threats, etc., thus 
setting the parameters for the higher positioned 
decision maker. Following the description of the 
organisational processes and the roles of those 
involved, the discussion turns to the case study of 
the F-16 to validate these points. The purpose is 
not to research a case study and then attempt to 
extrapolate from it axioms of weapons procurement. 
The exercise is intended to yield credence to the 
points referred to above. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Research into weapons procurement methods, policies 
and problems as an organised academic discipline is 
relatively new, not only within the field of Political 
Science and Economics, but also within the US Department 
of Defense, the Executive Branch, Congress and other 
defence related agencies. 
>> Where billions of dollars2] 
are involved, research into defence procurement has 
generated over-simplified explanations such as military- 
industrial complex theories, contractors are the cause 
of cost overruns, or that it is a system on the verge of 
disorder. For example, consider the three following 
interpretations : 
(1) "A normal thirst for more managing power 
within the largest management (Pentagon) 
in the United States gives the new state- 
management an unprecedented ability and 
opportunity for building a military-industry 
empire at home and for using this as an 
instrument for building an empire abroad. 
This is the new imperialism. The magnitude 
of the decision-power of the Pentagon 
management has reached that of a State. 
After all, the fiscal 1970 budget plan of 
the Department of Defense - $83 billion - 
exceeds the gross national product of entire 
nations : in billions of dollars for 1966 - 
Belgium $18.1; Italy $61.4; Sweden $21.2. 
The state-management has become a para-state, 
a state within a state 
) 
2 
(2) "Large defense contractors can let costs 
come where they will and count on getting 
relief from the DoD through charges and 
claims, relaxations of procurement 
regulations and laws ... or other escape 
mechanisms ... They will make their money 
whether their product is good or bad; 
whether their price is fair or higher 
than it should be; whether delivery is 
on time or late. " 
41 
(3) "Let's face it - the fact is that there 
has been bad management of many defense 
programs in the past. We spent billions 
of the taxpayers' dollars; sometimes we 
spent it badly. Part of this is due to 
basic uncertainties in the defense 
business. However, most of it has been 
due to bad management,. both in the 
Department of Defense and in the defense 
industry ... Frankly, gentlemen, in 
defense procurement, we have a real mess 
on our hands. "51 
These and many other criticisms, or exposes of 
management, regarding the decisions of weapons 
procurement (even though two quotations - the 
first from the Defense monitor and the other from 
Secretary of Defense Packard - are from within the 
defence establishment) have blurred the decisional 
processes of weapons procurement. All too frequently, 
conventional wisdom and the literature relating to 
weapons procurement have related certain viewpoints 
to a given weapons system, and proceeded to assert 
3 
that all weapons procurement decisions were the 
resultant of such activities which subscribe to or 
fit within the scope of that author's persuasion. 
For example, Seymor Melman, mentioned above, viewed 
decisions in military hardware as promoting benefits 
to the defence industry (para state), with the motive 
being profit. 
61 Anthony Sampson argued that weapons 
procurement processes are "about the companies who 
make the arms, and the attitudes and methods of the 
men who buy. them and sell them. "71 The implication 
throughout being that it is a business in which a 
"fellow has to wish for trouble so as to make a 
living". 
81 George Thayer, set out to detail the 
international sales of arms. Throughout his work 
he made reference to "a distinct group of arms 
dealers", also referred to as "munitions 
manipulators". 
91 Bloomfield and Leiss examined the 
lack of arms control, and the influence of the military 
industrial complex in limited wars. The authors 
reviewed profits et al, but neglected in their work 
to provide a basic definition of war. 
101 The point 
here being that these authors, and others"] like 
them, hold a certain outlook that neglects the 
consideration of essential variables such as wars. 
national security, Congressional Oversight Powers, 
foreign sales and so forth. In other words, a 
conception or belief is formed on the part of the 
author by his interpretation of the facts, which he 
sees fit to utilise, accounts for only a part of the 
process. The trap, or blurring effect, is that the 
observer, if convinced, tends to relate a few facts to 
the overall process while still failing to fully 
appreciate the reality or the complexity of the situation. 
Furthermore, it is not only opinions which cloud the 
decision making processes. There is a danger that 
4 
the misapplication of information, in literary works, 
such as The Genesis of New Weapons, Decision Making 
for R&D, by Long and Reppy12], leads to certain 
functions or relationships exhibited at a precise 
stage of a weapons system inadvertently being applied 
to other inappropriate stages. For example, applying 
facets of Research and Development (R & D) to Production 
and Deployment as well. Long and Reppy clearly stated 
that "more thoughtful attention needs to be paid to 
decisions on military R& D"131, and an account was 
provided as to how contractors work within the Department 
of Defense to promote new technologies. The inference, 
herein, is that assumptions might be made that 
contractors interact the same way when producing arms 
as they do during R&D. They do not. Furthermore, 
another work by Cannizzo, The Gun Merchants, which 
detailed the politics and policies of the major arms 
suppliers, could also lead to the same type of 
misinterpretation - parallels could be drawn to the 
relationships of the government and contractors from 
sales to the DSARC III B (Defense System Acquisition 
Review Council) decision to enter full production. 
141 
Moreover, Cannizzo falls into her own trap by concluding 
in her opinion, that politics is the essence - 
"governments have their own 'midas touch': they 
politicise everything they touch, and arms sales have 
been no exception. "15 
Thus far, the insinuation has been that the observer 
of weapons decision making does not possess a complete 
framework of the US procurement practices, basing 
his/her knowledge on opinions, and applying specific 
explanations to the entire process. This is partly 
because weapons procurement is extremely complex both 
in the "magnitude and diverse sources" involved in the 
weapons acquisition 
161 
, and this is due to : 
5 
"The capacity of the human mind for 
formulating and solving complex problems 
is very small compared with the size of 
the problems whose solution is required 
for objectively rational behavior in the 
real world - or even for a reasonable 
approximation to such objective 
rationality. ., 
171 
No inference is being made that man is essentially 
irrational. The point is that the "complexity of 
procurement problems ... accentuates the need for 181 Some of the systematic procurement research. " 
aforementioned authors have done so, but they 
reviewed specifics or certain situations. However, 
the point is that the decisional processes should 
not be construed to be uniform throughout the entire 
weapons procurement process. 
Thus,. at the other end of the spectrum, an approach 
would be to attempt viewing the entire process, but 
the other dimension to be avoided is treating the 
overall defence establishment as monolithic. An 
excellent work which managed to take this into account, 
and thus is probably considered the Bible of this 
literary genre, is The Weapons Acquisition Process : 
An Economic Analysis, by Merton J Peck and Frederick 
M Scherer. 
19 Even though they diagnosed many aspects 
of-the military industry, they admitted that : 
"we have not examined directly or in detail 
the contractual and competitive incentives 
provided defence contractors through which 
the government supervises its contractors - 
in short, the various policy instruments 
through which the weapons acquisition process 
is directed. " 201 
6 
Even though a better approach to review the weapons 
procurement process might be to research the overall 
process itself, caution must be exercised against 
simplifying (for example, labels such as monolithic). 
Thus careful attention and research must focus not 
only on the progression of a weapons system through 
stages or phases, but the various components, their 
relationships to one another, and the legal or extra- 
legal parameters exerted upon them. To a limited 
degree, this has already been accomplished by other 
authors. However, in general the resultant has been 
a preoccupation with single case studies. 
21] 
Immediately, the author herein could be accused of the 
same. However, the approach is not to examine the case 
study of the F-16 and draw conclusions of the defence 
industry; it is the reverse. The approach herein is 
that the first part of this thesis will detail. the 
organisational structures as well as the legal and extra- 
legal (by precedence or tradition) parameters within 
which the defence planners and contractors operate. 
Following this, in Part II, the various roles of those 
concerned with defence planning and operations (for 
example, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (DoD) 
Component 
221, 
et al) will be subject to examination 
by outlining the case study of the F-16. The purpose 
is not to review the events of the F-16 case in 
particular, and then extrapolate the roles and functions 
of the defence planners. Rather, the intention is to 
examine the various roles and functions of the overall 
defence industry, conceived or prompted by the 
organisational structure, and subject them to the 
case study of the F-16. For example, and discussed 
below, the DoD Components and the defence contractors 
work closely together throughout the acquisition 
process, particularly during the conception, and 
7 
research and development of 
the DoD Components exercise 
decisional process at these 
case of the F-16, the close 
contractors and the DoD Com 
will be demonstrated. 
a weapon system. Further, 
great influence in the 
stages. By examining the 
interactions of the 
ponents and their influence 
Heeding Martin Edmonds' advice that "it is necessary 
to turn to studies of US weapons acquisition for 
insights into organisations, their objectives and 
their potential role in arms procurement "231; and, 
subsequent to Edmonds' plea, having been prompted to 
do so based on empirical evidence amassed from previous 
employment experience, the author wishes to suggest a 
new conceptual approach. First and foremost, the 
organisations and actors involved in the weapons 
procurement process must be identified as to their 
relevant functions prescribed by law or precedence. 
The weapons procurement process herein being defined 
by its stages, namely : 
(1) Concept Exploration (Conception) 
(2) Demonstration and Validation (Research 
and Development) 
(3) Full Scale Development 
(4) Production and Deployment 24] 
From employment experience in Washington 
25], the author 
realised that he was at times, dealing with various 
defence related offices as a given weapons system 
progressed through stages. However, whilst a given 
weapon system proceeded throughout the various stages 
(from Concept Exploration to Production and Deployment) 
work with a specific office would lessen or increase 
depending on the stage of development. In other words, 
a shifting of the level of influence appeared in that 
specific office, which either generated to it a greater 
8 
influence: during a given decisional stage, or that 
office yielding such influence to another office 
within the overall defence organisation. From a 
lobbyist's perspective, it was necessary to be aware 
not only of the continuing workload of that office, 
but also of the new actors and influences which had 
entered on the scene thereby creating the impression 
of the decisional centres to be either multiple or 
shifting. Initially, having entered this employment, 
the author approached the lobbying practice with the 
perceptual framework that the President, Congress, 
Departments of State and Defense, et al were the 
ultimate decisional centres. It was not long before 
this basic mode of thought proved to be inaccurate. 
These naive assumptions were quickly replaced with a, 
systematic approach. A crucial factor regarding 
communications surfaced early on, as well. Communication 
was essential, not only with the correct people and 
organisations, but also, and just as importantly, 
contacts had to be made at precisely the correct time. 
During the Concept Exploration Phase, the decisional 
centres and their influences appeared to remain at 
the lower levels (DoD Components) of the Pentagon's 
hierarchy, and this was also true for the most part 
during the Demonstration and Validation Phase. An 
exception to this rule occurred when large sums of 
money were needed for massive programmes of research 
and development (for example strategic Defense Initiative 
Programme). If large sums were required, the trend 
was that the decisional centres shifted upwards (Secretary 
of Defense, Congress, et al). On the other hand, if 
smaller sums were necessary for research and development, 
no shifting occurred, because funds could be made available 
for continuing research and development of systems at the 
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discretion of the Secretary of Defense. However, 
if this programme proceeded to Full Scale Development, 
a noticeable shift was evident.. This phenomena led 
to the need to judge whether or not a given weapon 
system had entered the hardware phase with large sums 
appropriated by Congress, or whether it was still in 
a non-hardware phase. This judgment would indicate 
which activity was more important, as well as where 
it was taking place. Note that, once this shift 
occurred, it was not to be interpreted that the DoD 
Components had abdicated their influence to higher 
authorities. Their influence recededZlittle, 
compared to those who, concerned with the political 
issues of funding a weapon system, experienced a 
sudden surge, but was eventually restored to a 
constant which continued throughout the implementation 
of its Development Phase and Production and Deployment. 
During these latter two phases, the amount of influence 
of those at the top moved up or down in a cyclical 
pattern. Initially, the influence would rest within 
the upper echelons during such times as Hearings and 
Budgeting of a given system. Afterwards influence 
receded downwards again, unless outside variables 
became operational. This idea is illuminated by the 
example of a nation requesting an arms buy, or perhaps 
dealing with a crisis (Yom Kippur War) in which a 
system's performance is tested. The issues, such as 
funding for a system, or the perceived threat, or 
cost overruns, and many other variables, publicly 
politicised a certain weapon system, causing the 
decisional centres to be shifted upwards. 
As stated, the intention of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that varying degrees of influence are 
exercised by different compartments, agencies, or persons 
as a weapons system proceeds from conception to deployment. 
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Identifying the relevant organisations, and their roles, 
illustrates the organisational relationships and their 
influences. The evidence below suggests that it is 
highly organised, yet complex, with conflicting as 
well as complementary variables. Even so, from a 
lobbyist's perspective, by knowing the organisations 
and their relationships, and also who or which 
group(s) is involved in the process at a given stage, 
the number of scenarios or strategies is narrowed 
down, thereby lessening the uncertainties (for the 
contractor). Thus, if a framework as such is offered, 
in general, the uncertainties inherent in weapons 
acquisition might enjoy what'O Young referred to 
as "loss minimising". 
26) 
Peck and Scherer stated, "uncertainty is a pervasive 
feature of all economic activity, and most of the 
uncertainties in weapons acquisition have their 
commercial counterparts. But there is a uniqueness 
in both the magnitude and the diverse sources of 
uncertainty in weapons acquisition. "27] 
The approach adopted is to argue that the first part 
of this statement is correct, while the latter part 
is misleading. There is uniqueness in that the 
"procurement of arms is one of the most important and 
most exacting tasks performed by governments. It is 
the responsibility which no government, irrespective 
of its political complexion, can escape. "28) However, 
it is improper to suggest that the nature of the 
defence industry and the added variables of the size 
of the industry, the defence budget, and the millions 
of items procured on an annual basis, would imply an 
even greater increase of uncertainties. The emphasis 
here is to prove the contrary by viewing the 
organisation, and its processes, and the relationships 
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exhibited between various groups. For example, the 
working relationship of a defence contractor and 
members of the staff of the US Air Force Research 
and Evaluation Team, and the culmination of the 
organisational processes and influences exerted by 
these individuals reveal that the uncertainties are 
essentially kept to a minimum within the overall 
acquisition process. 
The necessity to review the organisations is heightened 
by the fact that the defence area of government is 
rather diffuse, involving much more than the Department 
of Defense and is certainly not the preserve of the 
military. Not doing so leads to over-simplification 
and distortion of the facts. For example, attributing 
President Gerald Ford with the decision to prototype 
the F-16 is an oversimplified statement. To take it 
one step further, arguing that had it not been for 
his decision (he did not make the decision anyway) 
the F-16 programme might have been doomed, is another 
misleading misinterpretation. The event of the 
decision occurred during his tenure, and as Commander- 
in-Chief of the Armed Forces (President Ford being 
ultimately accountable for military matters) the 
decision to prototype could, for the sake of argument 
have been his. However, having examined the defence 
related organisations, and the case of the F-16, 
gentlemen such as Colonel John Boyd, or US Air Force 
research scientist Pierre Sprey, exerted greater 
influence in the decisions of the F-16 programme, at 
particular stages, than President Ford or his 
predecessor President Nixon. 
In addition, another reason to examine the 
organisations is that "processes located in the 
environment toward which officials direct their 
12 
decisions are no less relevant than those which occur 
in their minds and interactions. 
29] The approach 
herein will emphasise this, and perhaps clear some 
of the confusion of power, authority and influence. 
For example, the Secretary of Defense is in a position 
of authority and a DoD Component below him is cognisant 
of that fact. However, that DoD Component is able to 
exercise more power and influence for a given weapon 
system at certain stages (Concept Exploration, 
Demonstration and Validation), and may even be called 
upon during later stages to help influence others in a 
position of authority (for example, Congress). This 
is a result of the organisational processes a weapon 
system must pass through. 
For an organisational process to function, aside from 
its structure, a decision making process must be 
operational. And, "the behavior of complex 
organisations can be regarded as determined by 
decisions. " 
301 Before turning attention to previous 
authors' attempts to construct a conceptual approach 
to decision making, there is a problem here at the 
outset. It would be problematic herein to attempt 
to choose one paradigm of decision making when there 
are a multiplicity of decisional centres whose 
influence shifts upwards or downwards. Furthermore, 
as stated, the overall procurement process is very 
complicated and "policy making should be viewed as an 
existential phenomenon, or phenomena cluster, much 
too complex and dynamic to be fully caught in concepts, 
models and theories. "31) Governmental realities are 
both more dismal and yet more promising than presented 
in literature below. "Social science studies from 
the outside do not penetrate into the realities of 
central high-level decision making. " 
321 Items such 
as leaked in house studies (Pentagon Papers), memoirs 
13 
by insiders (Kissinger, Nixon) and writings by 
actors-observers (Schlesinger) reflect crucial choices 
better than research and data processing. It must be 
noted that these individuals have a limited scope of 
varying degrees, by their own personal prejudices. 
This in mind, attention will now turn to examining 
other accounts of decision making and the conceptual 
approaches employed by their authors, and the 
shortcomings found in applying them to the US 
weapons acquisition process. 
A great percentage of the literature concerning 
decision making has been addressed within the scope 
of a crisis -a crisis in the sense of a progression 
of events occurring between the governments of two 
or'more sovereign states, which is primarily 
configured by the perception of an unequivocal threat 
to highly held national values, and by the increased 
likelihood of resort to force which results in a 
degree of instability that is perceptibly greater than 
that which existed before the crisis. For example, a 
"kind of conflict, whether war or just maneouvring 
for position, is a process of bargaining - of threats 
and demands, proposals and counter-proposals, of 
giving reassurances and making trades or concessions, 
signalling intent and communicating the limits of 
one's tolerance, of getting a reputation and giving 
lessons. " 331 Thus, the perceptions of the intentions 
of the opposition will play a role in the bargaining 
with the opposition. 
Aside from perceptions, the important key is the 
"progression of events" which are characterised by 
both escalatory and de-escalatory phases during which 
certain other variables become especially salient. 
14 
These include the availability and adequacy of 
information, the finite amount of time available to 
make decisions, and the degree of surprise with which 
the decision makers are faced. Therefore, in order 
to successfully address the question of why a 
particular crisis evolved as it did, one must be armed 
with a conceptual understanding of the way in which 
decisions are reached which most closely approximates 
the way in which the decisions of a given crisis 
actually were or will be reached. 
Virtually, all of the earlier models of crisis decision 
making and indeed of decision making in general, employ 
a basic assumption which underlies and structures the 
subsequent developments of those analyses. 
341 
Specifically, there exists an assumption of rational 
action which implicitly structures and regulates 
explanation, and provides a core-understanding of the 
decision making process in which various casual and/or 
mediating factors are treated as though they were 
supplementary to that rational process. Even the most 
tenuous examples of goal-directed action with a basis 
in rational means and calculations seem to defy the 
existence of any legitimate alternative. 
An initial assumption is made that John Steinbruner's 
description of the analytic or rational paradigm 
incorporates the most significant facets of most models 
of rational decision making into its structure. 
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Immediately, one of the first problems encountered in 
studying most formal versions of a rational theory of 
decision is the pervasive tendency, found within those 
models, to equate "good" or "efficient" decisions with 
some rational calculations, and thus to incorporate 
real-world data into the theory in question in such a 
way as to make data appear to be rational. As 
1D 
Steinbruner writes : 
"Formal versions of the rational theory 
of decision are frequently-advanced as 
nominative arguments; that is, as 
statements of how decisions ought to 
be made with no necessary implications 
that they are made in that way ... 
The transition from a nominative to a 
positive model is often made by using 
the critical assumptions tautologously. 
That is, the decision process is assumed 
to approximate the formal ideal, and 
observed data are interpreted in such a 
way as to make them consistent with the 
critical assumptions of the paradigm. " 
36) 
According to Steinbruner"OLview, the critical variables 
involved in the consideration of complex decisions 
include - 
1) the relation and aggregation of values 
held by the decision maker (limited value 
integration); 
2) the concept of "maximising utility"; 
3) the view of uncertainty as largely 
a statistical problem; 
4) the assignment of certain probabilities 
to values and outcomes; 
5) the assumption that decision makers 
consciously assess alternative outcomes 
while intuitively updating outcome 
calculations as a result of their 
sensitivity to pertinent information. 
37] 
16 
It is imperative to recognise that any analytic 
paradigm must be scaled down to human dimensions if 
it is to represent actual human behaviour. For 
example, value integration does not mean the 
integration of all relevant values prior to initiating 
a trade-off process - no decision maker is capable of 
this, as Herbert Simon demonstrated, as is discussed 
below. 
381 
Rather, it indicates that some limited 
cost/benefit analysis occurs in which a decision maker 
evaluates the competing claims of certain values he 
has already selected above all others, in order to 
balance them and achieve some satisfactory trade-off 
or solution. 
391 
Formal models of rational decision assume that the 
decision maker is perpetually engaged in trying to 
get the whole picture and is virtually always amenable 
to, and capable of, altering his objectives and outcome 
calculations in response to new, more pertinent 
information. There is also the notion that uncertainty 
exists ("an imperfect correspondence between 
information and the environment")401 which affects 
the way in which the decision maker structures his 
outcome calculations, although the decision maker is 
presumably able to compensate for this. In addition, 
the idea of maximising utility is considered to be a 
central objective in any "good" decision, lending 
credence to the assumption that since a rational 
approach to decision is implicitly concerned with 
maximising utility, such an approach must therefore be 
operational in preferred decision calculations. Glen 
Snyder and Paul Diesing address this point and help 
to illustrate the crux of Steinbruner's analytic 
paradigm : 
The 'rational actor' or 'maximising' 
theory treats decision making as a 
process of maximising expected utility. 
It is assumed that there is a single 
homogeneous good, utility, that is 
present in all actually desired ends, 
and that an increased amount of any 
end brings with it an increased amount 
of utility, at a steadily diminished 
rate ... Second, a set of well-defined 
and mutually exclusive alternatives is 
assumed, from which the decision maker 
is to choose one. Third, it is assumed 
that the decision maker is able to 
estimate the outcome and calculate the 
expected value of each alternative. 
Given these assumptions, the decision 
maker calculates the expected value 
of each alternative, compares all 
alternatives, and chooses the alternative 
that maximises expected utility. " 
41) 
Recognising how hard it is to achieve pure rationality 
in the real world of weapons decision making, the 
approach offered herein is that various phases of 
pure-rationality decision making should be developed 
only insofar as it is economical to do so. In other 
words, when considering inputs in terms of what else 
could have been done with the resources - such is a 
more rational process compared with the outputs which 
are arrived at by a less rational means. Since the 
notion here is to be as rational as is feasible, the 
model is limited in its implementation into complex 
decisions. There is, in analyses of complex decisions, 
the assumption that more than one actor is often 
involved. This notion has been lent considerable 
sophistication by Graham Allison, one of Steinbruner's 
mentors, in his models of Organisational Process and 
Bureaucratic Politics. 
421 
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Beginning with Model 11, the basis of the 
organisational Process Paradigm is governmental action 
as organisational output. The activities of actors 
take place with certain established physical routines 
and "... constitute the range of effective choices 
open to government leaders confronted with any 
problem" . 
431 
Organisational outputs also act to 
... structure the situation within the narrow 
constraints of which leaders must make their decisions 
about an issue. Outputs raise the problem, provide 
the information and take the initial steps that colour 
the face of the issue that is turned to the leaders. " 
44] 
The output produced by an organisation is subject to 
certain parochial priorities and perceptions which 
are the result of factors as wide-ranging as the 
career goals of relevant officials and the selective 
cognitive ordering employed by participants in 
integrating new and perhaps contradictory information 
into an approved organisation perspective. The 
operation of governmental organisations is also 
influenced by the necessity of paying "sequential 
attention" to goals by adhering to "standard operating 
procedures", by avoiding uncertainty and by effectively 
co-ordinating the activities of members of the 
organisation. 
45] In other words, organisational 
activity is predominantly characterised by a 
dominant inference pattern, which, in turn, is 
responsible for structuring the programmes and 
routines that produce output. In practice, these 
routines result in only limited alternative courses 
of action, generally because organisations are 
concerned more with presenting opinions and thereby 
perpetuating and possibly enhancing their influence. 
461 
it is within this type of constraint that the analytic 
or cognitive actor must operate; but before proceeding 
to a discussion of the second type of actor, it is 
19 
important to expand upon Allison's Organisational 
Process Paradigm by looking at his Model III 
Government or Bureaucratic Politics. 
47) 
This model posits that the political "chess game" of 
competing organisations is motivated not merely by 
the reasons found within the Rational Actor Model 
(Model I- the notion of maximising expected utility), 
or by the standard operating procedures of Model II. 
Rather, the progression is also marked by the 
manipulative skill and political power brought to the 
political game by the individuals/groups upon whom 
its course depends. Within this view, government 
action becomes a political resultant instead of an 
organisational output. The primary ramification of 
this approach for top-level decision makers is that 
while the President remains the final arbiter of given 
issues and disputes, the inherent complexities involved 
in establishing goals, alternatives and priorities are 
such that some sort of consensus-building procedure 
must occur. 
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There is an "internally inconsistent 
compromise among competing goals or an incompatible 
mixture of alternative means for achieving a single 
goal. " 
49] The President needs the support of his top 
advisers and of those around him representing 
influential o_-ý; anisational _n: e=ests if his decisions 
are to be successfully arrived at and effectively 
implemented. "Presidents manoeuver, persuade and 
pressure - using all the levers, powers and influences 
they can muster. " 
50] 
It is within this Bureaucratic 
Politics model then that certain organisational 
constraints act, in conjunction with the dynamic of 
the model itself, to inhibit the pursuit of purely 
rational decisions. 
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Steinbruner recognised that an important aspect of 
Allison's Models I and III is an appreciation of the 
necessity for consensus-building in complex situations. 
Collective decisions within an analytic paradigm are 
often seen in terms of an individualised entity with a 
single view. This makes analysis easier and downplays 
the personal influence of individual actors. However, 
this view is obviously insufficient to deal with the 
procedures involved in arriving at complex decisions. 
A better way of viewing collective decisions is in 
terms of consensus-building, as Steinbruner and 
Allison have pointed out. Steinbruner has written 
that - 
"the right course to take within the 
analytic paradigm is [the] attempt to 
evaluate by debate and mutual effect 
a set of calculations which meet the 
criteria of analytic logic. If a 
dominant decision emerges from the 
explicit, shared analysis, then 
according to the analytic paradigm 
that should be the one take. if 
clear dominance of one alternative 
does not emerge, then the decision 
taken should at least be within the 
range defined by the common 
calculations if the decision is held 
to be the result of an analytic 
process. 
511 
This is not to make the assumption that leading 
decision makers necessarily act according to their 
bureaucratic roles, as Snyder has written 
52], 
but 
merely that Model III encompasses many of the 
characteristics responsible for commonly configuring 
the decision making environment. Allison attempted 
21 
to alleviate the confusion in decision making with 
his three Models, especially the delineation between 
Models I and III. In Model III, Allison argued 
that the "leaders who sit on top of organisations, as a 
disunited group, with each leader in his own sight, 
a player in a central competitive game" acted "in 
terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives, 
but rather according to various conceptions of 
national, organisational and personal goals". He 
alleged that this led to governmental decisions being 
made "not by a single rational choice but by the 
pulling and hauling that is politics". 
531 
Applying Allison's competitive game approach (Model 
III) to the weapons acquisition process does not 
offer any remedy in as much as on the occasion 
governmental or contractor decisions are made by 
a rational choice (for example, chosing a design 
for radar development). Furthermore, a "rational 
actor" such as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
had a "strategic objective" to bring down cost 
overruns - and implemented his cost benefit analysis 
to weapons contractors. The new process focused 
attention on the requirements process and sought to 
bring to bear on decisions sophisticated analytical 
techniques and cost-effectiveness concerns. "There 
were substantial managerial improvements in the sense 
that validation of requirements was subjected to 
systematic review and analysis, and the generation of 
alternative means of meeting requirements came to be 
an accepted managerial practice". 
541 (Perhaps this 
may have been a personal goal, given that his 
managerial skills had been accumulated from previous 
experience. ) 
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Several other flaws are found in Model III as it stands 
alone. The first and most apparent is that Allison's 
"leaders" are never clearly defined as to whether 
they are politicians, political appointees, or civil 
servants. For example, Allison does not develop the 
constraint placed upon a politically appointed leader 
who must still answer to his superior or risk the 
prospect of resignation. Nor is consideration given 
to the organisational limitations imposed on them. 
Considering the constraints placed upon "the leader", 
Allison's notion of one's stand depends on where one 
sits, should read; one's seat depends on 
where one stands. Even though Allison refers to 
"... personal goals", he does not develop that these 
personal goals of various politically appointed 
leaders would mirror those of their superiors and 
work the opposite way in duplicating their policies 
to the group surrounding or below them. Expanding 
this notion to include Model II, Allison blurred 
decision making behaviour by not developing the fact 
that Model II behaviour (organisational outputs) 
could act as an input into Model III aside from 
producing outputs within its own scheme. However, 
it is important to note that Allison has refined his 
approach in a more recent work in conjunction with 
Morton Halperin. 
551 
Specifically, "he has merged the 
two conceptual models that he presented as alternatives 
to the dominant rational actor approach ... ", forming 
one alternative model referred to as the bureaucratic 
politics model. 
561 
Arguably, this is a step closer 
to providing a better paradigm for examining weapons 
acquisition. Unfortunately, it is not comprehensive 
enough to encompass the shifting that occurs within 
the decisional centres. Allison might attribute 
the shifting to organisational and bureaucratic 
processes, but this approach neglects variables such 
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as unforeseen events (Yom Kippur War and its effect 
on the F-16 programme), uncertainties of technology 
in new weapons, but, most importantly, fails to 
consider the contributions of individuals' expertise 
in their specific field (cost-benefit analysis, R&D 
in avionics, et al). Allison's blending of the two 
conceptual models (II and III) as an alternative to 
the rational actor model assumes that it would be of 
little consequence whether Robert McNamara had been 
Secretary of Defense, or Pierre Sprey had been a 
research scientist involved in the F-X study (the 
study which eventually produced the design for the 
F-16). * Perhaps Allison might argue that given the same 
circumstances and events of the entire F-16 programme, 
and regardless of the individual person(s), the 
ultimate outcomes of the decisions would have been 
similar to the F-16. The approach herein argues that 
a Robert McNamara or a Pierre Sprey were of great 
importance to the decisions of the F-16. The 
development and acquisition of weapons like the F-16 
was not simply an organisational or bureaucratic 
output. Further, the thesis argues that certain 
individuals as well as their organisational 
(bureaucratic) units reflect a greater influence at 
various stages in the acquisition of a weapons system 
due to the shifting which occurs within the decisional 
centres. For example, the case study of the F-16 
presents the argument that Pierre Sprey at various 
stages was more important to the F-16 programme than 
Robert McNamara. This is not to say that Pierre Sprey 
was more important to the entire F-16 programme than 
Robert McNamara - because that statement is an 
oversimplification which does not take into account 
the organisational structures of the weapons 
acquisition process and the shifting that occurs 
within the process. Thus, an application of Allison's 
,ý 
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approach does not prove to be an adequate formula to 
properly explain the weapons acquisition process. 
Irving Janis derived a fourth model based on 
Allison's three conceptual models - the group dynamics 
approach - better known by the term "groupthink". 
571 
Groupthink refers to a "mode of thinking that people 
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive 
in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity 
override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action. "583 According to 
Janis' hypotheses, Groupthink is most likely to occur 
within three situations : 
1) The prime condition in group cohesiveness - 
... members of any small cohesive group 
tend to maintain esprit de corps by 
unconsciously developing a number of 
shared illusions and related norms that 
interfere with critical thinking and 
reality testing. " 
591 
2) Another condition found by Janis is the 
insulation of the decision making group 
"from the judgments of qualified associates 
who, as outsiders are not permitted to know 
about the new policies under discussion 
until after a final decision has been made. , 
601 
For example, in inter-service rivalry, the 
more insulated a cohesive group becomes, 
the greater are the chances that decisions 
will be the precipitate of Groupthink. 
3) The more actively the leader of a cohesive 
Group promotes his own preferences, "the 
greater are the chances of a consensus 
25 
based on Groupthink, even when the 
leader does not want the members to 
be Yes-men and the individual members 
try to resist conforming. x, 
611 
Janis' third hypothesis may resemble the model of the 
classical approach to the Theory of International 
Relations (Allison's Model I) rooted in the work of 
Hans Morgenthau. 621 Analysts using this approach 
construct a set of objectives that the statesmen 
responsible for a policy are intending to achieve. 
"Presuming ways" as Morgenthau said, the aim being 
to determine the ends the political actor is trying 
to attain by means of the policy he has chosen; 
he being a "unitary rational decision maker: centrally 
controlled, completely informed and value maximising. " 
631 
Morgenthau emphasised the necessity of employing a 
framework when studying foreign policy. To explain 
rational action in specific situations, the analyst 
must examine the nation's problem and re-enact the 
leader's choice : 
"We put ourselves in the position of a 
statesman who must meet a certain problem 
of foreign policy under certain 
circumstances, and we ask ourselves what 
the rational alternatives are from which 
a statesman may choose who must meet this 
problem under these circumstances. , 
641 
This is exactly what Janis and Allison were moving 
away from, for two reasons : 
first, it presumes that the statesman 
always acts in a rational manner; and 
second, decision making theory has moved 
away from the "states-as-sole-actors" 
approach. 
zE 
But the applications of Janis' and Allison's 
interpretations, although one step further away from 
Morgenthau, do not suffice - the proposal being that 
there are a multiplicity of decisional centres, not 
only structures to eventually arrive at a decision at 
the top, but given the specialisation involved in 
weapons procurement, autonomy has been granted to 
lower and middle groups in promulgating decisions. 
Note, that caution should be exercised, not to 
construe that the top echelons of the decision making 
process fit within Allison's bureaucratic politics 
model whilst the middle/lower level bureaucrats 
resemble the organisational model. Both act as an 
input into the other as well as the rational actor 
model playing a role. It is further complicated by 
the fact that, ultimately, funding is necessary for 
the eventual hardware required, and other specialised 
groups enter the process. In other words, it is a 
more complicated reality than supposed, and in trying 
to arrive at catch all explanations of decision making 
and applying them to reality, distorts the truth. 
Arnold Wolfers observed, "until quite recently, the 
states-as-sole-actors approach to international 
politics was so firmly entrenched that it may be 
called the traditional approach. " 
651 
The suggestion of this thesis is that the Organisational 
Approach and the Bureaucratic Politics Approach be 
termed the "modern approach", with a new "contemporary 
approach" to decision making theories reflecting 
the true complexity of reality. Such an approach 
would permit decision making to be better explained 
in terms of reality. An examination of the actors 
involved, the constraints upon them and their 
organisations; trends and underlying causes of an 
individual's preference; the organisational activity 
and its basis for functioning whether legal or extra 
27 
legal are but a few examples of the influences that 
affect decisions. Attempting to emphasise one or 
two of these, within the scope of a model, disregards 
other influences. "Models are abstract representations 
of reality which help us to perceive significant 
relations in the real world ... in no case are models 
photographic reproductions of reality. " 
661 
Further, 
models tend to limit perceptions and capabilities, by 
the promotion of a given persuasion or the held 
allegiance to a certain model - such is unproductive. 
"Given the nature of shifts that are 
occurring in the relative power of 
governmental institutions, and the 
persistence of more individualistic 
models of policy formation, we are 
faced with a more difficult task in 
attempting to understand the real 
nature of bureaucratic involvement 
in public policy formulation. " 
67) 
Thus, weapons procurement decisions should be viewed 
as essentially sequential as are most all decisions. 
Dealing with alternative consequences to make a 
decision, in which a "decision yields action and 
action involves the pursuit of goals, "681 the goals 
here eventually becoming part of the alternative 
consequences and so forth. The sequential-decision 
model was designed by Burton Klein of the RAND 
Corporation to handle decisions about progress in 
military research and development. 
69] 
This model is 
also applicable to other types of decision making. 
The basic tenet is that "if some information can be 
learned only during the early stages of carrying out 
that activity, the more promising alternative ways 
to carry it out should be undertaken simultaneously, 
and the decision as to which is the best alternative 
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should be delayed until the information has been 
learned. " 70] However, this presupposes rationality 
and is not what happens in the stage of Research 
and Development (R & D). For example, a certain 
period of time was deemed necessary for the testing, 
evaluation and analysing of the two design prototypes 
(General Dynamics YF-16 and Northrop YF-17), before a 
selection would be made by the US Air Force. However, 
before the final results were analysed, the time 
period was shortened, due to such factors as 
European pressure for the US Air Force to make a 
choice. The approach herein will argue that 
R&D, even on operational systems, is a continuous 
activity not only one of the sequence of stages 
due to changes in technology. 
Similar to Klein's approach and due to the reluctance 
of people to take decisions based on uncertainty, 
Charles Lindblom had previously advanced the 
Incremental Changes Model. 71 Lindblom was also 
disturbed by the assumption that pure rationality was 
the best method for decision making, and proposed 
another model that advocated "muddling through" -a 
slow evolution of policies by cautious incremental 
changes. Lindblom stated that in the "conventional 
ideal of a rational decision, a decision maker 
maximises something ... but ... an exhaustive search 
for the maximum, for the best of all possible policies, 
is not usually worth what it costs ... and an 
alternative strategy therefore is not to try too 
hard. "721 Or, as Henry Kissinger stated, "for the 
statesman, gradualism is the essence of stability. "731 
The incremental approach is quite valid for large 
areas such as social action, in which stability and 
predictability are the most important values, for 
example judicial decision making. A decision making 
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system of "moving compromise - specifically a never 
ending sequence of compromises", 
74] 
has its place in 
policymaking, but the inference is that drastic 
changes are avoided, to lessen uncertainties. This 
does not apply to weapons procurement within the 
nature of modern weapons themselves, especially when 
considering technological changes. A philosophy of 
incremental change in design or "marginal advance if 
followed would eventually lead to technological 
stagnation". 
75] 
For US military products there are 
"demands for technologically advanced weapons [which] 
require large programs", 
761 
which are not the resultant 
of incremental decision making. In fact, the system 
and types of contracts as well as some of the 
organisational processes, promotes drastic changes, 
as well as lessens the risks to those contractors 
involved. 
A final approach merits mention at this stage. 
Although it was an earlier approach than the others, 
Simon's satisficing model is of interest before 
turning to a brief discussion of power. In essence, 
it is more a behavioural model than a normative one, 
although it has collected some normative trappings. 
The Theory of Bounded Rationality, developed by 
Herbert Simon does not view maximising expected 
utility - the central tenet of the rational actor 
approach and of the analytic paradigm - as his 
objective. 
771 
Bounded Rationality is a conception 
of decision which is rationally based but 
psychologically adjusted. Originally developed as an 
alternative to what Simon viewed as the impossibility 
of the human mind to systematically address the 
complexities of the real world, bounded rationality 
calls for simplifying reality in one's mind to a 
sufficient degree that one's limited rational faculty 
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can effectively be brought to bear. However, the 
greater the degree of simplification, the less 
optional is one's consequent behaviour with respect 
to the situation as it actually exists. This is 
because increasing simplification by definition makes 
perception a less accurate representation of a more 
complicated reality. 
According to bounded rationality, the process of 
maximising expected utility found in more strict rational 
actor models is replaced by the simple notion of 
"satisficing". Satisficing means that not all, or 
even most, of the possible alternative options in a 
situation are considered; the individual is incapable 
of this. Instead, a course of least resistance, one 
that is good enough, is chosen by sequentially 
searching for the first option that "preserves 
endangered goods at an acceptable level". 
78) 
Relating 
the two concepts, Simon stated, "the key to the 
simplification of the choice process ... is the 
replacement of the goal of maximising with the goal 
of satisficing, of finding the course of action that 
is good enough ... ". 
79] 
Further, Simon raised the dichotomy between simplifying 
and the issue of "increased specialisation in all 
economic activity" and "increased productivity in any 
segment of the economy". 
80] 
According to Simon, the 
'organisms simplification of the real world for 
purposes of choice introduce discrepancies between 
the simplified model and the reality". 
81) 
Thus far, no one conceptual approach offered by 
previous authors, appears entirely to apply. 
(For the 
sake of avoiding redundancy, other literature will be 
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addressed throughout the thesis. ) Complicating 
the use of a single model is the notion that if 
the decisional centres are indeed shifting, 
and if the character of the process changes over time, 
then the rules of the "competing game" shift alongside. 
Moreover, "as has been proved by empirical analysis, 
the research, development, experimenting, production 
and implementation phases of major weapon systems do 
follow a very rigid sequential scheme within research 
and production plants not affected by the vicissitudes 
in the developments of international politics. "821 
This implies that arms procurement is little affected 
by changes in the international environment. If this 
is so, then there may also be a self-sustaining 
phenomena within individual states whereby "defence 
administrations and those social forces involved in 
the security and defence business usually put much 
effort into the maintenance of keeping, once 
established, research and production plants going 
since an interruption of the work in these institutions 
is considered intolerable by the political and military 
due to the long lead time requirements of modern 
weapon technology". 
831 
The other dimensions which are a part of decision 
making are power, influence and authority. Considering 
the long lead time involved in modern weaponry, whoever 
shall hold that power to steer a system throughout all 
the stages is of major importance. The approach is 
that, as the decisional centres shift, so does the 
influence in decisions, however, authority remains 
within previously delegated centres. The ability to 
exercise such authority pertains not only to the 
particular developmental stage of the weapon system, 
but also, how the persons in that group immediately 
concerned with that designated system are able to 
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translate their authority into influence. For example, 
the approaches of McNamara will differ from those of 
Weinberger, or a Carter versus., a Reagan. 
An early study of power was conducted by Robert Dahl 
in Who Governs. 
84] 
He found that few people in the 
external community, "individuals in the apolitical 
strata", had sufficient power to influence decisions 
and that a power elite, within the organisation, 
exerted power in almost all decision areas. 
851 
Every 
organisation has a dominant set of perceptions 
concerning what are its roles, missions or functions. 
And each organisation tries to defend its interests 
in accordance with the interpretation of its ruling 
elite, versus the claims of competing organisations. 
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This is of interest to weapons in general, because 
weapons are procured to defend the national security 
of a nation, as a whole, but are procured through 
organisational processes, with different interests and 
influences. Those completely outside of the 
organisational processes, which are defence related, 
have very little influence. Those inside or related 
(for example, lobbyists representing contractors) are 
able to influence to varying degrees, conditional to 
the specific developmental stage of the weapons. "In 
politics, information is power, and bureaucracies 
typically possess greater information about their own 
bailiwick and expertise in their specialty than do 
outsiders". 
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Those at the top (Secretary of Defense, 
Congress, et al) may have the authority, but their 
response, in the form of influence, is predicated on 
the stage of development. 
Another earlier work of significance describing the 
governmental process as one of inherent bargaining 
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was Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power : The 
Politics of Leadership. Neustadt's recurring theme 
is that "Presidential power is the power to persuade. "88] 
According to Neustadt, the efficacy of a President's 
influence is derived from three related sources, 
the bargaining advantages inherent in the job, his 
professional reputation, and his public prestige. 
The Presidential task "is to induce them to believe 
that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal 
of their own responsibilities require them to do in 
their interests, not his. "891 "Thus power does not 
automatically exude from a President; he must work 
to promote his influence". 
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This is to be applied 
to all those in a position of authority (for example, 
Secretaries of Defense and State, National Security 
Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al). Their 
position of authority does not always influence a 
given weapon system at all stages. However, caution 
must be exercised not to envision power as emanating 
from those in authority at a given time in a weapon 
system's progress. Power is the "ability of those 
who possess power to bring about the outcomes they 
desire". 
91) 
In these regards, considering the long 
lead times necessary for a weapon system, the tenure 
of DoD Components can be, and is, translated into 
power by their influence of marked familiarity as well 
as their professional expertise with a system. 
The important dimensions of power concerning weapons 
procurement is that it is diffuse, and depending on 
the stage of development, the influence of those 
below (DoD Components) may weigh heavily on those in 
governance. "Employees do not consciously compare 
their power with the power that the manager has, and 
then decide whether or not to comply depending on 
the relative power balances. , 92] 
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As will be discussed, the legal organisational 
functions and responsibilities and the legal autonomy 
available to them, make DoD Components perfectly aware 
of their power to influence those in authority. 
Furthermore, power being so diffuse, other groups, for 
example, contractors, given the organisational setting, 
where legally they are to assist DoD Components in 
pursuing new technology during the conception and 
research and development of a weapon system, are in a 
prime position to direct and persuade those of higher 
rank. It is important to recognise that those outside 
a legally prescribed position of authority in weapons 
procurement do have power/influence if they are within, 
or are connected in some way along the periphery of the 
overall defence industry (for example, contractors). 
Power being implemented through politics leads to 
another aspect of power, the politics within an 
organisation. One definition of such power provided 
by Rourke is that the "first and fundamental source 
of power for administrative agencies is their ability 
to attract outside support". 
931 This definition is 
not admissible because DoD Components and the Pentagon 
conditionally provide for the national security of the 
nation as a whole. It is the responsibility of 
Congress to allow for the appropriate funding of the 
security programmes without public endorsement. 
941 
In fact, Congress probably receives more criticism 
than support, and yet, it is an exceedingly powerful 
organisation. Congressional support for funding 
weapons development is not a straightforward matter. 
On the House and Senate sides there are 5 Committees, 
each, with 10 and 11 sub-committees respectively (total - 
31 Committees and sub-committees) involved at some 
stage of the weapons acquisition process. 
95] "This 
fragmentation of power ensures that all sides of an 
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issue can usually find allies in Congress. "961 
Congressional guidance resulting from fragmentation 
"leaves the military services and the Defense 
Department with a relatively free hand in responding 
to it. The Defense Department can pick and choose 
which guidance it will follow, privately negotiate 
the relaxation of certain restrictions, or ignore 
the inconsistent guidance entirely while pursuing 
its preferred program". 
971 
Further, although funding 
is compulsory for the production of weapons, with 
Congress holding the purse strings, other funds are 
available outside the boundaries of Congressional 
overview for Research and Development. 
Perhaps the definition, "organisational politics 
involve intentional acts of influence to enhance or 
protect the self-interest of individuals or groups, " 
981 
would be more suitable. This definition is only half 
the picture because there is the added dimension in 
weapons procurement that they are also serving the 
national interest - providing for the national defence. 
Although this definition does consider the protection 
of a certain system, which devotes an element of a 
self-interest (for example, Navy versus Air Force for 
Lightweight Fighter), it does not take into account the 
pace of technology. From empirical experience, there 
are many DoD Components who, in the belief that a 
certain system should be chosen based on technological 
advances, would and have been willing to suffer the 
consequences of setbacks in their groups or self- 
interest, in the form of trade-offs, by promoting 
that system. For the purposes of this thesis, politics 
within organisations will be defined as : 
"Organisational politics involves those 
activities taken within organisations to 
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acquire, develop and use power and 
other resources to obtain one's 
preferred outcomes in a situation 
in which there is uncertainty or 
dissension about choices. " 
99] 
This definition fits well into the context of this 
thesis. Pfeffer further states, "an individual, 
subunit, or department may have power within an 
organisational context at some period of time; 
politics involves the exercise of power to get 
something accomplished, as well as those activities 
which are undertaken to expand the power already 
possessed ,,, N. 
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There is one other aspect of power regarding weapons 
procurement relating to NATO Coproduction and Foreign 
Sales. Holsti states, "what is important in 
international politics is the perceptions of influence 
and capabilities held by policy makers and the way 
they interpret another government's signals. "101) 
This will be apparent, especially from the 
perspective of foreign governments on how they 
interpret the signals that they receive for the 
coproduction of the F-16 and its foreign sales. (Not 
only by government to government but contractor to 
government. ) 
In analysing the decision making of weapons procurement, 
the normative approaches do not entirely suffice. 
The approach herein is to accept a rationality 
limited conceptual approach, (the review of different 
alternatives as an input). Man is not irrational, 
however other influencing variables, such as politics, 
power, self-interest, promotion, et al foster the 
102T 
rationality of the irrational. Certainly, the 
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rejection of pure rationality permits decision making 
to provide an optimal goal. This mode will best 
subscribe to the overall shifting of power and 
decisional centres. 
Thus, the major points which have emerged from the 
preceding discussion imply that decision making in 
the acquisition process of weapons procurement should 
be viewed as complex, yet compartmentalised, with 
power and authority, and the influence of these 
decision centres being very diffuse. Although 
conceptual models are relied upon greatly in decision 
making, in general, there is none that could wholly 
and concisely explain all of the facts of -the weapons 
acquisition decision making. In essence, this is the 
theme of this thesis. The models offered herein 
should not be utilised or research into the decisional 
processes because they tend to distort the reality 
of the event. There are many different variables 
operative from within and on a large number of 
decisional centres. The decisions of a weapons 
system may be the resultant of an individual 
advocate influencing the decision, or the output of 
organisational factors, or bureaucratic politics, or 
a combination of all three acting as inputs into each 
other. Further, the decision may reflect rational 
and irrational behaviour and the multitude of actors 
involved may range from the President of the United 
States down to a systems analyst working within the 
research laboratory of a weapons contractor. 
Although the decisions of weapons acquisition, as 
explained above, appear to have much in common with 
general decision making, the variances between these 
two procedures is the substance of this thesis. The 
thesis argues that as a weapons system continues 
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through the developmental stages of its life, the 
decisional centres exerting influence shift as that 
weapons system progresses from one stage to the next. 
Moreover, the other dimensions to be considered is 
that these decisional centres also shift along a 
structured yearly cyclical pattern regardless of the 
stage of development of that weapon system. The key 
elements which determine at what time a decisional 
centre is more important than another is measured by 
the amount of influence it yields, and the level of 
responsibility that centre has for that decisional 
stage. An examination of this scale must uncover 
the relevant actors and their relationships to 
determine their levels of influence as well as the 
organisations, and the structural processes of 
weapons acquisition. 
Although previous research has been motivated by 
exposes of mismanagement, or the misapplication of 
the analyses of one stage, or one weapons system to 
all stages of the process, it is imperative to examine 
the organisational structures and the parameters 
exercised from the framework to grasp the actuality 
of the decisional processes. Moreover, the suggestion 
being that since these decisional centres are shifting 
the decisions should also radiate upwards from 
subordinates as well as those, at given times, 
exercising their authority downwards. "[The] most 
important policymaking echelon in public bureaucracy 
is that level which actually delivers the services to 
the client. The decision making of many of the 
lowest-level administrators may have more to do with 
the real outcomes of policy in society than do all 
the decisions made by senior bureaucrats heading the 
huge organisations. , 
1031 Thus, having chosen to 
examine the actors and organisations involved should 
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illustrate what influences, if any, the DoD Components 
exert upwards. However, to obtain an even clearer 
picture of the activities of DoD Components et al, 
the processes of acquisition must also be analysed 
because "defense policy in this country [US] is not 
marked by the free play of bureaucratic bargaining 
or by open processes ... " as are other types of policy 
formulation, 1041 To substantiate this, and the 
shifting that occurs, more proof is required than just 
a description of the acquisition processes. For 
example, another source of influence is the DoD 
Components' close association with the weapons 
contractors (and other associations) throughout the 
life of a weapon system, particularly during the 
stage of Concept Exploration. Thus, aside from 
weapons contractors just providing the goods they 
also must exert inputs into the decisional processes. 
Proof of this will be illustrated through their 
Research and Development and Test Evaluation of systems, 
regardless of their stage. And, there are other 
dimensions which are operative, for example, the 
considerations of cost overruns are not only the 
fault of the contractors but also the blame should 
rest with the DoD Components as well as the 
Government (for example, costs were increased from 
the coproduction effort of the F-16). These and 
other relationships will be discussed to enhance the 
understanding of the DoD Components' role in the 
Acquisition Processes. 
To systematically review and analyse the processes 
of weapons procurement, Chapter 2 discusses US defence 
planning by identifying the major actors or groups 
involved. Evidence is provided so as to view those 
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in authority operating in their capacity as managers 
as well as politicians. This Chapter also illustrates 
some of the roles of the DoD Components, but the proof 
of their influences is highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 3 will then detail the organisational, as well 
as the structural, processes, and those involved in a 
weapons system's Fiscal Cycle - which it must pass 
through each year of its life. Also, the overall 
process and decisional structures of the Life Cycle 
is included in Chapter 4 with interesting relationships 
demonstrated between both Fiscal and Life Cycle 
processes. By reviewing the organisations, and 
those involved, it becomes apparent that in the 
earlier stages of a weapon system the decisions are 
structurally at lower levels. Moreover, it should be 
clearer as to why lobbyists/contractors tend to knock 
on the doors with a lesser amount of brass. 
In Chapter 5, to test and evaluate the preceding 
discussion, the focus changes to a review of the F-X 
studies - the conception of the F-16, and who was 
more involved in the decisions. It is not intended 
to be a complex historical account, but encompasses 
all of the major events, actors and organisations up 
to and including the Congressional decision to fund 
a prototype in Fiscal Year 1972. 
Chapter 6 continues, and proceeds to the Air Force 
choosing the F-16, after a prototype competition with 
the F-17, in January 1975. The reasons for the choice 
and the additional consideration of whLXOwas influencing 
whom, now that the system had been politicised since 
1972, demonstrates some interesting features of the 
decisional process. 
t 
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Chapter 7 then turns attention to the implementation 
and production of the programme. Although the 
process is highly politicised with sizeable sums of 
money under consideration, and used for leverage in 
bargaining, the corporate memory emanating from the 
concerned DoD Components is still exercising its 
influence. NATO and the coproduction effort of the 
multi-national F-16 is also the focus, as well as 
foreign sales, in Chapter 7. Throughout Chapters 
5 and 6, the NATO connections are discussed, as to the 
relevance of the decisions at each subsequent stage. 
However, a wider application of the impact of the 
coproduction programmes is examined. A brief survey 
of the foreign sales also emphasises the different 
decisional centres at work, where foreign sales are a 
highly politicised issue. Following this, is the 
Conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PLANNING US DEFENCE POLICY 
Conventional wisdom dictates that comprehensive defence 
planning and decision making is the province of the 
Executive Branch; Presidents are perceived as the 
pivot. They either make the most important planning 
decisions or retain responsibility when they delegate 
authority for the subordinates to make them. In the 
idealised case, "comprehensive national security 
policy, promulgated by the President, forms the 
foundation for defence planning in conformation with 
proven procedures. He hand-picks so-called qualified 
Cabinet officials, who participate in that process - 
the Senate probes and confirms their competence, "11 
together with appointed senior subordinates, both 
military and civilian. Positioned beneath them, the 
next in order are the "career" military officers. 
They remain outside the sphere of Congressional 
approval or civilian scrutiny, though they are 
dependent upon Congressional funding and civilian 
groups (contractors, lobbyists, et al). They 
seemingly participate in the implementation of defence 
policy guidance which comes from their superiors. 
Therefore, in the ideal case, the military at all 
levels is held in check by a civilian "checks and 
balances" and those at the top, the appointed 
civilians, determine overall defence policy. 
The intention of this Chapter is to describe defence 
planning and defence decision making as it effectively 
operates, compared to the simplistic explanation 
offered above. Before doing so, it is necessary to 
mention that in attempting to assess the decision 
making within an organisational political system such 
as the defence establishment, two tasks are 
required : 
42 
i 
"1) The principal organisational actors 
need to be identified on a meaningful 
basis 
2) then, the power of these various 
actors needs to be assessed. .. 
21 
Pfeffer states further that in identifying the 
relevant organisational units "it is wise to start 
with the labels used in and provided by the 
organisation. "31 However, extreme caution must be 
exercised since although separate units, National 
Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense (DoD), 
et al, will be identified, people within these 
organisations also have multiple interests which are 
cross-cut in a variety of ways. For example, a given 
individual may move from the Department of State to 
the Department of Defense, later to the Staff of the 
National Security Council, followed by two years at 
the Senate Armed Services Committee and presently 
works in the Office of Management and Budget. 
41 
Other variables for consideration are educational 
background and disciplinary background (law, 
business, engineering) and so forth. The list is 
infinite. Primarily, the discussion in this Chapter 
and the next shall clarify the established units of 
defence decision making and, second, what power and 
influence by law, tradition or whatever means, shall 
be exercised by these units in promulgating decisions. 
43 
Commencing with the top of the chain of command - and 
statet outright - Presidents are the Commanders-in- 
Chief of the US Armed Forces, but they are not experts.: 
in the field of national defence. Dwight D. Eisenhower 
was the only defence specialist to occupy the White 
i 
House in this century. Strategic expertise will 
almost certainly continue to be the exception, rather 
than the rule, for US Presidents. They come from all 
walks of life and once installed have little time to 
digest all facets of defence planning. The XXII 
Amendment to the US Constitution, proclaimed on 
1 March 1951, permits each President no more than 
two four-year terms, plus "two years of a term to 
which some other person was elected". In the period 
under review, excepting Reagan, only two Presidents 
since 1960 have endured even half that long (Johnson - 
5 years, 2 months; Nixon -4 years, 7 months). 
Moreover, during their time in office, the Presidents 
must address themselves to many other demanding 
issues that compete with their attention for the 
national defence. 
Chief Executives are therefore compelled to depend on 
advice from civilian officials, whom they appoint, 
and military professionals, who may have been picked 
by predecessors. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief 
will receive little attention in this study. 
This is intentional, to stress the point that 
the organisational processes either within which he 
himself operates, regarding defence matters, or lower 
level organisations making up the network, are to be 
the main focal point. The President's educational 
background, personality and tenure are all important 
variables in terms of leadership. However, these 
variables also have a far-reaching effect on the 
reception that the President receives from 
organisational units. Far too often, the error is 
made to single him out of the various organisations 
and treat him as if he were a mediaeval king able to 
promulgate decisions capriciously or without constraint. 
For example, the decision to manufacture the F-16 was 
made in 1975 --during President Ford's tenure - and 
44 
i 45 
he and the American government received the credit, 
51 
even though the original decisions to design and 
manufacture were received during Carter's tenure. In 
actuality, it was a US Air Force decision, announced 
on 13 January 1975 by the Secretary of the Air Force, 
Dr John L. McLucas, who had already secured money 
($417,904,758) from Congress the previous year to 
fabricate 15 engineering development F-16 aircraft. 
61 
US defence planning is determined by a joint decision 
making system able to deal with some issues better 
than others. The chief policymakers of this joint 
system are the National Security Council Staff, the 
Department of State and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense for they are the consumers of the 
institutional (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military 
Services) product of military advice. 
The National Security Council 
The foremost defence related organisation within the 
Executive Branch is the National Security Council. It 
is the forum within which the President operates in 
either promulgating or making decisions. The 
National Security Council, supervised by the National 
Security Adviser7] and his "NSC staff of fewer than 
fifty professionals are occupied with virtually every 
serious national security and international economic 
problem confronting the government". 
81 
The Council 
includes the President, the Vice-President, the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, and the heads of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. The President chairs the National Security 
Council (NSC), whose members ideally "assess and 
appraise (US) objectives, commitments and risks ... 
in relation to our actual and potential military 
power", then advise him, "with respect to the 
integration of domestic, foreign and military policies. "9] 
46 
The Council's apparatus and procedures for 
application, however, have been an institutional 
"roller coaster" since the NSC's inception in 1947. 
Rapid rises to peaks and plunges of influence 
within the NSC occur repeatedly, whilst successive 
Presidents reshape Council purpose and structure to 
suit their temperaments. 
° 
Every President, since Eisenhower, has installed a 
National Security Adviser. Associated functions 
have never been subject to statutory restrictions, 
since their post is not prescribed by law. For 
example, uniformed officers on active duty are 
eligible but none have been selected. 
11) 
The Council, unlike the Cabinet, had for its birth 
the sanction of an Act of Congress where, under its 
statutory charter, the Council is concerned only in 
policy matters effecting the security of the nation. 
On the other hand, the Cabinet handles other policy 
areas such as labour, health, education, justice and 
commerce. The purpose of the Council is to integrate 
aspects of national security policy including foreign, 
military, economic, fiscal and internal security to 
the end that "security policies finally recommended 
to the President shall be both representative and 
fused, rather than compartmentalised. "121 It is 
imperative to emphasise that the role of the NSC is 
supposed to be an advisory one - "it recommends, it 
does not decide". 
131 
Whatever final policy is 
approved by the President, "after such modifications 
or rejections of the Council's views as he may 
determine, is the policy, not of the Council, but of 
the Chief Executive". 
141 
Such is the simplistic view 
that would subscribe to Allison's Rational Actor 
Model. Moreover, what pressures, if any, would Janis' 
1 
"Groupthink" have on the President in his range of 
policy choices; and what pressures would be exerted 
on the individuals of the group to keep his or her. 
seat depending on his or her stand? These questions 
arise upon viewing the roles of various National 
Security Advisers and their relations with the President. 
Once this has been accomplished, it should become apparent 
that the NSC by "its nature ... is very much dependent 
on the personal style and wishes of the President whom 
15) 
it serves". 
At its inception, President Truman preferred a career 
staff that would furnish continuity for the NSC. So 
did Eisenhower, his successor, who felt a strong core 
should remain in place while administrations filed 
past. 
161 
Their prescriptions did not persevere. 
Staffers, since then, when appointed, have 
characteristically been "foreign policy [and defence] 
professionals rather than political appointees in the 
partisan sense" but, with few exceptions, were forced 
to leave when party affiliations of Presidents changed, 
obviously indicating that indeed they are political 
17) 
appointees. 
47 
Richard Nixon promised to restore the NSC "as the 
principal forum for Presidential consideration of 
foreign land defence] policy issues", starting in 
1969. Its immediate "mandate" was to "clarify our 
view of where we want to be in the next three to five 
years". 
18] 
In 1969, Mr Nixon "revised the status and 
doubled the staff of the National Security Council and 
created under it the Defense Program Review Committee" 
19] 
with the intention that, as Morton Halperin wrote, 
"decisions not only on the total size of the Defense 
Budget but also on Major Defense Programs will be made 
outside the Pentagon in an inter-agency forum where 
201 White House influence is dominant". This intention 
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policy making; as a US official said, "his military 
training has-taught him never to outshine a 
superior". 
25) 
Poindexter's replacement, Frank 
Carlucci III (2 December 1986), has expertise in 
foreign affairs as a senior diplomat as well as 
experience in the military (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense) and intelligence (Deputy Director, CIA) 
field. Nevertheless, National Security policy 
formation for the Reagan Administration lacks 
corporate memory at the top. Backgrounds of the 
other Advisers are discussed in footnote 26]. 
Another function of the NSC is to advise the 
President on how to avoid the "problem of a growing 
national security policy bureaucracy". 
27) 
The NSC 
was to serve as a "means for co-ordinating the 
activities of the various departments and agencies. " 
28] 
The aim was to give the White House a system for 
weighing the complex information and proposals 
flowing in from diplomatic, military and 
intelligence agencies. This has not been the case 
because the NSC is not presently scrutinised by 
Congress and "by the late 1960s, the NSC and 
especially the Security Adviser had become a 
powerful locus of national security advice and 
formulation. " 
29] 
NSC Staff 
In co-ordinating policy concerning national security 
matters, the NSC, as other agencies, has at times 
succumbed to the problem of balancing operations with 
plans. A pre-occupation with operations as opposed 
to plans tends to distort priorities. Both functions 
are important and should proceed simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the NSC often grinds to a halt with 
49 
i 
daily business. Furthermore, that condition can 
occur despite contrary intentions. Nixon and Carter, 
together with their National Security Advisers, set 
out to re-establish the primacy of plans, which had 
diminished during immediate predecessors' tenure. 
Both teams, however, soon found fast-moving events 
more compelling. Kissinger devoted much of his time 
to shuttle diplomacy; Brzezinski was better known 
as a "big time operator" than as a painstaking 
planner. The NSC activities during their tenure 
reflected those roles 
301 
, as well as their preferences 
for operations. 
31] 
Aside from the above, competition between the NSC 
staff and Cabinet members, uncontrolled or even 
encouraged by some Presidents, tends to undercut 
coherent policy. A bitter rivalry ensued when 
Brzezinski clashed with the Secretary of State, 
Cyrus Vance, making co-operation, compromise and 
top-level co-ordination almost impossible. On the 
other hand, even though Nixon/Kissinger enjoyed 
collegial relations, ensuring conceptual continuity 
by cutting out other opponents (Rogers, Clifford, 
Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger), policy still 
suffered because decision making in isolation 
discarded options that might have proven to be better 
than those adopted, if they had been debated 
objectively. 
32] 
This is not intended to be axiomatic 
of decision making in general, but is axiomatic in 
defence decision making when considering that the 
National Security Council, Department of State and 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense are "in this 
together", as both the consumer and civilian 
watchdog of the military activities generated by their 
non-civilian counterparts. 
50 
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The Department of State 
As the second consumer and policy-maker of defence 
policy guidance, "the Department of State advises 
the President in the formulation and execution of 
foreign policy. "361 Its primary objective is to 
promote the long-range security and wellbeing of the 
US. Arguably, and with good reason, it would be 
expected that the Department of Defense and not the 
Department of State should follow the National 
Security Council in this discussion. Historically, 
within the realm of international relations and world 
economic affairs, it was not until recently that the 
Department of Defense played a role at all - DoD was 
created in 1947 to fulfil the duties of military aid 
and co-operation. However, it is necessary to stress 
that the Department of State fulfils a major function 
within the procurement process for not only historical 
reasons but also as an organisational unit, within the 
decisional processes. 
Under the US Constitution, the President has the 
authority to make treaties and appoint diplomatic and 
consular officials, to receive foreign emissaries and to 
exercise other authority provided by legislation (for 
example, Lend-Lease Acts, and aid to foreign countries). 
In 1789, Congress created the Department of State to 
assist the President in these duties, thereby replacing 
the Department of Foreign Affairs established in 1781. 
The Secretary of State was. made the President's 
principal adviser on foreign affairs. The current 
machinery of the Department of-'State was developed 
after World War II when the global responsibilities 
of the US required a more complicated foreign 
relations operation. For example, the number of 
52 
1 
Americans working for the Department of State rose 
from 6,000 in 1940 to 14,000 in 1984.371 Other 
agencies were placed under the general direction of 
the Secretary of State; the most important here 
being the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961) 
and the International Development Co-operation . 
Agency (1979, to co-ordinate all foreign aid). 
38] 
The above is intended to raise the issue that foreign 
policy, as perceived by the Department of State, 
assists in determining the US roles in the world, and 
helps to shape the complementary military strategy. 
On the other hand, the military capabilities of the 
US impose practical limits on its implementation of 
foreign policy. Consequently, those who plan policy 
within the State Department appreciate those 
relationships and therefore work closely with their 
counterparts in the Pentagon to fulfil their 
functions effectively. More specifically, in the 
case of procuring a weapons system, the decisions 
regarding the system design must either comp 1, ent 
(or be legitimised to do so) the overall force 
/ 
structure and foreign policy of the US. For example, 
if negotiations conducted by the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency with other interested nations 
should precipitate a treaty banning all chemical 
weapons, and be ratified by the Senate, those 
companies involved in their procurement would find 
it difficult to secure funding. Another way to view 
this matter is to examine the case of the F-16 fighter 
aircraft which is co-produced by the US, Belgium, 
Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, who are allies 
to the US. The F-16 is sold to Israel, Egypt, Korea, 
Pakistan and Venezuela (Iran under the Shah), aside 
from being in the inventory of its co-producers.. 
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(It is assumed that General Dynamics would not be 
negotiating sales to North Korea or Vietnam. ) 
The Department of State is a major organisational unit. 
It assists in setting the parameters within which the 
Department of Defense and industry associated with 
military matters must operate. This is the proper 
way to view the relationship between the Department 
of State and the Department of Defense. In other 
words, the former is setting the limits on the other 
fulfilling the required material. However, this is 
not substantiated by the gross disparity in dollar 
amounts in their respective budgets. In Fiscal Year 
1984, the total Federal Budget was $853.9 billion. 
The Department of Defense received $285.5 billion and 
the Department of State only $2.9 billion. 
39] This 
is a contributing factor to the lack of literature 
regarding the Department of State's role in weapons 
procurement. 
40] Probably the worst incident involved 
a report that was requested by President Carter in 
1978, which reviewed the overall National Military 
Command Structure. The Department of State is not 
even referred to within the 79 page report. 
411 
However, it should be noted that the report was 
conducted by the Department of Defense. Perhaps this 
is explained as jealousy or inter-departmental rivalry, 
but a better description of this would be for the 
maintenance of the organisation, in this case, the 
Department of Defense. 
Many Secretaries of State and the political appointees 
at the State Department could best be described as 
transients. Of the twelve Secretaries since World 
War II, only Dean Rusk remained for eight years; 
John Foster Dulles lasted six years; James Byrnes, 
George Marshall, Edmond Muskie and Alexander Haig 
endured for two years or less - Muskie left office 
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after 8/ months, Haig left after 17 months. Although 
tenure arguably is an important aspect of decision 
making, prior preparation for such a post is just as, 
if not more, important considering appointees found 
little time for learning speciality skills and self- 
educational strategy once they were submerged in the 
general business demands of the post. Henry A 
Kissinger, who holds a Ph. D in political science from 
Harvard, was the only Secretary who had credentials421 
from a civilian university, which directly related to 
his political career choice. 
43] 
Six other of the 
twelve were law school graduates. 
441 
Aside from education, practical experience is also 
vital in preparation for such a job. Rusk had been 
Under and/or Assistant Secretary of State. Haig had 
been Senior Military Adviser and then Deputy Assistant 
to President Nixon for National Security Affairs from 
1969-73 before becoming the Chief of White House Staff 
from 1973-74. 
As mentioned above, many political appointees such as 
Under Secretaries are best described as transients - 
in fact, the turnover rate compared to the above was 
twice as fast. The subordinates to the Assistant 
Secretaries in charge of regional bureaux and their 
underlings, the Directors of Politico-Military Affairs, 
experienced a high rate of job turnover. Minimum 
tenure for every post was measured in months -a few 
favourites logged 4 to 6 years, but the average 
lasted less than 2/. Lags between incumbents to 
appointments of new members were several months long. 
The best illustration of this weakness of leadership 
at the Assistant Secretary level is evidenced in the 
case of the Bureau of African Affairs. This Bureau 
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lacked an appointed Assistant Secretary for 12 
consecutive years, from November 1946 to September 
1958.45] 
The commitment (or lack of) of the upper rank 
"professionals" within the State Department is hardly 
conducive tothe formulation of sound decision making. 
Moreover, even personnel policies applicable not only 
to the upper-rank professionals but also to the 
intermediate levels of the State Department's Foreign 
Service create 'bureaucratic inertia. All of the 
intermediate and upper rank are "expected to serve 
abroad for substantial portions of their careers". 
The Secretary normally seeks to assign every officer 
"to duty within the United States at least once 
during each period of fifteen years", but none of 
them "may remain more than eight continuous years 
unless the Secretary approves an extension ... because 
of special circumstances. " 
461 
Easily understood is 
why many staffers of the State Departments play 
"musical chairs" as they move from one staff 
assignment to another in Foggy Botton. 
47] 
Members 
of the Foreign Service spend nearly 60 percent48] 
of their service in foreign countries. 
Under the Constitution, the President has the final 
authority over US foreign policy. As chief foreign 
policy adviser and spokesman, the Secretary of State 
is responsible for executing the President's 
policies. 
49) 
In turn, the Secretary is informed, 
advised and assisted by senior State Department 
officers, including the Deputy Secretary and five 
senior aides of Under Secretary rank. 
501 
This is the 
idealised case that is far too simplistic, which will 
become apparent following a discussion of the 
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Department of Defense and the relationships of 
those in authority and their subordinates. However, 
for the purposes here, in performing its functions, 
the Department of State : 
- consults with other departments 
and agencies of the Executive 
Branch and with Congress; 
- negotiates treaties and agreements 
with other nations. 
51' 
The performance of these duties is conducted at 
levels below the political appointees, where 
corporate memory is found. The staffs of the 
State Department and DoD must have some lines of 
communication, aside from the ones those in 
authority have, for example, within the forum of. 
the NSC. Those in the Pentagon need to know about 
diplomacy in the same manner as those in the State 
Department have to know how military power fits 
into foreign policy. This is partly achieved 
through an exchange programme, in progress since 
1961. There are cross assignments of a few Foreign 
Service Offices to the Pentagon for a period of one 
to three years. As well, "DoD civilians and middle 
ranked military men drawn from all four services 
benefit from duty with Statement Department bureaus for 
comparable periods". 
521 
Other forms of communication 
exist. For instance, staff members of Congressional 
Committees, whilst seeking information on both 
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Departments are criss-crossing that information 
between the Departments. Another important form of 
communication, suggested herein, is provided by 
weapons contractors, who strongly lobby, aside from 
Congress et al, both the State Department and DoD 
officials to enhance their position for weapons 
contracts, regardless of the stage of development 
of that system. More will be discussed later of the 
influences of contractors, lobbyists, outside 
institutions and so forth 
531 
, but for now, from 
empirical evidence, this line of communication 
appeared to exist more on a l( 
Jly routine with 
subordinates in these Departments rather than those 
in authority. 
The Department of DefenEe (DoD) 
The present Department of Defense was created by the 
National Security Act of 1947, as amended. It has 
evolved through a series of amendments up to 1958, 
from a decentralised National Military Establishment 
of separate Military Departments to today's Department 
of Defense (DoD) headed by a Secretary of Defense 
with full authority and responsibility for its operation. 
Although national defence planning, per se, takes 
place primarily in the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and all four military services providing 
input along with unified/special commands and 
assorted agencies, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
ideally steers that process from start to finish. 
He provides guidance, sifts through various proposals, 
and is ultimately supposed to make the final decisions. 
His Deputy, Under Secretaries, Directors and-staffs 
participate in this process; taken together, they 
constitute the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 
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The Secretary of Defense generally exercises his 
command authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
who include the Chairman, the Army and Air Force 
Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps participates 
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of direct 
concern to the Corps. Their primary function is-to 
be the principal military advisers to the Secretary 
of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the 
President and also the Congress. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
both provide staff assistance to the Secretary of 
Defense and, though separately identified and 
organised, are formally charged to function in full 
co-ordination and co-operation. More discussion 
concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff takes place 
later in'this Chapter. 
Civilian control over the military has been a basic 
tenet of US Defence Planning since its inception. 
The National Security Act of 1947 prohibits the 
appointment of any person "as Secretary of Defense 
within 10 years after relief from active duty as a 
commissioned officer of a regular component of an 
armed force". 
541 
Even a second lieutenant or ensign 
is just as ineligible as a general or admiral. There 
was a single exception to this regulation. From 
1950-51, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, who, 
although he had been a General in the Army, had 
received a special dispensation from Congress. 
However, Congress was careful not to permit his span 
in office to set a precedent. 
55] 
Furthermore, the 
SECDEF's three principal lieutenants, namely, his 
Deputy, the Under Secretary of Policy, and the Under 
Secretary of Research and Engineering, may not "be 
appointed ... within ten years after relief from 
59 
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active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular 
component of an armed force. "561 
Policy direction is the primary responsibility of 
the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Such 
direction naturally encompasses all areas of the 
Department of Defense's (DoD) activities. That which 
relates to the National Military Command Structure 
includes the preparation of contingency plans and 
future force plans. 
60 
In the area of force planning, effective policy 
direction requires the statement of policy and 
objectives which can form the basis for military 
planning and from which are derived the DoD programme 
and budget. Because of the issue of jealousy or rivalry 
between the Departments of Defense and State (and the NSC), 
the overall direction for national security policy 
is to be generally considered to be within the realm 
of both Departments. Most military officers believe 
that more clear and definitive national security 
policy is needed for strategic planning. 
57] 
if 
adequate national planning guidance is not given to 
military planners, they must prepare their own as a 
necessary starting point. The debate arises that 
national security policy is too general to be useful 
and with certainty it may be deduced that vague or 
all-encompassing statements of defence policy 
objectives are of little help in detailed force 
planning. 
581 
However, programmes constructed without 
clear policy directives can only be prepared on the 
basis of policy goals determined by the programmer 
himself, but often not made explicit for senior 
decision makers to accept or reject. 
I 
Aside from changes within the context of policy guidance 
(changes in force structure to meet different needs), 
policy guidance can arguably be said to have suffered 
from a lack of tenure and expertise of the Secretaries 
of Defense. As of 1987, fifteen SECDEFS have occupied 
the Pentagon's senior post since it was established in 
1947.591 The first four served for a total of five 
years; three, Elio'tichardson (114 days) , James 
Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld, filled the post for 
48 months from January 1973 to January 1977. A total 
of eight of the fifteen left the post after less than 
two years. Clark Clifford (1968-69) served only 10 
months. Robert McNamara endured the longest, almost 
eight years (1961-68) but only three others (Charles 
Wilson 1953-57, Melvin Laird 1969-73 and Harold Brown 
1977-81) remained one half that length. Aside from 
the SECDEF's lack of longevity (similar to Secretary 
of State), the SECDEF's Deputies have stayed in place 
for even shorter periods - 19 of them since May 1949.60) 
Beyond tenure, none of the civilian SECDEFs had any 
directly related formal education in conceptual 
planning of strategic analysis. Only one, James 
Schlesinger (1973-75) was even pertinently employed 
in the private sector as a Professor of Economics 
where he worked as a strategic analyst from 1963-69 
with the RAND Corporation. Robert McNamara (1961-68), 
a former President of the Ford Motor Co and Director 
of Scott Paper Co, and Caspar Weinberger (1981-87), 
a former Director of the Pepsi Co and Director of 
Quaker Oats, had little knowledge, if any, of national 
defence in any phase before accepting the top position 
at the Department of Defense (DoD). Such a lack of 
expertise mandates on-the-job training before they 
could participate competently in the concept 
61 
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formulation process. However, this, coupled with 
such short. tenure, would permit few to pass the 
primer stage before they stepped down. This leads 
to an inability amongst the top echelons to appraise 
proposed strategies with competence, thereby 
unavoidably increasing the chances of sound decisions 
emerging by accident rather than by design. 
DoD Staff 
Broadening the notion of tenure to staff at lower 
levels, an interesting point arises. When proceeding 
down the GS 
611 
scale within the DoD, the length of 
stay increases; thereby demonstrating that 
responsibility is inversely proportional to 
retainability (the same may be applied to the State 
Department). 
The Secretary of Defense, a civilian, is a political 
appointee as are other Cabinet members, who serve at 
the pleasure of the President, subject to Senate 
confirmation. The President usually allows Cabinet 
members to pick their own teams which may be a lengthy 
process, especially the breaks between departures and 
arrivals during transition periods of changing 
Presidents. 
62) 
In this case, the SECDEF picks his 
planning team, subject to Senate confirmation 
63] 
; 
selects the planning structure he desires, within 
limits 64]; establishes procedures; sets standards; 
oversees the process; and approves products. As is 
the case with the SECDEF, the average longevity of 
all these political appointees within DoD is less 
than three years. For his Deputy, it is 1.8 years; 
for the Under Secretaries, it is 1.7 years, and so 
forth. 
651 
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Below the political appointee level are close to 440 
military officers "on loan" to the OSD who remain a 
little longer. Three year controlled tours are 
standard and the extensions to tours, approved by 
the parent services, may not stretch to a total of 
more than four years. 
66) 
"Corporate memory" must 
come from the 1,100 career executives 
67), 
many of 
whom occupy the same or similar posts for a decade 
or more. Twenty year awards are not the exception. 
However, average retention rate is about 8 years. As 
mentioned above, and for the purpose of emphasis it 
should be apparent that the planners with the 
greatest potential opportunity to influence decisions 
have the shortest tenure. 
Before continuing the discussion and outlining the 
formulation of policy within the Department of 
Defense (DoD), the author wishes to suggest a new 
conceptual approach of viewing those who occupy the 
top posts in DoD and hopefully apply it to the 
Department of State. According to Samuel P Huntington, 
ideally, "the Secretary of Defense is supposed to be 
policy- and strategy-minded, one who commands the 
admiration of the public, a man of experience, 
possibly having moved up from other posts in the 
Department of Defense or some equivalent branch of 
government; a man who should be concluding his 
career and thus not be in a position to use it as a 
stepping stone". 
681 
Realistically this is not the 
case - only one Secretary of Defense, George Marshall, 
had moved up within the ranks of the Department of 
Defense. An alternative perspective would be to 
evaluate one individual on their managerial skills 
accumulated from previous working experience. It is 
the author's contention that SECDEFs are managers of 
the bureaucratic organisation (DoD) in the sense of a 
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within DoD. Hence, the above argument, regarding. 
who runs the DoD,. should not be applied to those 
subordinates in the same manner. 
Second, regarding DoD's performance with other 
organisations, if such a situation exists, this 
further insulates the decision making group (within 
DoD) "from the judgments of qualified associates who, 
as outsiders [for example, Department of State], are 
not permitted to know about the new policies under 
discussion until after a final decision has been made. " 
71) 
In other words, to avoid a confrontation with another 
group in defence planning, a certain group (for 
example, Office of the Director of Research, Testing 
and Evaluation) could perform its functions without 
necessarily informing other groups (for example, 
Department of State, NSC, et al). Further, this 
could be applied to within the Defense Department, 
where that same group could also continue its role in 
the process, and not be communicating every aspect and 
decision to the Secretary of Defense. Such leads to 
a lack of information that the Secretary of Defense 
might otherwise have. For example, the choice of the 
F-16 over the F-17 was made by the Air Force after 
their in-house work. The Secretary of Defense gave 
various reasons for its selection, one being its 
engine performance, unaware of the difficulties of 
the engine (known by the Air Force) which eventually 
led to crashes and a General Accounting Office inquiry. 
Also the Department of State, excepting the NATO 
connection, was not involved in that Air Force 
decision; and entered the scenario when the issue of 
foreign sales of the F-16 arose. 
These issues will be discussed within the context of 
following a weapon system through the processes of 
i 
Fiscal and Life Cycles of a weapon system and within 
the discussion of the F-16 study. Here, the purpose- 
is to identify the organisation and its actors, but 
the issues should remain in mind when viewing those 
at the top as managers. To test the approach of 
previous managerial skills, consider the following 
list of Secretaries of Defense since World War II 
FIGURE 2-I 
Secretaries of Defense since World War II 
Civilian Jobs 
FORRESTAL Journalist, 
(1947-49) Businessman 
JOHNSON Lawyer 
(1949-50) 
MARSHALL (General in the Army) 
--- (1951-53) (Chairman of the JCS) 
LOVETT Banking 
(1951-53) Investment 
WILSON President, General Motors 
(1953-57) 
McELROY President, Proctor & Gamble 
(1957-59) Director, General Electric 
Director, Chrysler 
GATES Investment Banker 
(1959-61) Director, Scott Paper Co 
McNAMARA President, Ford Motor Co 
(1961-68) Director, Scott Paper Co 
CLIFFORD Lawyer 
(1968-69) 
LAIRD Lumber Business 
(1969-73) 
RICHARDSON Lawyer 
(1973 (114 days)) 
SCHLESINGER Professor 
(1973-75) RAND Strategic Analyst 
RUMSFELD Investment Banking 
(1975-77) 
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BROWN Professor 
(1977-81) College President 
WEINBERGER Lawyer 
(1981-37) Director, Pepsi Co 
Director, Quaker Oats 
Twelve of the fifteen Secretaries of Defense, if 
including the lawyers, would have had direct managerial 
experience in their previous jobs. Based on 
empirical evidence and personal experience, the 
lawyers or the attorneys would have accumulated 
managerial skills as partners of their respective 
firms. 
721 
Further, law firms in Washington are 
sometimes referred to as "powerhouses", because a 
great majority are involved in lobbying efforts. 
These powerhouses are usually quite large, sometimes 
national as well as international firms, and a large 
portion of the partners' time is devoted to the 
overall management of the firm. 
73] 
Secretary of 
Defense Brown may also have acquired some managerial 
skills as a College President, bringing the number 
to thirteen. It cannot be overlooked that Secretary 
of Defense Schlesinger may have depended upon 
managerial skills as a Professor, but very likely his 
seven years service as a strategic analyst with the 
RAND Corporation provided him with a strong 
foundation in managerial ability. The remaining 
Secretary of Defense Marshall (1950-51), who served 
in the Army in World War II, is the non-civilian on 
record to have held the post of Secretary of Defense. 
74] 
It is obvious that the majority of the serving 
Secretaries of Defense (13 out of 15), receive high 
marks for having developed managerial skills in their 
previous and often prestigious career posts. In 
contrast, only two had qualifications in defence 
planning. It would be prudent, at this stage, to 
67 
i 
68 
see if the same pattern emerges in an examination of 
the individuals holding the Secretary of State post 
since World War II. 
FIGURE 2-II 
Secretaries of State since World War II 
Civilian Jobs 
BYRNES Lawyer 
(1945-47) 
MARSHALL (General in the Army) 
(1947-49) (Chairman of the JCS) 
ACHESON Lawyer 
(1949-53) 
DULLES Lawyer 
(1953-59) 
HESTER 
(1959-61) 
RUSK 
(1961-69) 
ROGERS 
(1969-73) 
KISSINGER 
(1973-77) 
VANCE 
(1977-80) 
MUSKIE 
(1980-81) 
HAIG (Army, SACEUR) 
(1981-82) 
SHULTZ 
(1982- ) 
Journalist 
Professor, College Dean 
President, Rockefeller 
Foundation (1952-60) 
Lawyer 
Foreign Defence Policy 
Professor; author and 
consultant; Study Director, 
Council on Foreign Relations 
Lawyer 
Lawyer; Senator 
College Professor 
Business Executive 
Evidently, the same appears to apply - out of twelve 
Secretaries of State, two had direct involvement with 
management at the corporate level; and using the same 
1 
criteria for attorneys 
75), 
as in the case of the 
Secretaries of Defense, six of the Secretaries of 
State were attorneys and should be added to the 
previous managerial skills category, bringing the 
tally up to eight members. 
Kissinger, like Schlesinger, may have exercised 
managerial skills as Professor, but heavily'relied 
upon managerial duties to perform as a consultant, 
and as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. 
Though the argument for Kissinger is weak, it should 
not be entirely dismissed. It is equally hard to 
make assumptions regarding the sphere and practice of 
managerial experience that Hester would have exercised 
as a journalist; and the remaining two, Marshall and 
Haig, both enjoyed a military oriented background. 
Therefore, 66 per cent (8 out of 12) of the post 
World War II Secretaries of State relied heavily upon 
managerial skills from career posts previous to their 
appointment as Secretary of State, while 33 percent 
(4 out of 12), Kissinger, Marshall, Haig, and Rusk 
(who had also been Under Secretary of State) had 
backgrounds and expertise in the field of defence 
planning. 
Since the majority of these gentlemen share a 
common bond of managerial expertise, it can be 
established that tenure can be eliminated as one of 
the supposedly adherent considerations in the realm 
of the decisional processes of a weapon system. 
Primarily, an individual chosen for his managerial 
skills applies his knowledge by organising his 
department accordingly. In comparison, an individual 
who is chosen for a position and lacks managerial 
skills has to somehow attempt to balance the command 
of his post, while simultaneously developing an 
69 
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effective factual base of managerial discipline. In 
essence, he is prepared upon arrival to manage the 
operation based upon his own preferences, which have 
been shaped by past experience and practice. This is 
not to suggest that he as an individual cannot 
influence - he does - but he does so based on his 
accumulated managerial experience and skills. For 
example, Robert McNamara changed the contracting of 
weapon systems to include a "contract definition". 
McNamara felt that some of the uncertainties inherent 
in a weapon system might be reduced before committing 
large sums of money to it. McNamara's reforms 
introduced the cost-benefit analyses of major systems 
to the procurement process, which would have been a 
facet of business decision making at the Ford Motor 
Company and Scott Paper Company. Simply, the point 
being made here is that those at the top are more 
concerned with managing the overall organisation 
based on their personal managerial preferences. If a 
campaign to reveal the seeds of a new weapon system 
were launched, certainly the least likely source for 
investigation would be the upper echelons of authority. 
Second, given the complexities involved in the decisional 
processes of the life cycle of a given weapon system, it 
is easily understood why those in privileged positions 
are not even cognisant of many systems until it involves 
the organisation itself or the total procurement apparatus 
within which the organisations operate. For example, 
prior to Congressional awareness of the F-16 programme, 
and at the time the DOD was preparing to make a first 
announcement about the programme (1972), in its 
preparation of its budget, $30 million had already 
been spent from Research and Development funds for 
the F-16.761 Obviously, a threshold of investment 
had been realised and the time had come for the DoD 
71 
as an organisation, to enter into the arena with 
Congress, as an organisation, for the bureaucratic 
battle of the F-16. In this case, and for the sake 
of argument concerning weapon systems, decisions in 
the early stages emanate from lower stations of 
authority. 
At this stage, it is necessary to proceed with the 
formulation of policy within the DoD and address 
other relevant organisations and actors involved in 
defence planning. 
The Formulation of Policy within the Department of 
Defense 
In formulating policy, the National Security Act of 
1947 prescribes an Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), 
chaired by the SECDEF who has "the power of decision". 
His Deputy, the Service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) and the Under Secretary of Research 
and Engineering are charter members. Their mission 
is to "advise the Secretary of Defense on ... broad 
policy relating to the armed forces" and to undertake 
other tasks that he may direct. 
77] 
Today, the Armed 
Forces Policy Council (AFPC) meets each Monday with 
20 to 25 top echelons and their assistants to 
formulate policy. However, the participants pay 
little attention to defence planning. The Under 
Secretary for Policy (USDP) who, on paper, is 
supposed to assist the SECDEF in integrating 
"departmental plans and policies with overall 
national security objectives", does not even take 
part. Apparently management is the main topic that 
is discussed at these meetings, with additional 
special interests in the subjects of manpower, money 
matters, and legislative affairs. 
781 
This information 
further substantiates the proposal that these 
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Policy is then tasked with pulling the whole DRB 
process together. 
82] 
He takes the lead in 
developing defence policy guidance that deals with 
threats, opportunities, objectives, policies, 
strategic options and associated free planning. 
Also, his two principal. subordinates, the Assistant 
Secretaries for International Security Affairs (ISA) 
and International Security Policy (ISP), assist him 
with that burden. However, although these three 
gentlemen have an enormous responsibility, they are. 
still answerable to the DRB Chairman, the Deputy 
SECDEF, and his Director of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (PA & E). 
83] 
There is no document to date that specifically 
delineates the Defense Resources Board's (DRB's) 
mission and functions in any detail. However, such 
functions may be implied from memoranda providing 
instructions to its members. 
841 
SECDEF Caspar 
Weinberger expanded the original charter almost 
immediately upon assuming office to promote "a more 
disciplined planning process". 
85) 
The corporate direction of the DoD's entire planning, 
programming and budgeting system (PPBS) presently 
lies within the DRB. A previous Chairman and Deputy 
SECDEF, Frank Carlucci, put the DRB in the "concepts 
business" as never before861, with implicit 
instructions to measure requirements against 
realistic goals and threats, to estimate the risks 
when ends and means refuse to match and recommend 
adjustments for consideration by the SECDEF. 
871 
The 
DRB concentrates on major issues and also secondary 
concerns that the OSD staff and Military Services 
cannot settle. Such a procedure contrasts sharply 
with the past practice of flooding the system with 
74 
paper. For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) 82 Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) requirements produced 
"2,691 pages of text and tables" .! 
81 
which, aside 
from taking interminable time to produce, would more 
importantly make proper appraisal impossible. 
Members of the DRB attempt to reach a consensus 
before the Board. However, disputes arise and in 
that case the Chairman of the DRB takes on the role 
of adjudicator. Furthermore, he may oppose the 
majority opinion, if the conclusions of the majority 
seem counter to Administration/Departmental policy - 
final resolution in such cases rests with the SECDEF, 
who either reinforces or overrides his Deputy. 
Within this special relationship between the SECDEF, 
Deputy SECDEF and other DRB members, it has been 
demonstrated that some DRB sessions simply show the 
Chairman and SECDEF where members stand on important 
issues and that they have the strength of their 
convictions. 
89] 
However, many sessions do lead 
directly to decisions that appear in Program Decision 
Memoranda (PDMs) and Defense Guidance documents. 
901 
The members of the DRB are better prepared to cope 
with defence programmes and budgets than with 
policies and concepts. To correct this situation, 
Caspar Weinberger briefly considered having two 
boards - one for programmes, another for policies - 
but discarded the idea because it would put 
inseparable planning components in separate 
compartments. 
91] 
The DRB tries to put strategic 
requirements and resources on the same plane which 
is a deliberate departure from the past practice of 
following SECDEF McNamara's reported belief that the 
"best alternative is invariably a matter of choosing 
the most appropriate economic criterions. "92] 
75 
As mentioned above, the only non-civilian charter 
member of the DRB is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS). He and his support staff provide 
little competition for the 1,800 OSD and Service 
counterparts. Because of this, "unofficial officials", 
namely, the Service Chiefs, also attend most DRB 
sessions and are situated behind their respective 
Secretaries (Secretaries of Navy/Army/Air Force/ 
Marine Corps) and help to provide valuable 
professional military insights not usually available 
from the civilian members. 
Above is mentioned a military input into defence 
planning, but although important, it is not as 
effective as perceived. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) not only play a role in the Department of 
Defense but also advise the President and the 
National Security Council directly. However, the JCS 
military inputs into the Defense Resources Board 
could be more important as a litmus test for civilian 
response. This raises the issue of strategies on the 
part of the producers of various weapon systems. For 
example, these "professional military insights" could 
be constrained not only by the civilian members of the 
DRB or the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but 
also by the fluctuations of policy emanating from the 
Department of State and the National Security Council 
or even the President (for example, changes in policy 
regarding the B-1 bomber). It is important to 
mention this here before any discussion of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because in pursuance of 
any weapon system its producer must strive to strike 
the right balance between all of the defence related 
organisations and much of that may even be by chance. 
931 
For example, a weapons contractor would be at risk if 
he were to work solely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
i 
whilst neglecting other civilian members of the DRB 
or the NSC, or DoD Components, et al. 
Further, the contractor must be aware not only of 
the ongoing work and research of each and every 
defence related organisation, but also which of those 
organisations are presently yielding more influence 
depending on the weapon's stage of development. 
The message is that the whole process is highly 
compartmentalised, complicated, and judgments as to 
one group being more important' than another need to 
be specific to particular contexts. For example, a 
small Research and Development Group within the Air 
Force may have more influence on a given system than 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The author is not 
suggesting that they are equal - they are not. The 
point is that in weapon systems, not only is the 
process to obtain them costly and complicated but, 
given the acquisition cycles, discussed below, the 
decisional centres shift during the various stages 
of development. At this stage, other relevant 
actors/organisations must be identified and discussed. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal Military 
Advisers to the President, the National Security 
Council and the Secretary of Defense. "94] The 
foremost function of the JCS which was accorded to 
them by the National Security Act of 1947 is to 
"prepare strategic plans and provide for the 
strategic direction of the armed forces". 
951 
The JCS 
is comprised of 15 members, each representing a 
Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) and the 
"purple suited" Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
who is supposed to be completely free from Service 
assignments. 
76 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff were formed during World 
War II for combined strategic planning with their 
British counterparts. Their legal status and 
functions were formalised by the National Security 
Act of 1947. An underlying principle of the 1958 
Amendment to that Act, as proposed by President 
Eisenhower, was that, "... separate ground, sea and 
air warfare are gone forever ... our country's 
security requirements must not be subordinated to 
outmoded or single-service concepts of war". 
961 
In 
accordance with the amendment, a Service Chief's 
duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take 
precedence over all his other duties. However, 
problems inherent in the dual roles of the Chiefs, 
as both the military leaders of their Services, and 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with 
providing military advice that transcends Service 
positions, were recognised in the 1958 amendments. 
The 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act of 
1947 made provisions for the creation of a Vice-Chief 
of Staff for each Service respectively. The Chiefs 
were instructed to delegate Service related duties to 
the Vice-Chiefs. This reduction of duties to the 
Vice-Chief helped assure that the Chiefs had an 
adequate time allowance to attend to their joint 
duties and obligations. 
There is often a great deal of speculation and 
confusion regarding the role of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, their function, and their place in the order 
of command. From a legal standpoint, the Chiefs of 
Staff are excluded in the order of the chain of 
command as it passes down from the Executive Branch. 
The President passes control to the Secretary of 
Defense, who in turn, dictates to the Unified and 
Specified Commanders. These Commanders have direct 
77 
i 
1 
78 
authority over all of the forces assigned to 
them. 
97) 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff act as the 
military staff to the Secretary of Defense for 
operational direction of those forces. The military 
Departments (Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps) 
are not in the chain of command. They are 
responsible for the administration, training, and 
supply of the forces which are assigned to the 
Unified and Specified Commanders. Presently there 
are five Unified Commands and three Specified 
Commands, merging together to make up what is known 
as the Unified Command Plan. A Unified Command is 
a command composed of significant forces from two 
or more Services. 
98] 
The Unified Command Plan 
defines the organisational structure and 
responsibilities of the various commands, under which 
the Nation's combatant forces receive direction from 
the National Command Authorities. 
99] 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff take on more of an advisory 
role in the proceedings of the procurement process. 
Their counsel regarding matters such as personnel, 
material, et al, is important in establishing or 
maintaining a command. Consequently, if the means 
do not coincide with the needs of those in the chain 
of command, then the Chiefs must perform as a sounding 
board. Given that the Joint Chiefs operate in an 
advisory role to their civilian colleagues (President, 
Secretary of Defense, et al), there must be a military 
connection at work. The contact is made through the 
component commander, who provides the necessary 
information (men, material) to the JCS. A Unified 
Command is led by a Unified Commander (Commander-in- 
Chief)(CINC), who has, reporting to him, a component 
commander for each assigned Service element. For 
example, at EUCOM there are the Commander in Chief and 
i 79 
three component commanders : one for US Army, Europe; 
one for US Naval Forces, Europe; and another 
component commander of US Air Forces, Europe. 
Component Commanders report to the Commander in 
Chief (CINC) on operational matters but also directly 
to their military departments on matters of 
personnel and material support. Each Chief is 
responsible to the Secretary of his Department, 
(Chief of Staff for the Air Force is responsible to 
the Secretary of the Air Force) for the "management 
and military leadership of his individual Service 
in its mission of organising, training and equipping 
its forces" [emphasis added]. 
100] 
The Chiefs have 
responsibility for administering an organisation and 
budget larger than any American commercial 
enterprise. Since 1958, the advent of the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) 
101] has imposed 
greater demands in the management of his Service, 
thereby increasing a Service Staff to over a thousand 
officers to assist him in this role. This same staff 
also supports him in his role as a member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Considering that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not in 
chain of command, but are responsible for the 
organising, training and equipping of the US Armed 
Forces; and given the size of the organisation of 
each Service which each Chief is responsible for; it 
is the intention herein to treat them as managers. 
In a sense, each Chief manages his individual Service 
whilst undertaking the management of the overall US 
Armed Forces in the role of Chiefs of Staff. This 
leads to the first of four problems which impair 
integrated defence planning on the part of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. They are : 
s 
80 
(1) Legal restrictions 
(2) Competition with Military Services 
(3) Competition with Each Other 
(4) Competition with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
(1) Legal Restrictions of the JCS 
Law demands that "the Joint Staff shall not operate 
or be organised as an overall Armed Forces General 
Staff and shall have no executive authority", but may 
be shaped "along conventional staff lines to support 
the Joint Chiefs ... in discharging their assigned 
responsibilities. "1021 "Conventional staff" are 
never defined in the National Security Act. There 
are specific provisions in the Act which clarify the 
intent. 
Moreover, no law or Secretarial directive dictates 
how the Joint Chiefs of Staff should conduct their 
business, nor what the relationship should be between 
the Joint and Service Staffs. The Chiefs themselves 
determine how their staff will interact and to this 
end have issued a series of procedural directives 
covering the processing of JCS actions. Furthermore, 
the Act indirectly forbids a "Defense Chief of Staff" - 
the JCS Chairman outranks "all other officers of the 
armed forces" but, because he may not exercise military 
command over the (other) Joint Chiefs of Staff 
103]01 
he lacks power to solve disputes or make JCS decisions, 
even under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense. 
However, he may act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
time sensitive operational matters. For the most 
part, his uniqueness is derived from the other Chiefs 
by representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 
deliberations. of the National Security Council. Thus, 
in the ideal sense, he becomes a close personal 
adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President, 
which is the source of his influence on the other 
Joint Chiefs. 
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on the JCS has not been high on the list for success 
in a military career - in fact, it is the opposite. 
1061 
The unwillingness of the Services "to heed the pleas 
of various Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assign their most highly 
qualified officers to the Joint Staff ... the Services 
have not perceived such duty as being of the highest 
priority and have made their personnel assignments 
accordingly. , 
1071 Moreover, it has been stated that 
many of the best officers avoid any Joint Staff 
assignment if at all possible. 
1081 "In consequence, 
while the Joint Staff officers are generally capable, 
the very top officers of the Services more frequently 
are on the Service staffs. "1091 It would appear that, 
in general, fewer officers, at any level are interested 
in seeking JCS assignments. This is evidenced by the 
average length of tour reduced from 3 years to 30 months. 
Generals and Admirals in leadership slots tend to move 
on after 24 months. 
1101 Considering that the JCS 
planners require the fusion of land, sea and air warfare 
expertise, it is expected that vested interests of 
individual services should be secondary to them. Short 
periods of tenure encourage the practice of JCS officers 
requiring Service Staffs to draft complex JCS papers for 
them. 
111] Engagement in a practice such as this allows 
vested interests to frame the initial issues and the 
terms of reference from which the JCS will work. 
Corporate memory, as established within the Department 
of Defense, and instrumental for long term defence 
policy guidance, appears to emanate from lower levels, 
and also has its effect on the JCS. 
(2) Competition with Military Services 
82 
On paper, the JCS allegedly give their common 
interests precedence over their Service interests. 
i 
Four out of five members must maintain this dual 
balance by giving allegiance to the JCS and their 
parent Military Service. Only the Chairman, who is 
free from Service assignments, is able to concentrate 
on joint problems. However, even his "job is 
complicated by ... a dual set of loyalties. He is 
the spokesman for the military but he is also the 
President's and the Secretary of Defense's man. To 
hold their confidence he must retain that of the 
Joint Chiefs. " 
112] 
Although joint responsibilities are to take precedence, 
in practice primary loyalty almost invariably 
remains with the respective parent Services, which 
provide top officials a political power base that 
no "abstract entity" like the JCS can duplicate. 
113] 
The JCS have no formal to semi-formal affiliates 
such as Associations of the United States Army and 
Air Force or Navy and Marine Corps League. 
"In general, [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] 
has handled operational and most planning 
matters quite well. On the other hand, 
the nature of the organisation virtually 
precludes effective addressal of those 
issues involving allocation of resources 
among the Services, such as budget levels, 
forces structures, and procurement of 
new weapons systems - except to agree 
that they should be increased without 
consideration of resource constraints.  
1141 
It is no wonder then that political and industrial 
pressure groups can gain much more from the Services 
than they can from the JCS in terms of monies for 
weapons procurement and military installations. 
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ti- d pressure of this degree, it is not difficult 
to understand that each Service Chief of the JCS 
constantly finds himself in a dilemma when 
promulgating planning or decisions. A Chief cannot, 
for example, be expected to argue for additional 
carriers, divisions, or air wings when constructing 
a Service budget, and then agree in a joint forum 
that they should be deleted in order to make provision 
for programmes of other Services. Agreement with 
his Service could curtail his rapport with his JCS 
counterparts, but disapproving proposals by his 
Service, even one time, could cost him permanent 
loss of that Service's confidence in him. 
In an attempt to avoid such a situation, decisions 
tend to be made amongst the Services where trade-offs 
and bargaining occurs, and the recommended decisions 
are almost guaranteed during JCS review. The 
principal casualties of this system - joint plans 
and programmes - are supposed to be the raison d'etre 
of JCS activities. However, such is not the case. 
1151 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff do attempt to assess the 
military risk involved at various programme levels 
and force compositions. While this is a necessary 
function, arguably it is not a substitute for joint 
military advice on the preparation of constrained 
force structure options. 
Furthermore, if inter-service squabbles should 
surface during a JCS review, the Chairman of the JCS 
can only appeal to principle and apply indirect 
pressure. He can do little more because, as mentioned 
above, the law forbids a "Defense Chief of Staff ... 
He may not exercise military command over the (other] 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. " 
1161 
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(3) Competition Among JCS Members 
"Free play of contradictory Service viewpoints among 
the Chiefs ... permits, indeed encourages, issues to 
be aired thoroughly ... and ... a certain amount 
of inertia probably helps prevent half-cocked 
decisions. " 
117] 
However, rivalries over missions and 
money increase dual hat difficulties. 
Although inter-service competition for resources and 
spheres of influence is often severe 
1181 
, inter- 
service rivalries often water down plans within the 
several Services, which are in a sense coalitions. 
Three Navies (surface, sub-surface and air) plus a 
Marine Corps, for instance, compete for power within 
one Department. Strategic Air Command (SAC) and 
Tactical Air Command (TAC) fight for funds in 
another - and so on. Negotiated compromise muffles 
many or most positions long before Joint Chiefs even 
begin to consider them. 
1191 
Furthermore, the four 
Service Chiefs depend primarily on their staffs to 
prepare them for joint meetings. Joint planners 
seldom brief them and, as mentioned above, often 
allow the Service staffs to draft papers setting the 
issues and framing the arguments. That practice 
subverts the joint process, because it slants 
subsequent deliberations; "the net effect tends to 
be a projection of Service ... positions rather than 
an emphasis on the joint interest". 
120] 
However, 
it is not only a projection of the Service, but also 
a protection of the Service. 
85 
Considering that the Chiefs split so consistently along 
Service lines, it is important for the Chiefs to_appeeAr 
to share unanimous voting. During splits, debating 
teams in the JCS try to drive hard bargains but if 
i 
they fail, backscratching is the popular alternative. 
"The Chiefs can always agree on more for everybody, 
and since this is the path of least resistance, it 
is often taken. " 
1211 
It is imperative for the JCS 
to reach unanimous decisions for two reasons: first, 
monolithic military opinions reinforce JCS 
pronouncements, especially as perceived by Congress, 
the American public, US Security partners and US 
opponents. Second, they also present the pressure 
of a solid front to the Secretary of Defense who 
might otherwise deal with unsettled issues in ways 
that would displease every Service. 
On the other hand, the pressures on the JCS to appear 
harmonious in their decisions also impedes defence 
planning. For example, JCS action officers prepare 
drafts, then request "concurrence" (not simply 
co-ordination or comment) from opposite numbers on 
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps Staffs. 
Rewriting and recycling is the rule - papers more 
often than not repeat that process several times, 
seeking approval at successive levels. "Each Service 
has a de facto veto on every issue at every stage" 
of that process, which takes 18-24 months to complete 
for major plans. 
122] 
The suggestion herein is that 
at the end of the day, such a system produces reports 
representing the lowest common denominator, expressed 
in the least precise language, so that all Chiefs can 
meet on common ground. Line-by-line amendments 
reduce clarity and continuity; procedures take 
precedence over substantive content, which is 
frequently riddled with ambiguity. 
1231 
The military 
style of writing is often "foreign" and tends to 
reduce their acceptance among the civilian consumers. 
86 
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This claim is best demonstrated in a report, referred 
to as the Joint Strategic Objective Plan, also known 
as the annual Joint Chiefs of Staff Plan, 'which 
provides their recommendations for future military 
strategy and mentions the appropriate forces 
necessary to carry out national security policy and 
objectives at what they interpret to be a prudent 
level of risk. This document has been criticised for 
being too remote from fiscal reality ("a wish list") 
and too voluminous to be useful to the Secretary of 
Defense and the President. 
124] 
Consequently, it is 
not read by the audience for whom it is primarily 
intended. On balance, the annual JCS Plan establishes 
a benchmark which the Joint Chiefs of Staff can use 
as a reference point in assessing the risks of various 
programme and budget alternatives as mentioned above. 
However, arguably it would appear that the JCS Plan 
is of more value to the Joint Chiefs of Staff than to 
its intended consumers. 
A second aspect of the JCS annual plan and other JCS 
papers is the role they play in changes of approach 
to strategy, organisation of commands, roles and 
missions of the Services and other issues of similar 
concern. For example, if a Service interest, such 
as the control of close air support to ground forces, 
arises, the changes are "initiated only when the pace 
of technological change n Secretarial [Secretary of 
Defense] directives force it,, 
125] 
which may be 
related to inherent military conservatism. Changes 
in such an area are greeted with reluctance. 
As in any field, there is a tendency to be comfortable 
with what one not only understands but, more 
importantly, especially in weaponry, with what one is 
confident will operate successfully. On the other 
88 
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hand, there tends to be a natural scepticism to 
accept theoretical assertions of improvement. More 
succinctly, this tendency has been labelled fighting 
the last war over again. Warranted conservatism, 
which permeates Joint Chiefs of Staff reports, 
stifles innovative ideas. At best they are concerned 
with the maintenance of the status quo. The best 
strategy for a weapons contractor with a new idea or 
technological advance wishing to fund research is 
"best off knocking on Pentagon doors with little or 
no brass. " 
1261 
"Many of the now-classic arguments 
about representative bureaucracy may be more 
applicable at the lowest level of organisations than 
at the senior level, for it is the lowest-level 
administrator whom the clients actually meet ... ". 
1271 
As seen in their civilian counterparts, decisions 
within the Pentagon arguably appear to travel 
upwards - the case study of the F-16 fighter will 
demonstrate this point. 
Aside from the above, one of the most pernicious 
results of this compromise process "has been the 
inability of the JCS to present their cases in the 
precise, sharply focussed way which most Secretaries 
of Defense have sought. " 
128] 
(4) Competiti 
of Defense (OS 
Office of Secretary of 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff by law advise the Secretary 
of Defense, who may accept or reject their professional 
opinions as he sees fit. 
129] 
The compulsion of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to present the appearance 
of a solid front despite deep-seated differences is 
a self-inflicted wound to the JCS in its relationship 
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 
The Joint Chiefs seldom submit pros and cons of 
i 
serious options for the Secretary of Defense to 
compare, and therefore the OSD civilians are called 
upon to fill this vacuum and develop alternatives, 
provide rationale for recommendations, thereby 
ultimately becoming the final arbiters when the 
Secretary of Defense decides what strategy and 
supporting force posture it is best to assume. 
130] 
Another self-inflicted wound to the JCS was its 
professional snobbery. The JCS, who had operated 
semi-independently since 1942, resented civilian 
intrusion in military matters. "It took many years" 
to realise that "they should basically serve the 
Secretary of Defense" and be "responsive to his 
interests and concerns, and ... provide him with 
advice and analysis that is specifically relevant to 
his needs and wishes. " 
1311 
This attitude encouraged the Secretaries of Defense 
to seek assistance from civilian strategists, which 
was exacerbated by the fact that, although there was 
little competition from the OSD staff for the first 
14 years (1947-60), sceptical civilians armed with 
new analytical tools began to advance alternatives 
soon after Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara took 
office. 
1321 
"The major effect of McNamara's 
innovations was a fundamental shift in political 
design of organisation and process. For the first 
time, OSD became an effective player in the weapon 
system acquisition process, positioned to challenge 
Service dominance of that process. "1331 They and 
their successors have been making US military 
planning ever since. For example. "Packard returned 
day-to-day program management to the Services, but 
sought OSD essential management control through the 
definition of milestones - key decision points ... 
which would permit program review by OSD. "1341 
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OSD programme specialists will likely retain that 
power until the JCS planners start relating superior 
concepts to resources but such is not a self-inflicted 
wound, it is a structural fault. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare "strategic plans". 
However, they are not organised or equipped to connect 
those plans with programmes and budgets, which "are 
developed through dialogue and debate betweeen OSD, 
the President, NSC and the Services". 
1351 
Decisions 
pertaining to Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) are made by the Secretary of Defense 
under the authority granted by the Defense 
Reorganisation Act of 1958. That legislation gave 
the Secretary of Defense, under the policy guidance 
and direction of the President and the National 
Security Council, two distinct lines of authority 
1) A direct line of authority was 
established through the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to the unified and specified 
commands. Through this command line, 
the Secretary of Defense issues decisions 
regarding threat appraisal, strategy and 
force structure; 
2) An administrative line of authority 
for the control of the military departments 
and for the management of military forces 
which was established through the Secretaries 
(civilian) of the Military Departments. 
Through the administrative line of authority, 
the Secretary of Defense issues decisions 
regarding programming of resources to 
support existing force structure and also 
the budgeting of annual funds to support 
programmes. 
90 
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Consequently, JCS pronouncements play a subordinate 
part in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System 
(PPBS). "The JCS in their corporate capacity do not 
appear to play a crucial role in the final process 
of allocating the defense budget. "1361 Even though 
the planners for the Army, Navy, Air Force and the 
Marine Corps, who deal with concepts, programmes 
and budgets as part of an integrated package hold a 
stronger position, they still have serious problems. 
Their parochial products, compiled in separate 
compartments, do not adequately address joint demands. 
The Secretary of Defense therefore falls back on 
civilians in the OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation 
(PA & E) who have found favour for more than 20 years 
as the architects of joint strategies relating to 
the available means. Systems analysts without any 
official command authority "seldom differentiated 
between line and staff roles for much of that period, 
1371 
riding roughshod over military men. " Moreover 
there is military resentment of civilian analysts 
at the OSD. Comments like those from Air Force Chief 
of Staff Thomas D, White who scorned "pipe smoking 
defense intellectuals" who are "often over-confident, 
sometimes arrogant ... ", ring of such resentment. 
138] 
The Reagan Administration has reduced the powers of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Analysis 
and Evaluation and improved its relationship with the 
uniformed competitors. 
139] 
Nevertheless, civilian 
programmers will continue to dictate US military 
planning until the Joint Chiefs of Staff strengthen 
their abilities to participate in the PPBS process. 
In summary of some points made earlier, the Joint 
Chiefs shall be viewed as managers based not on their 
previous experience before assuming the position but 
91 
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on their role in the overall organisation. It has been 
established that they are not in the chain of command 
but act in an advisory role to their civilian 
colleagues (for example, the Secretary of Defense). 
Furthermore, each Chief is responsible for the 
management of his individual Service in its mission 
of organising, training, and equipping its forces. 
However, the discussion of the last few pages has 
complicated the issue. It is too simplistic to 
assume that their decisions are based on or derived 
from their sound managerial skills whilst overseeing 
their Service and their joint responsibilities. They 
are politicians - politicians in the scheme of 
bureaucratic politics. They are part of the pulling 
and hauling that is the essence of politics, the 
backsctatching, and trade-offs et al. In a sense 
there is a rg441 dual set of loyalties, each 
intertwined with the other, hoping to advance 
decisional output in favour of their Service, the 
overall military establishment or for themselves. 
Each tends to discredit the other. For example, 
were the decisions involved in procuring the F-16 
purely managerial or politically motivated? Such. 
an exercise would be fruitless because ultimately 
it is impossible to separate the two. A member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not have two in-trays, 
one for managing his organisation and the other 
concerned with the political consequences, but he 
does have both elements operating simultaneously 
in his decision making. Moreover, the point is not 
that decisions made within an organisation are 
simply managerial - they are political as well. In 
essence, this is the "Catch-22" which Allison 
attempted to evade. Allison's Model II based on 
Governmental action as organisational output from 
standard operating procedures clashed with his 
i 
Model III known as Government or Bureaucratic 
Politics model based on Governmental action as a 
political resultant. However, the suggestion is an 
approach that Government action as a political 
resultant may also act as an input to government 
action as organisational output. In other words, 
aside from Model II influencing Model III, the 
opposite also applies. Moreover, Allison's Model I 
of the Rational Actor is at times both influencing 
Models II and III. Essentially, Allison's three 
paradigms are useful as long as a specific decision 
is viewed along all three lines. However, it is 
incorrect to accept one model and discount the 
other two when viewing a specific decision. Indeed, 
there should be no distinction or categorising for 
such practice often blurs decision making because 
an individual's perceptions of the events differ. 
It is the opinion, herein, that Allison fell into 
the trap of what Herbert Simons referred to as 
Bounded Rationality - the impossibility of the 
human mind to systematically address the 
complexities of the real world. It is to simplify 
reality in one's mind to a sufficient degree; 
however, increasing simplification makes perception 
a less accurate representation of a more complicated 
reality. 
Weapons procurement decision making is a very 
complicated process involving millions of people 
and billions of dollars. Also, given the 
uncertainties inherent in a weapon system itself, 
decision making has to be viewed en masse for each 
weapon system procured, but there should be some 
common trends applicable to almost all. 
93 
i 
Congress at Its Weakest 
"Congress, cast in the role of resource allocator 
and concept critic, does not participate directly 
in the defense planning process". 
140) 
However, 
Congress' authorisations and appropriations shape 
defence planning. Further, its oversight 
authorities provide Congress with leverage to 
influence defence planning by exercising constraints 
on the Executive (for example, War Powers Act of 
1973)1,141] and on other defence related agencies 
(except the NSC) and organisations. Also, senior 
military officials and civilians in the State 
Department and DoD can take office only if 
confirmed by the Senate. Essentially Congress 
remains a "reactive participant in the process" of 
defence planning and policy initiative is 
"exercised by Congress only spasmodically". 
142] 
Of course, "the checks and balances system assures 
that Congress also plays a role [in defence 
planning) but this system is weaker here than 
anywhere else. " 
143J 
Congressional "incapacity to determine force levels 
and strategic programs is often attributed to the 
lack of proper information and technical 
competence", 
144] 
This is a contributory factor, 
however, another reason for Congress' inability to 
act effectively "derives primarily not from its 
technical failings but from its political ones" 
145] 
as well. 
In regard to the political failings of Congress - the 
initiation of programmes and the authorisations and 
appropriations of them are highly political decisions 
involving conflicting interests and groups. Congress 
and the Congressional Committees concerned with 
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defence related issues (refer back to footnote 95 
in Chapter 1) further fragments defence "programs 
because the interests which are primarily concerned 
with those programs are not adequately represented 
in any Congressional body". 
1461 
The various 
committees, in one way or another, are involved 
in the process, thus creating a situation of each 
committee having a partial view of the interests 
involved. For example, Members whose constituents 
rely on defence industries "for sustenance often 
seek seats on Armed Services or Appropriations 
Committees, hoping to influence which regions will 
get Pentagon contracts". 
1471 
Or Members who 
emphasise diplomacy would favour Foreign Affairs/.. _ 
Relations Committees. The point is that committees 
are "now the rule ... but decision making became 
immensely more difficult, because no faction, 
official or informal, can deliver consistently". 
148) 
Moreover, what must be taken into account concerning 
the varied interests of Members of Congressional 
Committees, is the tremendous increase in employees 
staffing them. "During the period from 1955 to 1979, 
the number increased from just over 5,000 to about 
20,000, raising the cost of maintaining the committee 
staffs from $170 million to $1.2 billion in 1980.11149] 
Aside from the committee system, Congress' role in 
defence planning is further fragmented for two 
reasons. First, it is a bicameral House and, second, 
because of the interests of the Congressmen themselves. 
Regarding the former, there is the fact that bills 
must pass through both Houses. In many cases, the 
two versions of a bill differ, however this is 
usually resolved in a Conference Committee. 
1501 
From 
the perspective of the lobbyist (whether lobbying 
for contractors or armed services), "the mere fact 
95 
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that bills must pass both the House and the Senate 
affords lobbyists two cracks at determining their 
fate". 1511 
Regarding the interests of the Congressmen themselves - 
Congress contains 100 Senators, each of whom tries 
to satisfy federal, state, and political party 
interests. The House of Representatives with 435 
Congressmen also has a fourth interest - district. 
Members of the House have a two year term and are 
perennially concerned with re-election compared to a 
Senator's six year term. Thus, Congress is a large 
body of policymakers whose political survival is a 
function of 535 different constituencies to whom all 
of the House of Representatives and one-third of 
the Senate are accountable every two years. 
"Congress, in this view, is the epitome of the 
weakness of the American system". 
1521 
Congress' lack of technical competence is reflected 
by the fact that "[a] almost every Congressman feels 
that he is an expert on education, or economics, or 
in any number of domestic fields. But when he deals 
with defense and foreign policy, he lacks confidence 
and tends to depend upon the 'experts' ... in 
uniform ... uniforms are identified with expertise". 
1531 
Congress relies heavily on experts and scientists who 
may find themselves "on the political firing line, 
placed there by a politician interested in using the 
scientists prestige as an 'expert' to disarm the 
critics of his the politician's] choices". 
154] 
As the following Chapters will demonstrate, defence 
planning and the military programmes involved have 
to be weighed against each other, and the conflicting 
interpretations of military requirements, the domestic 
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needs and non-military foreign policy programmes, as 
well as the tax revenues and the demands of fiscal 
policy. "No Congressional Committee is competent to 
do this, not because it lacks the technical knowledge, 
but because it lacks the legal authority and 
political capability to bring together all these 
conflicting interests, balance off one against 
another, and arrive at some sort of compromise or 
decision". 
1551 
Thus far the main actors and organisations of 
defence planning have been outlined, and more 
discussion of these will follow before detailing 
the case history of the F-16. It is safe to assume 
that those at the top, for example the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Secretaries of Defense and State, are 
managers exhibiting political skills. Further down 
the scale are found the professionals - the expertise 
or corporate mind of the organisation, usually 
exhibiting a longer tenure period. Expertise not 
only plays an important role with respect to 
influencing Congress, it also acts as an influencing 
factor regarding the weapons acquisition process 
within the DoD itself. The defence establishment 
is relatively decentralised in the aspects of its 
management. The "hierarchical general staff 
concept of organisation relies heavily on the 
principle of subordination. Varying amounts of 
power are distributed throughout the system, and 
each subordinate reports to one superior". 
1561 
However, even at the "lower levels there is a 
typical tendency for a superior officer to insist 
that junior officers responsible for operations must 
pass their 'requirements' upward for reconciliation 
with the sub-budget for which the superior officer 
is responsible". 
1571 
Moreover, the "superior officer 
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usually lacks the detailed knowledge with which to 
determine priorities at the operating level ..,  
158] 
There is the "myth that a junior officer ... does 
not give orders to a superior officer". 
1591 
Authority is a very complex phenomenon. "Legal 
authority [the right to demand obedience] cannot be 
confused with influence or power [the ability to 
retain obedience]. "1601 Thus, if a hierarchical 
superior wishes to control his subordinates, he must 
use more than his legal authority. Although, "the 
Secretary of Defense does have the tools to manage 
the Department", 
1611 
subordinates can manipulate 
their superior. "As one proceeds towards the top of 
the hierarchy, a superior has time for only the most 
cursory review of his subordinates' decisions or his 
staff's judgments". 
162] 
The number and complexity 
of "decisions that reach the top conspire to reduce 
the executive's ability to influence more than a 
very few aspects of the action of his subordinates". 
1631 
"Tremendous volumes of technical staff work will be 
reduced to a single recommendation by the time a 
problem reaches an executive up the line". 
164] 
Because the "detailed knowledge and ingenuity 
available at the lower ends of management", 
1651 
most 
"decisions are in fact made at lower echelons. More 
frequently than not an executive must rely on his 
confidence in the staff rather than any deep 
knowledge of the merits of their judgments", 
166] 
Or as Simon, Smithburg and Thompson pointed out that 
it is more realistic to speak of a "line of 
confidence" from the top to the bottom, than a 
"line of command". 
167] 
4 
1 
1 
The aforementioned leads to a situation of the 
executive being"trapped by the size of his 
organisation". 
168] 
The executive is reduced to 
endorsing the proposals of his subordinates or 
staff officers. "[he] has precious little control 
beyond indicating general approval". 
1691* 
The organisations involved in weapons acquisition, 
and the functions thereof, require further 
examination in order to determine the validity of 
defence decision making emanating upwards, and, if 
so, at which stages, during the development of a 
weapon system, is this most apparent. The following 
two Chapters discuss the stages of development, 
and the roles of individuals as well as organisations, 
and their relationships and influences to the process. 
This involves detailing those participants in both 
the inside and outside of the process. The approach 
taken in Chapters 3 and 4 is to review the 
development of weapons systems along fiscal lines 
as well as the life of a weapon system. This will 
demonstrate a greater level of participation by the 
DoD Components, at crucial stages, and also provide 
an understanding of the shifting of the decisional 
centres. Chapters 3 and 4 are by no means a complete 
description of each and every process. Nevertheless, 
the Chapters provide the relevant insights which, 
aside from the complexity involved, substantiate, 
"that there is much to be gained from careful study 
of this type of organisation ... and the conditions 
necessary for its effective functioning. 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CHAPTER 3 
THE FISCAL CYCLE AND THE DECISIONAL PROCESSES 
The term "weapons acquisition" has been used 
throughout the text hitherto without any explanation 
as-to what. it_is. 
"The weapons acquisition process of any 
country is a heterogeneous activity that 
varies considerably over many dimensions. 
The specific military service, the class 
of equipment, and the vagaries of time 
are but a few of the dimensions over 
which enormous disparities are observed. 
In order to reduce to a manageable size 
the problem associated with a description 
and analysis of weapons acquisition, some 
simplifications are necessary. " 
11 
Primary objectives can be acquired if the proper 
decision making and action is pursued by the group, 
individual or organisation seeking the objectives. 
Thus, it is important to appreciate the acquisition 
process from the perspective of the decision maker, 
who as an insider is directly influencing and 
checking the acquisition process hoping to achieve 
their primary objective as the end resultant. The 
process from the decision maker viewpoint breaks 
down into four phases along organisational structure 
lines : 
1. Concept Exploration (Conception) 
2. Demonstration and Validation 
(Research and Development) 
3. Full-Scale Development 
4. Production and Deployment. 
101 
It would appear that the decisions made by the various 
actors whilst considering a weapon system at each phase 
should suffice. However, from the outset there is a 
problem. Because, also operational and interacting 
with these four phases are two distinct cycles of 
decision making in weapons acquisition - the Fiscal 
Cycle and the Life Cycle. The Fiscal Cycle is the 
annual planning and budgeting for all weapon systems 
whether deployed (maintenance or increasing numbers 
of that system) or at the stage of Concept 
Exploration. The Life Cycle is the time it takes 
for a weapon system to go from Concept Exploration 
to Production and Deployment. Previous authors 
have usually pursued the acquisition of a system 
through these four phases and completely overlook 
the fact that the acquisition of weapons systems 
is in itself a combination of two parallel decision 
cycles. For example, when Paul Hammond21 
reconstructed the political arguments that occurred 
regarding the issue of the Super Carrier and the B-36 
bomber through these steps, he neglected much of the 
first phase - Concept Exploration. Although he sought 
to answer questions regarding the relationship of the 
Navy to the Armed Services Committee, or the effect 
of Congress and the public debate sponsored by the 
House Armed Services Committee concerning the B-36, 
he failed to mention that these were more or less 
"Oversight" debates which concerned the system. 
Moreover, whilst he touched on Service rivalry, he 
neglected to ascertain how the political manoeuvring 
may have been affected within these two parallel 
decision cycles. 
A better study was conducted by R. J. Art31 in his 
investigation of the TFX aircraft (later designated 
the F-111) decisions. He illustrated the association 
102 
between costs and the institutional processes and 
political pressures. However, he did not categorise 
the decisions in the two distinct files of the 
Fiscal Cycle and the Life Cycle. Similarly, two 
other authors of distinction in the field of 
weapons acquisition, namely, R. G. Head4 
1 
and M. H. 
Halperin 
51 
also neglected to separate the two 
cycles and to view the dynamics between the two 
and the manoeuvring made possible by the 
institutional processes. For example, if R. G. Head 
had separated the decisions into the two categories, 
he may have demonstrated that Fiscal Cycle decisions 
emanating as organisational outputs are the inputs 
into Life Cycle decisions reflecting the 
Governmental (or Bureaucratic) Politics Model, and 
vice versa. 
This Chapter and the following Chapter will deal 
exclusively with the two cycles, and more 
specifically to their dynamics, and the 
relationship between the two cycles at various 
phases of the decision process. This examination 
will reveal a clearer and more concise understanding 
of the basis of the acquisition process as well as 
the higher degree of activity and influence of the 
DoD Components. The criticism could be levied 
that a distinction between the two cycles is 
arbitrary. Rather, these two consecutive Chapters 
will evidence that a distinction between the two 
is necessary and valid. The distinction of the 
two cycles will be more readily accepted once the 
facts are established in regard to the complexity 
of their fusion. They are both highly 
compartmentalised and distinctly separate, and yet, 
they are very closely inter-related. In essence, 
earlier approaches to the decision making of weapons 
m 
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development, production, and deployment. It might 
appear that weapons acquisition, in general, follows 
the same mode as the Life Cycle. This, however, is 
not the case. ' In order to fully - appreciate the! 
complexity of the decision making efforts involved 
in weapons systems, it is helpful to treat the Life 
Cycle as an additional component of the acquisition 
process, which in turn, is effected by the continuing 
Fiscal Cycle, which vacillates between facilitating 
and hampering the progress of the weapons system. 
An improved evaluation of the decision making in the 
acquisition of modern weaponry is helped by utilising 
the set of questions to test defence programming. 
Regardless of size, the defence programmes must be 
able to give an affirmative response to the three 
questions below : 
1) Is it needed or wanted by the defence forces? 
2) Is it technically feasible? 
3) Is funding available to develop and deploy it? 
Any of the stages of the Fiscal and Life Cycles which 
generates a "No" answer to one of these questions 
affects that programme's outcome. For instance, a 
programme has proper documentation to show that it 
is needed -a Life Cycle decision. The Research 
and Development (R & D) community states that it 
is technically feasible - another Life Cycle decision. 
The Department of Defense and the Developing Service 
plan funding for it -a Fiscal Cycle decision. But, 
should the Congress decide not to appropriate funds 
for it -a fiscal Cycle decision - then, the 
programme is "dead". 
If, 
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Figure 3-I 
Preparation of DoD's Operating Budgets 
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At the outset, it should be emphasised that the 
Fiscal Cycle is not a one-way discourse. It is an 
exercise of advocacy - first, within the military 
departments and agencies, for example, between the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Unified and 
Specified Commands; next, between the Department 
of Defense (DoD) Components and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) as a corporate body; then, between 
the military establishment and the National Command 
Authority; and, finally, between the Executive 
and Legislative branches of the government. 
The total time span of one Fiscal Cycle takes a 
little more than two years. The "in-house" 
Department of Defense (DoD) effort takes 17 months 
alone - August of one year through December of the 
following year. The results of that effort are 
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then fed into the overall National Budget and 
presented to the Congress by the President, usually 
in January. The review and enactment of the 
Authorisation and Appropriation Bills take from 
January to September (sometimes October) so that 
DoD has its operating budget about 26 months after 
it had begun working on it. 
These 26 months of the Fiscal Cycle are taken up by 
four distinct phases : 
1) Planning 
2) Programming 
3) Budgeting 
4) Enactment 
All phases are inter-related and each is dependent 
on the other, as well as being inter-related and 
dependent on the other four stages of weapons 
acquisition. 
To get to the point where the Secretary of Defense 
can submit his annual budget to the President, the 
defence establishment uses two systems covered by 
separate instructions. The first is the Joint 
Strategic Planning System. The second is the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
61 
The importance for reviewing these two systems of 
the Fiscal Cycle is to demonstrate that "the decisions 
having the largest effect on the outcome may well 
be those that are made ... in the planning and 
programming process". 
7) 
This opinion will be 
pursued further in the discussion to follow. This 
proposal is founded on the evidence that the DoD 
Component, at certain stages and phases of the 
108 
conception and development of a weapon system's life 
enjoys an influencing position in the decision making. 
The case history of the F-16 will document and 
validate this datum. However, before reviewing 
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS), attention will now be directed to the other 
system of the Fiscal Cycle. 
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are charged with 
certain strategic responsibilities and to discharge 
these responsibilities the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have developed what is known as the Joint Strategic 
Planning System (JSPS). 
81 
To carry out the 
functions of the Joint Strategic Planning System, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgate seven 
documents, as follows : 
1) Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning, 
containing estimative intelligence for the 
short and mid-range periods. It describes 
situations and developments throughout the 
world that could affect US security interests. 
91 
2) Intelligence Priorities for Strategic 
Planning, which establishes comprehensive 
military intelligence subjects, targets 
and priorities for the short and mid-range 
periods. 
3) Joint Security Assistance Memorandum, 
which provides military views on alternative 
funding levels projected for the US-financed 
Security Assistance Program, security 
assistance manning levels and key arms 
transfer policy matters. 
11] 
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4) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 
whose purpose is to provide guidance to 
the Commanders of the Unified and 
Specified Commands and the Service Chiefs 
for the accomplishment of military tasks, 
based on projected military capabilities 
and conditions. 
12] 
5) Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal 
provides consolidated estimative intelligence, 
strategic forecasts and broad force structure 
implications, 
131 
6) Joint Strategic Planning Document141 is 
one of the two most important documents of 
the Joint Strategic Planning Systems because 
of the integral role it plays in the actual 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) 
151 
where it is submitted for use in 
the development of the draft Defense Guidance, 
(DG). 
161 
7) Joint Program Assessment Memorandum 
17] 
is the other most important document in the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) because it is submitted for 
consideration in reviewing the Services 
Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) 
181 
developing Issue Papers and drafting 
Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs). 
19] 
Prior to directing attention to the second system, 
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System of 
the Fiscal Cycle, it is necessary to make three 
comments. First, these seven documents, especially 
the latter two, are of some importance in the 
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consideration of any weapon system. Second, because 
there are seven documents, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
aspiring to opinions and themes that are consistent 
and harmonious, though these 4good intentions, are 
often interrupted by the necessity to deal in 
generalities (as previously mentioned). Finally, the 
preparation of these documents substantiates another 
point made in the previous Chapter. It is required 
that the JCS staff draft these reports, but the 
underlying point is that the staff rely on the Service's 
expertise in drafting these documents. It seems 
probably then, that a certain Service's "wish list" 
may well be entered into these documents. 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) 
The second system, covered by its own separate 
instructions from that of the Joint Strategic 
Planning System (JSPS), which the defence 
establishment utilises to get to the point that the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) can submit his annual 
budget to the President, is the Planning, Programming 
and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) "is the 
only one (of the two systems) which ties all facets 
of the defense effort together, relating national 
security objectives to strategy, strategy to forces, 
forces to resources, and resources to costs ... ". 
20] 
Within the process, is the development of mid-range 
objectives, the conduct of special studies and the 
research and development of weapon systems and 
their support. In fact, all resources of the 
Services are drawn upon to formulate their plans, 
programmes and budgets. It is imperative from the 
outset that the major actor(s) who initiate or 
make the decisions within the Planning, Programming 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) be identified, prior to 
111 
setting out a seemingly simple outline of this very 
complex decisional process. 
Conventional wisdom derived from legal statute 
dictates that decisions pertaining to the planning, 
programming and budgeting process are made by the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). 
21] 
As mentioned 
earlier, Congress gave the SECDEF, under the policy 
guidance and the direction of the President and the 
National Security Council, two distinct lines of 
authority. A direct line of command was established 
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the 
Unified and Specified Commands, although the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff are not in the chain of command. 
A line for administrative control of the military 
departments and for management of support of 
military forces was established through the 
Secretaries of the Military Departments. Via the 
command line of authority, the SECDEF issues 
decisions regarding threat appraisal, strategy and 
force structure. The administrative line of 
authority enables him to issue decisions regarding 
programming of resources to support the force 
structure and the budgeting of annual funds to 
support various programmes. Prior to detailing 
the complexities of the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS), it is necessary to note 
that throughout the process, because of the sheer 
complexity and workload of the systems, many 
decisions are already agreed upon before the 
involvement of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). 
The Secretary of Defense should be seen as a 
manager, or essentially as the Chairman of the 
Board. The workload of managing the entire 
Department of Defense rests on the Secretary of 
Defense, and his office. Consideration of his 
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weighty responsibilities indicates that to carry 
out much of his work and decision making, he must 
depend on the expertise of subordinates who keep 
him briefed of the complexities of a system, as well 
as the techno ogical data, the systems' needs, 
cost effectiveness, matching resources and other 
related details of the system. There is also the 
added dimension that the SECDEF lacks previous 
expertise in defence planning before becoming the 
SECDEF. Thus, he is in a position of delicate 
balance: he must learn, and most likely he would 
have to be educated by his subordinates. This 
problematic situation often times leaves the leader 
no other alternative but to accept knowledge and 
direction from his staff. If the relationship 
proves to be a compatible one, the Secretary's 
trust in his staff increases, and he is more often 
than not inclined to take their advice when 
difficulties arise. Likewise, the lower echelons 
are occasionally able to have their ideas viewed 
and accepted by higher echelons by utlising their 
superiors to act as a mouthpiece for their own 
interests. However, there is a check on this 
procedure. The staff could never expect the majority 
of their objectives to be realised in this manner. 
The SECDEF is a political actor, and his own actions 
will be complicated and interrupted by the other 
variables and influences that are directed towards 
him. For example, the influences of power could 
occur from within the DoD, or they could just as 
easily be perpetrated from without - the President, 
Secretary of State, Congress, et al. Therefore 
the SECDEF must always appear to be in full control 
. of 
the decisional processes, and be prepared to 
take responsibility for those decisions. However, 
the importance of this point in the examination of 
113 
the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
lies in the fact that subordinates outside the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense also make decisions which 
are the responsibility of the SECDEF. 
To summarise, it was previously stated that the 
Fiscal Cycle, as opposed to the Life Cycle, is 
comprised of four distinct phases : Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Enactment, taking a total 
time of 26 months to complete. As mentioned, all 
phases are inter-related and dependent on one another. 
Enactment will be treated as a separate entity so as 
to clarify the processes. By temporarily 
eliminating the Enactment Phase and looking only at 
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
the total Fiscal Cycle time is reduced to a 17 month 
time cycle. In order that the stages of the PPBS 
can be better absorbed, the timing of the PPBS is 
set for the preparation of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1975 
Budget. 
221 
Congress provided $32 million in the 
FY 1975 Budget for the Air Force's Air Combat 
Fighter. 
231 
Thus, the entire cycle began in 
August 1972 (26 months for total cycle, August 
1972 - October 1974). However, the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was 
completed by December 1973 or early January 1974. 
The PPBS can further be broken into three phases 
with the time periods being : 
Planning Phase - August 1972 - January 1973 
Programming Phase - January 1973 - August 1973 
Budgeting Phase - August 1973 - January 1974 
This is followed by Enactment which would be 
completed usually by late Autumn of 1974. 
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I. Planning Phase (August 1972 to January 1973) 
I-1 August 1972 - The Commanders of the Unified 
and Specified Commands (CINCs) prepare their 
personal recommendations for major changes in 
the previous Defense Guidance (DG). These 
Commanders have been receiving year round 
reports from their Component Commander for 
each assigned Service element. These Component 
Commanders report on operational matters directly 
to the Unified and Specified Commanders (CINCs), 
but on matters concerned with personnel or 
material support, they report to their Military 
Department. The chain of command runs from 
President to the Secretary of Defense to the 
Unified and Specified Commanders, who exercise 
operational command over the forces assigned 
to them. As with the chain of command, these 
Commanders' inputs into the Defense Guidance (DG) 
emphasise threat appraisal, strategy, 
operational problems, et al. The Defense 
Guidance (DG) is prepared by the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy whose purpose is to provide 
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) with guidance 
to the DoD Components for the preparation of 
their Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). 
24] 
I-2 Late August 1972 - The Commanders of the 
Unified and Specified Commands' (CINCs') 
recommendations are furnished to the SECDEF. 
After submission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) and the CINCs meet with the Defense 
Resources Board to review and assess their 
recommendations. 
251 
These meetings are crucial 
in the respect that here the means are to meet 
the requirements. Those in the chain of command 
(CINCs) who are concerned with the operational 
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matters meet with those, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, who are not in the chain of command, 
but who are concerned with the personnel and 
material to meet the operational concerns, 
Many trade-offs and balances must be struck 
in view that they are meeting before the 
Defense Resources Board whose Chairman is the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. Although the 
recommendations had been submitted to the 
SECDEF before these meetings, his lack of 
presence at these meetings is further proof 
that he only has time to be briefed later of 
their outcome. However, it must not be 
discounted that the SECDEF is also. busy 
managing the rest of the DoD's activities 
as well as its political image. 
I-3 Late August/Early September 1972 - 
Various other organisations provide other 
key inputs into the planning process to the 
SECDEF. These include from the office of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Joint Strategic 
Planning Document, one of the most important 
documents of the Joint Strategic Planning 
System (discussed above). Also major issues 
which the DoD Components wish to have 
considered during the development of the 
Defense Guidance, are incorporated, as are 
other references pertinent to the development 
of the policy, strategy and force planning 
sections of the Defense Guidance. 
I-4 September 1972 - Based on the Defense 
Resources Board's (DRB's) assessment of the 
CINCs' recommendations, the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, develops 
,ý 
: a=> _. 
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in co-ordination with the staffs of the 
DoD Components and the Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, a "FOR COMMENT" draft 
of the Policy Guidance section of the 
Threat Assessment, Policy, Strategy and 
Force Planning part of the Defense Guidance. 
It has been claimed that the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff play little if any role at all, simply 
because they are not in the chain of command, 
and, therefore not as much concerned with 
operational matters as much as managing the 
personnel and material of their Military 
Service. 
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However, more significant, as 
mentioned earlier, the Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff lacks the staff to work on 
such documents, thereby having to rely on 
DoD Components or the Services to do so. 
Being that the DoD Components are involved 
at this stage it would be redundant for the 
Joint Chiefs to be involved on their own. 
The JCS would have already received inputs 
from the DoD Components before ever previously 
meeting with the CINCs (see 1-2), and 
afterwards recommended any changes to the 
DoD Components which at this stage would be 
reviewed by the JCS to make sure that they 
are implemented. Essentially, the issue is 
whether or not the JCS played any role 
whatsoever save being a rubber stamping group 
in the interest to appear harmonious. 
"Rewriting and recycling is the rule ... The 
Joint Chiefs themselves become 'wordsmiths' 
... ". 
271 If little or no role was played 
by the JCS aside from meeting with the CINCs, 
it is further proof that decisions emanate 
from below. 
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I-5 Early October 1972 - The Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, provides 
the FOR COMMENT draft Policy Guidance section 
of the Defense Guidance to the DoD Components, 
the CINCs, the staff of the National Security 
Council (NSC), the Department of State and the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review 
and comment. Two other organisations are 
involved at this stage, namely, the National 
Security Council with its focus of the national 
state of security, and the more far reaching 
Department of State, focused on the international 
threats, strategies, and the international 
repercussions of all the above groups' decisions. 
Also, a third organisation, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) is supposed to act 
as a sieve trying to match the required needs 
with a limited resource - money. In essence, 
the OMB does not deal with specifics at this 
stage. It merely assigns an amount for overall 
defence spending in a given year with future 
projections. The actual fighting of amounts 
for any one system versus another takes place 
later in OMB and in other corridors. This is 
where the OMB informs the DoD Components as well 
as the SECDEF, Department of State, the NSC, et 
al, on the amount of monies available, the 
portion of which one receives is resolved in 
later phases. Consider the consequences made 
by a mistake of dollar amounts, as David 
Stockman did, by appropriating $1.46 trillion 
more over a four year period to the Pentagon. 
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I-6 Before mid-October 1972, the various 
comments are submitted to the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Policy (only two weeks for 
comments and review from NSC, DoS, OMB! ). Where 
118 
possible, various issues raised by the comments 
are resolved between the various staffs and 
incorporated into an updated Policy Guidance 
section of the Defense Guidance. Other issues 
are identified as requiring Defense Resources 
Board (DRB) review and resolutions. 
I-7 In late October 1972, the DRB meets to 
resolve the remaining issues and to review and 
approve and/or modify the updated Policy Guidance 
section of the Defense Guidance. Once again, 
due to the organisational structure of the DRB, 
the Secretary of Defense is absent. 
I-8 Also in late October 1972, the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, revises 
as necessary, the updated Policy Guidance 
section of the Defense Guidance. 
I-9 Meanwhile, in September/October 1972, the 
Under Secretary (formerly Director) of Defense, 
Research and Engineering, and the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Reserve 
Affairs and Logistics, in co-ordination with the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller, the Office of the Director, 
Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the staffs 
of the DoD Components, the Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, prepare a draft Resource Planning 
Guidance. At the same time, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and 
the Office of the Director, Program Analysis and 
Evaluation prepare a Tentative Fiscal Guidance. 
Essentially, these people and their staffs have 
begun the process of determining which programs, 
whether new or existing, are financially viable. 
-)b 
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I-10 In early November 1972, the draft Resource 
Planning Guidance and the Tentative Fiscal 
Guidance are forwarded to the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Policy. Based on these 
documents and the revised Policy Guidance section 
of the Defense Guidance, the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defence, Policy, prepares the draft 
Defense Guidance. 
I-11 Also in early November 1972, the draft 
Defense Guidance is returned again to those who 
had earlier commented on it (Step 1-5) - the 
DoD Components, the Commanders of the Unified 
and Specified Commands (CINCs), the NSC staff, 
the Department of State and the OMB for review 
and comment on the Resources and Tentative 
Fiscal Guidance sections of the draft Defense 
Guidance. 
I-12 By mid-November 1972, the various comments 
are provided to the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense, Policy, (again, only 2 weeks to 
receive reviews and comments from NSC, DoS and 
OMB! ). Again, where possible, issues raised by 
the comments are resolved between the various 
staffs and the Defense Guidance is revised, as 
necessary. Issues requiring DRB review and 
resolution are identified. At the same time, 
the office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Research and Engineering, and the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower. Reserve 
Affairs and Logistics, prepare briefings on the 
resources issues of the draft Defense Guidance. 
I-13 In late November 1972, the DRB meets to 
review the revised draft Defense Guidance, the 
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various comments on the draft and to resolve 
the remaining issues of the draft. The DRB is 
also briefed on the resources, implications and 
constraints of the revised draft Defense Guidance. 
At this stage, this review and briefing provide 
early insight into areas of strategy-capability 
mismatches and risks. In some cases, the DRB 
may recommend that the SECDEF request an actual 
increase in resources to reduce the mismatch and 
risks. The DRB "estimates risks when ends and 
means refuse to match, and recommend adjustments 
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for consideration by the SECDEF". 
I-14 In late November/early December 1972, as 
a result of the previous DRB review and briefings, 
the Service Secretaries, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, Membership of the DRB and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff are tasked, as necessary, by the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense to develop proposed 
alternative solutions to reduce the identified 
risks. Again, it would appear that it is the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense who is the man who runs the 
Pentagon, especially considering that he might have 
to task the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 
propose an alternative solution. Obviously he, being 
Chairman of the DRB, would be cognisant of all 
the deliberations thus far, more so than the 
Secretary of Defense. However, the suggestion 
is that in such a circumstance it proves to be 
politically embarrasing for the SECDEF to 
receive a request of this nature. Arguably, 
this could yet be another political pressure 
on the SECDEF not to align himself or get 
especially close to a new programme which would 
impair his prestige if a better alternative is 
b 
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found. This is an indication of the political 
forces exerted from within, but also it is an 
indication that he is best off keeping his 
hands clean for outside consumption by letting 
those underneath him make the decisions. 
I-15 In early December 1972 (sometimes January 
1973), these proposed solutions are presented 
to the DRB. As a result of this review, the 
DRB develops its recommendations for changes 
to the revised draft Defense Guidance. 
I-16 By mid-December 1972, the Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on the revised 
draft Defense Guidance and the DRB recommendations, 
prepares tables of expected major forces which 
it estimates will minimise the risks involved 
and an assessment of the risks associated with 
their ability to carry out the strategy 
contained in the DRB recommendations. 
I-17 In mid-December 1972, the DRB decisions 
on major issues that result in changes in 
guidance emphasis/force mixes are reflected, 
by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Policy, in an updated draft Defense Guidance. 
At this time, the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense, Policy, also prepares a list of any 
unresolved problems and/or issues. 
I-18 At the end of December 1972, the updated 
draft Defense Guidance, the DRB recommendations 
as to mismatch and risks, the associated Office 
of Joint Chiefs of Staff force tables and risk 
assessment and any unresolved problems and/or 
issues are reviewed and resolved by the SECDEF. 
Most issues are already resolved before SECDEF 
final review. 
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I-19 In early January 1973, based on the 
updated draft Defense Guidance and the SECDEF 
decisions, the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense, Policy, prepares a proposed Defense 
Guidance. 
I-20 In early January 1973, the proposed 
Defense Guidance is presented to the SECDEF 
for review and approval. 
30] 
Throughout the planning phase, the basic theme is 
that those concerned take the previous year's 
Defense Guidance, amend it through the co-ordination 
of various military and Executive agencies and 
produce, in a period of roughly less than six months, 
an updated version which reflects any new changes 
in forces/strategy. Although the time devoted to 
the planning phase is relatively short, it is not 
to be envisioned as working from "scratch" for the 
three following reasons. First, in Phase I-1, the 
Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands 
(CINCs) begin their work based on the previous 
year's Defense Guidance. Second, the process is an 
ongoing phenomenon. For example, the DoD Components, 
who had been assisting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
preparing the JCS Joint Strategic Planning Document, 
are now placing the final insertions into that 
document, whilst they are outlining and drafting 
the next. Third, and discussed below, are the 
influences exerted by the overall Fiscal Cycle 
overlapping which permits trade-offs in planning/ 
programming. Thus DOD Components will be 
attempting to insert a project, which they may have 
traded-off in a previous budget. 
Itemising the twenty steps of the planning phase 
raises several issues. It demonstrates that the 
system is very compartmentalised, with various 
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actors assigned specific functions and a schedule 
to adhere to, and that there are many people involved 
in the decisions. This leads to decision trade-offs, 
sell-outs, backscratching, incrementalism, 
bureaucratic inertia, et al. However, at this stage, 
the important consideration is not the many people 
or individuals involved as much as the organisation 
as a whole, for two reasons. The first is, that 
the gentleman in authority (Secretary of Defense) is 
not as involved in preparing the Defense Guidance, 
as are those with a longer period of tenure. As 
Janis has pointed out, the longer the stay of an 
individual with an organisation the greater the 
alignment to that organisation's esprit de corps. 
31) 
Second, although each of these organisations begins 
the process with the same previous year's report 
initially, their views and opinions of the necessary 
changes to the Defense Guidance clash. However, 
without disagreement of policy, the essence of the 
entire exercise will be lost. This procedure is a 
secure methodology to compromise. For example, the 
CINCs will originally have a different view than 
that of the OMB on a weapon system, and these are 
resolved within the confines of the Defense 
Resources Board. There is the overall preoccupation 
that although the views of the organisations may 
differ on the numbers and material, they should 
eventually agree on an acceptable level for the 
overall security of the nation, which is to be 
expressed in the Defense Guidance for the eventual 
budgeting of defence. In other words, it is 
arguable that, at this stage, the preparation of 
the Defense Guidance appears to be less politically 
oriented (in the sense of top management involvement). 
Particularly, when considering that fact, there is the 
absence of the Secretary of Defense throughout most 
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of the proceedings. Second, as witnessed, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, although politically motivated, are 
reliant on their DoD Components. Third, there are 
little if any outside political forces to bear, for 
example, the Congress, and the Media. The influx of 
political pressure, for example, the review and 
comments of the DoS, NSC and OMB apparently only 
skim the surface by devoting so little time to the 
process. Fourth, and discussed below, is that when 
the actual budgeting is being considered, more 
emphasis is placed on the Program Objectives 
Memorandum than on the Defense Guidance. 
It is the opinion herein that the Defense Guidance, 
although important in itself, is more of an 
organisational output than that of a highly 
politicised bureaucratic output, but in the next 
stage of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System, the Defense Guidance acts as an input into 
the Program Objectives Memorandum which reflects 
a more bureaucratic decisional output. 
Another point of interest is that the Secretary of 
Defense, although the final arbiter, could be argued 
to be less of an influence than that of the Defense 
Resources Board which is chaired by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. Throughout each step, the 
DRB is reviewing and resolving differences arising 
from other key inputs. Moreover, the Secretary 
of Defense, being politically astute, would rather 
manage and be kept appraised of the process as a whole 
and its outcome than become embroiled with political 
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in-house arguments. If he strives to be involved 
in each and every weapon system, from the very start, 
in the hope of avoiding such political squabbles, 
his ability to manage the overall Department, as 
well as his abilities to be concerned with the 
larger political issues, would suffer. However, 
most of the members of the DRB are political appointees, 
so in the case of a new Administration taking office 
is everyone "learning" simultaneously? If so, who 
or which group is constant? It is debatable that a 
"constant" might be found within the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff whose Chairman is also a permanent member 
of the DRB. However, caution should be exercised, 
because the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff is first determined on a rotational basis; 
but, more importantly, the DRB plays a greater role 
in the planning of joint strategies/force 
requirements than do the Joint Chiefs on their own. 
The suggestion herein is that a "constant" is found 
within the professional bureaucrats (military and 
civilian) of the Department of Defense (DoD 
Components), especially when considering that the 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is so heavily 
dependent on the DoD Components. However, more 
examination of the whole process is required, 
bringing the discussion to the second phase of the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
II. Programming Phase (January 1973 to August 1973) 
Ii-1 In May 19733 using the Defense Guidance 
as its margin, each of the DoD Components 
submits a Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). 
The purpose of the POM is to recommend, annually, 
the total resource requirements within the 
parameters of the published SECDEF fiscal 
guidance, contained in the Defense Guidance. 
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Essentially, the POM is the instrument through 
which programming, under fiscal constraints, 
is implemented, It is also the. primary means 
of requesting revision to the SECDEF approved 
programmes as published in the Five Year 
Defense Plan (FYDP). 
33] 
Specific procedures 
for developing each POM submission are provided 
annually. The POM represents a comprehensive 
and detailed expression of the total resource 
requirements associated with the total 
commitment of each DoD Component. Assessment 
of risks and military advantages of the proposed 
programmes, as measured in the FYDP, must be 
addressed. Supporting detail is prepared in 
Program Element (PE) displays as well as a wide 
variety of other displays required by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense to analyse POM 
content. 
34] 
During the Programming Phase a 
greater role is played by the Secretary of 
Defense. Although much of the arbitration is 
still conducted by the Defense Resources Board 
under the direction of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, more involvement by the Secretary of 
Defense will be exhibited here than in the 
Planning Phase. This holds true, because the 
process is beginning to move closer to the 
budgeting phase, where the Secretary of Defense 
acting as manager must be viewed as-being 
cognisant of such preparation. Further, the 
SECDEF, acting as a politician, must be in the 
know as to which systems are politically viable, 
which will facilitate him in his future decisions. 
This may appear contradictory to what was 
previously said of the SECDEF during the 
Planning Phase. However, as will be illustrated 
he is concerned with three different budgets 
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simultaneously, (See, Fiscal Cycle Overlap pp. 139-141) 
for thousands of weapon systems all at different 
stages, 9AUging him to be reliant-on the 
expertise below. More importantly, this one of 
the three budgets is at an earlier stage than 
the other two (Congress is not yet involved). 
Therefore, the SECDEF will be more involved 
with a budget, undergoing enactment by Congress, 
than the one at this earlier stage; as well as 
the SECDEF more involved with Programming than 
Planning. The suggestion now is that as the 
process moves towards budgeting and funding 
the more politicised the system becomes. New 
systems under consideration (R&D phase), must 
have a raison d'etre or be legitimised to fit 
within the context of the national defence to 
meet a requirement. 
11-2 In June 1973, copies of each Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) are provided to the 
Defense Review Board (DRB) members. Based on 
its review of the POMs, the Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff prepares its joint Program 
Assessment Memorandum, the second most important 
document from the Joint Chiefs in their role of 
the Joint Strategic Planning System. 
The fact that the Joint Program Assessment 
Memorandum is forwarded (see 11-3) to the 
Defense Resources Board for review in a matter 
of days, is further proof that the JCS depend 
on the DoD Components. It would be incorrect 
to visualise the Joint Chiefs of Staff awaiting 
their copy of the Program Objectives Memorandum 
(POM) in the Pentagon, reviewing and revising, 
and forwarding it to the Defense Resources 
Board. In reality, the DoD Components, while 
1'. 
3eß. ý: _, 
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drafting the POM, are also drafting the Joint 
Program Assessment Memorandum. This is also 
an indication that the professional civilian- 
military DoD Components are very influential 
in the decisional process. 
11-3 In June 1973, the Joint Program Assessment 
Memorandum is forwarded to the Defense Resources 
Board (DRB) members. The members' staffs of the 
DRB, after reviewing the Program Objectives 
Memoranda (POMs) and the Joint Program Assessment 
Memorandum, identify issues raised by this 
review. As many issues as possible are resolved 
between the DRB members' staffs and the DoD 
Components and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Issues which cannot be resolved are 
documented as ISSUE PAPERS for insertion into 
the Final Issue Books. 
Issue Papers are based on the analyses of the annual 
POM submissions. The DOD Components within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense evaluate them in terms 
of their relation to the guidance provided by the 
SECDEF in the Defense Guidance, the balance 
between force structure, modernisation and 
readiness, and efficiency trade-offs. The Issue 
Papers also define the issues, list alternatives, 
and evaluate the capabilities and costs of 
those alternatives in terms of their ability to 
accomplish DOD missions. Issue Papers are circulated 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DOD Components 
for comment, prior to being submitted to the SECDEF 
for decision. In part, the Issue Papers help form 
the basis for the SECDEF's Program Decision Memoranda 
(PDMs)"35] 
SkL". 
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11-4 in June 1973, copies of the FINAL ISSUE 
BOOKS are provided to the Defense Resources 
Board (DRB) members for review and brief 
executive-level comments. This brief 
executive-level review includes the Secretary 
of Defense so as to inform him of the DRB's 
actions. 
11-5 In July 1973, the assembled ISSUE BOOKS 
and comments are provided to the Defense 
Resources Board (DRB) for review. After review, 
the DRB determines its position on the Program 
Objectives Memoranda (POMs). These positions 
are recorded in a set of Program Decision 
Memoranda (PDMs). A separate Program Decision 
Memorandum (PDM) is issued for each POM to each 
DoD Component. The PDMs are prepared by the 
Office of the Director, Program Analysis and 
Evaluation, under the direction of the DRB. 
Supplemental PDMs may be issued by Assistant 
Secretaries of Defense and other Directors to 
expand individual mission or functional areas. 
361 
Issuing separate Program Objectives Memorandum and 
separate Program Decision Memorandum to each of the 
DoD Components means that each of them receives 
their instructions as to the parameters that have 
been set before actually entering into dollars and 
cents. This has been done under the auspices of 
the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, whose 
office is of most importance. 
371 
It is that office 
which is in charge of evaluating the performance of 
new or existing weapon systems, evaluating 
alternative systems, testing the feasibility of new 
technologies, setting the goals to be attained in 
a new system and so forth. This must be accomplished 
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within the preoccupation of national security and 
fit within the context of the overall strategy and 
requirements to meet the requirement. "The SECDEF 
falls back on civilians in OSD Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (PA & E), who have found favor for more 
than 20 years, as architects of joint strategies 
constrained by available means. "381 Essentially, 
and with little fanfare, it is this office which is 
constantly legitimising the needs of various weapon 
systems. There are three major reasons for a 
contractor to take a special interest in this office 
and they are as follows. First, it is within this 
office that the so-called "bail-out" process occurs. 
For example, General Dynamics became the prime 
contractor for the F-16 after this office determined 
. 
that Northrop's design was not as good, yet years 
later it was this same office which awarded 
Northrop's same design with an additional two fins 
to become the Navy's F/A-18. Second, this office 
reflects any of the changes in strategies or force 
requirements. It is crucial for any lobbyist in 
Washington representing weapons contractors to be 
kept informed of these changes, which could determine 
whether or not a contractor's new system has a chance, 
or why an existing one may be cancelled, phased out, 
or increased. Third, the Office of the Director, 
Program Analysis and Evaluation, is the last office 
involved in the Programming Phase - making it 
important because the next stage is the budgeting. 
III. Budgeting Phase (August 1973 to January 1974) 
III-1 In August and September 1973, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Components, based 
on their Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) 
and the Defense Resources Board's Program 
Decision Memoranda (PDMs), prepare their 
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proposed budgets. Towards the middle of 
September, these proposed budgets are submitted 
back to the Defense Resources Board (DRB); and 
following their review, positions on the 
proposed Budgets are determined by the DRB. 
These positions are recorded in a set of 
proposed Program Budget Decisions (PDBs). 
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The DRB prepares a series of these Program 
Budget Decisions (PBDs) which are then submitted 
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for review 
and approval in October and November 1974. 
Arguably, the influence of the Secretary of 
Defense is lacking at this stage. The 
suggestion is that the Secretary of Defense 
would prefer to distance himself temporarily 
from the politics, which would be exhibited 
by inter-Service rivalry of the DoD Components 
until the majority of it has been resolved. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, in managing 
the entire Department of Defense he would not 
have time to become embroiled and held down by 
such in-house fighting. This suggests that, 
should he have a certain opinion of maintaining 
or increasing funds for a given system, he would 
direct that opinion through his Deputy Secretary 
of Defense. Essentially, "the Deputy SECDEF is 
the man who runs the Pentagon". 
40] 
111-2 In October and November 1973, aside from 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense reviewing the 
Program Budget Decisions (PBDs); the PBDs 
provided by the Defense Resources Board (DRB) 
are passed back to the Department of Defense 
DoD Components. This is a significant phase 
because not only do the DOD Components have a 
chance to prepare for items that they are in 
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disagreement with the DRB (which become 
"appeal issues") but, more importantly, they 
can do this with the knowledge of how the 
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense is 
proceeding on those issues. This permits the 
DoD Components to prepare various strategies 
or scenarios in the hope of being coeposetic 
with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In 
November, these appeal issues are presented to 
the Defense Resources Board for review and 
resolution. 
111-3 In early December 1973, the Defense 
Resources Board (DRB) meets to review the 
proposed budget. Based on this review, the 
DRB prepares its recommendations to the Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) and submits them to the 
SECDEF in mid-December. The SECDEF, in turn, 
makes his recommendations to the President who, 
after review, provides the SECDEF with his final 
budget guidance. The President himself does not 
submit the budget, but his opinions and those 
of the National Security Council and the 
Department of State's have been worked into a budget 
through the Office of Management and Budget. 
And it should also not be thought that this 
budget should differ greatly from that of the 
Secretary of Defense, because, as this is an 
ongoing process, the military inputs or links 
have been made to the Executive through the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who maintain a seat on 
the National Security Council. Furthermore, 
communications are constantly flowing between 
the Department of Defense and the Executive 
Branch of government. 
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111-4 In mid-December 1973, the whole process, 
appearing quite disjointed, suddenly gels. 
Based on the approved Program Budget Decisions 
(PBDs), the DoD Components' Program Budget 
Decision (PBD) appeal issues, and the 
President's final budget guidance provided to 
the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Resources 
Board (DRB) meets to establish the final budget 
guidance for the DoD Components. The DoD 
Components review their earlier submitted 
proposed Budgets and the approved Program 
Budget Decisions (PBDs) and appeal issues, and 
based on the final budget guidance, prepare 
their proposed Final Budgets. This is 
completed within a period of one week! 
Clearly, the majority of the budget decisions 
had been reached earlier. In fact, it is said 
that this stage is only formal, because in 
actuality, the decisions had been reached 
earlier in October/November (see Stage I11-2). 
41] 
Moreover, this period has actually been said 
to have nothing to do with the present budget, 
except to count wins or losses, and prepare 
in-house reports for next year's budget, because, 
already work is being prepared due to the 
overlapping of the entire Fiscal Cycle, 
discussed below. 
42] 
111-5 In late December, the DoD Components' 
proposed Final Budgets are forwarded to the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller (OASD)(C), who combines them into 
a single proposed Final Department of Defense 
Budget. This is then submitted to the Secretary 
of Defense for review and approval. At this 
stage, the Secretary of Defense should noiv have 
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a complete picture of the budget requirements 
and be formulating his arguments for the 
enactment process. 
III-6 In early January 1974, the Final 
Department of Defense's Budget is then 
forwarded to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), where it is incorporated into 
a single National Budget, approved by the 
President and then submitted to the Congress 
for enactment. 
IV. Enactment 
Congress, as mentioned earlier, does not participate 
directly in the process of defence planning. Its 
role is that of resource allocation and concept critic 
which it performs by its Authorisations 
43], 
Appropriations 
44], 
and oversight451 capabilities. 
Further, "policy controversies" in Congress 
regarding defence programmes "are seldom made with 
any finality ... which inhibits [its] efforts to 
establish sharp definitions of purpose, policy, and 
strategy that might enhance the clarity of guidance 
for the national-security planner". 
46] 
Regarding its role of resource allocation, it is 
"an article of faith among political observers that 
Congress possesses ultimate control over executive 
actions, because 'it controls the purse strings'. "47] 
This is true, however, whether it is exercised is 
another story. "Congress is extremely slow to 
exercise this prerogative. Nowhere is this clearer 
than in the area of the defense budget. "48] The 
purse strings argument, which implies a rational 
decision made on the merits of a given programme, 
is "particularly unsatisfactory when it comes to 
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the yearly appropriations for our defense 
establishment". 
49] 
For example, Congress could 
reduce military spending by making any one of a 
hundred or so possible cuts in the Pentagon's 
budget. "However, this almost never happens. The 
Pentagon generally comes away with everything it 
wants, and sometimes more besides. " 
50] 
Regardless, Congressional review of the Defense 
portion of the President's Budget is undertaken from 
the separate standpoints of Authorisation of programmes 
and Appropriation of funds. Annual authorising 
legislation is required for appropriations for 
major procurement items (for example, aircraft, 
missiles, naval vessels); Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E); authorised military 
personnel and strengths; and for the authorisation 
of military construction programmes. Authorisation 
legislation is prepared by the Armed Services 
Committeesof both the House and the Senate; and 
the Appropriation legislation by the Defense Sub- 
Committees of the House and Senate Appropriations 
Committee. A description of the Authorisation 
process is found in footnote 
51] The Appropriations 
process is similar to the Authorisation process and 
5 
. is found in footnote 
Congressional decision making is dominated by the 
committee system which currently includes 38 standing 
committees. (For a list of the committees relevant 
to weapons procurement refer to footnote 95, found 
in Chapter 1. ) On the one hand, the committee 
system has allowed for power centres to "proliferate, 
but decision making became immensely more difficult, 
because no fac5iln, official or informal, can deliver 
consistently". More shall be said of Congressional 
activity in the following Chapter, but the important 
.., 
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aspect to be aware of is that although they do not 
participate in defence planning directly, a programme 
is dependent on Congressional approval and funding. 
Once a programme is funded, the Apportionment 
Process follows. 
V. Apportionment Process/Execution 
V-1 The Apportionment Process (not to be 
confused with Appropriations Process) normally 
takes place in late September, early October, 
as the Appropriations Bill is finalised, and 
passed by Congress and signed by the President 
into law. Apportionment is based on 
Presidential Guidance and reflects his control 
and restrictions. At the same time, the 
Treasury issues a series of Warrants to 
reflect the types and amount of funds 
available. The actual Apportionment process 
is exercised through the office of Management 
and Budget which provides guidance to the 
various Executive departments and agencies 
based on the President's Guidance and Treasury 
Warrants. Apportionment is designed to 
prevent over obligation and funds are made 
available on an annual, quarterly or other 
periodic basis. 
V-2 Based on the guidance that is received 
from the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense provides 
its guidance to the DOD Components. The 
Apportionment Process and the Apportionment 
Requests (from DoD Components) also serve the 
important function of updating the DOD 
Components' budgets which were submitted to 
the office of the Secretary of Defense over 
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a year earlier. In other words, the 
Apportionment Process of September/October 
1974 is dealing with a Budget from DoD 
Components (proposed in August to September 
1973). However, simultaneously with the 
Apportionment Process of September/October 
1974, the DoD Components are proposing their 
budgets for 1976. More of this is discussed 
below in Fiscal Cycle Overlap. 
V-3 Apportionments are made on the basis of 
hearings conducted by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, and the DoD Components, wherein 
Apportionment Requests are considered. In the 
absence of an enacted appropriation, the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) establishes 
authorised obligation rates for each appropriation. 
After the Appropriation Bill is enacted, and 
the apportionment is released by the OMB, the 
apportionment becomes the SECDEF's authorised 
obligation rate. 
V-4 Following the establishment of the rate 
of obligation by the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF), the DoD Components allocate funds to 
the responsible officials in their organisations. 
These allocations are usually subdivided into 
sub-allocations, allotments and sub-allotments, 
or are included in operating budgets to make 
funds available for commitment, obligation and 
expenditure. A commitment is a reservation of 
funds based upon currently directed use of 
funds leading to obligations. An obligation 
is a liability, for example, a firm contract 
for goods or services. An expenditure is 
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payment of an obligation. Allocations, 
commitments, obligations and expenditures 
are controlled to avoid overspending. 
54] 
Once the Secretary of Defense has submitted his 
Budget to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
the role of Deputy Secretary of Defense seems to all 
but disappear. Although he is seen also participating 
in other roles, for example, he accompanies the 
SECDEF to Capitol Hill for Congressional Hearings; 
the suggestion is that he has knot abdicated his 
influence in the overall process, for two reasons. 
First, it is now the duty of the Secretary of Defense 
to appear in full control and manage the remainder 
of the budgetary process through the political jungle 
of Congressional Committees and Sub-committees and 
the scrutiny of the OMB. Essentially, his political 
talents are tested during this process, which unfolds 
in a vet public arena. He must be viewed to be in 
control. Also, the Secretary of Defense communicates 
directly to the DoD Components during the Apportionment 
and allocation of funds, which creates the impression 
that he is completely in command, acting as manager 
and distributing the funds directly to the parties 
concerned. This line of communication in actuality 
is maintained by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense with the DoD Components. A more tangible 
reason for the SECDEF to be in direct communication 
with the DoD Components, is that if a change should 
occur in the requirements of men or material, he can 
make adjustments with the various financial control 
techniques available to him. These techniques are 
discussed shortly, but any changes, unless the 
resultant of unforeseen events (outbreak of hostilities), 
will be identified as emanating from below. Even 
changes in finances will involve the Deputy SECDEF, 
before the SECDEF is briefed. 
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The second reason for the disappearance of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense is that he and the Defense 
Resources Board (DRB) have already begun considering 
the next two years' budgets. The two budgets 
respectively are simultaneously at two different 
stages, not to mention the additional budget that 
was just submitted. This supports an earlier claim 
that the Secretary of Defense does not have the time 
to concern himself with two other budgets, whilst he 
is trying to argue the present one through Congress. 
However, it does permit the SECDEF the knowledge 
that if funds should be cancelled by Congress for a 
given programme, he can direct his Deputy Secretary 
to review and/or insert the programme into future 
budgets. This increases his chances of manoeuvring 
various projects. 
Fiscal Cycle Overlap and Budgetary Issues 
As mentioned earlier, it takes over two years for the 
annual Fiscal Cycle, from the Commander in Chiefs' 
(CINCs') inputs to the Secretary of Defense until the 
final passage and signing of the Appropriations Bill. 
As a result, therefore, there are always three 
different fiscal years' budgets which are active. 
See Figure 3-II below, where this budget overlap is 
shown graphically. 
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For example, Stage 111-4, whilst the DoD Components 
are preparing their Final Budget, they are also 
preparing for next year's planning (See Figure 3-II). 
Various trade-offs usually appear between the 
Services, with the knowledge that a loss this year 
could mean a win next year, or vice versa. Fiscal 
Cycle operlap can be a benefit to the DoD. In short, 
it is an evasion of financial controls exerted by 
Congress. For example, in the case of the F-16, in 
1972 Congress imposed language in its appropriations 
to the Air Force and Navy that they strive for 
commonality in their aircraft, or lose funding. 
Both the Air Force and the Navy were against such 
controls exerted upon them, because each envisaged 
a different role for themselves, in relation to 
their respective aircraft performances. Meanwhile, 
other monies were appropriated through the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, and changes were made 
in the programmes scheduling, until the arguments of 
the commonality advocates in Congress fell on deaf 
ears. 
The suggestion is, that Fiscal Cycle overlap is an 
organisational technique, which affords not only 
trade-offs, but lessens the uncertainties of a 
weapon system, from the perspective of the contractor, 
as well as the DoD Component concerned. This is 
especially apparent during the Concept Exploration 
phase (and also during Demonstration and Validation) 
where trade-offs of requirements and available 
technology occur. If funding for a contractor 
working in conjunction with the DoD Components is 
not realised, the requirements can be altered for 
review in another budget. Or funds, outside of the 
scrutiny of Congress, are made available from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Secretary of Defense is in 
direct communication through the OSD and Deputy 
SECDEF with the DoD Components allowing him various 
financial control techniques. One financial control 
technique used by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) is to defer approved programmes until 
later in the budget execution period. This can 
either be utilised to restrict the flow of funds 
into the economy, as well as to control programmes 
by withholding funding authorisation until complete 
justification is provided. An example of controlling 
a programme occurred to the B-1 bomber. Due to leaks 
in the fuel tanks, the Air Force froze funds to 
General Electric via the SECDEF. Another OSD 
technique is the imposition of recoupment objectives 
on the military departments. A recoupment objective 
represents the amount of money that OSD estimates 
can be saved in the construction, procurement and 
research, developing, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) 
accounts in current or prior year programmes. 
55] 
Although this is used, the recovery by such reduction 
is seldom realised. If anything, the cost increases, 
which is expounded upon below. However, for the 
purposes of this discussion, the suggestion is that 
it is a technique to appear on paper as reducing 
cost in a given fiscal year, and, after reaching a 
threshold caused by prior investment, increase in 
funding is usually the resultant. 
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has the authority, 
with the approval of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) to transfer funds from one appropriation 
to another if such transfers do not exceed statutory 
limits. This is argued on the grounds that it is 
the SECDEF and his. office and departments who are 
better qualified than, say, Congress to meet any 
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changing needs during a given Fiscal Year. However, 
it has been the author's experience that this is a 
way of either by-passing Congress or keeping any 
expected Congressional opposition to a minimum. 
Aside from the transfer authority, another method 
available is the Supplemental Budgets (or Deficiency 
Budgets). 
561 
Supplemental and Deficiency Budgets are 
in essence additions to the annual budget proposed 
by the SECDEF to request funds for major unforeseen__ 
emergencies during the current year. For example, 
after the fall of the Shah of Iran, the transitional 
Bakhtiar Government cancelled US military equipment 
(already on order) worth $7 billion in February 
1979.571 To alleviate the burden on the contractors 
for equipment already produced, the Carter 
Administration requested and received a supplemental 
budget of $2.2 billion. 
58] 
A further method by which the DoD exerts budgetary 
control is by means of Reprogramming. 
591 
This 
procedure involves the re-application of funds 
between programmes within a particular appropriation. 
Dollar limits, referred to as thresholds, which are 
set by Congress, dictate who may approve the 
re-application of funds. In other words, changes 
which exceed certain thresholds, or which meet other 
substantive criteria, require notification or prior 
approval of Congressional Committees. Obviously, 
this is not a technique to employ in order to bypass 
Congress` especially when over the past two decades 
Congress^ exert tight dollar thresholds, but there 
is still some room for manoeuvreability. 
By far the most important techniques, and least 
probably noticed, is that the SECDEF has a separate 
emergency fund for research and development (R&D) 
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programmes. 
601 
The amount is authorised by Congress, 
and varies from year to year. Aside from DoD having 
relative freedom in applying these funds to various 
weapons systems without Congressional scrutiny, the 
importance lies in the fact that by doing so, and 
the amount, is a gauge or litmus test for future 
systems. Of course, the "amount" varies . for 
example, amounts for emergency R&D funding for a new 
rifle are considerably less than emergency R&D 
funding for an aircraft wing design. But by 
authorising funds to a programme and how many times, 
is a very good indication that a given system has 
won the merit of the DoD. For example, in the case 
of the F-16, before Congress had its first chance 
to review the General Electric engine in the FY 1972 
Budget, $30 million had already been spent by General 
Electric and "independent (emergency) R&D funds". 
61] 
Also, operational to having received these funds, 
was the advocacy of the fighter mafia and the support 
of Mr David Packard, then Deputy Secretary of 
Defense. 
62) 
Advocacy of a programme plays a role in 
any of the stages and techniques, or for that matter, 
in any type of decision. However, advocacy found 
within a stage or technique which affords the DoD 
the greatest manoeuvreability, and the least 
constraint, provides a good measurement of a weapon 
system's chances of final approval. Moreover, 
advocacy and the support granted it in the form of 
monies appropriated, yields credence to a weapon 
system in its earlier phases, and also increases the 
amount invested, bringing it closer to a threshold 
where it is difficult or unacceptable to cancel a 
programme. 
Before considering the Life Cycle of a given weapon 
system, in the next Chapter, an important management 
tool used for decision making within the Fiscal Cycle, 
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as well as the Life Cycle needs to be mentioned. This 
is the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). The FYDP is the 
publication that records, summarises and displays the 
decisions that have been approved by the Secretary of 
Defense, as constituting the Department of Defense's 
programme. It is a management tool that keeps 
management informed of what has been accomplished in 
the past and what is to be planned in the future, to 
support the national strategy decisions. The FYDP 
includes an identification of force and support data, 
which has its programme structure on a foundation of 
mission and support related programmes. 
631 
The Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is not a document 
published every five years, setting the parameters 
by which the decision makers may operate. In fact, 
the FYDP is updated at least three times a year. 
There are at least 15 different FYDPs in a given five 
year period. The interesting point is that the 
changes coincide with the developments of the Fiscal 
Cycle, not only within one cycle but three in progress 
concurrently. The first major update takes place in 
October, after Congress has enacted the new fiscal 
year's Appropriations Bills. The second update takes 
place the following January, based on the President's 
submission of his next year's Budget (to be reviewed and 
acted upon by Congress the following October). The 
third update takes place in May, based on the Program 
Objectives Memoranda (See, II-1 in text above) which 
will eventually be part of a budget to be reviewed and 
acted upon by Congress a year and a half later. A 
better way to. view the 3 major updates is that the 
first is the result of a given Fiscal Year's (FY's) 
budget; the second update the result of developments 
of a FY+1 budget; the third update the result of a 
FY+2 budget. Thus, the obvious point is that the 
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overlapping of the Fiscal Cycle (three active budgets) 
affects the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). However, 
the subtle reality is that instead of the FYDP acting 
as a guidance, it can be a tool used by management. 
Consider the following - the Department of Defense 
(DoD) on a whole provides the major inputs into the 
FYDP. However, historical data shows that the Dod's 
Five Year Defense Plans are consistently undercosted. 
64) 
A report prepared by the General Accounting Office 
furthermore states that "one of the major contributing 
factors is a systematic bias in DoD cost estimating 
practice that encourages the use of optimistic cost 
assumptions while excluding actual cost experience 
and the reality of the budgeting process 
environment". 
65] 
DoD is responsible for estimating out-year costs 
(years two through five of the FYDP) and usually 
bases its estimate on the view that the costs will 
decrease as more and more units are produced. This 
represents a simplistic price and quantity 
relationship, which is in essence, the more you 
produce, the less additional units cost. This 
relationship is referred to as the "learning curve" 
or as the "experience curve", or as the "progress 
curve". Primarily, this emphasis enables planning 
for greater quantities with similar or lower 
projections of funding in the out years of the FYDP. 
This type of planning is based on planned costs 
decline, but in reality actual cost growth becomes 
evident. DoD often forecasts the declining future 
costs commonly using the models of 90,85, or 80 
percent learning curves. For example, by applying 
a 90 percent learning curve formula, DoD projects 
constant dollar cost declines of 10 percent as 
cumulative production doubles. The constant dollar 
forecast is then inflated using the DoD procurement 
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inflation index - simply, that is the forecast on 
which the FYDP programme estimates are based. 
However, estimating costs in this fashion neglects 
a basic maxim of defence economics, which is, defence 
plans have a propensity to change and systems do run 
into trouble. These changes are "very expensive 
since they reverse the normal trend of the production 
learning curve". 
66] 
Congress, having realised this years ago, required 
the DoD to make available a quarterly Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) on the cost status of major 
weapon systems. These reports provide current DoD 
estimates of the total cost changes since the 
previous quarter. Thus, by comparing successive 
estimates with the original ones for major procurement 
programmes, it is possible to identify the extent of 
price increases and many of their causes. These 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), however, do not 
give a complete picture of escalation in equipment 
costs, because the DoD changes the list of weapon 
systems reported on in different SARs, and, also 
alters its cost categories. Moreover, auditors of 
the General Accounting Office (Congress' watchdog 
agency) repeatedly charge the Pentagon for not 
complying fully with SAR requirements. For example, 
an audit found that in a 1976 SAR, the programme 
cost estimate of the F-16 fighter was understated 
by $260 million. 
671 
SARs are usually prepared for 
about 50 major weapon systems, but because SAR 
coverage normally begins after a system enters 
Full-Scale Development, many major systems in 
advanced development are excluded. In addition, 
most modifications to programmes are either excluded 
from the SARs or when they are reported, no 
explanation is offered to Congress. For example, a 
General Accounting Office Report68) stated that in 
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the "reporting system as of June 30,1979" ... the 
"performance specifications were changed on two 
occasions for the F-16 without any explanation of 
the impact of the changes. " 
691 
Cost overruns, or as DoD prefers to call it "cost 
growth", is not in any way unique to only the Five 
Year Defense Plan (FYDP) or the SAR - it permeates 
the whole of the Fiscal Cycle Processes. As former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, said in 
August 1970, "Let's face it - the fact is that there 
has been bad management of many defense programs in 
the past. We spent billions of the taxpayers' dollars; 
sometimes we spent it badly. "701 
A brief review of past practices in contracting will 
shed some light on the problem of cost overruns. 
Development programmes were managed in the 1950s almost 
routinely in terms of crash programmes and massive cost 
overruns. The sense of urgency surrounding the US 
missile programmes in the 1950s, in particular, led to 
the practice of spending whatever sums were necessary to 
realise their deployment as quickly as possible. The 
major device used by the government to get defence firms 
to undertake these programmes, on a crash basis, was the 
"cost-plus-fixed-fee" contract, which transferred the 
risks of development inherent in the new systems from the 
defence firm to the government. 
711 The result of this 
contracting system was massive cost overruns. Studies 
performed by the RAND Corporation and the Harvard Business 
School found that in the 1950s the average weapon's cost 
was three times as much as expected. 
72] 
Cognisant of the results, Robert McNamara revised 
the "incentive-type" contracts and "contract 
definition" to procure major systems in the 1960s. 
Essentially, the defence firm had no incentives to 
control the costs under the "cost-plus-fixed-fee" 
contracts, and McNamara and defence officials sought 
to create such incentives. Instead of guaranteeing 
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a contractor a fixed profit, no matter how large his 
costs, they related profits inversely to costs: the 
higher a contractor's costs, the lower his profits; 
and the lower his costs, the higher his profits. 
"Contract definition" was initiated by the McNamara 
team731 which tried to define a project more clearly 
before substantial sums were committed to it so that 
many of the uncertainties inherent in development 
programmes might be reduced. 
741 
"Contract definition" 
was essentially a competition carried on, usually 
between two companies, for a period of several months 
in order to determine which firm would receive the 
development contract. This led to each company 
preparing extensive technical designs and cost 
estimates on paper - one of these paper studies 
"stood eight feet high and weighed a ton". 
751 
Thus, in the 1960s, "contract definition" and 
"incentive contracts" went hand in hand. The former 
was intended to reduce the risks in developing a 
weapon system by eliminating many uncertainties; 
the latter, to divide the reduced risks between the 
government and the firm chosen. Both devices should 
have reduced cost overruns - it did in the sense 
that cost overruns were on the average close to twice 
instead of three times the estimated costs of the 
1950s. However, overall costs of a weapon system 
were not reduced. The point being that "incentive- 
type" contracts Affected the overall prices of 
weapon systems. As stated, the "cost-plus-fixed-fee" 
contract of the 1950s pushed firms to underestimate 
their costs because they faced no penalty by doing 
so. In the 1960s, unrealistically low bids were 
replaced by unrealistically high bids because if a 
firm could negotiate a price with the government 
well above what they thought the programme could cost, 
they would make a larger profit than would otherwise 
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be the case. If a defence firm has reduced its cost 
overrun by inflating the total contract price, 
overall cost has not been reduced. 
76] 
Moreover, 
it is argued that the reduction of cost overruns 
was not due to any significant improvement in the 
efficiency of the weapons acquisition process 
itself, but rather to a reduced demand for 
technological advance under less urgent conditions. 
The weapon systems of the 1960s incorporated less 
technological advances than those in the 1950s; in 
other words, the urgency was being reduced, and the 
state of the art was not pushed so far. As a direct 
result, cost overruns were smaller. 
77] 
The "cost- 
plus-fixed-fee" contracting of the 1950s and the 
"incentive/definition contracts" of the 1960s 
are still utilised today. 
As a result of increased cost, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) formed the Major Acquisition Group in 
mid-1969. The new group, established within GAO's 
Defense Division, was given the responsibility of 
making continuing reviews, on a current basis, of 
major weapon systems which are in various stages of 
the acquisition cycle. The review responsibility 
begins with the decision of the Secretary of Defense 
to commit substantial resources on a particular 
system and carries through the various stages of a 
weapon system. The Major Acquisition Group has two 
primary objectives : 
(1) To identify the basic causes of weapon 
system cost growth, schedule slippage, 
and the deterioration of the originally 
expected performance characteristics; and 
(2) the options available, in the remainder 
of a programme, in order to make 
recommendations for improvement. 78] 
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To accomplish these two objectives, the Major 
Acquisitions Group reports annually to the Congress 
in the form of a General Accounting Office Report. 
The majority of this report is based on the 
information provided by the DoD in its quarterly 
report - the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). 
As mentioned above, the DoD reports what it judges 
to be necessary, thus creating a void in the 
information that the Major Acquisition Group may be 
seeking in attempting to control costs. Although 
the GAO reports include more information than the 
SARs, and the GAO has even been critical of the Dcd's 
reporting in the SARs; an interesting relationship 
between DoD and GAO is demonstrated when discussing 
their reasons for cost overruns. 
In 1971, during the developmental phase of the F-16, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard supplied 
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress with the 
following causes for cost overruns : 
1) Engineering change - an alteration in the 
physical or functional characteristics 
of a system; 
2) Quantity change -a change in the quantity 
to be procured; 
3) Support change -a change in support 
item requirements; 
4) Schedule change -a change in a delivery 
schedule, completion date or intermediate 
milestone of development or production; 
5) Unpredictable change -a change caused by 
Acts of God, work stoppage, Federal or 
State law, changes or other similar 
unforeseeable events; 
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6) Economic change -a change due to the 
operation of one or more factors of 
the economy; 
7) Estimating change -a change in program 
or project cost due to refinements of 
the base estimate; 
8) Contract performance incentives -a net 
change in contractual amount resulting 
from differences between the contractor's 
actual performance and that indicated by 
performance (including delivery) incentive 
targets; 
9) Contract cost overruns -a net change in 
contractual amount ... not attributable to 
any other cause of cost growth previously 
defined. 79] 
JW Management (or even deceit) on the part of the 
military-industrial partnership between government 
and industry is not identifiable in any of the nine 
definitions. Of course, it would not be in the 
best interest for the DoD to place part of the blame 
with itself or its fiscal system. However, since 
the major Acquisition Group of the GAO was founded 
with one of its objectives to investigate the causes 
of weapon system cost growth, it would be expected 
that they should be the first to indicate a case of 
blatant mismanagement. However, in their first 
annual report, GAO in a study of 52 major weapons 
programmes offered a similar array of causal 
categories as did Packard in his definitions : 
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Cost Growth Elements Percentage 
New Quantity Changes 9.9 
Engineering Changes 17.0 
Support Changes 5.7 
Schedule Changes 10.9 
Economic Changes 16.7 
Estimating Changes 25.8 
Sundry 4.5 
Unidentified 9.4 
99.9 80] 
Again, no mention of mismanagement as a cause of cost 
overruns. But, on a more interesting note, what is 
incredible is that GAO, and its Major Acquisition 
Group, acting as a watchdog agency for Congress, 
were unaware that Congress had heard testimony from 
an official of the DoD, one year earlier, pertaining 
to mismanagement problems. Former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, Robert Anthony, provided the following 
list of cost overruns causes to Senator Proxmire's 
Joint Economic Committee in May 1970 : 
1) Low initial cost estimates by contractors; 
2) Concurrent development and production; 
3) High overhead costs; 
4) Inadequate cost accounting standards; 
5) Profit determination as a percentage of cost; 
6) Inadequate management control systems in 
the industry; 
7) Lack of DOD interest in cost control. 
811 
The above causes are a far cry from those voiced by 
Packard and the GAO, particularly the first, which 
implies deceit on the part of the industry when 
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providing their initial cost estimates. It is probable 
that the reason for such deceit is competition. 
"Competing firms bid unrealistically low in the hope 
that, if they win, they will be able later ... to 
renegotiate back up to a more reasonable price 
level ... ". 
823 This process is known as "getting well" 
or "contract nourishment". However, all is not so 
one-sided on the part of the industry; some of the 
blame lies in the competition found within DoD. 
According to a Lockheed Manager : "A guy in DoD wants 
to get a program started. Realising he can't sell it 
unless it costs less, he will cut the estimate, 
sometimes unconsciously. The contractor does the same. " 
831 
The contractor and the concerned DoD Components work 
closely, researching new technologies and matching 
requirements throughout the life of a weapon system. 
This is especially pronounced in the earlier stages. 
The case of the F-16 will suggest this, in that both 
the contractors and DoD Components provide low initial 
costs. Further, because the F-16 programme was a 
prototype programme, which also had its schedule of 
testing shortened, there was the problem of producing 
an aircraft, still under development, which increased 
costs. These and other causes of cost overruns will 
be discussed in the case of the F-16, but for now, the 
mismanagement of a programme comes from both the 
contractors and the DoD Components. 
However, the issue of competition becomes very cloudy 
when considering that instead of truly competitive 
contracts, the "military services rely on 'sole source' 
negotiated contracts for up to 70 percent of their 
equipment programs. " 
841 Thus, a small percentage of 
military procurement dollars are actually awarded through 
price competition. For example, in 1975, only 30 percent 
of military procurement dollars were awarded through 
price competition, of. any form, which had declined 
from 35.8 percent in 1971.85] 
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An even lower amount of competition is demonstrated 
by comparing the methods used in private industry 
for bidding on contracts with that of the government. 
In private industry, a common method to ensure 
efficiency and competition is to advertise for 
contract bids. Specifications for a project are 
decided upon and contractors are asked to submit 
sealed bids. The lowest realistic bid able to meet 
the desired needs is usually accepted. This type of 
method is not used for over 90 percent of the Defense 
Department's purchases. In 1975, only 8.5 percent 
of all military procurement dollars were spent on 
contracts awarded through general market advertising. 
861 
Of course, it is Obvious that it would 
be impossible to advertise openly for a contractor 
to develop and produce many systems where secrecy 
is at issue. On any account, secrecy is not really 
the issue. The suggestion is that the DoD Components 
work closely with the contractors, constantly 
researching and developing new technologies. As the 
emerging technologies begin to match a Service's 
requirements, the closer then that system is to 
becoming reality. This is discussed later in greater 
detail, but the point here is that there are 
limitations imposed on open competition because of 
this close working relationship where there are 
many cases of a Service's requirements actually 
conceived from evolving technologies - for example - 
the Stealth Technology. 
The amount of competition is also debatable. In a 
letter to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, 
the GAO stated that, "DoD officials portrayed 
competitive rates for the first half of fiscal year 
1981, ranging from a high of 69 percent in testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services to a 
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low of 45 percent in their procurement statistics". 
87 
Further, the procurement statistics were "also 
revised to include certain competitive non-military 
awards and to exclude certain non-competitive 
military awards". 
88] 
It was the GAO's opinion that 
"DoD's presentation of, and changes to, its statistics 
could even lead to a real decline in competition". 
891 
In the overall procurement system, there is a type 
of competition which shall be referred to as 
"abridged competition". Instead of open competition, 
as found in private industry, a more narrowly 
prescribed form of price competition and a more 
widely used method of military contracting 
"competitive negotiated contracts" is common in this 
arena. In essence, a limited number of contractors 
are requested to bid on a project. Theoretically, 
the lowest bid able to tackle the project is selected. 
Aside from the necessity of secrecy in some systems, 
Defense Department officials have argued that 
"abridged competition" is necessary because open 
price competition is very difficult for very complex 
and sophisticated weapons, almost impossible in 
some programmes, such as electronics and aircraft 
development. Moreover, arguably, there are perhaps 
only two or three corporations able to meet required 
specifications, or maybe even just one. This 
argument of open competition versus abridged 
competition appears to be an especially moot point 
to an official in the Defense Department. As a 
researcher for US Aircraft at the Congressional 
Research Service said, "what difference does it make 
if its open competition or limited [abridged] 
competition - it's still competition. "901 Hpwever, "true 
competition does not exist at either the larger, 
prime contractor level or at the smaller, critical- 
component supplier level. "911 
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The suggestion is that it. is more . than 
"abridged competition" but actually "predetermined 
abridged competition" whereby one who is selected 
for one contract has a lesser chance of winning the 
next contract of a similar weapon system. This is 
not simply due to competition in the sense of giving 
each contractor a piece of the pie. That is too 
simplistic. The lack of competition is brought upon 
the contractors by themselves. As in any organisation 
or business, there are limited resources available. 
Although the contractors are constantly researching 
available avenues to win contracts, it is impossible 
for them to be involved in all available options 
simultaneously. This is due not only to the close 
relationship the contractor has with the DoD 
Components but also, directly in correlation with 
the contractor's limitations in terms of his prior 
commitments to resource investment. The other 
dimension to be aware of is a political one - jobs. 
For example, General Dynamics and Northrop are two 
contractors able to construct fighter aircraft. 
Once General Dynamics had been awarded the contract 
for the F-16, it stood a lesser chance to win the 
next. Both companies had invested large amounts into 
the F-16 programme, but now that General Dynamics 
had been chosen, it would be devoting more resources 
to that programme. In the meantime, Northrop would 
be able to work with the Navy, and eventually be 
awarded the contract for the F/A-18. 
On the surface, the above might also suggest that 
once General Dynamics had been chosen, Northrop was 
bailed out so as to preserve or increase jobs, and 
thus keep a large contractor economically viable. 
However, it is not as simple as that, for if Northrop 
were to argue solely on that basis, they leave 
themselves open to criticisms of being inferior to 
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General Dynamics for not having been selected 
originally. Another dimension which should be 
considered is the nature of the Fiscal Cycle (and 
also factors later seen in the Life Cycle), where 
three cycles are operating simultaneously, and if 
a contractor appears to be losing ground to another 
contractor on a given system, a shift in strategies 
takes place whereby that contractor concentrates 
on research and upcoming contracts, leaving the 
other contractor to fulfil its newly won contract. 
As stated, each contractor, no matter how large, 
has finite resources available to itself. Given 
the many hurdles outlined above, and the many more 
to be seen in the Life Cycle, it would be virtually 
impossible for a given contractor to allay interest 
for the award of every contract in a family of 
weapons. 
The suggestion is that jobs and economics are 
a major issue but are operative in a more subtle 
manner. A large military contractor will sub- 
contract out hundreds of smaller components, 
especially in a more complicated system, such as 
a new aircraft. Various strategies are worked upon 
where instead of appearing to be a contractor 
struggling to keep afloat it is better to shift 
that onus on to the many subcontractors struggling 
to stay ahead. Thus, instead of selecting your 
subcontractors to be "down the street" when 
considering final assembly, it is more fashionable 
to deal with those who are farther away. Although 
this might appear to make no economic sense, it 
helps to win the ultimate contract. The distance 
of the subcontractors ultimately drives up costs 
for the final assembly but given the system of the 
Life Cycle it is worth it. For the most part, 
excepting some of the methods used by the Secretary 
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of Defense, the Congress ultimately holds the power 
of the purse. The simple economic equation works 
as follows : the more subcontractors found in 
different states will add votes from the House of 
Representatives and the Senate when they are 
concerned with the Authorisation and Appropriations 
Bills. This is where methods used by private 
business to drive down costs have no meaning to those 
dealing with military contractors. This simple 
equation works best in the House of Representatives 
where a Representative in any state would swerve 
away from cutting jobs in his home state or in his 
own constituency. A Representative's term is only 
two years and the latter half of his tenure is 
spent seeking re-election. A slate of keeping or 
increasing jobs, and being on record for doing so 
in his constituency, will translate into votes. Given 
the nature of a Representative's short term in office 
(two years compared to a Senator's six years), 
he/she more than his/her counterpart in the Senate 
has to be concerned with domestic issues. 
It is not to be assumed that this strategy is 
pursued only on the part of the contractor. That is 
only half of the picture. Additionally, the 
"device of large scale contracting for the services 
of science and industry has become a new kind of 
federalism". 
921 
The whole development of military 
hardware represents "functions that the United States 
Government has decentralised and delegated mostly 
to the private sector of society". 
931 
The 
alternative available would have been for 
"government to accrue these functions to itself and 
thereby augment an already monolithic bureaucracy". 
941 
However, the dispersal of these functions creates 
a problem for the DoD. As former Deputy Assistant 
:;, 
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Secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler stated, 
"although DoD is virtually the sole buyer at the 
prime contractor level, and its prime contractors 
are oligopolies extensively using government plants, 
equipment and money, DoD has essentially no policies 
or organisations dedicated to planning for the most 
effective use of its industrial resources". 
95] 
As stated earlier, and to be discussed, contractors 
work closely with their DoD Components especially 
in the earlier stages of a weapon systems development. 
"Contractors perform research and development to 
maintain their competitive position by coming up 
with new products for the Services". 
961 
Once a 
Service has chosen a given system, and the contractor, 
it is also in the Service's best interest to prepare 
strategies and scenarios to enhance their chances 
of funding from Congress. Proof of this comes from 
perhaps their worst attempt, which was made public 
in a letter from Representative Jack Brooks. As 
Chairman of the Committee on Government Operations, 
Representative Brooks wrote a letter to the 
Comptroller General, of the General Accounting Office, 
on 26 July 1982, which read, "it appears that DoD 
has developed comprehensive files on Members to 
further aid their lobbying efforts and possibly 
other illegal and unethical activities". 
97] 
Thus, 
it appears that the DoD Components, as well as, the 
contractors are in the business of promoting their 
weapon system. However, to appreciate more fully 
the development of a weapon system, the discussion 
is directed to the other parallel decision process - 
The Life Cycle. 
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52. The Appropriation is very much similar to the 
Authorisation Process in that the Bill must 
be considered by the committees of both 
houses, in this case the Appropriations 
Committees (and their Defense Sub-Committees) 
pass both Houses, be compromised in conference, 
and finally passed and then signed by the 
President (See, footnote 51). The major 
logistical difference here though is that 
the Defense Sub-Committee of the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committee also "marks 
up" its own version and issues its own Sub- 
Committee Report to the full Committee. An 
obvious point, but of great impact, is that 
any item which should be deleted during the 
Authorisation Bill review and passage, 
cannot be considered during the Appropriation 
Bill review and passage. For the Fiscal Year 
(FY) 1975, this phase begins in February 
1974 and should be complete by September 1974. 
Source: "Understanding Congress, A Seminar 
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THE LIFE CYCLE AND THE DECISIONAL PROCESSES 
Life Cycle 
The development of major weapon systems is a primary 
function of the Department of Defense. The development 
process is as highly structured and complex as that 
witnessed in the Fiscal Cycle. The combined process 
involves close interaction between the needs of the 
users, the military, and the ability of the developer, 
the weapons contractors, to fulfil them. A substantial 
portion of personnel of the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) and the military services are 
involved in the process, in which the costs of 
weapons development consume a large portion of the 
military budget each year, and involves large 
segments of industry which are engaged in producing 
them. 
in the previous Chapter it was stated that the process 
of weapons acquisition should be broken into four 
phases : 
1. Concept Exploration (Conception) 
2. Demonstration and Validation (Research 
and Development 
3. Full-Scale Development 
4. Production and Deployment. 
l1 
These are the same four phases of a weapons system's 
Life Cycle, however there are Department of Defense 
Directives, DoD "Circulars" and Milestone decisions 
which accompany these phases. Before continuing 
to the intricacies of the documentation and 
milestones that must be surpassed in any weapon 
system's life .a 
few words must be devoted to the 
four phases. 
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Conceptual Phase 
Simply, this is the initial phase in weapons 
acquisition. In this phase, the need for new 
military capabilities is established, concepts are 
developed for a weapon system which will provide 
those capabilities, and technical feasibility is 
explored and determined. The objective of this 
phase is to provide the technical, economic and 
military basis for initiating full-scale development 
of the weapon system. Advancement to the next phase, 
Demonstration and Validation, is dependent on 
satisfying criteria designed to measure achievement 
of the conceptual phase's objective. According to 
the Comptroller General of the US, there are six 
objectives to be accomplished in this phase : 
- Mission and performance must be defined. 
A thorough trade-off analysis must be made 
among the elements of cost, schedule, and 
performance to ensure that the most effective. 
product is obtained when it is needed and at 
the most reasonable cost. 
-A Military Service must ensure that the best 
technical approaches have been selected for 
the new weapon system. 
- The Service must provide assurances that 
engineering rather than experimental effort 
remains uppermost in the program and that 
the needed technology is available. 
- The cost effectiveness of the proposed 
weapon must have been determined to be 
favourable in relation to the cost 
effectiveness of competing systems on a 
DoD-wide basis. 
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- The Service must ensure that the cost and 
schedule estimates are both credible and 
acceptable. 
2] 
Demonstration and Validation Phase 
In this phase, the preliminary designs and engineering 
for the weapon system are verified or accomplished; 
management plans are made; proposals for engineering 
development are solicited and evaluated; and (most 
important) a development contractors selected. The 
objective of this phase is to verify that the 
technical and economic bases for initiating full-scale 
development of the weapon system are valid. 
Advancement to the next phase, Full-Scale Development, 
depends upon the establishment of achievable 
performance specifications for the weapon system 
that are supported by an acceptable proposal for 
the selected development contractor. 
Full-Scale Development 
In this phase, the design and engineering of the 
weapon system is accomplished - the development 
contract is negotiated and awarded; the prototype 
of the weapon system is developed, purchased, and 
tested; and the detailed specifications for 
manufacturing the weapon system are prepared. The 
objective of this phase is to develop a weapon 
system acceptable for production. 
Production and Deployment 
The weapon system is produced in quantity for 
deployment. It begins when the production contract 
is negotiated and awarded. Production acceptance 
tests are conducted to validate the adequacy of the 
162 
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production model of the weapon system. Quantity 
production is initiated and the first operational 
unit is equipped with the weapon system and trained 
to use it. Production continues until all required 
quantities of the weapon system are produced. 
3] 
There are many potential weapon systems that never 
progress beyond the early stages of consideration. 
Some reasons for this are the unavailability of the 
necessary technology; the realisation that a 
potential system may become too costly for its 
intended purpose; the anticipated obsolescence 
in terms of the threat that the system is intended 
to counter; or another system concept subsequently 
may compete more effectively. The importance of 
the previous few pages is two-fold. First, before 
advancing from one phase to the next, approval must 
be received from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. Whether or not the SECDEF is a party to 
every decision in the proceedings will be a central 
focus of this section. The suggestion herein is 
that he is not involved to a great extent. The 
second focus deals with the commitment of the 
government. By the time the system reaches 
full-scale development, the government's commitment 
has become so great, and the structure of the 
programme so definite, that major adjustments to 
the programme are difficult because they almost 
always delay critical delivery dates and prove to 
be costly. Few really acceptable options are 
available to the government once the design is 
approved and a decision made to begin production. 
The pattern of deeper involvement and decreasing 
options is best demonstrated in Figure 4-I. 
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Options Available During Acquisition Cycle 
ACQUISITION CYCLE 
CONCEPT 
Demonstration FULL SCALE 
Phase nd Validation DEVELOPMENT 
PRODUCTION 
Phase 
POCKY TIARI 
goo 
10 
n 
ýo 
R S0 
I' 
1: )s7$r 10 It 
Ip 12)1S0719 10 11 
is 
W 
m 
p 
20 
I0 
0 
rýouur ýuýs 
Obviously, the greatest opportunity for broad 
decisions occurs during the earlier stages of 
production. Moreover, the further a programme has 
progressed the harder it is, for example, for 
Congress to discontinue it. Just how the Department 
of Defense and the Military Services travel down the 
continuum of these phases will now be the focus. 
The Department of Defense works with documents and 
forms referred to as Department of Defense Directives 
(since 1976 DoD also uses 0MB Circular A-109, See, 
Appendix 2). The decisions made throughout the 
acquisition process are designated as Milestones 
(or milestone decisions). The documentation and 
decisions follow their own numbering system and 
should not be confused with following the pattern 
164 
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of the four phases listed above. For example, DoD 
5000.1 does not refer to the Conception Phase, nor 
does Milestone I (this actually refers to the 
Demonstration and Validation Phase). 
Primarily, the Life Cycle of any defense system is 
controlled by the four Department of Defense 
Directives (DoDD) or Department of Defense 
Instructions (DoDI) listed below : 
DoDD 5000.1 
"Major Systems Acquisition" (See, Appendix 1). 
Its purpose is to establish acquisition policy for 
major systems within the Department of Defense which 
apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
and the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies 
(designated as DoD Components). This document is 
noted for its establishment of the major milestones 
and phases for acquisition programmes, and the 
documentation required for major systems : 
(JMSNS) - Justification of Major System New Start 
(SCP) - System Concept Paper 
(MENS) - Mission Element Need Statement 
(DCP) - Decision Co-ordinating Paper (previously 
referred to as Developmental Concept 
Paper - See, footnote 34 of Chapter 5) 
(IPS) - Integrated Program Summary 
* (SDDM) - Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum 
(* More will be discussed on the content of these 
papers later in this Chapter and in Chapters 
5,6,7 but presently, the exercise is to 
demonstrate the requirements of DoDD 5000.1) 
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It also advances the responsibilities for systems 
acquisition within the office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and the specific individuals and groups 
involved, which are : 
(DAE) - Defense Acquisition Executive 
51 
(DSARC) - Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
6] 
Every defence system is restrained by these documents 
and, as will be demonstrated, these documents listed 
above are primarily produced by various DoD Components. 
Also, although DoDD 5000.1 is titled "Major Systems 
Acquisition", at the bottom of the document it is 
stated that, "The management principles and objectives 
in this Directive should also be applied, where 
appropriate, to the acquisition of systems not 
designated as major". 
71 
DoDI 5000.2 
"Major System Acquisition Procedures", whose purpose 
is to provide the procedures for the implementation 
of the above DoDD 5000.1. It merely instructs or 
complements the above Directive. 
DoDD 5000.3 
"Test and Evaluation" phase which establishes 
policy for the conduct of test and evaluation by the 
DoD Components in the acquisition of weapon systems. 
In addition, it defines the responsibilities of the 
Director, Defense, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) now the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E). "The Director of Defense, Research and 
Engineering, was by statute designated the Defense 
Secretary's principal adviser on scientific and 
technical matters". 
81 
He supervises "all research 
and engineering in the Department of Defense and 
to control, assign or reassign any research and 
engineering activities". 
9] 
More importantly 
1 
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though, the Director also now referred to as Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 
is designated as the Defense Acquisition Executive 
for the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(DSARC). Thus his dual role is comprised of 
supervising research and engineering activities, 
but, essentially all of the activities are related 
to the development of weapons. 
DoDD 5000.4 
"Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)"whose purpose is 
to provide a permanent charter or uidelines-for 
themselves, namely the OSD CAIG. 
1o 
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OMB-A-109 Circular 
Since 1976, another important document known as the 
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109, 
has been included. The purpose of the A-109 is to 
"identify technical risks, adequacy of testing, 
affordability, program concurrency, cost effectiveness, 
program management, deployment strategy and 
timeliness". 
11] 
(Also, see, Appendix 2 and Footnote 
12) 
Aside from the Department of Defense Directives, 
the other reference to decisions adopted within the 
DoD are the Milestone decisions - Milestones 0, I, 
II and III. Prior to reaching the point of making 
a Milestone I decision, a Mission Need Determination 
Decision must be exercised. The link between the 
Milestone Decisions in conjunction with the 
four phases mentioned earlier, take on the following 
association and order : 
i 
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I. Concept Exploration - Mission Need Determination 
Decision - Milestone 0 
II. Demonstration and Validation - Milestone I 
III. Full Scale Development - Milestone II 
IV. Production and Deployment - Milestone III. 
It is appropriate to, note here that the Life Cycle 
follows stages along a continuum as does the Fiscal 
Cycle. Unlike the Fiscal Cycle, the Life Cycle does 
not have a specific scheduled time frame of development 
to which to adhere. Consequently, no dates will be 
assigned to these stages. 
I. Mission Need Determination Decision - Concept 
Exploration 
This is the most difficult phase for any weapon system. 
The justification for selecting a particular major 
weapon system must meet key considerations such as 
mission requirements, threat studies, current 
capabilities, and technological advances. The notion 
that. Concept Exploration follows a policy guidance 
starting in the Oval office and filtering down was 
likened by General Maxwell Taylor 
131 
, to "the 
British Constitution in that it is never set down 
in a single document ... ". 
141 
Nor is it a group 
within the DoD following a structural annual pattern 
of decision making to answer the above considerations 
for new systems - it is an ongoing process. The DoD 
Components-conduct continuing analyses of their 
mission areas to identify deficiencies in their 
capabilities or to identify more effective means 
of performing their designated tasks. First and 
foremost, it is an indicator that the needs for a 
new system are determined by the DoD Components 
and not by those at the top. For example, as 
evidenced in the previous two Chapters, the 
i 169 
assessments of requirements, needs, et al formulated 
by the JCS, are prepared by the DoD Components. 
Other than those documents 
15] 
the JCS are "not very 
valuable as far as the process is concerned .,, . 
16] 
Second, in conducting such analyses, especially those 
involving new technologies, the DoD Components 
weigh heavily on outside assistance, especially from 
private contractors. Third, and obvious, it is these 
reviews and analyses which will result in a decision 
to initiate a new system. In the past (pre OMB-A-109 
Circular 1976), "the real starting point of a program 
was rarely a discrete bureaucratic milestone, nor 
a formally documented mission need, but rather some 
form of general consensus about how to join an 
operational need, with available or emerging technology, 
that arose spontaneously from the grass roots of the 
military establishment and the defense industrial 
base". 
17] 
The exact time when this "consensus 
occurred is difficult to identify and is seldom 
documented". 
18] 
However, the suggestion is that the 
DoD Components have a greater amount of influence in 
this phase than their superiors. This will be further 
detailed in the case of the F-16, where the 
"Fighter Mafia" exerted influence to the higher 
echelons. Moreover, in the next phase, Demonstration 
and Validation, it is the DoD Components working 
with contractors and research scientists in the 
application of matching new technologies with operations. 
The assumption, for now, is that they are also working 
with them during the Concept Exploration phase - this 
will be substantiated during the F-X and F-XX studies 
of the F-16. 
The actual decision to initiate a programme was best 
described by Richard Head 19] when he said, "the reasons 
for [the initiation of the A-7 Attack Aircraft 
programme] are many, but among them is an unusual 
'r : if 
i 
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relationship of personalities - Russell Murray in 
Systems Analysis and George Spangenberg in the 
Bureau of Naval Weapons". 
20) 
The Navy's decision 
"to award the A-7 contract to LTV was primarily 
on the basis of Spangenberg's analysis of the 
competing design". 
211 
Although this is also true of 
the F-16 programme with the personalities of the 
"Fighter Mafia" exerting influence, the point is, 
that the actual decision to initiate a programme is 
unique to that programme. Moreover, it stresses 
the point that certain individuals are responsible 
for a given programme. This suggests that any 
programme, given the levels of expertise which are 
required in new technologies is initiated from below. 
For example, new technological advances will come 
from scientists or analytical experts from within 
DoD, or from weapons contractors assisting DoD 
Components. Thus a review of the earlier activities 
of the relevant contractors will illuminate the 
decision to initiate new technologies. 
Further proof of the uniqueness to initiate a 
programme was also provided, again by Richard Head, 
by stating that, "there was a certain congruence - 
a co-ordination of expectations - between Navy 
attack advocates and Systens Analysis on the desirable 
characteristics of a new aircraft". 
221 
What must 
be realised is at the same time of the A-7 programme, 
the "OSD decision to award the F-111 contract to 
General Dynamics was in the policy process for over 
thirteen months; the award of the A-7 contract to 
LTV [Ling-Temco-Vought] took less than three weeks! " 
23] 
Hardly enough time for the ink to be dry on the 
documents discussed below, but of more significance 
would be the fact that many decisions had been made 
prior to OSD involvement. A discussion of the 
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documents and their procedures will follow after a 
discussion regarding the initiation of new weapon 
systems and the relevant technology. 
The military services or DoD Components "are 
responsible for initiating and managing the thousands 
of R&D projects that make up the total R&D programme. " 
241 
For example, a "major Air Force weapon system program 
has its start in the continuing mission area and new 
technology studies that are conducted by HQ USAF 
[Headquarters, United States Air Force] and the major 
commands. These ongoing studies involve making 
trade-offs among stated missions, concepts of 
operations and available or projected technology 
and become the basis for more detailed definition 
of operational capabilities for the future force 
structure". 
25] 
Formal DoD procedures call for 
approval of a statement of military requirement 
before a project enters exploratory development. 
However, the military requirement, "as tempered by 
the knowledge of what is technologically feasible, 
links the military user to the developer in the R&D 
community". 
261 
Sometimes the requirement "may 
originate in the demonstration of a new technological 
capability, but formally it will come from the 
operational command". 
271 
Also, the military 
requirements reflect the missions of each service, 
and new weapons originating in the services 
perpetuates existing missions. For example, "the 
cancellation of the B-i bomber, was followed 
immediately by the formation of an Air Force task 
force to draw up requirements for a future manned 
penetrating bomber". 
281 
On the other hand, new 
technological developments from an existing major 
system, do-not usually take on. the role of prompting 
a new military requirement. The bias of contractors 
is to follow new developments to well established 
1 
missions - gold plating - because "these systems 
will already enjoy broad support within the Service 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense". 
29] 
Regardless of whether a system was initiated from a 
"spin off" of new technologies, or fulfilling a 
Service's requirement, the DoD Components exhibit a 
greater involvement in conception of new systems 
than their superiors. Consider the following 
procedures : 
Although the DoD Components are responsible for 
initiating and managing the R&D programmes, and 
preparing the statements of the military requirements, 
research in industry has begun to go beyond technical 
subjects. For example, General Electric publishes 
a Defense Quarterly that is devoted to the broader 
issues of technology and foreign and military policy. 
"It has also established a 'think' group of its own, 
as have other corporations such as General Dynamics, 
IBM, and many of the large aircraft companies". 
30] 
While many of these in house divisions are set up 
for scientific research and development, "many of 
them dig into military and social problems affected 
by technological advances". 
311 
Industrial companies also contract out their 
"research activities with institutions such as 
Stanford Research Institute, a non-profit corporation 
which has moved into the fields of military and 
foreign policy". 
32] 
Also, the Stanford Research 
Institute, works directly for the government, as well 
as other institutes "where the most. highly, organised 
strategy expertise is to be found. "331 Three of 
them are descendants of the post-war establishments 
created by the armed services: RAND, a large portion 
of whose research is mainly for the Air Force; The 
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Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) primarily serves 
the Army; The Center for Naval Analyses organised 
as a division of the Franklin Institute works for 
the Navy. Others such as the "Institute for Defense 
Analyses works directly for the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and several of its components. " 
34] 
The institutes are valuable in terms of the link that 
they provide between private industry and the military 
Services. However, the institutes are equally, if 
not of greater value than the contractors, not only 
for their contributions in the research of new 
technologies, but the assistance that they render 
to the DoD Components in their formulation of new 
military requirements. It is ironic that more than 
twenty five years ago, some military leaders were of 
the opinion that, "there has been too little solid 
contribution from military pens to national security 
policy thinking .,, ýý. 
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This discussion has not yet provided a clear 
determination of the precise point that a decision 
is enacted regarding the conception of a new weapon 
system. The suggestion is that there is no precise 
point, in the sense that a specific DoD Component 
is briefed on the system, his decision is confirmed 
after review of the information, and his decision is 
passed on to higher stations for approval. Naturally, 
this is an oversimplified version. A more accurate 
interpretation, which is suggested, would outline 
this approach as a two-tiered procedure (with fiscal 
approval), which is dependent on the advocacy of 
those involved in technological research and the 
military requirements to meet a Service's needs. 
On the one level, through continuous research, the 
technological basis and feasibility of a new system 
has to be established. This is executed by DoD 
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Components, contractors and research institutes. 
On the other level, a Service's requirements are 
formulated, scrutinised and reappraised not only 
within the domain of the DoD Components, but 
increasingly from outside sources - contractors, 
research institutes and even academia. 
361 
This is 
measured by the investment involved in R&D from the 
DoD. 
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There must be a constant trade-off process between 
technologies and requirements. Thus, either the 
technology has to be further altered to match the 
requirement (more research and development needed); 
or the requirements or specifications have to be 
amended to match the available technology. The 
suggestion is that both trade-off processes occur 
simultaneously, However, whichever of the two occurs 
more frequently, that is the one which enjoys an increased 
relationship to the required level of technology 
and to the nitial amount of advocacy for the 
programme. In other words, "the requirements are 
dynamic" 
Al 
and systems requiring a high level of 
new technology, with many complex subsystems, would 
influence the DoD Components to be more compromising 
on their requirements. Perhaps this explains why 
systems tend not to meet the original requirements 
of the military 100 percent. 
39] 
The original 
advocates of the programme are those involved in 
the research of the new technologies, whether it 
be DoD Components, and/or, those from the 
outside - contractors or research institutes. 
For example, in the early 1960s aircraft contractors 
were researching new designs in avionics, some of 
which were based on Major John Boyd's theories of 
the 1950s. Also, contractors such as Lockheed and 
Northrop were preparing "in house" reports detailing 
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the future fighter of the 1970s and 1980s. It was 
not until 1965 that the Air Force initiated its 
F-X Study, based on some of these new designs, for 
the purpose of fulfilling the need for a new fighter 
to replace the F-4 and F-ill, which had not performed 
well in Vietnam. In 1966 Major John Boyd was 
summoned to the Pentagon, to revise the F-X study 
with Pierre Sprey, a civilian Systems Analyst working 
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Systems Analysis. These two gentlemen, and others, 
became known as the "Fighter Mafia" because of their 
strong advocacy to push for their designs. Other 
details of all this are discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, it is apparent that contractors and scientists 
were researching new avionics designs before Air Force 
involvement. Also, the "Fighter Mafia", involved 
with the design of the new technologies, advocated 
for the prototyping (which came later), which enabled them 
to test these new designs. Military requirements 
would have had to have been secondary, because as 
the designs and research were being developed, 
certain expectations of the DoD Components were 
not feasible (for example, to attain the speed of 
Mach 3 like the Soviet Foxbat). On the other hand, 
certain items were not foreseen by the DoD Components. 
For example, an engine was investigated that had 
capabilities of 25,000 pounds of thrust, powerful 
enough, that only one engine was necessary to 
achieve the maximum performance of its designs. 
These factors and many others would be forcing the 
DoD Components to be constantly reappraising its 
requirements. 
Regardless of which group might be compromising 
more than the other, the point is that the DoD 
Components exhibit a higher degree of activity, 
i 
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during the Concept Exploration Phase than their 
superiors. In fact, since July 1981, the decision 
making within DoD became more decentralised under 
the 33 experimental reforms initiated by Deputy 
SECDEF Frank Carlucci40]. "The number of major 
decision making milestones in the acquisition process 
involving the Secretary of Defense has been reduced 
from four to two - requirements validation 
[Demonstrati. on and Validation] and the program 
go-ahead through full-scale development. " 
41] 
This 
only formalised the non-involvement of the SECDEF. 
The DoD Components already had exerted greater 
influences than the SECDEF but, the reform indirectly 
increased the role of the Defense Resources Board 
(DRB). Prior to continuing with a discussion of 
this, some of the procedures concerned with the 
initiation of a new weapon system must be identified. 
I-1 When the mission analyses, or the military 
requirements, conducted by the DoD Components, 
results in a service's wish to initiate a new major 
acquisition, a proposed Justification for Major 
System New Start (JMSNS) is prepared by the DoD 
Components. A JMSNS is required for all new starts 
in which the DoD Component anticipates to invest 
more than $200 million in funds for Research, 
Development, Testing and Evaluation and/or $1 billion 
in production. 
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The JMSNS defines the deficiency 
or opportunity, such that there is a reasonable 
probability to satisfy the need by the acquisition 
of a single system. It is not a broad definition 
of a few systems necessary to counter projected 
threats in a mission area, because that is part 
of the continuing analysis of mission areas rather 
than a part of a specific acquisition programme. 
Furthermore, the specific hardware solutions to 
i 
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fulfil the need are not defined in the JMSNS since 
it is the function of the Conceptual Phase to 
identify alternative concepts for satisfying the 
mission need. Incredibly, the JMSNS is not to 
exceed 3 pages and follows this format : 
- Mission 
- Threat on Basis of Need 
- Existing and Planned Capabilities 
to Accomplish the Mission 
- Assessment of Need 
- Constraints 
- Acquisition Strategy. 
43] 
The last component, Acquisition Strategy, has 
two-fold significance. First, it is proof that even 
at this early stage the DoD Components are actively 
working with private contractors to assist them in 
outlining a feasible acquisition strategy. Second, 
and more importantly, the contractor is in the 
process of assisting the DoD Components with 
technological developments. 
I-2 Once the proposed JMSNS has been processed 
within its own organisation, the DoD Component submits 
it to the Executive Secretary of the Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). The DSARC, 
acting as the leader corporate body for systems 
acquisition, provides advice and assistance to the 
Secretary of Defense. The Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) was established 
in 1969, "to review such programs and provide the 
Secretary of Defense, with recommendations concerning 
the status and readiness of individual weapon 
systems to enter or continue in the acquisition 
cycle". 
44) 
Further, it advises the SECDEF on 
Milestone decisions and other issues that the 
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Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 
45) determines to 
be requisite within the Department of Defense. The 
DSARC is the decision making body in the Life Cycle 
for weapons acquisition. As is the case of the 
Defense Resources Board in the Fiscal Cycle, the 
Secretary of Defense is not a member of DSARC. 
46] 
It is the responsibility of the Defense Acquisition 
Executive for the co-ordination of the JMSNS. "For 
each program the Defense System Acquisition Review 
Council (DSARC) meets to make formal recommendations 
to the Secretary of Defense at decision milestones" . 
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For example, "Deployment of this [MX basing] system, 
with an initial operational capability of FY 1986, 
was recommended by the Air Force to the Secretary 
of Defense through the Defense System Acquisition 
"4 Review Council (DSARC) on December 5,1978.8] 
I-3 Based on comments from DSARC, the DoD Component 
modifies the Justification for Major System New 
Start (JMSNS) as necessary, and submits it with the 
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) (See, Fiscal Cycle 
II-1 through 11-5, Chapter 3, pp. 125-129). All JMSNS 
must be submitted with the DoD Components Program 
Objectives Memorandum in which the funding is included 
for the major system's new start. An earlier discussion 
set forth the three different stages of budgets which 
remain active concurrently. The situation is the same 
for the POM. It is a case in which the 3 POMs, at 
different stages reflecting the stages of the 3 budgets, 
are under consideration by the DoD Components. It can 
be expected that at this level, trade-offs to ensure 
the balance of the needs of a new mission play a crucial 
role. "The function is to ensure that all separate 
inputs are molded into a coherent balanced force 
structure"491 and these inputs must weigh heavily in 
the DoD Components decisions, in which new systems 
should have priority over others. 
i 
I-4 Presently, there are three avenues of approach 
which will substantiate a mission need determination 
1) the DoD Components recommendation is 
modified, the changes may be documented in 
a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) (See, 
Fiscal Cycle 11-5, Chapter 3, p.. 129). 
2) a joint Justification for Major System 
New Start (JMSNS) is submitted, for example, 
to the OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the decision is documented in a SECDEF 
Decision Memorandum. 
50] 
3) a JMSNS is included in the Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) and the 
inclusion of the new start is found in the 
DoD Budget, which is submitted to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
The third avenue is by far the best mode for a mission 
need determination because it formalises the link-up 
of the Life Cycle to the Fiscal Cycle, and having 
established that the SECDEF is not involved in this 
stage, the decision "to initiate a major weapon 
program is now completed as part of the budgeting 
process". 
51) 
The integration of the acquisition 
decision making process with the budgeting process 
is to assure that "the proposed new program starts 
are affordable within the DoD's planning, programming, 
and budgeting constraints". 
52] 
The Defense Resources 
Board (DRB) has the jurisdiction to review the 
budgets. Yet, the DRB also plays a role in the 
decision to initiate a new start. It is interesting 
that the DRB is involved with fiscal matters, as 
well as new starts - fitting them into budget 
constraints. Moreover, in 1981, the influence of 
the DRB was increased, indirectly under a "Carlucci 
Reform", 531 stating that the "DoD has also required 
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the services to plan weapon systems development and 
acquisition on the basis of adequate funding by 
documenting, at major acquisition milestone decisions, 
whether funding is available to execute the program 
as designed". 
54) 
The DRB reviews that via the 
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) submitted by 
the DoD Components. As mentioned, the DoD Component 
essentially is concerned with three POMs, concurrently, 
allowing him the manoeuvreability to alter programmes 
or amend requirements. The added dimension of the 
private contractors co-operating so closely with 
the DoD Components also provides the contractors 
with a direct line of communication to the DRB. 
Thus, it is perhaps a misnomer to make reference to 
a "decision to initiate". There are too many 
considerations and decision makers involved - 
requirements of the Services, level of technology 
and the degree of contractor involvement, DRB, OSD, 
et al. However, it is the DoD Components (and 
arguably the contractors), who are in the best 
position to influence the outcomes of the series of 
decisions to initiate. Whether or not the DoD 
Components continue to exert such influence 
throughout other stages is now to be tested. 
Decisions Made to Proceed 
The Hardware Phases to Next Phase 
II 
DSARC I 
Milestone I- Demonstration 
and Validation 
DSARC II 
III Milestone II - Full Scale 
Development (funds to DSARC IIIA 
produce more prototypes 
for testing) 
DSARC III 
(DSARCIIIA) 
IV Milestone III - Production 
(DSARCIIIB) 
and Deployment 
55] 
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These three hardware phases are temporarily consolidated 
by the author to help clarify the process. The purpose 
for grouping the phases is expressed in the following 
views : First, DSARC IIIA appears both before Milestones 
II and III. Where and when such a decision takes place 
is dependent on the weapon itself (for example, a gun 
versus an aircraft), some of which (the aircraft) take 
a longer time for completion of the Demonstration and 
Validation phase. Further, usually a major system 
requires a higher degree of technology and although 
prototypes, as in the case of the F-16, may have been 
funded, following a DSARC II decision; more research 
and testing would be necessary to fulfil differing 
requirements (DSARC IIIA Decision), before a final 
decision to produce (DSARC IIIB). Usually systems which 
are not major or require less technology follow the 
path of DSARC I, II, III. A second reason for 
grouping the three phases together is that the image 
of one group making a decision in one phase and then 
another group involved in Milestone II is a false image= 
because they are the same actors (especially DoD 
Components) and they are concerned with all three 
phases at one time. For example, at one stage following 
the milestone planning meeting, three different draft 
documents are prepared jointly for Milestones I, II and 
III. This is not to say that three different Milestone 
decisions were made at precisely the same time, but 
that in preparation for the Milestone decisions the 
DoD Components consider these strategies for all three. 
The third reason is that although the entire process 
is as similarly structured and complex as the 
Fiscal Cycle, it does not have the same time 
.+ 
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parameters set by schedule. The only time limits 
are exerted by the Fiscal Cycle, as seen in the 
previous stages of Mission Need Determination, 
whereby the Justification for Major System New Start 
is placed within the Program ObjectivesMemorandum 
and continues within the overall Fiscal Cycle. The 
scheduling of DSARC meetings are set according to 
the progress and completion of various documents 
discussed below. However, a DSARC meeting on the 
scheduling will sometimes coincide with the 
scheduling or progression bf the budgeting process. 
This will be demonstrated in the case of the F-16. 
The fourth reason covers funds for the Demonstration 
and Validation, as well as funds for Production and 
Deployment. Occasionally, it will be solicited 
within the framework of the Fiscal Cycle. However, 
when considering the Life Cycle, it is wrong to 
completely separate the two because a system, once 
deployed, does not mean the Research and Development 
(R&D) of that system ceases. The point is that it 
is all right to view a weapon system along the 
continuum of the four phases when placing that 
weapon system within the constraints of the Fiscal 
Cycle it passes through many times. However, it 
is wrong to conceive a weapons system's life as 
passing through one phase to the next as if once 
completing Demonstration and Validation it is 
thus Produced and Deployed. For example, presently 
research is being conducted by Pratt and Whitney 
and General Electric to retrofit new engines to 
the F-16. 
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Deployment differs from Research and Development 
but the approach herein is to conceive of.. the life 
I 
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of a weapon system to be either in a non hardware 
stage or a hardware stage. This should be the 
formal criteria to determine the stage of 
development and the decisional centres concerned 
with that weapon system. As witnessed in the 
previous phase - Concept Exploration - Mission 
Needs Determination - the issues do not deal with 
hardware. They deal with needs and capabilities 
or the lack of such. As shown in the Justification 
for Major System New Start (JMSNS), specific hardware 
solutions shall not be defined, since, it is the 
function of the Conceptual Phase to identify 
alternative concepts for satisfying the mission need. 
Once a JMSNS is included in the Program Objectives 
Memorandum and then later approved by the Defense 
Resources Board (DRB) and right up the line to the 
next (Fiscal Life Decisional Process), the necessary 
hardware becomes the preoccupation of the Department 
of Defense (and all Defense related agencies and/or 
concerned contractors). Essentially, that is the 
point or junction when a weapon system's life 
begins to materialise. Various Defense related 
actors and hosts of various contractors enter and 
a scenario of competing strategies will eventually 
lead to the culmination of a weapon system - which 
may never have been deemed necessary or which does 
not fulfil the original mission needs of the 
Justification for Major System New Start (JMSNS). 
Another reason for the grouping of all three phases 
is a structural one for this thesis. The documents 
outlined below are the same, though they have been 
updated with more information, from stage to stage. 
Also the same platform of scheduling usually applies. 
So as to avoid the appearance of redundancy, the 
documents and steps below are applicable to 
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DSARCs I, II, III. Following an examination of these, 
there will be a separation of the three phases in 
order to provide a more thoroug, h understanding of 
each, respectively. 
II, III, IV-1 When the DoD Component makes 
sufficient progress within the previous 
phase (DRB and OMB approval), that Component 
requests the scheduling of a Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) meeting. 
Based on this request, the DSARC Executive 
Secretary (Under Secretary for Defense, 
Research and Engineering) schedules a 
milestone planning meeting. Prior to this 
DSARC meeting, the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) action officer for the 
programme is the Chairman of the Milestone 
planning meeting which is held approximately 
six months in advance of this DSARC meeting. 
Representatives of DSARC attend this meeting 
to become informed of the needs and strategies 
before the above scheduled DSARC meeting. 
Though the format appears to be rather 
complex, it is interesting for the following 
reasons. First, the meeting is an avenue of 
communication between the DoD Components, 
Office of Secretary of Defense, and the 
Executive Secretary of DSARC. Second, and 
more importantly, though no formal documents 
are usually lodged (draft milestone 
documentation) and the documents which are 
later drafted do not receive input from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(aside from those addressed at 
that planning meetingl. Essentially, again 
the major focus of the decision making is 
found within the DoD Component. 
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II, III, IV-2 After the milestone planning 
meeting, and based on the issues raised, 
the DoD Component prepares 
1) a for government draft System Concept 
Paper (SCP) for the Milestone I review, 
or a 
2) for comment draft Decision Co-ordinating 
Paper, previously referred to as a 
Development Concept Paper (DCP), and 
3) an Integrated Program Summary (IPS) 
for Milestone II and/or Milestone III* 
4) Attached to the three documents will 
also be-another known as the Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). 
Once a programme has been initiated at Milestone 0 
the DoD Components must support preparations 
for DSARCs I and II by "fleshing out the system 
concept from a field environment standpoint. 
Also, though appropriate analyses and experiments 
[DoD Component(s)] must determine how competing 
systems would be used and what their operational 
value would be. This involvement would 
become more intense, and more demanding of 
resources as the DSARC II decision point 
approaches ... that DSARC II should be 
emphasised as the point of 'big decision' 
when an explicit 'commitment' is made  ýý 
561 
(* Normally, the Milestone II decision is delegated 
to the Service Secretary unless any of the 
established Milestone II thresholds are breached) 
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1) Systems Concept Paper (SCP) 
The Systems Concept Paper (SCP) which is prepared 
by the respective DoD Component (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis) 
provides the basic documentation for the Defense 
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) members 
in reaching a recommendation for the SECDEF. The 
System Concept Paper is used to summarise the 
results of the Conceptual Phase up to Milestone I, 
and to describe the DoD Component's acquisition 
strategy, including identification of concepts, 
which is likely to be carried into the 
Demonstration and Validation Phase, as well as 
credence for the elimination of other concepts. 
The Paper also includes the extent of competition 
planned for each subsequent phase, the need for 
industrial base capacity and of manufacturing 
developments. Furthermore, it includes the 
programme structure, and a discussion of how the 
acquisition process will be tailored to fit the 
programme; and it establishes the goals and 
thresholds to be attained at Milestone 11.571 
2) Decision Co-ordinating Paper (DCP) 
The Decision Co-ordinating Paper (DCP) which is 
prepared by the respective DoD Component (Office 
of the Director [now called Under Secretary] of 
Defense, Research and Engineering (DDR&E)) 
summarises that DoD Component's acquisition 
planning for the system's Life Cycle and provides 
a management overview of the programme. "The 
total acquisition process from earliest concept 
definition to ultimate development was keyed to 
such devices as the DCP. "58] Ultimately, the DCP, 
becomes the contract between the SECDEF and the 
Service Secretary. Aside from its overview 
i 
placed in the back of it, as an annex, is the first 
attempt within the DoD Component to assign costs 
under the heading of Life Cycle costs. 
59] 
Although 
costs have already been reviewed by the DRB, this 
is an attempt to consider all of the costs involved 
in that weapon system for DSARC review. However, 
DoD Components, who are over-optimistic in their 
60] 
cost estimates, always neglect some costs. 
3) Integrated Program Summary 
The Integrated Program Summary is prepared by the 
respective DoD Component and as the previous 
document (Decision Co-ordinating Paper - DCP) 
summarises the DoD Component's acquisition planning 
for the system's Life Cycle and provides a management 
overview of the programme. The difference between 
the two is, that it does not repeat the information 
of the DCP but provides more specific information 
and a comprehensive summary of the programme. The 
Cost Annex is further broken down into Cost Track 
Summary, Funding Profile, Summary of Acquisition 
Cost and Manpower. 
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4) Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
The Test and Evaluation Master Plan is prepared by 
the respective DoD Component and identifies and 
integrates the overall test and evaluation, plan 
objectives, responsibilities, resources and schedules, 
to be accomplished prior to the subsequent key 
decision points. An initial version of the Test 
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is prepared as 
early as possible in the acquisition process. Upon 
approval by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
any changes made in the TEMP must be properly 
documented to show the reasons for the changes. 
62] 
187 
1 
188 
The evidence of the above four documents suggests 
a heavy involvement on the part of the DOD 
Components in the initial stages of the hardware 
phase. Essentially, this substantiates the 
point that decisions in weapon acquisition tend 
to radiate upwards especially considering the 
influence of these reports. It also substantiates 
that the contractors are in a position to influence 
these reports, because the DoD Components, aside 
from research and development, are dependent upon 
them for information regarding production costs 
et al. The assumption is, that the contractors 
are also optimistic in their initial cost figures. 
II, III, IV-3 These four documents are then 
referred to the Defense Acquisition Executive 
(Under Secretary for Defense, Research and 
Engineering) of DSARC three months prior to 
the scheduled DSARC meeting. The Office of 
the Secretary of Defense action officer 
ensures that all members of the DSARC also 
receive copies, and he then prepares a 
formal Memorandum documenting the various 
comments submitted. These comments form 
the basis for the preparion, by the DoD 
Component, of the final System Concept Paper, 
Decision Co-ordinating Paper and the 
Integrated Program Summary. These three 
final papers are then submitted to the 
SECDEF only 15 working days prior to the 
DSARC meeting. 
63] Thus, the final documents 
were prepared before SECDEF review and such 
a short period of review would indicate that 
as seen in the Concept Exploration Phase, the 
lack of involvement of the SECDEF. 
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and Evaluation, and the Weapon Support 
Improvement Group prepare written reports 
for their respective areas of responsibility 
and make them available at least three 
working days prior to the DSARC meeting. 
Upon meeting, the Defense Systems Acquisition 
Review Council (DSARC) reviews these papers 
as well as the reports submitted. Following 
the DSARC meeting, the OSD action officer, 
in co-ordination with the DSARC Chairman 
(Defense Acquisition Executive), and the 
DSARC members and advisers, prepares a 
proposed Secretary of Defense Decision 
Memorandum. This is accomplished within 
five working days after the DSARC meeting. 
The proposed Secretary of Defense Decision 
Memorandum is submitted, by the Defense 
Acquisition Executive, to the SECDEF, for 
approval. The final Secretary of Defense 
Decision Memorandum (SDDM) is issued to the 
concerned DoD Component, within fifteen 
working days after the DSARC meeting. A 
favourable SDDM allows the DoD Component to 
begin work on the next phase of development. 
Turning attention to enlarge the discussion of the 
DSARC decisional structure by including an 
examination-of what is performed in each stage, 
and by whom, will further substantiate a greater 
influence from the DoD Components during these 
stages. Arguably, the separation of the three 
phases, as well as the grouping of them, is 
arbitrary. This is the inherent Catch-22 element 
in viewing weapons acquisition. Perhaps the best 
way to envision the entire process is to define 
it as an ongoing phenomenon, with decisional 
points to review its progress. Following post- 
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evaluation, decisions of whether to continue or 
not, are promulgated. 
II. Milestone I- Demonstration and Validation 
(Research and Development) 
In 1975, the total budget for the national defense 
of the US was $85.6 billion, with $8.9 billion 
devoted to Research and Development (R&D) -a 
little more than 10 percent of the total defense 
budget. 
65] 
This may not seem like a large amount 
in relation to the total, however, if a comparison 
is made with procurement that year, $16.0 billion, 
it is more than 50 percent that amount. 
661 
Various steps must be accomplished before monies 
are appropriated to Research and Development, 
Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E). They are as 
follows 
-A statement of operational need by a military 
command. 
- In response, the formulation of a "mission 
element need" or "Justification for Major 
System New Start", and other (DCP) documents, 
which typically call for an R&D effort. 
- Validation by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense of the requirement for a new 
development (Milestone 0). 
- Analysis (done by in-house groups and/or by 
contract with industry) of alternative ways 
of meeting the mission need. 
- Selection of a limited number of options 
to be pursued (Milestone I, DSARC I). 
191 
- Selection of industrial contractors to 
perform the development. 67] 
1 
A review of the military departments' practices 
and policies in performing the tests and 
evaluations of weapon systems illustrates the 
level of involvement of the DoD Components and 
their influence. It should also be emphasised 
that the "tests and evaluations of weapon systems 
continue during the various stages of acquisition". 
68] 
It is also helpful to be Cognisant of the fact that 
"testing is a management technique for controlling 
activities to ascertain and minimise risk. " 
69] 
According to a Report to the Congress by the General 
Accounting Office, there are only three basic 
categories of testing and evaluation : 
1) Engineering testing to demonstrate, 
before a system is accepted for production, 
that it will perform as intended; 
2) Acceptance testing to demonstrate that 
the state and quality of the weapon system 
fulfilled the legal and/or commercial 
requirements agreed to by the supplier 
and the customer; 
3) Operational suitability testing to 
demonstrate that the weapon system, the 
operating personnel, and the tactical 
operations can work together to accomplish 
an established combat mission. 
70] 
The three definitions fit well into each of the 
three phases following Conception Exploration; 
Demonstration and Validation (engineering testing); 
Full-Scale Development (acceptance testing - 
especially in terms of DSARC IIIA before a 
DSARC IIIB decision is made); and Production 
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Deployment (operational suitability testing). 
Research and Development Testing and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) should always be envisioned as a continuing 
process throughout the Life Cycle of a weapon 
system. This also suggests the reasons that it is 
difficult to separate these last three phases 
when considering specific aspects of the acquisition 
process. Perhaps this has blurred the decision 
making involved. Following is a discussion of 
engineering testing, which will be followed by 
the other two stages of the acquisition process. 
Engineering Testing 
Engineering testing is all scientific and objective 
testing done in the interest of experimentation, 
development and testing or proving a system or 
its parts. This type of testing will depend on 
its progress within the phase of Demonstration and 
Validation. For example, at earlier stages it 
could be computer analysis (paper studies and 
concepts) included in the Decision Concept Paper 
for a Milestone I (DSARC I) decision. On following 
the decision, and money having been appropriated, 
at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense 
(from R&D funds, thus avoiding Congress), it could 
be testing of different defined options to evaluate 
the best performance. 
It is performed under controlled conditions to 
properly assess the physical properties and 
characteristics of the item being tested. Usually 
this is accomplished in such places as laboratories, 
wind tunnels, environmental facilities (for example, 
gravity-free environment) and ranges. 
i 
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The testing is performed before accepting a system 
(or item) for production including a part, a 
subcomponent, or a subsystem or the entire system. 
(In Concept Exploration it may have involved model 
testing. ) In Validation and Demonstration it 
involves mock-ups of major subsystems or models. 
(In development, it involves various types or 
degrees of prototyping. ) 
Repetitious a process as it can be, engineering 
testing is performed until success is achieved (or 
until the item is discarded). Practicality of the 
system dictates that success be defined in specific 
terms, as to both quantity and quality. Or, in the 
military vernacular, the success be defined by the 
acceptable "tolerances". 
The entire process is "supervised by the developer; 
performed by a Government laboratory or contractor; 
and carried out by scientists, engineers, and 
technical experts". 
71] 
Due to a lack of expertise, 
those in authority at the Pentagon would not be 
participating in this process. Moreover, 
structurally, the Secretary of Defense is not a 
member of DSARC, which reviews the System Concept 
Paper, or the Draft Decision Paper and other 
documents produced by DoD Components, and arrives 
at a Milestone I decision. Thus the assumption 
is inevitable, that the Secretary of Defense has 
less influence during this phase than the DoD 
Components. The greatest amount of influence 
would be found within the Office of the Under 
Secretary for Defense, Research and Engineering 
not only because testing and evaluation is within 
its jurisdiction, but the Under Secretary is the 
Chairman of DSARC. 
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Further, the DoD Components possess, as well as the 
expertise, "the political resources to eviscerate 
the managerial purposes of DSARC I, using it to 
legitimise very specific hardware specifications 
and gaining substantial leverage in the PPBS 
process". 
721 
The advantage that the DoD Component 
enjoys, aside from its expertise, is that due to 
the increased technological complexities of weapon 
systems, the "services became aware that the key 
to successful program advocacy lay in defining in 
as much detail as possible how a general need, or 
requirement should be met with a specific weapon 
system". 
73] 
For example, the Commission on 
Government Procurement in 1972 described the 
Army's use of this practice in the mid-1960s as 
it sought to fund (DSARC II) the development of 
an armed helicopter before the program had been 
approved (DS, ARC I) - 
"Although the AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter 
appeared for large scale funding in 1965, 
it began years earlier in exploratory 
development under a project entitled 
'aircraft suppressive fire'. Another 
project was called 'air mobility' which 
also helped finance this early armed 
helicopter exploration. In about 1963, 
the project was moved into an advanced 
development project listed as 'aircraft 
suppressive fire' and in 1964 became 
an engineering development activity 
identified as the 'aircraft suppressive 
fire system'. This was changed later to 
'weapons helicopter' and still later to 
the 'advanced aerial fire support system'. 
With each change, the identifying project 
number was changed. " 
74] 
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Thus the influence of the DoD Components lies in 
both an institutional, as well as, a functional 
role that they perform. The institutional or 
organisational structure requires their inputs in 
determining mission needs, requirements, et al, 
for DSARC review. Second, the function of testing 
and evaluating, with contractors should support 
and compliment such documentation leading to 
changes in the mission requirement. 
III Milestone II - Full-Scale Development 
The Full-Scale Development phase is that segment 
of the acquisition cycle extending from the award 
of an engineering development contract until the 
end item is authorised or ready for production. 
The phase extends from Milestone II (DSARC II) 
to Milestone III (DSARC III). However, due to 
the expense and complexity of major weapons 
systems, a DSARC III-A decision may be taken to 
award a few more units for further testing. Such 
a decision should be included in this phase 
because a DSARC III-B calls for full production. 
Regarding testing and evaluation, the type of 
testing is Acceptance Testing which will 
demonstrate that the quality of the weapon system 
fulfils the requirements set by Milestone I 
(DSARC I decision). An examination of Acceptance 
Testing will further illustrate the DoD Components 
involvement. 
Acceptance Testing 
Acceptance testing is performed to prove that the 
quality of an item(s) fulfils the legal and/or 
commercial requirements agreed to by both the 
contractor and the Service (DSARC I); and that 
t 
the item is satisfactory and acceptable to both 
parties. This is also referred to as performance 
testing (not to be confused with suitability 
testing which tests the performance in the context 
of an integrated combat operation). Prototyping 
is in this category of testing and evaluation. 
It tests the performance, or the evaluation of 
competing prototypes. The case of the F-16 versus 
the F-17 exemplifies this point very well. 
Where feasible, it is performed on the entire 
system, for example, fighter aircraft, ship, tank, 
or missile. Most testing, though, is performed 
prior to final assembly (for example, testing of 
Pratt & Whitney F100 engine for the F-16, or radar 
components), under controlled circumstances to 
technically demonstrate the presence of the 
contracted state and quality of the system. It 
is the process by which the DoD Component assures 
itself that the contractor has, in fact, provided 
what was previously agreed upon. The results are 
eventually available for DSARC review. 
Each item accepted should be tested by the DoD 
Component to the extent necessary that the quality 
of the item meets DSARC review. Thus, requirements 
may be altered to match the results of the testing 
of new technologies. At times, it may be justified 
to use scientific sampling techniques or intensive 
testing (stress over time on wing design - metal 
fatigue). Also this may be arranged with adequate 
contractual agreements with the contractor to 
reduce the costs of testing. For example, most of 
the testing was performed by General Dynamics 
beforehand. To save costs to the contractor, 
which are eventually charged to the Pentagon, 
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testing was performed at two USAF Bases - Fortworth 
Texas and Edwards AF Base, California. 
Acceptance testing is conducted by "The Military 
Command expert personnel, or an independent chartered 
organisation, would perform acceptance testing at 
selection and upon completion of production". 
751 
Further, upon deployment, the using command would also 
perform acceptance testing when it receives the 
system, for example, the Air Force held trials of the 
F-16's performance at Edwards AFB. 
Thus, regarding the specific issue of testing and 
evaluation during the Full-Scale Development Phase, 
the evidence would suggest little if any involvement 
from those at the top, except informing them of 
developments. Also, the DoD Components, through 
testing and evaluating, during the previous phase, 
had updated the documentation necessary for DSARC II 
review and are in the process of doing so again for 
DSARC III. It is the DoD Components' opinions and 
their interpretations of the results for a mission 
need, which is the weight of their influence. 
Further, at this stage - Milestone II - the involvement 
has become more intense measured by investment and 
the advocacy of a programme. It is "clear that 
development programs which lacked strong advocacy 
were much more likely to be cancelled than those which 
had energetic and dedicated advocates". 
761 Such will 
be demonstrated in the F-16 programme with its "Fighter 
Mafia", some of whom were also DoD Components. 
198 
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IV Milestone III - Production and Deployment 
This is the stage at which the weapon system is 
produced in quantity for deployment. For a long 
term programme, like the F-16, the quantities 
procured will differ from year to year, depending 
on the budgetary constraints imposed by Congress, 
and the numbers chosen by them. Subsequent to 
those events, further testing and evaluation must 
be accomplished to substantiate a DSARC III 
(sometimes DSARC III-B) decision. This type of 
testing is referred to as operational suitability 
testing which demonstrates that the weapon system, 
the operating personnel, and operations work 
together. 
Operational Suitability Testing 
Operational suitability testing is performed to 
evidence that the weapon system can accomplish 
the mission, as part of an integrated combat 
operation. It is no longer an evaluation of the 
performance of a weapon system, but an evaluation 
of its integration to the other systems already in 
operation. 
It is carried out in the field under simulated or 
actual combat conditions. For example, information 
would have been gathered about the performance of 
the F-16, following the Israeli attack of the 
nuclear reactor near Baghdad on 7 June 1981. 
After an analysis of its performance, the Service 
could again alter its requirements and thereby 
change that weapon's position in the overall force 
strategy. 
1 
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Operational suitability testing is conducted to gain 
assurance that the weapon system, the operating 
personnel, and the tactical operations can work 
together to accomplish the mission of the new 
system. Also, to be noted, is that when a new 
system is included, older systems will also have 
their operations adapted. Thus, there will be 
testing on the older ones, as well as the new. 
The testing Mould start as soon as the weapon is 
first wholly assembled during development, as a 
preproduction prototype, or when the first 
production models are available, before full-scale 
production and deployment. Both of these cases 
apply to the F-16. 
Operational suitability testing must continue until 
an acceptable weapon is established and proven. 
The DoD Component must be satisfied, as well as 
DSARC, and eventually the Secretary of Defense, 
whose purpose then is to persuade the Congress 
that the weapon fulfils its needs. The actual 
testing is "performed by the using command, ie 
the military personnel who will be operating the 
fl 
77] 
weapon. 
It is understandable that those at the top (SECDEF, 
et al) can not be expected to be personally 
involved with the testing and evaluation throughout 
the phases of acquisition. This would be virtually 
impossible due to the specialisation and technical 
expertise involved, to say nothing of the hundreds 
of systems proceeding simultaneously through the 
acquisition process. However, the suggestion is 
that the DoD Components who are participating in 
the testing will be evaluating and amending 
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mission needs throughout the Life Cycle. They 
have the first hand expertise, and have been witness 
to and involved in the various tests and so forth. 
Also, their opinions contained in the earlier 
mentioned documents (MENS, DCP) are instrumental 
and weigh heavily during DSARC review - fiLn 
indication that the influences of decision making 
tend to radiate upwards. However, outside events, 
such as an international crisis (monitored by the 
managers as politicians) would place pressures on 
DSARC from above. For example, the Air Force losses 
during the Vietnam War, where the first "dogfights" 
took place in April 1965. Earlier, in the Korean 
Conflict the air battle exchange rate had been 
6.2 (1,941 enemy aircraft downed against 152 
losses)or a kill ratio of 10: 1 or better. In 
Vietnam, the corresponding kill ratio was 3: 1.78] 
Perhaps, in this case, pressure may have come 
from above for a new fighter; it is evident that 
those figures, although consequences of the Vietnam 
War, were arrived at and amended through operational 
suitability testing. In other words, the performance 
was questioned within DoD corridors by the DoD 
Components and thus would create a new mission 
need. Unfolding after an agreement between the 
DoD Components (Air Force) and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense on a Development Concept 
Paper in 1968, for the F-15, Congress did 
appropriate funds to acquire a system to make up 
for the poor performance beforehand. 
79] 
However, 
for Congress to have made a decision on the F-15, 
it had to have been a system that was already 
technologically feasible as well as available in 
the near future to deploy. Those questions had 
already been answered through various tests 
i 
conducted by DoD Components during the successive 
stages of development. 
The significance is that the development of 
weapon systems and the decision making thereof tend 
to be located within, or influenced by, the DoD 
Components. The specific issue of testing and 
evaluation throughout a weapons system's Life 
Cycle was chosen not only to demonstrate DoD 
involvement, but also its importance as an issue 
for each phase to be accomplished. "Testing and 
evaluation is an important ingredient throughout 
the acquisition process. The responsibility for 
the success of testing and evaluation throughout 
the acquisition process lies with the developer, 
the user, and the contractor in different degrees 
and at different times". 
801 
Aside from testing and evaluation, the influence 
of the DoD Components is further shown by the 
documents below, which are prepared by the DoD 
Components. 
1) Acquisition Strategy 
811 
which is prepared by 
the DoD Component and is an overall plan to attain 
the end objective of the acquisition undertaking. 
An initial program Acquisition Strategy is 
developed for each major system acquisition when 
a new start is proposed. The Acquisition Strategy 
is unique for each programme, and is tailored to 
the circumstances surrounding the programme. It 
merits mention here because it encourages the DoD 
Components to obtain advice and assistance from 
business and technical advisers and experienced 
managers of other major system programmes. As 
stated earlier, this document supports the claim 
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of the DoD Components' close contacts with 
contractors as well as the importance of the DoD 
Components' inputs. 
2) Research and Technology Work Unit Summary 
(DD Form 1498) 
821 
is prepared by responsible DoD 
Components to provide technical and management 
data for ongoing research and technology efforts 
being accomplished by the DoD Components within 
the Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation 
programme. Its functions include identifying 
scientists or engineers who are working in 
technical areas of interest so they may be 
contacted for further technical information and 
maintain current awareness through periodic review 
of progress statements. The importance is to keep 
in touch with business considering the high 
technology level achieved in modern weaponry. 
3) Research and Development Planning Summar 
(DD Form 1634) [Air Force AFR 80-2 dated 12 May 
1969, "Documents Used in the Management of Air 
Force Research and Development"]. 
83] 
This document provides, as the title implies, a 
summary of Research and Development studies, analyses 
and projects. It contains a concise problem and 
objective statement; the approaches to be taken 
and their rationale; the key technical issues 
and most important - as a link to the Fiscal Cycle - 
the plans and objectives for the budget fiscal 
year plus one (FY+1). The form (DD 1634) is 
submitted twice yearly : first in May, on the 
plans and status of all projects; second, in 
September, on revisions or changes to the first 
submittal, and, as a technical back-up to assist 
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in the review of the annual budget submission. 
Another significance of this document, is that it 
links money or resources available to a mission's 
need, and new technology. 
4) Selected Acquisition Report 
84] 
(SARs) 
Mention was made earlier (see, Chapter 3, p. 146 of 
these reports, but the importance here is that 
they are prepared by the DoD Components for all 
programmes designated as "major" by the SECDEF. 
Therefore when a Justification for Major System 
New Start (JMSNS) is proposed, the DoD Component 
provides a summary of current estimates of 
technical, schedule, quantity and cost information 
of the system. SARs are prepared four times a 
year for use by the office of the Secretary of 
Defense for transmittal to Congress. 
Congressional Weaknesses in Weapons Acquisition 
Thus far, little has been said regarding the role 
of Congress, except perhaps its role in the budgetary 
process or a brief mention of its oversight 
capabilities. This has been intentional. Up to 
now, the purpose has been to demonstrate the role 
of the DoD Components and their performance in the 
decision making of weapons procurement. By law, 
though, the DoD Components are (supposedly) 
excluded from participating with or influencing 
Congress in its decisions concerned with the 
acquisition of weapons. However, as evidenced, 
contractors work closely with the DoD Components, 
and the suggestion is that the contractors, while 
influencing Congressional decisions through their 
lobbying efforts, do provide a means of communication 
i 
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between the DoD Components and Congress. But, 
before discussing this, it is necessary to examine 
the oversight role of Congress, and see if it 
compares with the relative inability of Congress 
to exercise the power of the purse. Pursuing 
this, establishes whether or not contractors are 
closely scrutinised by Congress, not only concerning 
their lobbying efforts, but also their performance 
in contracts funded by Congress. "The best known 
of these executive reporting requirements" 
851 
was 
mandated in 1975 by Congress - the Arms Control 
Impact Statements (ACIS) - which was to have 
profound effects on the selection and monitoring 
by Congress of the majority of weapon systems. 
The discussion below, should demonstrate the 
inability of Congress to effectively use its 
legislative and oversight powers granted it by 
this legislation. 
The ACIS legislation required that arms control 
impact statements (ACIS) be included for selected 
defence programmes with three goals in mind : 
- to make the executive branch formally and 
systematically consider the possible effects 
of proposed programmes on arms control; 
- to improve the quantity and quality of 
information submitted to Congress on 
proposed defence programmes, so it can 
better deliberate the merits of these 
programmes; 
although unrelated to Oversight, it was 
also to enhance the role of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (State 
Department) in the national security 
making process. 
861 
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Regarding the first goal, "one is hard put to 
suggest that the outcome of defense decisions, 
since the passing of the ACIS legislation, would 
have been any different in its absence". 
871 
From 
1975 to 1980, there is only one case of a 
Congressional decision in which an ACIS played a 
part - the August 1977 decision on funding for the 
enhanced radiation warhead (W-70, Mod 3) for the 
Lance Missile. Senator Hubert Humphrey convinced 
the Carter Administration that an ACIS was required 
prior to approval of the funding bill. Senator 
Humphrey, presenting it to the Senate, noted that, 
"the statement is one that really fits the 
description of on the one hand and on the other 
hand ... The conclusion is one that does not give 
much of a conclusion". 
881 
Regardless, the Senate 
passed the bill, without even knowing at the time 
whether the President would actually recommend 
continued development of the warhead. This suggests 
that the ACIS was useful as a procedural device, 
but not terribly important for its substantive 
content. 
The second goal returns to an earlier mentioned 
problem of Congress' expertise or lack of it. 
Moreover, the ACIS is intended to make it possible 
for Congress to better deliberate the merits of 
proposed defence programmes, but as just noted, 
there is no direct evidence that this ever occurred 
between 1975-1980. But for Congress to do so, it 
would require a level of detailed expertise which 
Congress has generally seemed unable or unwilling 
to develop regarding security issues. 
891 
A 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) study outlined 
just this problem, but it also cast doubt on the 
inability of Congress to make effective remedies. 
90] 
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With the staff of the committees so large, "the 
major responsibility for reviewing, analyzing 
and suggesting improvements [to ACIS] was assigned 
to the CRS and the GAO. " 
91] 
Whatever the merits 
of the CRS or the GAO, this procedure means that 
an "additional layer of bureaucracy is interposed 
between legislators who must exercise oversight 
and the actual analysis that informs their 
judgements. " 
92] 
Even with the availability of 
the CRS and GAO to inform Congress, "during the 
days of the Lance warhead debate, several [Members] 
thought that the W-70 Mod 3 was a chemical device, 
and certainly it [Congress] needs to understand 
that a neutron bomb is not entirely devoid of heat 
and blast effects. "93] 
The example of ACIS demonstrates another weakness 
of the Congressional dimension. A similar situation, 
to be discussed, existed in the case of the F-16. 
The Congress inserted language in an appropriations 
bill, insisting that the Air Force and the Navy 
work together on producing a common fighter aircraft 
for both forces before further funds would be 
released. That was 1974, and to date, there is no 
such aircraft. 
However, allocations and appropriations are still 
within the Congressional domain and various groups 
influence or lobby Congress to obtain funding for 
their defence system. "Pressure groups all told 
spend about a billion dollars each year to bombard 
Congress, plus another billion to shape decisions 
indirectly by priming constituents. "941 Thus, 
it is no wonder that, "legislative conflicts in 
Congress are resolved more often than not by 
political pressure, not by any rational presentation 
of the issues. "951 As a means to influence defence 
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policy, access to the Members of relevant 
committees (Armed Services, Appropriations) is 
sought by these groups. For the Pentagon and 
armed services, it would appear that a strong 
lobbying effort should have the highest priority. 
While the SECDEF regularly makes presentations 
to the relevant committees to convince them of the 
merit of new weapons acquisitions and budget 
requests, "the lobbying activities of industry 
groups may be more powerful and more effective". 
961 
Also, "strictly speaking, it is illegal for the 
Services to lobby on Capitol Hill. They do a great 
deal of it under the guise of disseminating 
information. "971 Obviously, they accomplish this 
by passing their requirements upward to the SECDEF 
in DoD's Final Budget. Otherwise, they may be 
called upon as experts to testify. But more 
importantly, the suggestion is that the Services 
or the DoD Components accomplish their goals 
through their close working relationship with 
private industry which is maintained in two ways 
As seen, the DoD Components work closely with 
private contractors particularly during the 
earlier phases of a weapon system researching 
new technologies and matching requirements. 
Further, the DoD Components are also actively 
working with contractors during procedures 
for testing and evaluation which take place 
throughout all of the phases. 
Retired military officers are "employed by 
defense contractors or by public relations 
firms retained by such contractors". 
98' 
Either 
way, "when the Services really want something, 
they usually get it". 
99] 
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"Of all the groups seeking to lobby for increased 
defense expenditures, the most effective and 
perhaps the most dangerous from the point of view 
of ensuring a balanced military establishment are 
large defense contractors. "100] Essentially, each 
of the contractors wants to promote its own weapon 
system and the most profitable over a long period 
of time are those labeled "big ticket", (fighter 
aircraft, ships, nuclear missiles and so forth). 
From the viewpoint of the contractor, if it should 
obtain the contract for such items, it could 
monopolise the market for future generations, in 
that system, by making relatively small 
modifications to it. Eventually, when that 
system is ®3bsolete, the contractor can still do a 
"brisk business in spare parts at very profitable 
prices", to third countries that had purchased the 
system. 
101] 
"In view of the considerable economic spread effects 
of the production of big-ticket items, Congress is 
often sympathetic to the manufacture of these 
weapons systems. " 
102] 
The long term contracts 
of major systems create jobs, and from the viewpoint 
of Congress, especially Members of the House of 
Representatives, the creation of jobs in a 
constituency enlists supporters who will vote for 
him. The contractors understand this all too well, 
and in major-systems, the contractor arranges 
subcontracts for components throughout the US to 
enhance his position. This happened in the case 
of the F-16 versus the F/A-18, where Northrop 
Corporation has subcontracts for the F/A-18 in 
a total of 44 states. 
1031 
For now though, this 
discussion indicates that Congressional 
participation in defence planning, or the selection 
1 
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of weapons systems is relatively weak in relation 
to the Executive Branch and its Administrative 
Agencies. Further, the DoD Components are able to 
effectively obtain what they want, albeit indirectly 
from Congress. This will also be substantiated in 
the following Chapters, beginning with the actions 
of the contractors. But what must be kept in a 
proper perspective and applies equally both to the 
contractors and the Services, is that the resources 
available are limited. This affects their strategy 
in attempting to obtain contracts throughout the 
acquisition process. For example, if the Services 
are lobbying Congress, "the Services cannot mount 
one for every issue". 
1041 
That is physically 
impossible, and applies to the contractors as well, 
in seeking priorities, or shifting their strategies 
to obtain funding, or to compensate for changes in 
the environment. Further, it is not to be 
envisioned that those contractors or Services 
involved in either continuous research or lobbying 
efforts, do not neglect other efforts from other 
Services or contractors - it is not that clear cut. 
More will be said of this in the discussion 
pertaining to the case of the F-16. 
SUMMARY 
There is more to the overall acquisition process 
than has been detailed in these three Chapters. 
For example, there are more subunits, the 
relationships of subcontractors to prime contractor, 
more documentation, other interest groups/agencies 
which affect the outcome of these decisions. 
However, what has been outlined is more than 
adequate to show that the decisional centres are 
diffuse, shifting and are not able to be 
I 
comprehensively explained in terms of simple 
concepts. 
Far greater research and understanding could be 
accomplished by examining any one single aspect 
mentioned above. For example, the varying 
influences exerted on, and the preparation of a 
Developing Concept Paper, of a given weapon system 
for DSARC review. That is not the purpose here. 
The reason for this thesis is that a new conceptual 
approach to viewing the reality of the decisional 
processes of weapons acquisition is imperative. 
However, to accomplish this, the conceptual lenses 
offered by previous accounts, must be disregarded. 
In essence, the world of decision making is a 
complicated phenomenon, and to explain it by 
simplifying, only distorts it. Or, as John 
Steinbrunler suggested, "it is important that such 
bear as close an approximation to the ways in 
which governments actually make decisions. " 
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In Part II, the case study of the F-16 is by no 
means a complete historical account, however, the 
events of the F-16 adhere to a chronological sequence 
of results outlining the evolution of the F-16, 
through the stages of weapons acquisition. The 
analysis of the case study commences with the 
operations of the contractors, participating in 
the programme, before the decision to initiate 
the undertaking, and continues by covering the 
developments up to and including the foreign sales 
of the F-16. 
The purpose of examining the case study of the 
F-16, is not to extract nuances of defence decision 
making, but it is an investigation to make more 
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conclusive the following points that have emerged 
from Part I. Initially, it should be apparent 
that there are a multiplicity of decisional centres 
entailed in the procurement of any weapon system. 
Simple models or catch-all phrases do not suffice 
in so much that also these decisional centres are 
dynamic, in the sense of shifting. Complicating 
this are many variables such as the influence of 
certain individuals, bureaucratic rivalries, 
organisational and structural pressures, financial 
constraints, interests of the contractor, and an 
array of widespread Congressional interests, to 
name a few, converging elements. Sometimes they 
overlap simultaneously, which affects, in different 
degrees, the outcome. of the decisions. Moreover, 
there is an uniqueness inherent in each weapon 
system, and the organisational processes through 
which a weapon system passes are reappraised and 
in a constant state of flux - for example, the 
reforms of SECDEF McNamara, Deputy SECDEF Carlucci, 
Congress legislating the Arms Control Impact 
Statements, and many more. 
However, the "constant" which exists within this 
overlapping of jurisdictions is found within the 
levels of the DoD Components. Further, due to 
the organisational structure, and the decentralisation 
of decision making within the DoD, the decisions 
radiate upwards which permits the DoD Components 
to exert a greater input in the decision than 
those in authority. This is especially pronounced 
in the earlier stages of weapons development, in 
which defence contractors enjoy a close working 
relationship with the DoD Components to research 
new technologies and match these with a Service's 
requirements. Also, the DoD Components maintain 
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this partnership with the contractors throughout 
the entire life of a system, as demonstrated by 
the repeated testing and evaluation performed on 
the systems. Such is an indicator that due to the 
fast pace of technological advancements, the 
existing systems are upgraded, altered, or perhaps 
rendered obsolete. Thus, throughout the process, 
the contractors are within the position to exert 
pressures on the decisions. 
As the development of a system advances and begins 
to materialise, an increased role is applied to 
the proceedings by those groups or individuals in 
authority. Presidential statements, JCS announcements 
to Congress on the merits of a system, or Secretary 
of State approval are not decisional points, but 
may affect the outcome of the decision. The real 
decisions have been determined beforehand, based 
on such variables pertaining to the amount of 
advocacy for the system, the thresholds obtained, 
the level of prior investments, and the feasibility 
of the available technology. These and other 
examples have far more impact on the decisions to 
produce and procure a system, than for example, 
Secretaries of State or Defense mustering support 
abroad or at home for a new system. Regardless, 
the duties of those in authority (SECDEF) are 
expanded as the weapon nears Full-Scale Development. 
However, the DoD Components have not abdicated 
their influence, even though this may appear to 
be the case. 
The supposed gradual fade out of the DoD Components 
in the later stages will be further examined in 
Part II. But before turning attention to the case 
of the F-16, the increased roles of those in 
I 214 
governance are usually in response to events outside 
of the environment of the Pentagon. This is the 
function of the SECDEFs (and others in authority). They 
act not only as managers of the DoD, but as politicians, 
exercising their expertise for the enhancement or 
maintenance of the decisions promulgated from below. 
Some of the examples of external pressures being 
exerted, which are discussed in Part II, are the 
following : Congress exercised its Oversight 
capabilities by stressing commonality for a similar 
fighter for both the Navy and the Air Force. 
Another example is, the negotiations and dealings, 
some through-the State Department, which persuaded 
NATO allies to enter into, and participate in the 
coproduction effort to produce the F-16. Or the example 
of Presidents Nixon and Carter, who were engaged in 
foreign sales (some of which were a precipitate of a 
crisis - the fall of the Shah of Iran and cancelled 
orders of the F-16). Another example of outside 
involvement exerting pressures on the SECDEF is again 
the Congress, but in a different light. Earlier it was 
stated that Congress was the weaker link in defence 
planning and the related decisions to establish funding. 
As this thesis has emphasised, it would be incorrect 
to view Congress in this regard concerning weapons 
procurement in general, because the Congress is not 
as weak when reviewing foreign sales. Congress has 
legislated powers which permits it to oversee, review, 
or if it wishes, to cancel foreign sales. Consequently, 
the theme of this thesis, which is to express the reality 
of the decision making process in weapons procurement, 
unhindered by. _the 
handica.. of applying simplistic 
1 
conceptual models, carri over into Part II. Attention 
should now turn to a discussion of the events of the 
F-16 with this in mind. 
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THE CONCEPTION OF THE F-16 
The Non-Hardware Stage of the Lightweight Fighter 
F-X Concept 
The F-16 multinational programme is a multimillion 
dollar co-operative undertaking between the United 
States and four NATO countries, Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Norway with the prime contractor 
being General Dynamics. The General Dynamics YF-16 
(F-16) is a fighter plane which is a compact, 
single-seat, single-engine aircraft designed to 
achieve air superiority over other aircraft in 
air-to-air combat, and to carry over 15,000 pounds 
of missiles and bombs on air-to-ground missions. 
The F-16 is slightly over 47 feet long, with a 
wingspan of 31.3 feet, including two missiles at 
the wing tips, and an overall height at the tail 
of 16.3 feet. The aircraft weight, with full internal 
fuel, is 21,000 pounds, with maximum take-off weight 
of 31,000 pounds. Maximum external payload is 
15,200 pounds. It is powered by the fully developed 
Pratt and Whitney F 100-PW-100 turbofan engine (the 
same 25,000 pound thrust engine that powers the US 
Air Force F-15 Eagle). 
11 
The F-16 "multirole fighter" emerged from the Light 
Weight Fighter programme, which was initiated by 
the US Air Force during the early 1970s in response 
to rising costs. The acquisition cost of tactical 
aircraft has risen steadily since World War 11.2] 
This was partially due to the development of 
increasingly sophisticated avionics and weapons 
technology. Also, although inflation accounted for 
some of the increase, "most of it is attributable 
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v 
to the greater size and technical complexity of 
modern planes, as well as the declining rates of 
production that have accompanied the rise in 
unit costs" 
31 
The General Dynamics F-16 (also referred to as the 
Fighting Falcon) was one of the stars of the 1977 
Paris Air Show. Aside from it being one of the 
"hottest", and probably at the time, the most 
controversial fighter in the Western world, many 
observers were intrigued not only by the aircraft 
itself, but by some who were photographing it. 
One person in particular, dressed in a suit that 
was distinctly out of date, and equipped with a 
Russian camera fitted with a large telephoto lens, 
was photographing the aircraft, not from close up, 
but from a range of several hundred yards. The 
resulting photographs were no doubt examined in an 
East European Defence Ministry a few days later. 
However, the whole exercise might have been much 
easier had the photographer simply approached the 
aircraft, like everyone else, and accepted 
photographs and a booklet showing basic design 
and potential capabilities from two General 
Dynamics men on duty beside the aircraft. 
41 
This 
story was repeated amongst interested observers, 
who, although they found humour in it, also 
realised the seriousness with which the Warsaw 
Pact was taking this new warplane - even if their 
intelligence gathering method was unsophisticated. 
Although the F-16 made its debut in 1977, it had 
flown by "accident" four years earlier on 
December 13,1973, at Fort Worth, in what was 
supposed to be a high speed taxi trial. To the 
surprise of General Dynamics pilot, Phil Oestricher, 
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the aircraft oscillated and, realising that the 
aircraft's horizontal tailplane had hit the runway, 
he knew that the best way to resolve this difficulty 
was to become airborne -a brief six minute flight 
followed and the F-16 was broügh&in to a smooth landing. 4 
The debut of the F-16 and its first flight were 
turning points for the F-16 programme. However, 
how the Air Force and/or the Defence establishment 
turned concepts and needs into the hardware of the 
F-16 is the major emphasis of this Chapter. This 
matter can be brought to light by first, turning 
attention to the events and earlier contractor 
actions before the conception of the F-16. The case 
study of the F-16 can be better appreciated if firstly 
there is a discussion of the procedures, the activities 
of various DoD Components, and particular individuals 
credited with the F-16 programme. 
Early Contractor Actions 
In the mid-1960s, the United States was heavily 
involved in the South East Asian conflict. Over 
North Vietnam, the US pilots found themselves unable 
to match the kill rates of the Korean War. Instead 
of a 10: 1 or better kill ratio of the earlier 
conflict, they achieved at best just over 3: 1, a figure 
which steadily fell. Throughout the Vietnam Conflict, 
and for an extended period of time, the US services 
claimed to have maintained permanent superiority over 
the MIGs, quoting rates of just over unity at worst. 
In certain battles, the ratio came out slightly in 
favour of the Vietnamese. 
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The Air Force, which at the time had no new tactical 
fighter or attack designs which could be put rapidly 
into production, was procuring adaptations of two 
US Navy Aircraft - the McDonnell Douglas F-4 and 
the Ling Temco-Vought (LTV) A-7. Additionally, the 
General Dynamics (GD) F-111 (formerly the TFX) was 
in production for the Air Force. However, numerous 
problems then associated with the F-111 programmes, 
raised questions as to both the length of its 
production run and its utility in the Vietnam 
arena. 
6] 
The Air Force also had contracts with two other 
aircraft companies, Lockheed and Northrop. 
Approximately 300 Lockheed Starfighters71 had been 
procured by the Air Force in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. As this production run was entering its 
final stages in 1959, Lockheed won a European fighter 
competition and subsequently established a four-nation 
consortium (Germany, Italy, Belgium and The 
Netherlands) to co-produce a heavier, multi-mission 
Starfighter - the 21,000 pound F-104G. The successor 
of this consortium eventually paved the way for 
additional co-production arrangements in Canada and 
Japan with the F-104 sales finally reaching 
approximately 2,500 in 15 countries. 
81 
In 1962, the Air Force awarded Northrop a contract 
to produce the F-5 Freedom Fighter, a very lightweight 
(13,000 pound) twin-engined tactical fighter based 
on the Northrop T-38 jet trainer used by the Air 
Force since 1961. The objective of the Department 
of Defense was to develop a simple, inexpensive but 
reasonably capable fighter which could be provided 
or sold to those countries which could not afford, 
or lacked the capability to operate, more complex 
aircraft. 
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Both Lockheed and Northrop developed support sites 
and field offices in each of the countries operating 
their aircraft, with Lockheed more actively involved 
at the six foreign F-104 manufacturing sites. On 
the surface, such support sites and field offices 
were necessary simply for either manufacturing or 
operating aircraft. However, Lockheed and Northrop 
both produced in-house reports detailing that in 
the future 1970s and 1980s many other fighter 
aircraft worldwide would have to be replaced, and 
each projected in its report that their established 
international connections would give them an edge 
over other US fighter manufacturing competition in 
capturing a large percentage of this market. 
10] 
Furthermore, both companies concluded that the 
share of the Free World market which they might 
lose to sales of the F-4 (McDonnell Douglas) and 
F-111 (General Dynamics) would be small because 
the heavier weights of the aircraft and its 
greater complexity would result in excessive costs 
to many countries. These companies were accurate 
in that appraisal. For example, in 1971, "the 
trouble-plagued F-111 was being delivered at a 
fly away cost of more than 8 million dollars". 
11] 
Two years later, in 1973, a declassified Air Force 
study for the General Accounting Office announced 
that they were happy to report that "the F-111 
aircraft average unit decreased from $15.9 million 
to $15.01 million". 
12] 
An increase of almost 100 
percent in two years! 
At the time, the only other viable foreign 
competition was considered to be the French Mirage 
series of aircraft made by Avions Marcel Dassault, 
whose Mirage III fighter had lost to Lockheed in 
the earlier European fighter competitions. 
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the mid-60s, Britain and France had joined forces 
briefly with the hope of developing the Anglo-French 
Variable Geometry (AFVG) fighter; however, the 
project was abandoned in 1967. Also in 1967, the 
Air Forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Canada and West Germany (with Norway and Britain 
observing) aligned to develop the concept for the 
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA). Lockheed's 
replacement aircraft strategy focused heavily on 
the existing F-104 (Lockheed) markets and manufacturing 
sites. It was their goal to design a new fighter 
with considerably improved performance compared not 
only to the existing F-104 but also potential threat 
aircraft, and yet maintain a very high degree of 
commonality (70 to 80 percent) with the F-104. The 
philosophy behind such a strategy was simply that 
such a design, by retaining proven parts and 
equipment to lower costs, would be especially 
attractive to those countries already procuring 
and/or operating the F-104. Furthermore, it was 
reasoned that, after the initial success of such a 
programme, other buyers would join in its momentum. 
14] 
Northrop, then regarded as the primary manufacturer 
of small fighter aircraft, was somewhat more 
ambitious. In addition to planning modifications 
for the F-5 Freedom Fighter to improve its 
performance and capabilities (Northrop's strategy- 
for the F-5 was similar to Lockheed's strategy for 
future markets with the F-104), Northrop set out to 
design a new fighter responsive to force modernisation 
requirements perceived by many NATO countries for 
the late 1970s. At the time, NATO was considering 
the replacement of 4 current fighters (F-100, F-104G, 
F-5, F-4) with a single aircraft backed by 
standardised training, logistics, weapons and 
tactics. 
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Aside from the arguments of Rationality, 
I 
Standardisation and Interoperability of Weapon 
Systems, 
161 
costs would also be a major factor. 
The other factor would be whether to buy US or 
French (later Mirage F-1 in competition with F-16). 
Essentially, the posture taken at that time was 
that "the effect on NATO air power in Europe would 
be dramatic indeed if the US and European countries 
used the same aeroplane and the same maintenance 
facilities ". 171 
Aside from Northrop being sympathetic to future 
force modernisation, it was also cognisant of 
Lockheed's evolving "CL" design series for a 
smaller fighter. From Northrop's research centre, 
a new fighter design known as the P-530 Cobra 
emerged. 
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The P-530 Cobra was designed to the 
same medium weight as the Lockheed "CL" design, 
but incorporated advanced high-lift aerodynamic 
design concepts and new engines to achieve a top 
speed of Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound) minus 
variable geometry engine inlets. 
This was an example of the various in-house 
strategies contemplated by contractors. Earlier, 
it was mentioned that contractors who are engaged 
in the pursuance of a continuing strategy, cannot 
neglect the efforts of other contractors. The 
case here is interesting because each contractor 
was very aware of the presence of the other. 
Lockheed and Northrop, respectively were cognisant 
that the other was researching future European 
markets, developing new or evolving designs, 
and naturally investing heavily in the production 
of aircraft. Even though Lockheed and Northrop 
were competitors, the importance of this 
221 
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competition was diminished in the consideration of 
the decision making of DoD Components. What was 
of concern was the relationship with the contractors 
based on the F-104 and F-5 programmes, and the 
performance of these aircraft under review from 
testing and evaluation. However, of greater 
consideration was the amount of participation of 
the DOD Components in the research and development 
of new technologies of aircraft design with Northrop 
and Lockheed. This amount of participation was 
measured by the investment from the DoD. 
Although the design of the P-530 Cobra was a step 
forward in avionics, a revolutionary and unusual 
sales concept also emerged. Northrop envisioned 
an eventual multi-national co-production consortium 
similar to the Lockheed F-104 manufacturing group, 
which was already in progress. The unusual sales 
plan was designed along the commercial airline 
practices. The programme was financed by 
advance commitments from those nations wishing to 
participate; thereby alleviating the dependency on 
US Government funds. Under this concept, Northrop's 
plan was to evolve the P-530 Cobra from a two-phased 
programme consisting of a pre-production or 
development effort to validate the design and flight 
test several aircraft, followed by a production phase 
including delivery of the aircraft. Northrop would 
commit itself in either of two ways : 
1) Northrop would commit itself to initiate 
the entire two phases with firm orders 
for 400 aircraft; 
I 
2) Northrop would conduct the pre-production 
phase upon receipt of $100 million 
19)and 
proceed with production when 400 orders 
were obtained. 
As an inducement, Northrop determined that when 
applying the learning curve to an order exceeding 
a quantity of 750 aircraft, subsequently a unit 
price of $3 million would be the cost of the P-530 
Cobra. 
20] 
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Northrop, after having suffered a setback in Europe211 
reasoned in the summer of 1968, that the US 
Government backing would enhance their European 
sales efforts. Northrop did request and receive 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) support 
for their proposed P-530 multinational development. 
In a letter of 23 August 1968, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, Paul Nitze, pledged $4 million in 
development funds to Northrop for Fiscal Year (FY) 
1969.221 An earlier discussion outlined that the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense is Chairman of the 
Defense Resources Board (DRB) which is responsible 
for matching funds with needs. 
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However, it is 
all the more interesting to note that the letter 
to a private contractor was sent by the DLputy and 
not, as one would assume, the Secretary of Defense, 
especially considering a commitment of $4 million. Further, 
funds for 
_research 
and development *ere' made 
available at the discretion of the SECDEF. However, 
this wasthe time of year for appropriations and the 
Secretary of Defense Mrs concerned more with- -- 
the politics involved for securing funds. The 
letter also cited the reasons for such a commitment, 
mentioning Northrop's extensive development efforts, 
the impossibility of modifying existing US aircraft 
I 
to match the predicted performance and cost of the 
P-530. As a condition to these funds, Northrop 
had to devise a development and production schedule 
acceptable to the Department of Defense, and also 
obtain at least $15 million from two foreign 
countries for the first year's development effort. 
Furthermore, there was no mention of any further 
commitment of additional Department of Defense 
funds after FY 1969. Despite efforts, Northrop 
was unable to secure the required financial 
support abroad and the Department of Defense used 
the P-530 funds elsewhere. However, as a result 
of this recognition and the interest of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, the US Air Force did conduct 
a limited evaluation of the Northrop P-530 design 
in September 1968, but the test was restricted to 
assessing the validity of Northrop's claims for 
the P-530 as an export sales aircraft rather than 
as an aircraft which might be responsive to US Air 
Force fighter needs. Northrop's multinational 
development strategy to compete with. Lockheed had 
failed with the P-530 Cobra. Nevertheless, 
Northrop reconsidered its strategies, and the 
P-530 became an integral component of the F-X 
studies - studies that were already-in progress 
to determine the future needs of US Air Force 
fighters. 
Early DoD Actions 
As early as 1965, the US Air Force (USAF) had begun 
concept-formulation studies of new high performance 
fighters. These included a heavy 60,000 pound 
interceptor/air superiority fighter designated 
Fighter Experimental (FX). 
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Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Systems Analysis (OASD/SA), in July 1965, 
the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) initiated a programme of study, 
entitled the Joint Air Force/OSD FX Effort, to 
bolster the Air Force tactical strength as rapidly 
and economically as possible. 
24] 
"Pressure was 
exerted from OSD Systems Analysis for a new study, " 
251 
(eventually shortened to be called the F-X Study). 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Systems Analysis, a DoD Component, is instrumental 
in producing the Systems Concept Paper in the 
early stage of a weapons system's Life Cycle. 
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It should also be noted that a member of the 
"F-16 Fighter Mafia", Pierre Sprey (a civilian), 
was working at that time within the OSD, Systems 
Analysis. At this stage, those involved in the 
F-X Study, splintered into two groups advocating 
their perceptions of Air Force tactical strength. 
Presently, this continues to play a role in the 
F-16, F/A-18 and F-20 debate. 
271 
One group 
perceived a greater need for an increased ground 
attack capability and supported those within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for service 
commonality in favouring the development of an 
Air Force version of the Navy's A-7. The other 
group advocated an increased air-to-air combat 
capability and therefore pushed for the Air Force 
to procure the F-5. Following much debate, the 
Air Force opted for the A-7 in November 1965.28] 
Although this decision was hailed by some as a 
victory for ground attack or commonality advocates, 
more importantly, it established the argument for 
developing a new air superiority-oriented Air 
Force fighter. Further strengthening this 
I 
argument were the successes of the Soviet MIG 
fighters in the 1965 Vietnam air combat encounters 
which proved the error of assuming US air superiority. 
The consequence of the above decision was to bolster 
another F-X study, chartered by the Air Staff. 
29] 
The "Concept Formulation Phase" for this new F-X 
was initiated in December 1965 with the release to 
the aircraft industry of requests for new design 
studies. 
30] 
With the range, payload and performance 
requirements which had been provided to the 
contractors, many designs proposed by 
several contractors were evaluated during this 
phase. A multi-purpose fighter weighing about 
60,000 pounds with a variable-sweep wing was 
advanced by the Air Force Systems Command's (AFSC) 
Aeronautical Division (ASD). However, concern was 
raised not so much because of its size and heavy 
wing loading but because of its similarities to 
the F-111 which prompted the Air Staff to request 
additional expertise from within the Air Force to 
review this design. Although this decision 
permitted greater review of various designs, it 
more importantly signalled to the office of the 
Secretary of Defense that the Air Force was better 
equipped than the Navy and/or the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense in designing a superior 
aircraft. Thus the Air Force deafened their ears 
to the Navy's and the OSD's argument of commonality 
arrived at by the previous F-X study. 
This is typical of inter-service rivalry, of which 
the Defense Blue Ribbon Panel stated that the 
establishment of military requirements is a 
"service unilateral" process. "There is no 
opportunity for the Office of the Secretary of 
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Defense to review total requirements for priority, 
urgency, or duplication before they are screened 
and filtered by the Services". 
31] 
This not only 
substantiates the large role played by the DoD 
Components in the decision making, but also, this 
places the SECDEF in a relatively difficult 
"position either to establish options outside the 
agenda of service requirements or to modify major 
features of the requirements the services propose... 
32] 
This is an additional weakness of the SECDEF. 
Inter-service rivalry fuels this situation in that 
"the services jealously guard their power. Their 
autonomy in defining and developing weapons systems 
is central to their ability to define their 
mission capabilities and operational roles". 
33] 
Regarding the commonality argument, it is 
in the best interests of the Navy to side with the 
OSD to increase its jurisdiction and mission role. 
It would have been detrimental to the Air Force to have 
the Navy encroach into their arena, thus, all the 
more reason for the Air Force to stress air 
superiority and to continue lobbying for the F-X 
study. 
By the Spring of 1967, the Air Force favoured a 
more manoeuvreable 40,000 pound fighter with a 
variable-sweep wing. However, because of the 
characteristics of the variable-sweep wing, more 
in depth studies commenced to compare the 
performance, cost, and risk of this feature with 
those of a fixed wing design. Furthermore, in 
July of 1967, at the Moscow Air Show, the Soviets 
displayed the new Soviet Mach 3, a high altitude 
Foxbat fighter. This showing, as perceived by 
the second group in the first F-X study(who were 
against Air Force and Navy commonality) added 
4 
i 
228 
impetus by underlining the need for a pure air 
superiority fighter. The Air Force's argument 
for a pure air superiority fighter gave rise to the 
high/low mix concept. Second, the other reason for 
the concept was rooted in the high cost of high 
performance aircraft. The high/low (also sometimes 
referred to as hi/low) force mix concept incorporated 
a large number of less expensive weapons systems 
with a smaller force of very expensive systems, such 
as the Navy F-14 and the Air Force's F-15, which 
according to the result of the F-X study, ensured 
air superiority. Again, commonality was a factor 
which increased the Air Force's emphasis on air-to-air 
manoeuvring. However, performance was of greater 
value than the belief of both the Navy's and Office 
of the Secretary of Defense's commonality advocates 
who were pushing for the multi-mission Navy VFAX 
design to meet the Air Force needs. Therefore, 
according to them, the decision should be made by 
the two Services. This arrangement was unacceptable 
to the Air Force, because the Navy would then have 
influence in the Air Force's decisions. 
In September 1968, the Air Force and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense reached conceptual agreement 
on the F-X which was thereupon designated as the 
F-15. The Air Force gained approval from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense to pursue Contract 
Definition for an aircraft which would replace the 
F-4E as the first line counter-air fighter in the 
1975-1985 time frame. In the Development Concept 
Paper, today referred to as a Decision Co-ordinating 
Paper, 34] it was argued that : 
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1) the F-15 would be a single seat, fixed 
wing, twin-engine fighter in the 
40,000 lb weight class; 
2) a competitive prototype fly-off was not 
a suitable means for selecting a contractor; 
3) the Navy's VFX (which was VFAX) 
351 
was 
not suitable as an F-4E replacement, nor 
could the F-4E be modified to meet 
performance requirements; 
4) any F-15 ground attack capability would 
be a spin-off of its basic requirement 
of air-to-air combat capability. 
361 
The preliminary estimate of the average unit flyaway 
cost37j, based on a production of almost 750 aircraft, 
was approximately $5 million, with a total programme 
cost estimate which included the development of a new 
engine and a new radar, slightly in excess of $5 billion. 
It should be emphasised again, that history has shown 
that cost estimates developed in the conceptual stage 
are usually optimistic and should be given little 
consideration to actual costs. Also, blame does not 
lie solely with the contractor but is shared by the 
DoD Components' over-enthusiasm while preparing their 
documents found within DODD 5000.1 discussed earlier. 
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Thus far, the following points have emerged from the 
above discussions. First, although military aircraft 
are inherently complicated in themselves for the 
various tupes of missions required by such aircraft, 
ultimately costs are a major determinant. 
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What further complicates this environment are the 
contractors, very large private enterprises working 
with the Pentagon on design, mission need and 
requirements. Various strategies having been 
promulgated by these contractors to secure the 
contract complicated it further and a change in the 
international arena (Soviet introduction of MiG-25 
(Foxbat)) or in the performance of aircraft (poor 
in Vietnam) inherently altered the strategies of 
contractors and mission requirements. The point is 
that there are many uncertainties in weapon systems 
development. However, as shown in the discussion of 
Fiscal Cycle overlap 
391 
, some of the uncertainties 
can be narrowed down for the contractors whereby if 
contractor A realises he does not have his "foot in 
the door" compared to Contractor B, his (Contractor A) 
emphasis will shift toward upcoming awards. Taking 
this one step further, the uncertainties of the 
contractor are further narrowed by the DoD Components. 
For example, and discussed below, the risks are 
lessened by a prototype programme, between General 
Dynamics and Northrop, because the funding for it 
came from the DoD, instead of from the contractors. 
This was also evidenced by Northrop being "bailed out" 
after losing the competition to General Dynamics. 
The point is that although the acquisition of any 
weapon system is complicated, which results in risks 
and uncertainties, there are mechanisms to make certain 
that a large private contractor does not fold overnight 
due to loss of contract. 
Second, although decisions radiate upwards, had 
there not been a SECDEF Robert McNamara, who 
conceived a new regime at the Pentagon through his 
I 
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Cost Benefit Analysis, the Air Force may not have 
opted for the A-7 aircraft in November 1965. 
McNamara's budgeting techniques were to provide 
policy makers with a means of looking at total 
cost in money and man hours for any weapon system 
and to provide a "cost-efficiency" ratio for these 
programmes so that policy makers could decide 
whether the extra benefits they expected were worth 
the input when compared with the other means of 
accomplishing the same mission. Such techniques 
coloured his decision to opt for commonality, which 
made management sense, when working in an 
environment of rising costs. (Perhaps, whilst 
managing the overall DoD, he was exerting influences 
from his management skills received from previous 
experiencel. . 
In the case of commonality for 
the F-X, an individual such as McNamara did 
matter as opposed to a Clifford or a Richardson 
in decision making. Although they had similarities 
in management skills and were essentially managers, 
the decision might have had a different outcome 
if it had not been measured along the merits of 
McNamara's Cost Benefit Analysis. If that were 
the case, the aircraft for 1975-1985 may well have 
been the F-15 and not the F-16. This thinking is 
contradictory to what has been set forth throughout 
regarding the lack of input of a SECDEF to the 
decisions of weapons procurement. The SECDEF 
does playa role in a wider managerial sense. 
For example, McNamara's reforms affected the outcome 
of decisions daily. However, regarding the 
decisions on a specific weapon system, the SECDEF 
is less involved than DoD Components. In essence, 
the SECDEF, as a manager of the DoD, is responsible 
for setting the parameters. Nevertheless, it is 
not necessarily true that items which he favours 
based on his policy decisions, or his personal 
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persuasion (such as the commonality for fighter 
aircraft) always materialise. 
Third, aside from the role of an individual, the 
influence of an office is an important determining 
factor. This has been evidenced in the 
correspondence between the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense and the private contractors. As stated 
earlier, the Secretary of Defense is busy not only 
managing the entire DoD, but is attentive to the 
politics involved and the political consequences 
of decisions. Responsibility often lies with the 
Deputy Secretary who must also delegate his 
authority and manage the many decisions making their 
way toward him. . For example, his office and 
eventually the SECDEF receive influences from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
for Systems Analysis as well as other DoD Components 
in the preparation of the Systems Concept Paper. 
An additional dimension lr the culmination of the 
F-X project to consider is the personal influence 
applied by Pierre Sprey. While an individual may 
influence organisational output, in turn this 
influence may prove to be an input for bureaucratic 
output. Alternatively, an individual may be 
influenced by the organisation which may be an 
input to bureaucratic politics between two 
organisations. Thirdly, bureaucratic politics 
between organisations could be the precipitate of 
two or more individuals disagreeing on an 
organisational issue. The possible scenarios and 
permutations are infinite. Consider the 
following diagram : 
1 
Figure 5-I 
Relationships of Individuals to Organisations 
Individual A> Individual B> Individual C 
^<IA<IA 
ORGANISATION A ORGANISATION B ORGANISATION C 
/ý F .... 
Fý 
,. -. 
1A 
influence of individual or organisation 
(as Rational Actor or Organisation Output) 
------- -- bureaucratic politics 
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The diagram is based on the three categories of 
decision making illustrated by Graham Allison. 
401 
However, as stated earlier, Allison neglected in 
his original work to develop the point that 
organisational output (Systems Concept Paper) may 
act as an input to bureaucratic politics (for 
example, SECDEF aligned with the Navy, and Air 
Force versus Navy regarding the commonality issue; 
or the Navy versus the Air Force based on inter- 
service rivalry). Moreover in Allison's Rational 
Actor Model, he appeared to diminish the importance 
of the individual and how that individual might 
influence or act as an input to the bureaucratic politics 
I 
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model through organisational outputs or through 
himself. In essence, the above diagram presents 
a fuller picture of the relationships and when 
viewing decision making, the author is attempting 
to emphasise that a Pierre Sprey was just as 
important as a Robert McNamara, as was a DoD 
Component to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
in the roles they played in a decision. Dlff'ing the 
non-hardware phase of a weapon system, Pierre 
Sprey (as an individual output) was more 
important than Robe 'McNamara, as, a DoD 
Component (as an organisational output) was 
more important than the office of the Secretary 
of Defense. If those at the top are busy with 
management and politics, it is those below feeding 
them the decisions which they manage as final 
arbitrators whilst considering the political 
consequences. If such is the case, then from the 
viewpoint of a weapons contractor, he is best 
knocking on doors with less brass during the 
non-hardware processes. 
Fighter Mafia 
With the approval of the Development Concept Paper, 
the Air Force was in effect off and almost running 
with a new fighter programme. However, prior to 
the approval of the Development Concept Paper, 
several aggressive and perhaps farsighted 
individuals in the Air Force and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense had developed reservations 
regarding the F-X concept - particularly with 
respect to the potential for higher performance, 
smaller size and lower cost. The effect of the 
F-15 decision was to re-orient their efforts from 
trying to make that aircraft more austere, towards 
defining what the next Air Force fighter should 
look like. 
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The F-X Concept Formulation Studies were greatly 
aided by Colonel John Boyd (at that time Major), 
an Air Force pilot and engineer, who was summoned 
to the Pentagon in October 1966 to review the 
above mentioned heavyweight F-X design and, 
following that, was primarily responsible for the 
many trade-offs and analyses that led to the F-15. 
As a fighter pilot and tactics instructor at 
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, in the late 1950s, 
Boyd had developed several theories that, when 
applied to air combat manoeuvring tactics 
(dogfighting), assisted a pilot in gaining an 
advantage of position over an adversary. At 
Georgia Tech in 1962, he began to quantify and 
relate those aircraft characteristics which 
contributed most significantly to performance, 
namely : the aircraft's weight, drag, thrust and 
lift. Of course, these characteristics were well 
known to aircraft designers, but Boyd's unique 
connection of these variables directly to 
manoeuvreability was something new. 
41] 
At first, Boyd could hardly believe that this 
simple idea was a new method of looking at fighter 
performance. Once he had realised the fact, he 
confirmed how various combinations of aerodynamics 
and engines could be devised to create better 
aircraft. By looking at manoeuvreability from 
a different viewpoint, "manoeuvreability as an 
energy problem - when you manoeuvre an airplane 
you need energy ... you loose energy either in gaining 
altitude, airspeed or both. You loose energy in 
turning - what happens is that your drag exceeds 
your thrust, and at that point you have a 
negative energy rate". The negative rate has to 
come out of altitude, airspeed or out of a 
i 
combination of the two. "You reach 
which drag is greater than thrust - 
you have a negative vector ... you 
drag by velocity and that tells you 
energy you're going to have to pump 
a point at 
that means 
multiply net 
how much 
UP- 1142] 
In 1963, at Elgin Air Force Base, Florida, Boyd 
teamed with Thomas Christie, a mathematician, who 
recognised the potential of Boyd's emerging 
theories. Christie also had access to a computer 
which could be used to expand, refine and simplify 
them. The resulting "Energy Manoeuvreability 
Concept" shed new light on air combat tactics, 
and because it lent itself to computer analysis 
and synthesis of design trade-offs, proved to be 
valuable in the design of new aircraft. Boyd 
took. his programmes and made them available to the 
aircraft industry's design engineers and provided 
criticisms of their design studies. 
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Regarding the F-15, Boyd did have some reservations 
about the final F-15 design. Another person who 
doubted some of the design features was Pierre 
Sprey who, in late 1965, left Grumman Aircraft 
where he had been an operations research analyst 
and consultant to join the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Systems Analysis (OASD/SA) 
staff as a weapon systems analyst. While there, 
Sprey and. others were concerned over the increasing 
cost of weapon systems and the accompanying decline 
in the size of the major US forces. Sprey set out 
to determine what was causing this trend and, if 
possible,. do something about it. 
44] 
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In the Spring of 1967, Boyd briefed Sprey on F-X 
design trade-offs and the rationale for them. Sprey 
i 
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realised that Boyd's analyses were the key to 
rational fighter design. The association of these 
two, which in time attracted a following, became 
a kind of fraternity often referred to as the 
"Fighter Mafia". And it was the lobbying of this 
group as well as, "the lobbying of Boyd and Sprey 
for simpler more manoeuvreable weapons that made 
possible the development in the early 1970s of 
the F-16 fighter jet. ". 
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The primary motivation 
of the group was concern over force structure 
based on the premise that a greater number of 
small, very high performance fighters was 
preferable to a lesser number of larger, more 
complex, and therefore more costly fighters, with 
somewhat compromised performance levels. Although 
today there are almost infinite levels of weapon 
system complexity, the "Fighter Mafia's" conviction 
was that numbers were more important than complexity. 
Sprey and Boyd were convinced that if the current 
cost escalation of fighters continued it would 
not be economically feasible for the US and NATO 
to retain numerical parity with the Warsaw Pact 
tactical fighter force. They believed that the 
way to reverse this cost trend and maintain parity 
was to omit all non-essential systems from the 
mission; refrain from the penchant for advanced 
technology engines; and eliminate requirements 
for complex avionics systems, which were high and 
seldom used militarily, regardless of top speeds 
and excessive ranges. Sprey also believed that 
since the implementation of policies inaugurated 
by SECDEF McNamara 
461 
(who, as SECDEF, was setting 
the parameters) the Services were now constrained 
to fixed force structures, rather than budgetary 
limits. It was clearly in each Service's interests 
I 
to maximise the capability of each force unit; 
in other words, there was "no incentive to acquire 
larger numbers of weapons by reducing unit cost". 
47] 
Thus, Sprey had not only recognised the need for 
greater austerity in fighter aircraft, but also 
the need for incentives that could be exploited 
to achieve it. Furthermore, Sprey realised that 
Boyd's analytical techniques could be used to 
determine if such an aircraft could be designed and 
still retain relevant combat performance. 
Even though the Development Concept Paper, 
mentioned above, formed the design of the F-X 
requirements in late 1967, Boyd and Sprey with 
their data and trade-off techniques were still 
searching for a more austere fighter. They 
challenged almost every requirement of the F-X 
design and realised that extracting a little 
weight or complexity from each of many areas would 
result in large overall savings. They envisioned 
a smaller, less complex fighter, weighing about 
33,000 to 35,000 pounds which would have improved 
performance in all areas except for top speed. 
48] 
In the Spring of 1968, Boyd briefed the Air Staff 
and Sprey briefed the Commander of the Air Force 
Structural Command of their findings. Some 
interest was expressed, but no serious attempt 
to increase the performance, and decrease the size 
of the F-X was undertaken. 
49] 
The Fighter Mafia's 
battle for a more austere fighter seemed lost and 
they kept relatively quiet throughout the 
remainder of 1968. 
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The F-XX Concept 
Sprey and Boyd used the trade-off data from their 
work on the F-X to challenge all specifications 
and requirements in order to determine the extent 
of performance improvement that could be achieved. 
Their efforts of technological research and 
developments altered the requirements which 
evolved into a single engined, less than 25,000 
pound, fighter concept which Sprey dubbed the 
11F-XX". 
50] 
Subsequently, Sprey provided the F-XX 
designs both to General Dynamics and Northrop for 
independent reviews. Primarily, Sprey 
selected these two contractors because General 
Dynamics had submitted smaller designs in the 
F-X concept formulation phase, and because of 
Northrop's efforts on their attractive new P-530 
design. 
The traditional USAF thinking equated light weight 
with short range. In retrospect, this was 
perfectly justified in view of the technology of 
the time. The MiG-21 was lightweight and developed 
by using mid-1950s technology which gave rise to 
the quip that it was a "supersonic sports plane". 
The MiG-21 had a very limited range and an even 
more limited payload. 
A major breakthrough occurred in 1969. After 
receiving volumes of contractor design data, 
Sprey's 25,000 pound F-XX had stood the test of 
validity. The requirements he had set were as 
follows : 
- Slightly more range than an F-4; 
- no increases in weight or cost to 
achieve a ground attack capability 
or a top speed greater than Mach 1.6; 
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- 500 pounds of avionics including radar; 
- subsonic turning performance equivalent 
to that of an F-86; 
- structural specifications corresponding 
to the lowest used successfully on 
previous jet fighters; 
-a maximised thrust-to-weight (T/W) ratio; 
- stringent stability and pilot visibility 
criteria. 
511 
Sprey's design studies demonstrated that by limiting 
requirements to only mission-essential equipment, 
increases of more than 100 percent could be achieved 
in both acceleration and maximum turning performance 
compared to the F-4. (Sprey at this stage purposely 
did not make comparisons to the F-15, apparently to 
avoid the issue of the F-X concept. ) Thus, the 
relative costs were reduced by more than one-third, 
and their indications were that further reductions 
in avionics and equipment would result in still 
lower weights (as low as 17,000 pounds) and costs, 
with no loss in performance. As an incentive to 
incorporate his designs, Sprey also contemplated 
a major change in the acquisition process, whereby 
two contractors would each build two F-XX prototype 
aircraft for the Air Force and two other contractors 
would each build two VF-XX (Sprey's version of the 
Navy's VFX design mentioned above) prototypes for 
the Navy. 
52] 
Also, he envisioned four competing 
engine contractors. (Perhaps Sprey's idea was 
derived from the Northrop prototype scheme for 
the P-530 Cobra in 19671. The finale of the 
competition was to be an aerial dogfight, without 
munitions, on the basis of which the two winning 
designs (one Air Force, one Navy) would be selected. 
Furthermore, he felt that if the programmes were 
240 
241 
managed ixsing an approach of minimum documentation 
and manpower, the total development programme 
funding, including production start-up costs for 
the two aircraft and engines would be about half 
the combined F-14 (VFX) and F-15 (FX) development 
cost estimates. 
531 
Regarding the notion of Sprey being more important 
than a McNamara, during the non-hardware stage, 
it was Sprey who contemplated this prototyping 
programme which, although not entirely accepted, was 
eventually accepted in another version. Regardless 
of whether the prototyping scheme is credited to Sprey 
or Northrop, "the addition of the 'fly-before-you-buy' 
concept was another innovation of the management of 
systems acquisition". 
541 The importance of prototyping 
lies not so much in the concept itself, but in the 
fact that the DoD Components, or the contractors, can 
affect the overall management of the DoD. This 
indicates that the function of setting the parameters 
is not only the preserve of those in authority, for 
example, the SECDEF. One interpretation of the 
relationships between SECDEF and DoD Components, in 
the processes of decision making in weapons procurement, 
is the following: The DoD Components exert more 
influences in the approval or disapproval in the 
decisions of specific weapons systems. The 
influence of the SECDEF is an attempt to maintain 
that these decisions, and the processes pertaining 
to them, subscribe to the limitations or personal 
parameters imposed by a SECDEF. Nevertheless, 
even these influences are limited in their scope, 
in relation to those exerted by the DoD Components 
as witnessed in the outcome of the argument for 
. n* 
i 
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commonality. Thus, the participation of the DoD 
Components within the jurisdiction of the SECDEF, 
is a further indication of their strength, 
relative to the SECDEF. Further, it was the DoD 
Components and contractors who altered the 
requirements for the F-XX and not decisions from 
above. 
Also, prototyping altered the weapons system 
acquisition process, because much of the Research 
and Development which translated into hardware 
was done privately instead of at military research 
and development laboratories. It brought the 
Pentagon into even closer liaison with the 
contractors, and working alongside one another 
further cemented the two way street for technology 
developments. 
In January 1969, the incoming Nixon Administration 
brought in Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to take 
over the reins of the Department of Defense. The 
F-15 progressed towards source selection although 
the austerity advocates had not conceded. Members 
of the Air Force Studies and Analysis had been 
working with Boyd's data and other trade-off 
results provided by contractors. Major General 
Glen Kent, who headed this organisation, decided 
these studies needed another chance to convince 
the Air Staff that a lighter and less complex 
F-15 would offer significant benefits. A mid-1969 
briefing to this effect by Lieutenant Colonel 
Larry Welch was not supported at high levels and 
marked the last internal Air Force attempt to 
alter the F-15 design. 
55] 
i 
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At the same time, Boyd was transferred along with 
the entire F-15 office to Air Force Systems Command 
Headquarters. Sprey continued to update his F-XX 
concept as new data became available. His theories 
were beginning to gain additional support in the 
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense Systems 
Analysis (OASD/SA) and in the staff of the Office 
of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering 
(O/DDR&E). The first of these two offices, office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Systems 
Analysis (where Pierre Sprey worked) has the 
responsibility of preparing the Systems Concept 
Paper for DSARC review. 
56] 
The second office, the 
Office of the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering, is the DoD Component which prepares 
the Decision Co-ordinating Paper. 
57] 
Previously 
mentioned, the Decision Co-ordinating Paper (DCP) 
"defines the program and includes program 
objectives, program plans, performance parameters, 
areas of major risk, system alternatives, 
acquisition strategy, and special logistics 
problems. "581 This is also the document in which 
the contractors have the greatest input, in the 
earlier stages. "Industry is asked to submit 
proposals for engineering development and one or 
more contractors are selected for development". 
593 
The purpose of the DCP is "to verify that the 
technical and economic bases [POM review] for 
initiating a full-scale engineering development 
program are valid". 
601 
Moreover, the contractors 
will also be cognisant of the fiscal activities 
of this DoD Component, because the office of the 
Director, Defense Research and Engineering also 
has the responsibility of preparing the draft 
Resource Planning Guide. This document is 
implemented into the Defense Guidance of the 
I 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS). 
611 
However, most important to remember 
is that this office, the head of which is now 
referred to as the Under Secretary for Defense, 
Research and Engineering, is also the Defense 
Acquisition Executive of DSARC. 
In mid-1969, an Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Systems Analysis (OASD/SA) draft 
Presidential Memorandum on Tactical Air combined 
the suggestion that both the Air Force and the 
Navy should adopt the F-XX/VF-XX concept as a 
possible substitute for the F-15(F-X) and F-14(VFX) 
respectively; such action would provide each 
Service a doubling in force size. Both Services 
held their ground, arguing that so austere a 
fighter could neither defeat the high-speed, 
high-altitude Foxbat, nor carry the avionics 
needed to cope with enemy defences. 
62] 
Moreover, 
both the Air Force and the Navy had surmounted 
many problems and were too close to realising 
their own fighter designs, and were not to be 
easily swayed by a new and unproven design concept 
which would threaten to start the whole process 
all over. Another reason for their reluctance 
was the apparently inflexible Congressional force 
structure policy which led the Services to pursue 
multi-purpose, and thus more complex and expensive, 
aircraft. 
63] 
Furthermore, the light weight claimed for the 
VF-XX, Navy analysts stated, was in fact 
unachievable and the proposed thrust-to-weight 
ratio and wing loading could only be attained in 
an aircraft weighing in excess of 50,000 pounds. 
64] 
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The Services' hard line on the F-XX concept 
effectively emasculated the initiative of the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Systems Analysis. Nevertheless, the Office of 
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering 
would continue its research with contractors to 
eventually produce the Decision Co-ordinating Paper. 
In retrospect, it is clear that the "Fighter 
Mafia's" crusade for austerity at least forced 
the F-15 planners and designers to do additional 
research, producing a better fighter than they 
might otherwise have done. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to conjecture that, had this campaign 
for a more austere F-15 been successful, there 
might never have been a Lightweight Fighter. 
F-15 Programme 
In late 1969, Mr Packard directed the Air Force 
to review the F-15 programme requirements carefully 
with the objective of reducing both development 
and production costs. This was because some 
estimates of the F-15 costs exceeded the 1968 
Decision Co-ordinating Paper, but additional 
pressure was due to the still growing ranks of 
austerity advocates. Following Air Force guidelines, 
the range, manoeuvreability and size of the aircraft 
were left intact, but avionics and ground attack 
provisions were reduced by lowering the per unit 
cost by approximately $1 million. 
This behind them, the Air Force wanted to go into 
production as rapidly as possible but were realising 
that the "total package procurement" concept, 
65] 
as used for the C-5 would be difficult, if not 
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impossible, to get approved. On the other hand, 
the competitive prototyping had been waived in 
the Decision Co-ordinating Paper so that 
alternatives posed no problem for the Air Force. 
Stressing the urgent need for the F-15, the Air 
Force planned to apply the Total Package 
Procurement concept to the airframe, while using 
competitive prototyping for the higher risk 
systems - the new engine and radar. However, 
Congressional and public criticism aroused by the 
C-5 and F-111 cost overruns66] caught up with the 
F-15 Programme and the Total Package Procurement 
Strategy had to be modified. A compromise was 
worked out which separated the development and 
production phases to a greater extent and held the 
contractor to specified demonstration milestones 
prior to obtaining additional funding. This 
Approach reduced the possibility of criticism for 
concurrency and permitted the Air Force, as well 
as the Office of Secretary of Defense, to evaluate 
the aircraft more thoroughly prior to the approval 
and funding of serious productions - in a broad 
sense "fly-before-you-buy". 
In December 1969, the Air Force selected McDonnell- 
Douglas as the F-15 prime contractor. 
671 
Sources 
for both the new afterburning turbo-fan engine 
and lookdown radar were to be determined from 
the prototype competition. 
681 
With the acquisition 
strategy resolved and the prime contractor selected, 
the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(DSARC)691 convened on 19 December 1969 to review 
the F-15 programme. Following this meeting, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense cleared the 
programme for engineering development - twenty 
246 
aircraft for test and evaluation. 
70) 
Obviously, 
247 
this was cause for Air Force celebration and yet 
only a few foresaw the problems that still lay 
ahead for the F-15. 
Nixon Doctrine 
In 1969, one of the major implications of the 
Nixon Doctrine, which the new President proclaimed 
to increase pressure on America's allies, was for 
them to assume a greater share of the burden of 
their own defence. Such a modification of US foreign 
policy had repercussions on DoD's sales policy. This 
is an example of an external variable affecting DoD 
decision making. In October 1969, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense advised the Services of 
the objectives and limitations that were expected 
to govern future military export sales. The new 
guidelines stated that : 
- Sales proposals would be made only in 
response to a foreign secretary's 
initiative; 
- only those items needed to meet valid 
military requirements would be sold; 
- wherever practical, prospective buyers 
would be encouraged to purchase directly 
from US commercial sources rather than 
from the Department of Defense; 
- however, the Department of Defense 
would assist US industry in making 
sales while avoiding all connotations 
of favouritism; 
- items which the Department of Defense 
believed a country did not need, could 
not afford, or could obtain better 
elsewhere, would not be sold. 
711 
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For some time, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense had been concerned over the erosion of 
the US competitive. position,, jn the international 
sale of aircraft. Aside from DoD's sales policy 
being affected, the new doctrine, under which the 
US would supply the weapons for defence, but not 
the men to operate them, provided the incentives 
for developing a fighter which would appeal to 
allies. In September 1969, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Mr Packard, wrote Congress requesting 
approval for the Air Force to initiate development 
of a new "Free World Fighter" appropriate for 
allies. According to Mr Packard, he foresaw a 
need, over the next five to six years, for 
approximately 325 aircraft to support South Vietnam, 
South Korea, Taiwan and other allies. 
721 
The 
rationale was that it was in the best US economic, 
political and military interests to develop and 
produce a relatively inexpensive but modern 
defensive fighter-interceptor for these countries, 
thus enabling them to become nationally self- 
sufficient for their defence but, dependent for 
equipment. An aircraft 'urposet of this nature 
would also be attractive to other friendly 
countries, which would procure their defence needs 
elsewhere if they could not be met in the US. 
In an October 1969 letter to Senator John Stennis, 
the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, soliciting 
support for the International Fighter Aircraft (IFA) 
programme, Laird stated that "the fighter would 
have adequate capabilities to handle the existing 
threat, would be as inexpensive as feasible, and 
simple to maintain and operate". 
73) 
With Nixon 
executing his Vietnamisation programme and Congress 
I 
in a mood to accelerate the withdrawal of US 
forces from South East Asia, the expected approval 
and funding were rapidly obtained. Before the end 
of 1969, $58 million was earmarked by the office 
of the Secretary of Defense for the International 
Fighter Aircraft development in Fiscal Year (FY) 
1970 and 1971.74] In the meantime, companies 
which had produced fighter aircraft were not only 
cognisant of these developments, but two of these 
companies (General Dynamics, Northrop) were working 
on their own version of an International Fighter 
Aircraft based upon the requirements as they 
perceived them, even though final specifications 
had not yet been determined. The approach Was not 
too risky because these requirements changed 
and the contractors were in a position to influence 
that change. 
249 
The inherent problem of the International Fighter 
Aircraft programme was that although the 
capabilities of the aircraft (however austere and 
suitable for less developed allies), would be 
designed for foreign needs, which could possibly 
force the Air Force to inventory it, so as to 
enhance its sales abroad. The rationale was 
that if the Air Force did not include it, why 
should another nation, who might reason 
that if it was not good enough for Uncle Sam, then it 
was not for them either. 
75] 
Thus a clash of 
capabilities versus foreign sales ensued. The 
parameters of the capabilities were determined 
by the policy directions which stated that the 
International Fighter Aircraft was not to provide 
a capability to launch independent, aggressive 
actions against neighbouring countries - in other 
words a "completely" defensive aircraft was intended. 
761 
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Along these lines, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Packard approved the Air Force's IFA Programme 
and Requests for Proposals (RFPs) were released 
to the aircraft industry in February 1970. The 
Request for Proposals specified an aircraft capable 
of a 100 mile radius of action on three missions : 
counter-air, point intercept and close-air-support. 
The Request for Proposals further stated that the 
new weapon system be tailored and produced 
essentially from existing or "off-the-shelf" 
hardware and be operational by 1974; contract 
award was to be made before the end of 1970.77] 
The RFP came as somewhat of a shock to the 
contractors, especially those already working on 
their own versions, because most soon realised 
that even after removing all uncalled for 
equipment and systems, their International Fighter 
Aircraft candidates possessed inherent offensive 
capabilities well in excess of the RFP. A few of 
the would-be competitors were thus eliminated 
whilst others sought additional ways of reducing 
the offensive potential of their designs. 
781 
New Fighter Mafia Advocates 
Meanwhile, the "Fighter Mafia" had gained a new 
Air Force member - Colonel Everest Riccioni, a 
fighter tactician, test pilot and graduate 
astronautics engineer, who had been assigned to 
the Tactical Fighter Requirements Division of 
Air Force Headquarters in May 1969. Riccioni 
originally believed that a smaller, less expensive 
fighter could be produced only by sacrificing 
i 
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performance until he became aware of the studies 
by Boyd and Sprey. In January 1970, Riccioni 
took over the Development Planning Section where 
more opportunities to pursue his ideas were 
available. Convinced by Boyd and Sprey and also 
Chuck Meyers (a former test pilot and then an 
independent aerospace consultant) that a small, 
less expensive fighter could match or even 
improve upon the performance of larger fighters 
in most flight regimes, he began to contemplate 
fighters even more austere than those advocated 
by Boyd or Sprey. 
79] 
Moreover, Riccioni teamed with Boyd and Sprey to 
determine methods that might improve fighter 
design requirements. After several discussions 
with the Air Force and industry designers80] it 
was agreed that design mission rules should be 
more task oriented. 
81] 
By means of these 
discussions which weighed research and information, 
General Dynamics and Northrop had managed to 
begin to alter the requirements of the original 
Requests for Proposals. This is further evidence 
of the collegial relationship of industry and the 
DoD Components. Moreover, this relationship, 
perpetually in motion in research and development, 
has its effect in amending documents for DSARC 
review, for example, the Decision Co-ordinating 
Paper. 
Also, Riccioni, in the summer of 1970, became 
aware that the Navy had critics of the F-14 as 
the Air Force did of the F-15. He began to wonder 
if the Navy might be pursuing a more austere 
fighter than the F-14, in other words, was there 
a mirror image of the Air Force's "Fighter Mafia" 
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to be found in the Navy? Through his enquiries, 
Riccioni suspected that the Navy had been working 
on at least three such designs with contractor 
assistance. 
821 This was a reason to step up research 
on the lightweight fighter. The Air Force could not 
gamble on the notion that if the F-15 failed, then 
there would be the threat of the Air. Fo, rce having to 
adapt yet another Navy fighter design. 
Problems for DoD Procurements 
During the summer of 1970, critics of the Department 
of Defense's weapon systems acquisitions within the 
Congress and the media became more vocal and 
aggressive. As cost schedule and technical problems 
seemingly increased in programme after programme, 
831 
several study reports charged that the "entire DoD- 
contractor weapons systems acquisition process was 
out of control" . 
84] An outcome of these criticisms 
was the President's Blue Ribbon Panel Report in July 
1970,851 which substantiated the conclusions of 
several earlier studies and made a number of 
recommendations for improving the acquisition process. 
Two months earlier, in May 1970, anticipating the Blue 
Ribbon Panel Report, Mr Packard had released a 
Department of Defense policy memorandum861 on major 
weapon systems acquisition. The emphasis of the 
memorandum was to enable the Services to 'improve their 
own management of programmes, whereby the memorandum 
provided broad guidance in areas of management, development, 
production and contracting. Mr Packard decentralised 
the procurement system by permitting the 
various services to manage their programmes 
i 
as long as they adhered to the overall Department 
of Defense guidelines. Mr Packard directed that 
the new policies be implemented immediately and 
that pertinent DoD regulations be changed or 
cancelled by September 1970. This event delegated 
authority downwards due to not only the increase 
in size of the Department of Defense and the 
number of weapon systems, but also the high levels 
attained in modern weaponry and the expertise 
required. Whatever the reason, it substantiates 
the point that subordinates invariably will feed 
their decisions upwards based on their technical 
expertise to prove the judgments to be sound. 
One of the many recommendations of the President's 
Blue Ribbon Panel Report in July 1970 was the 
formulation of a new weapon system development 
policy that would reduce technical risks by 
demonstrating hardware before it entered engineering 
development - Prototyping - thereby providing the 
needed flexibility in decisions of acquisition 
strategies. In addition, the Report recommended 
the abandoning of Secretary of Defense McNamara's 
concept of Total Package Procurement for "more 
use of competitive prototyping and less reliance 
on paper studies". 
87] 
In 1971, Boyd was working for the Air Force 
Prototype-Study Group. Consequently, he was in the 
position to view the concept at a time when the 
idea of competitive flight-testing of prototype 
designs was returning to vogue after the highly 
controversial Total Procurement Package contracts 
of the 1960s which had resulted in the F-111 and 
C-5 Galaxy. 
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Prototyping Looks East - Europe 
In early 1971, Lockheed initiated the prototype 
competition on 14 January by proposing its prototype 
design, the CL-1200 (also called the Lancer). 
Northrop immediately followed on 31 January with 
its P-530 Cobra. Boeing followed in February and 
Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) in June. 
881 
The prime 
motivation for this flood of "unsolicited" 
proposals was not the Air Force's diet of 
evaluating new weapon systems. The reasons suggested 
for the submission of these proposals were, first, 
the interest that was being generated by Riccioni's 
Boyd's and Sprey's studies. Second, there would 
be fear that the F-15 and A-X programmes would 
monopolise the Air Force's tactical aircraft budget 
for the next ten years. And, third, presuming the 
validity of the second point, then it would be in 
the best interest to have a demonstration fighter 
to market in Europe where the next major fighter 
procurements were expected to occur. 
At this time, the number of participants for the 
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) programme had 
dwindled to three - Britain, Germany and Italy. 
The programme was in trouble. The three remaining 
sponsors were learning that designing an aircraft 
for a broad spectrum of combat missions can be 
very expensive, as the Air Force had similarly 
learned with the F-111. The British requirement 
for a long-range interdiction strike aircraft 
would detract from the air superiority capability 
desired by Germany and Italy. Most importantly, 
though, the engine contractor for the Multi-Role 
Combat Aircraft (MRCA) - Rolls Royce - not only 
254 
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had exceeded development cost estimates by fifty 
percent, but, was in receivership. It was 
apparent that the MRCA programme would not 
dominate the European fighter scene and therefore 
the four American companies, Lockheed, Northrop, 
Boeing and LTV, were anxious for a piece of the 
action. If the MRCA should fail, Germany offered 
the largest potential market. However, Germany 
had been planning to make an interim purchase of 
approximately 150 McDonnell-Douglas F-4E/Fs89] 
which were intended to complement the MRCA when 
it eventually entered service. The Germans were 
delaying this procurement decision which, in early 
1971, aroused a flurry of speculation. In addition, 
the Germans were waiting for the conclusion of 
US-FRG forces negotiations in June. A rumour 
purported that the Germans were trying to coax 
the Dutch into joining them in the F-4 buy. 
Others, also rumoured the existence of a Luftwaffe 
"Fighter Mafia" advocating abandonment of the MRCA 
in favour of the P-530 (Northrop) or CL-1200 
(Lockheed). Whatever the reason, the significant 
point is that both Lockheed and Northrop decided 
that the Dutch selection, of their own future 
fighter, might influence the German selection. 
Thus, both companies saw the Netherlands as the 
key. 
901 
At the time, the Dutch were evaluating the Dassault 
Mirage F-l, Lockheed CL-1200, LTV V-1000, 
McDonnell-Douglas F4E/F, Northrop P-530 Cobra 
and the Swedish AJ-37 Viggen. The decision of 
the Dutch was expected in late 1971. Of the 
American candidates, the Dutch knew little of the 
7 
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LTV-V-1000; and the McDonnell-Douglas F-4E/F 
was considered too large for Dutch needs and too 
expensive to operate and maintain. Moreover, the 
Dutch expected the Germans to buy the F-4 and 
eventually they did as an interim purchase to the 
MRCA in June 1971. On the one hand, McDonnell- 
Douglas would be busy producing the F-4s and on 
the other hand LTV was out of the picture. Thus, 
the companies were narrowed down to two: Lockheed 
and Northrop and both knew that getting a prototype 
performance demonstration into the air might be the 
decisive factor. With such substantial commitments 
and with the Air Force providing the engines on 
loan to the programme, Lockheed envisioned its 
researching and testing cost of two prototypes 
to be $30 million. 
911 
In a letter from Mr Johnson of Lockheed to the 
Secretary of the Air Force, Lockheed cited the 
possible benefits for the Air Force. 
921 
The 
benefits cited were : 
test data on a fighter configuration 
capable of countering the projected 
threat; 
a performance evaluation of an aircraft 
which could be produced at roughly 
one-half the cost of the F-15 and 
could out-perform the new Mirage 
models. 
931 
The letter further stated that the CL-1200 would 
be an excellent complement to the F-15 and might 
be available more quickly than expected. Also, 
the CL-1200 could be produced both in the US for 
US Air Force and in Europe as an interim fighter 
until the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) 
entered service. 
941 
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Obviously, such a proposal would create, and did, 
a furore in the Air Force and in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense. Teams within the 
Office were quickly assembled to evaluate the 
proposal. At a quick glance, one Air Force 
assessment saw some advantages in the Lockheed 
offer : 
- another contemporary fighter for the 
1970s at a reduced development cost; 
-a second production source in the 
event of a crisis; 
-a potential foreign sales candidate 
that would compete with the Mirage; 
- and another step forward in giving 
credence to prototyping. 
951 
However, the arguments against it ranged from it 
being a potential threat to the F-15 along with 
no room for a new fighter in the already 
constrained force structure, to the political and 
industrial repercussions of a sole source prototype 
programme (as demonstrated by the problems of the 
C-5). Although these objections were raised, the 
central objection in the Air Force was the potential 
threat to the F-15 itself. Lockheed's comparison 
of the CL-1200 and F-15 costs and availability 
evoked hostility simply because, if the CL-1200 
were successfully demonstrated before the F-15, 
critics of the F-15 would have the necessary clout 
to push for cancellation or curtailment of the 
F-15 programme. Thus a contractor and the DoD 
Components or a Service, which normally have a 
close working relationship, clashed. A 
given Service or DoD Component desirous to retain 
what it has already accomplished (ultimately to 
retain its mission from the infringement of other 
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Services) risks this special relationship with 
that contractor. Perhaps this was a reason as to 
why Lockheed was not chosen for the prototyping 
of the F-16. Another example of this was the=Air 
Force having negledt d: rthrop's F-20 which 
threatened the F-16.61 Nevertheless, the Air 
Force felt there were benefits in Lockheed's 
innovative means for testing development hardware 
(contributions from Germany, Netherlands and US 
companies) and in late February 1971, they decided 
to explore both the availability of US rather than 
European F-104 fighter aircraft and the strength 
of the commitments made to Lockheed by the 
supporting US companies. At this time, on 31 
January 1971, Thomas Jones, Chairman and President 
of Northrop, informed General John Ryan, Air Force 
Chief of Staff, by letter that Northrop was 
offering two pre-production P-530 (Cobra) aircraft. 
97] 
In this letter, Thomas Jones offered the two P-530s 
to the Air Force for $15 million if the Dutch made 
the $100 million commitment required to initiate 
the P-530 pre-production programme. 
981 
Aside from Lockheed and Northrop setting the stage, 
other aircraft industry representatives with their 
concepts, design ideas and potential prototype 
programme proposals were making their rounds 
within the corridors of the Pentagon. Ling-Temco- 
Vought (LTV) representatives came to Washington 
to explore the possibilities of prototyping a 
two-seat version of their A-7 and also a new 
version of their V-1000 (powered by the Pratt and 
Whitney (P&W) F-100 engine) which had been 
designated the Super V-1000. General Dy. namics (GD) 
representatives also had several meetings regarding 
i 
their ongoing design evaluations with interested 
Air Force personnel and personnel within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
991 
However, 
because of General Dynamics' somewhat tarnished 
F-111 image, the suggestion is that they (GD) 
would have been reluctant to announce any proposals 
until their designs were firmly supported by wind 
tunnel testing and analysis. 
Meanwhile, Boyd and Riccioni visited all the 
contractors working on Riccioni's study. At 
General Dynamics, it was apparent that top 
management was merely providing token support 
for the effort. 
100] 
So, Boyd set out to impress 
them with the viability of Riccioni's concept 
which resulted in a significant increase in 
support for the General Dynamics design effort. 
In February 1971, Boeing became the third contractor 
to submit their proposal. Following the cool 
reception by the Air Force of the two French Mirage 
proposals in late 1970, Dassault and Boeing had 
made contact. Boeing's plan was to prototype a 
Mirage F-1 with the General Electric J-79-19 
engine for $8 million. This warmed the Air Force 
because. the engine modifications (to the Mirage 
F-1) were to be done in the US; and to lessen 
the cost of the prototype, Boeing proposed only 
to build one and not two, as the others. Boeing 
requested that the Air Force pilots and technicians 
first evaluate the F-i in France, and should this 
evaluation be favourable, a more formal proposal 
would be forthcoming. 
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Although the Air Force was interested in Dassault, 
they were less than enthusiastic about the Boeing 
I 
proposal, since the F-1, even with the J-79-19 
engine, offered no great improvements over the 
F-4. Moreover, support from the Department of 
Defense might be used by the French to enhance 
F-1 sales. Shortly thereafter, Boyd and Riccioni 
managed to convince Boeing to abandon any further 
effort on the F-1 and concentrate on developing 
its own new fighter design. 
101) 
Boeing was behind 
in the race. 
Department of Defense Interest Increases 
The then Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, 
saw the concept of competitive prototyping as a 
method of reversing the ever growing cost of new 
weapon systems. On 12 February 1971 in a 
memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense, David 
Packard, Dr John Foster Jr (Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering (DDR&E 
1021 
of the 
Department of Defense) responded to the industry 
proposals by indicating that more prototype work 
should be directed towards the realistic needs of 
the Department of Defense. 
1031 
Dr Foster cited 
the numerous proposals that had been received and 
suggested that the Department of Defense might be 
well advised to fund the prototyping endeavours 
after sorting out both the proposals and the 
military needs. He proposed to initiate an in-house 
tactical fighter and strike aircraft study to place 
the many variables into a proper perspective. This 
study would permit a better look at the potential 
usefulness of the proposed prototypes, and, if 
they performed as expected, it would allow the 
Department of Defense to make sound decisions for 
future expenditure of funds. 
104] 
Packard approved 
Foster's plan on 16 February. Members of Foster's 
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staff, within the Office of the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering, led by the Assistant 
Director for Air Warfare, Allan Simon, drew up a 
plan for a "Fighter/Attack Aircraft Prototype 
Study" and the Air Force began to consider the 
prototype proposals even more seriously. The 
purposes of the Simon Study, as it became known, 
were to determine the validity for prototyping, 
examine the capabilities of the candidates and, 
if appropriate, propose programme guidelines. 
Moreover, the study was to determine how often the 
programme of evaluating technology and designs 
not included in current Air Force programmes were 
to be initiated, and set the general parameters 
of associated costs. 
105] 
Concurrently with the initiation of the Simon Study, 
the Air Force whilst cautiously pursuing the 
Lockheed proposal, was seeking additional 
information from Kelly Johnson of Lockheed. By 
the end of February 1971, more was known of Kelly 
Johnson's plan, and concern had developed. The 
US had no F-104s and the Air Force was reluctant 
to accept two aircraft from the allies, at no cost, 
which aroused suspicions that strings might be 
attached. Furthermore, the eighteen months 
programme would provide only a six-month flight 
evaluation - three for Lockheed, three for the Air 
Force. Lockheed then wanted the two prototypes 
returned so they could be used as demonstrators 
(presumably for the Dutch and Germans). 
106] 
Objections were that the flight testing period was 
too short; that after spending at least $30 million, 
the Air Force would have no hardware in hand. Also, 
some in the Air Force were of the persuasion 
that if the Air Force tested and returned .. _ -: 
i 
the aircraft it would open the d, 
the Air Force assisting Lockheed 
Other obvious internal Air Force 
why another fighter? Why a sole 
What would be told to Congress? 
absorb possible cost overruns? 
or to charges of 
in foreign sales. 
questions were - 
source programme? 
How could Lockheed 
Nevertheless, the Air Force considered the opportunity 
to obtain two high performance prototypes warranted 
further investigation because of their potential 
research value and modest cost. In early March 
1971, Kelly Johnson of Lockheed reluctantly agreed 
to modify his proposal. The Air Force would own 
the two prototypes after the flight evaluations 
and the programme would be more research-oriented. 
1071 
The Lockheed aircraft was assigned the 
experimental type and model designation of X-27 
rather than "F" (for fighter) or "YF" (for 
prototype fighter). This implied a research 
orientation in line with the Air Force position - 
the X-27 would not be competitive with either the 
F-15 or F-5E, nor was it being considered for 
inclusion in the force structure. It was purely 
a research vehicle. 
The Rush to Prototype 
In April 1971, the Simon Study recommended that a 
comprehensive prototyping programme and a plan to 
manage it be established. Deputy Secretary Packard 
advised the Services that he contemplated $100 
million to $200 million would be available for 
such an effort. These research and development 
funds are available at the SECDEF's discretion. 
Obviously, the Air Force which had been actively 
participating in the Simon Study was in a position 
to pursue these funds more vigorously than the 
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other Services - and followed through. Moreover, 
to avoid any slowdown of the programme which might 
result from multiple agency. involvement, the Air 
Force was in the process of developing a prototype 
plan of its own including the identification of 
specific programmes and establishment of ground 
rules. This point was outlined to Mr Packard by 
the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr Robert C Seamans, 
in a Memorandum on 7 May 1971,1081 which also stated 
that the Air Force would brief him on programme 
plans by the end of July. Packard, who by now was 
a strong and vocal advocate, approved the idea the 
next day and urged that the planning be expedited. 
Mr Packard said, "We ought to get one or two 
programmes going in FY 1972". 
109] 
News of major DoD memoranda/decisions spreads 
quickly to interested parties - thus, reports of 
Packard's sense of urgency to establish one or 
more prototype programmes in FY 1972 spurred 
industry. efforts. Also, in the same month of May, 
draft copies of the new Department of Defense 
Directive 5000.1 entitled "Acquisition of Major 
Defense Systems" were available, although it was 
not formally released until 13 July 1971.110] 
This Directive, one of several implementing 
Packard's broad policy memorandum of May 1970, 
stressed the need for conducting advanced technology 
efforts which would be independent of approved 
defence systems development. Mr Packard had 
opened Pandora's box. His memorandum stated that 
the "advanced technology effort includes prototyping 
preferably using small, efficient design teams and 
a minimum amount of documentation. The objective 
is to obtain significant advances in technology 
at minimum cost". 
111 
The Aircraft industry would 
t 
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now find it easy to ascertain what lay ahead and, 
coupled with Packard's sense of urgency, a 
strategy of providing the Pentagon with design 
concepts immediately would be assumed. 
Ling-Temco-Vought pursued that strategy and were 
the first to respond. Ling-Temco-Vought sent a 
letter on 28 June 1971 to the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Packard outlining a formal proposal of a 
programme for two V-1000 lightweight fighter 
prototypes. 
112' 
Moreover, representatives of 
General Dynamics and Boeing also visited the 
Pentagon in June to discuss their evolving 
lightweight fighter designs; although neither 
company had submitted a proposal, they were 
preparing the information necessary to do so. 
Northrop also submitted their proposal. However, 
their proposal outlined two designs : the twin 
engine P-530 Cobra and a new design - the single 
engine P-610 which was comparatively similar to 
General Dynamics' and Boeing's design incorporating 
the single Pratt and Whitney F100 engine. 
The Air Force Prototype Study 
In late May 1971, the prototype programme was 
expanded to become the Air Force Prototype Study 
Group with additional participation from Air Force 
headquarters. The job was to review and recommend 
candidate projects, generate a supporting rationale, 
and identify management and procurement approaches 
appropriate for prototype development programmes. 
The working group to review and select candidates 
for prototype development was headed by Colonel 
Lyle Cameron, and his assistant was Colonel John 
113] 
Boyd. New management procedures would be 
1 
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necessary. These included small Air Force programme 
offices with direct participation in the contractor's 
programme and a minimum use of formal procedures 
and/or specifications. "Streamlined procurement 
procedures are to be proposed _x'. 
114] 
On 5 August 1971, the Air Force Study Group presented 
its findings to Mr Packard and only twenty days 
later (25 August 1971), Mr Packard approved the 
Program Decision Memorandum outlining the Air Force 
plans and funding for the Lightweight Fighter. 
In this particular case, due to the time constraints 
imposed by the Fiscal Cycle in its latter stages 
for FY 1972, the Program Decision Memorandum for 
the prototype study was a Supplemental PDM. 
115] 
Furthermore, only two days after the Program 
Decision Memorandum was approved, the Air Force 
Prototype Program Office was established. 
116] 
Needless to say, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Packard was a supporter of the programme. 
During October and November 1971, as the Congress 
debated the FY 1972 Appropriations Bill, the Air 
Force (especially in the Air Force Prototype 
Program Office) was busy preparing the 
documentation for a Justification of Major Systems 
New Start. Obviously, considering the sensitive 
issue of the F-15, these documents had to be 
carefully conceived. Early in November, more 
pressures were exerted by a Memorandum from Dr 
Foster to the Air Force that Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Packard desired to commence the FY 1972 
prototype programmes as soon as the Appropriations 
117] 
Bill was released by Congress. To accommodate 
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this decision, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense would require the Air Force to submit a 
Program Memorandum, which would include a 
programme description, a milestone schedule, a 
funding profile, and identification of those 
questions and issues to be resolved by the test 
programme. These documents were requested within 
ten days! The Air Force, anticipating such urgency, 
and the DoD Components' constant appraisal of a 
programme, submitted it on 17 November 1971 - two 
days after having received the Memo. 
118] 
As the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense sought resolution of the Program 
Memorandum, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
was holding hearings on the weapons systems 
acquisition process. One of the several witnesses 
to appear was Pierre Sprey, who by now, had left 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems 
Analysis for private industry. In his testimony, 
Sprey addressed the problem of the increase in 
weapons cost, more commonly known within DoD as 
"gold-plating". Sprey charged that the military 
specifications and procurement methods had driven 
avionics costs up by a factor of ten over commercial 
versions; that the significant increase to airframe 
and engine costs was due primarily to the "zeal 
to achieve the last one or two percent of possible 
performance ... and that these last few percentages 
of improvements [to match specifications] were 
enormously more costly than the preceding ninety- 
eight or ninety-nine percent". 
119] 
Sprey also 
explained the F-XX concept in some detail and, in 
comparing it with the current lightweight fighter 
designs, stated that the concept had progressed 
well beyond anything he had envisioned in 1968.120] 
i 
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Upon the completion of his prepared statement, 
Sprey received some favourable comments from 
Senator Goldwater. However, he came under 
considerable scrutiny from Senators Symington and 
Cannon. Essentially, Senator Symington appeared 
to doubt Sprey's credibility because he was not a 
licensed pilot. On the other hand, Senator Cannon 
quoted portions of the Navy's 1969 analysis of the 
F-XX concept. The debate, which became heated at 
times, involved Sprey defending his concepts and 
trying to avoid F-14/F-15 issues while Senator 
Cannon attacked by questioning the capability of 
a lightweight fighter to "do the job that may be 
required". He cited the example of "the experience 
in Southeast Asia with our own lightweight fighter 
... the F-104", which 
had to be withdrawn because 
it "could not exist in the sophisticiated 
environment". Near the end of this hearing, 
Senator Goldwater asked Sprey if he thought that 
the aims of the proposed lightweight fighter 
programme were within the line of the F-XX study. 
When Sprey responded affirmatively, Senator 
Goldwater's concluding remarks were : 
"I don't ask that, Mr Chairman, to 
downgrade any of the testimony offered, 
but I think part of our trouble lies in 
some of these career civilians and men in 
uniform who just can't see anything 
valuable in a new idea; and I have seen 
some pretty good ideas shot down by these 
same people who would, I think, live to 
regret the thought that they had ever 
spoken against advancement. That is all 
I have. " 
121 
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Only six days later, on 14 December 1971, the FY 
1972 Appropriations Bill was released and $12 million 
was approved by the SECDEF for the initiation of a 
prototype lightweight fighter aircraft. The tasks 
to implement the programme were rapidly accomplished. 
On 20 December 1971, the Assistant Secretary for 
Research and Development, Grant Hansen, approved the 
procurement actions; Dr John Foster, Department of saes. ' 
Defense, Research and 
MIM 
, approved the 
Program Memorandum on 27 December; and Acting Air 
Force Secretary, John McLucas, authorised release 
of the model contract to the industry on 32 December 
1971.122] Conveniently, 1972 would be a new year 
and new developments in research of the F-XX would 
begin to materialise in the form of hardware. 
At the outset, there had been little if any 
involvement of the SECDEF in the conception of the 
F-16. McNamara did apply pressure for commonality, 
however, no such fighter aircraft exists in the 
USAF's or Navy's inventory today. In the case of 
commonality, the SECDEF's weakness may have been 
attributed to inter-service rivalry. Nevertheless, 
inter-service rivalry will remain and the 
contractors, (and the rivalry between them referred 
to as competition), further hampers the SECDEF in 
his ability to effectively influence decisions. 
This is accomplished-by the contractors in an-- 
indirect way, for example, by taking advantage of 
the rivalry between Services, or in a more direct 
and participating manner. 
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Evidenced earlier, contractors maintain a close 
working relationship with the DoD Components in the 
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researching of new technologies. Technology itself 
is a reason for the further decentralisation within 
DoD (Packard's memo, Blue Ribbon Report), but other 
dimensions are implicated. If, as in the case of the 
F-16, the weapon requires a high level of technology, 
the DoD Components will be pressured to continuously 
alter their requirements. The Services or DoD 
Components' requirements are detailed in differing 
manners, in a variety of documents, which further 
adds to the complications. But most significant for 
the SECDEF from a Service's viewpoint is the Decision 
Co-ordinating Paper (DCP) because ultimately it is the 
contract between the SECDEF and the Service. Further 
complicating this is the preparation of the DCP by the 
Office of the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering (ODDR&E) whose responsibility it is to 
monitor and research all new technologies and 
engineering developments, thus placing them (ODDR&E) 
in the position of working directly with contractors. 
The other significance of this office is that the 
Director (presently referred to as Under Secretary) 
is the Defense Acquisition Executive of DSARC. Thus 
contractors researching new technologies, which are 
monitored by this office, have a direct line into 
DSARC. If during the matching of new technologies 
and research with requirements is altering a Service's 
needs, then it would be reasonable to assume that the 
DCP would have to be amended to reflect those changes. 
In the case of the F-16, as of January 1977, the "Air 
Force had prepared three drafts of the DCP for the 
F-16 program". 
1231 
At the time, a GAO Report stated 
that the draft, "dated 18 May 1976, is being reviewed 
by the office of the'Secretary of Defense. Although an 
F-16 DCP has not [emphasis added] been signed, the 
i 
draft version is used as a source document for 
program management". 
124] 
The GAO Report which is 
dated 9 April 1977, stated that regardless of the 
status of the DCP, they still expected the decision 
for Full Scale Production in September. 
1251 
The weaknesses of the SECDEF set forth throughout, 
should not always be translated to mean that the 
strengths lie in organisations. The importance of 
advocates in the "Fighter Mafia" or Dr John Foster, 
David Packard, tell another story. The offices 
they worked in were prestigious. (Sprey in Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems 
Analysis, Foster in DDR&E), but their personal or 
combined inputs, as evidenced thus far, were 
crucial for the development of the F-16. Further, 
other influences were exerted by the contractors 
upon them and vice versa. Regardless though, 
apparently very little pressure was dictated from 
above in these decisions. Whether or not this is 
similar in the next stage of development will now 
be the focus. 
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THE DECISION TO CHOOSE A FIGHTER 
The General Dynamics fighter aircraft entered 
production in 1977 as a co-manufacturing/co-production 
effort for the US Air Force and the services of 
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. In 
only a period of five years since the release of 
$12 million from Congress in the FY 1972 
Appropriations Bill it had not only entered 
production, but had a current order (in 1977) of 
1,736 units, and other countries, at that time, 
were considering its purchase. 
1] 
In understanding 
how the F-16 fighter left the drawing boards to 
eventually become the advanced fighter, attention 
must return to events of the previous Chapter. 
The F-16 was a fallout of the Lightweight Fighter 
concept, especially from the controversial F-XX 
(sometimes referred to as the FX2) study of 1968, 
which first suggested the hi-lo mix concept. As 
seen, it was received with much scepticism in the 
Pentagon, since it was more or less viewed as a 
threat to the evolving F-14 and F-15. Following 
the events of the previous Chapter, and with the 
influence of the Fighter Mafia, Requests for 
Proposals (RFPs) were authorised and released by 
Air Force Secretary John McLucas to the aircraft 
industry on 31 December 1971. The Requests for 
Proposals (RFPs) were issued in January 1972 
initially to Boeing, Fairchild, General Dynamics, 
Grumman, Lockheed, LTV, McDonnell-Douglas, Rockwell 
Internation and Northrop. By April of 1972, 
General Dynamics' YF-16 (the "YF" designation is 
used for the experimental prototypes) and 
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Northrop's YF-17 entries were selected. Within 
four months the competitors had been narrowed down 
to two. Prior to pursuing this investigation, it 
is necessary to give attention to a few central 
focal points as follows : First, although the RFPs 
were released on 31 December 1971, it is not as if 
the "competition" began instantaneously. For 
example, Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) sent a letter on 
28 June 1971 to Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, 
six months before the RFPs were released, outlining 
a formal proposal of a programme for two V-1100 
lightweight fighter prototypes. The research and 
development of the contractor is a continuous 
process. Moreover, the contractor has to be aware 
of and astute to developments within the Pentagon, 
Congress, et al, and be able to balance these 
varying influences, so as to plan for and develop 
the required hardware. 
Second, this is accomplished by the contractors 
maintaining a line of communication with and working 
alongside DoD Components, namely, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Systems Analysis 
(where Pierre Sprey worked, which prepared the 
Systems Concept Paper). 
21 Another DoD Component, 
assisted by contractors, was Dr John Foster's 
staff within the Office of the Director, Defense E, 
Research and 
A 
n. In the Chapter detailing 
the Life Cycle of a weapon system it was identified 
that this DoD Component has responsibility for 
initiating and preparing the Decision Co-ordinating 
Paper (DCP). 
31 To stockpile information on research 
and technological developments (state-of-the-art), 
these components rely on information from contractors 
which the DoD Components see in the form of a Research 
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and Technology Work Unit Summary41 or a Research 
and Development Planning Summary. 
51 
For example, 
in the former document the intention is to 
"identify scientists or engineers who are working 
in technical areas of interest so they can be 
contacted for further technical information". 
6ý 
This cements a very close relationship between DOD 
Components and contractors. There are many 
different DOD Components constantly researching new 
ideas to meet various new requirements or needs. 
Various Components, receiving information of 
technological developments will be choosing between 
differing levels of the state-of-the-art, having 
worked with engineers and scientists of the 
contractor. Each contractor may be pursuing 
similar lines of research (wing design and its 
effects to avionics), but more than likely, will 
be pursuing different avenues (variable sweep 
wing or fixed wing designs). Eventually, one 
contractor is chosen by one Component for its needs, 
but the second (contractor) has not lost because 
there may be a slightly different need for another DoD 
Component, for example, the USAF's F-16 (General 
Dynamics) and the Navy's F/A-18 (Northrop). 
Essentially, the point is that there are hundreds 
of contractors and once one Component has chosen 
a contractor (or in the case of the F-16 initially 
nine contractors were narrowed down to two), that 
contractor will be concentrating and working with 
that Component whilst the other contractors will 
shift their priorities of research and development 
to secure future, contracts from the same or other 
Components who are continuing to research the 
development of new systems. This is not only 
achieved during the earlier stages of weapon 
systems acquisition, but throughout the life of 
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the system as demonstrated through the testing and. 
evaluation. (For example, some F-16s have the new 
General Electric engine, instead of Pratt and 
Whitney). 
Although research and evaluation should be seen as 
a continuous and dynamic phenomenon, with the 
contractors competing against one another (as well 
as competition between Services or within a Service), 
the DoD Components, based on the Services' 
requirements, are ultimately liable to choose which 
contractor would best serve those requirements. 
More information and previous activities of Northrop 
and General Dynamics illustrate and provide 
insights as to how within a few months after the 
Requests for Proposals were issued, nine contractors 
were narrowed down to two. 
General Dynamics and Northrop - The Chosen 
As the 1960s drew to a close, it became increasingly 
apparent to NATO nations that there was a need for 
"a replacement of the F-104 that could fly faster 
than Mach 2 and cost as little as possible". 
7] 
As 
a result of Northrop's close association with three 
NATO nations, 
81 
it began to design a new fighter 
to meet the new need. As mentioned in the previous 
Chapter, Northrop's project was the P-530 Cobra 
which, though bearing a faint resemblance to the 
F-5, was larger and faster with weight of around 
25,000 pounds. The main sales pitch was, at the 
time, that anybody. who wanted a fighter would be 
unable to find a better one - the Cobra would, 
'Northrop promised, "outfly any other aircraft 
in the. future sky". 
9] 
The reason for Northrop 
pursuing such a pitch was that the weight of the 
plane was 5,000 pounds less than the insured thrust 
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from two GE15 afterburning turbojet engines. These 
engines, although still being researched by General 
Electric, enhanced Northrop's position. At the 
Paris Salon, in May 1971, General Electric displayed 
a detailed mock-up of the GE15, under its new 
designation of J101, which revealed its Department 
of Defense funding. Northrop, with its design, 
and with the GE-JiOl engine's performance level 
capable of more than Northrop required the future 
potential of these combined with a new radar 
system seemed infinite. 
10] 
By the end of the Paris 
Salon, Northrop appeared to be the only horse in 
the running, and had taken negotiations to an 
advanced stage with several potential customers in 
Europe, as well as being interested in talks in 
Canberra. If Northrop had been left alone, it 
might have ultimately clinched a massive global 
deal for the 1,000 Cobras, beating the Mirage, 
F-l, F-14 and F-15. But, as the previous Chapter 
denotes, within weeks of the Paris Salon, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense David Packard, on 25 August 
1971 in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) 
approved Air Force plans and funding for the 
Lightweight Fighter programme. Two days later 
the Air Force Prototype Program Office was 
established. 
That decision was to prove very significant indeed, 
and it held dire consequences for Northrop's 
current programme. Northrop was forced to alter 
its priorities. 
The Lightweight Fighter programme was merely an 
exercise to see how far it would be possible to 
fly useful military missions with a fighter 
significantly smaller and cheaper than the F-15. 
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Bids were invited, and contenders were told that 
as there were no USAF. requirements for such an 
aircraft, they had a fairly free hand. New 
technology was the objective and its purpose was 
to fly rival prototypes and see how they stacked 
up against the F-15, and to analyse the recommendations 
of the fighter pilots at Nellis Air Force Base 
(Fighter Weapons School, Nevada). If the outcome 
was positive, there was a chance that an aircraft 
in this category might be procured for the USAF 
inventory, after a further competition. 
After the signing of the PDM, Northrop recognised 
it was no longer alone in the rate - unless it 
could reach a deal with the Europeans before any 
other Lightweight Fighter took shape. Northrop 
failed to reach such a deal. At the same time, 
Northrop also was cognisant of the FX and FX2 studies 
and the activities of Dr Foster and his staff within 
the Office of the Deputy Director, Research and 
S luat;, and the work of Pierre Sprey within the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Systems 
Analysis. Following the approval of the PDM, it was 
imperative for Northrop to shift its priorities and 
assess the outcome of the Air Force bids. Northrop 
shifted its priorities and according to its President, 
Mr Thomas Jones, they literally worked day and night 
to create the P-600 (streamlined on the in-house 
P-530 Cobra). 
11] 
Meanwhile, General Dynamics was working equally 
hard on a complete new design, which did not only 
incorporate the analyses of Boyd and Sprey. The 
General Dynamics Team at Forth Worth, Texas, 
sought to incorporate new technologies, while at 
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the same time balancing these with some of the 
existing high technologies.. For example, 
General Dynamics chose the Pratt and Whitney F-100 
afterburning turbofan engine which had already been 
developed for the F-15 but the General Dynamics 
Model 401, as their model was designated, would only 
use one engine instead of two. This strategy 
pursued by General Dynamics was brilliant because 
it served three purposes. First, it lessened the 
risk of there being too many "bugs in the system". 
Second, it reduced the cost to General Dynamics (and 
ultimately to the Air Force) by buying already made 
parts off the shelf instead of developing new ones 
themselves. Third, and the author suggests, that 
General Dynamics' strategy was to use existing parts 
not only from the viewpoint that the contractor is 
saving money, but that he is also securing contracts 
by empire building. During the prototype fly-off 
competition (and later throughout the stages of the 
Fiscal Cycle where costs were questioned) General 
Dynamics was able to argue that it would reduce costs 
by applying the learning curve of weapons production. 
Further, General Dynamics was able to bring down not 
so much its own costs, but more importantly, the 
subcontractors' costs, with increased orders for the 
F-16, and therefore an across the board saving was 
realised. For example, the costs for the research 
and development of the Pratt and Whitney F-100 
engine, and the costs for tooling up and 
manufacturing the engine, had all been done for 
the F-15 programme and, further, that engine was 
already in production. This lessened the cost 
for General Dynamics. More importantly, though, 
General Dynamics was securing its contracts by 
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arguing that since the Air Force was initially 
planning to buy 650 F-16s, that would be 650 more 
high technology engines that were to be ordered from 
Pratt and Whitney. This would have the effect of 
reducing Pratt and Whitney's cost of the engine, 
since more were on order, and thus reduceäcosts for 
the F-15 programme. General Dynamics also identified 
for USAF consumption, (and later for Congress et al) 
254 identical items used in other aircraft, and 
another 78 modified from other use - thus, using 
only 20 percent new parts. 
12j 
Another reason for the General Dynamics Model 401 
incorporating so many similar parts was simply that 
General Dynamics was behind Northrop in the 
competition to replace the F-104. Once the rules of 
the game had changed with the approval of the 
Lightweight Fighter Programme, General Dynamics 
needed to use existing parts to quickly assemble its 
design and compete in the programme. However, more 
has to be said of General Dynamics' history to fully 
appreciate why they would react to the competition. 
Founded in 1952, General Dynamics was one of the 
first of the nation's big post-war conglomerates. 
It was founded around the nuclear submarine builder, 
at Groton, Connecticut, now the Company's Electric 
Boat Division, by John Jay Hopkins. Financed largely 
by profits from the nuclear submarine building boom of 
the 1950s and 1960s, the corporation grew and diversified. 
It took over the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft 
Corporation (now its Convair Division) in 1954, and 
moved into shipbuilding, building materials, coal 
mining and other fields. 
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In large part, after 
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major successes early in its history the story of 
General Dynamics was one of a sequence of 
disasters. For example, between 1959 and 1961, 
it had to write off $435 million as the result of 
an ill-timed unsuccessful effort to sell commercial 
jetliners. Its Convair 880 and 990 jets never 
found a market to compete with the Boeing 707 and 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-8.14] Six years later, it 
also had to write off losses of more than $200 million 
on a trouble-plagued effort to enter the surface-ship 
market. Smaller but substantial losses were also 
incurred in commercial microfilming, consumer 
electronics and other ventures. 
15] 
Regarding-contractsfor the Air Force, General 
Dynamics had also suffered. Although much of the 
blame for the F-111 cost overruns had been 
attributed to the supervisory policies (Total 
Package Procurement) of former Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara, General Dynamics suffered because 
of the management of the project. 
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Originally 
called the TFX, the F-111 was supposed to cost 
$4.5 million each, but the final price - for a plane 
which fell short of the original objectives of the 
Pentagon - was $15.6 million each. 
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Regardless 
of their problems, General Dynamics has recorded 
more years in the black than in the red, largely 
because of profits from work done on Polaris, 
Poseidon and the Trident missile submarines, as 
well as nuclear attack submarines. Moreover, 
work done on the F-111 was completed under the 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts181 which guaranteed 
a profit despite the huge overruns. Arguably this 
type of contract was and still is another mechanism 
to lessen the risks for the contractor. 
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In 1970, General Dynamics' growing losses and problems 
with the F-111 created a shake-up within the company 
which ousted the Chief Executive Roger Lewis, and he 
was replaced by David S Lewis, who had previously 
been the president and chief operating officer of the 
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. The two men are not 
related. David Lewis was instrumental in the decision, 
for General Dynamics quickly entered into the arena for 
the Lightweight Fighter. David Lewis had been with 
McDonnell-Douglas during the development of the F-15 
(McDonnell-Douglas - F-15 "Eagle" Fighter). He was 
extremely valuable in that he was familiar not only 
with the developments of the F-15, but also with the 
problems of McDonnell-Douglas in the development of the 
F-15. Also, he still had very close connections to 
those DoD Components, who were involved in the exchanges 
of technology and measuring them against the performance 
of the F-15. For example, he celebrated in 1968 when 
the first F-X study was ended, which put forward the 
likelihood of McDonnell-Douglas chances for the 
contract of the F-15. But now with General Dynamics, 
he was fully cognisant of all the Lightweight Fighter 
supporters' arguments against him with the F-15, and 
used those arguments to his advantage. Also, he was 
involved in the Research and Development of the engine 
for the F-15, conducted by Pratt and Whitney, and his 
relationship with Pratt and Whitney would still be 
coeposetic. This was a driving force for General 
Dynamics to choose their engine for the F-16. 
(Aside from his previous experience, Pratt and 
Whitney -a subsidiary of United Aircraft 
Corporation - is located in East Hartforlj' 
Connecticut, about 40 miles from General Dynamics 
headquarters in Groton, Connecticut. ) Whatever 
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David Lewis' influences from his past experience, 
as an insider with the F-15 he was able to ensure 
that the risks to. General Dynamics were kept to a 
minimum. This being the case, and remembering that 
DoD Components have a longer period of tenure, most 
if not all from the F-15 programme were also those 
judging the performance of the General Dynamics 
Model 401. 
Thus far, it has been shown how these two companies 
and their designs were proceeding in the Lightweight 
Fighter programme, but still the issue as to why 
these two were narrowed down from the original nine 
companies, who received Requests for Proposals, has 
not been answered. "The main reason General Dynamics 
and Northrop were selected out of several bidders 
on the LWF project was that their approaches 
epitomised by the one versus two-engine design, to 
the project were significantly different. "191 This 
was an obvious reason, but if Boeing was "interested" 
it would not have submitted a proposal with two 
engines if it were considering ways to lighten the 
weight! The intention is not to become involved with 
what the other seven companies were doing at the time, 
but some examples tie in the notion that they were 
already "occupied". For example, Boeing was proceeding 
with the commercial aircraft industry, Fairchild was 
involved with the A-10 Close-Air-Support Aircraft, and 
McDonnell-Douglas with its F-15. These companies were 
involved with other projects and would have little 
reason to enter the Lightweight Fighter competition. 
They were pursuing their own line of research and 
development which did not fit into the context of 
the needs for the Air Force Lightweight Fighter 
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Programme. On the other hand, Northrop had shifted 
its focus earlier to replace the ageing F-104s with 
the P-530, and later again to the P-600 in an 
attempt to be considered. General Dynamics 
churned out its Model 401 for consideration 
because it purposely wanted to shift its focus from 
the F-111 as reflected in its management shake-up, 
and to secure future USAF contracts. "We've got 
to live down the F-111", said a General Dynamics 
vice president. "All we can say is that we've 
changed our management; we've only got two of the 
top management people left from the F-111 days, and 
David Lewis is not Roger Lewis. " 
20] 
In April 1972, General Dynamics YF-16 (patterned 
on their Model 401) entry and Northrop's YF-17 
(modelled on the P-530 Cobra and P-600) were 
selected, with $37.9 million awarded to General 
Dynamics and $39.1 million to Northrop for two 
demonstrators each. 
21] 
The funds were made 
available by the Secretary of Defense from the 
"slush fund" of money available to fund Research 
and Development at his discretion. 
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These awards 
were also of the "cost-plus-fixed-fee" mode of 
contract and covered the design, construction and 
test of two prototypes by the US Air Force; 
plus one year of flight testing. 
As mentioned earlier, General Dynamics selected 
an aircraft design using a single Pratt and 
Whitney F100 engine, and economised development 
of the two demonstrators. The approach saved 
time and money, and the company unveiled the first 
aircraft. at Fort Worth, Texas, on 13 December 
1973 -a mere 21 months after General Dynamics 
received the $37.9 million contract. The first. flight 
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took place "accidentally" 
it was "officially" flown 
2 February 1974. General 
the running - Northrop di 
flight of the YF-17 until 
on 20 January 1974, but 
for the first time on 
Dynamics was ahead in 
d not conduct its first 
9 June 1974.23] 
Following their first flights, a leisurely year-long 
300-hour US Air Force evaluation was planned. 
However, this schedule was changed in the Fiscal 
Year 1975 budget, when Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger announced the Air Combat Fighter 
Programme that was to design and produce a more 
economical air superiority fighter to augment the 
F-15 and replace the F-4 in the 1980s. 
24] 
Both 
the YF-16 and the YF-17 became oandidates for 
selection by the Air Force as its "missionised" 
Air Combat Fighter aircraft. In August 1974, 
General Dynamics and Northrop each received 
$4 million to develop Air Combat Fighter prototypes 
for the Air Force based on the YF-16 and YF-17 
Lightweight Fighter prototype models. The Navy 
also requested Fiscal Year 1975 funds for 
development of a Navy Air Combat Fighter (designated 
originally as the VFAX programme), as a less 
expensive complement to the F-14 and a replacement 
for the F-4 and A-7 in carrier-based attack roles. 
As Col. William E Thurman, who headed the Systems 
Program Office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, for 
the Air Combat Fighter Program, stated: "The 
Lightweight Fighter prototype program office of 
Aeronautical Systems Division has begun to resemble 
a normal system program office organisation as the 
result of the Defense Department decision to 
initiate full-scale development. "25] The reasons 
for this decision were varied and on the surface, 
the decision by SECDEF Schlesinger to launch the 
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Air Combat Fighter was not a major turning point. 
Arguably, the reasons for the decision were 
based on the outside pressures exerted on the 
SECDEF, and the level of investment awarded 
by his office, these make the decision all the 
less notable. One of the external pressures 
being exerted on the SECDEF at the time were r 
the results of the 1973 Middle East War. The 
US Air Force has always fought its wars under 
numerical superiority, but October of that year 
saw a close ally (Israel) struggling to win 
air and battlefield superiority against forces 
abundantly equipped along Soviet lines. 
The argument of quantity versus quality was 
brought home within defence circles in a 
conflict in which one observer estimated that 
some forty percent of the Israeli fighter 
force was lost, or damaged to the point where 
it was not available for combat, within the 
first two days. 
261 Thus, the events of the 
1973 October Middle East War were on Congress' 
minds during their consideration of funding 
for the Air Force and Navy for their Air 
Combat Fighter Program. Discussed below, 
another pressure exerted on Congress was the 
need by NATO nations for commonality to 
replace the F-104 Starfighters. 
Another reason that this decision was not 
crucial to the F-16 programme is the amount 
of funding given by the SECDEF for the launch 
of the Air Combat Fighter, in comparison to 
the previous funding received in the programme. 
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A total of $8 million was awarded for the 
Air Combat Fighter programme. However, $12 million 
had been invested for the launch of the Air Force 
Prototype Study and a further $77 million ($37.9m 
to General Dynamics and $39.1m to Northrop) for 
the launch of the Lightweight Fighter. Essentially, 
the $8 million would not have been a major boost 
compared to the $77 million received only seven 
months earlier. 
Nevertheless, the decision to launch the Air Combat 
Fighter programme was crucial to the F-16 programme 
even if the decision was not entirely credited to 
the SECDEF. At this time, the commonality issue 
had returned to Congress, and it was imperative 
that the Air Force have a programme in the works that 
could withstand the Congressional scrutiny of that 
issue. In these regards, even the simple change of 
a title of a programme would have significant 
consequences. A Lightweight Fighter programme can 
easily fit into the context of Naval operations, as 
compared to an Air Combat Fighter, which denotes a 
specialised mission for the Air Force. 
Prior to these activities, the roots of this 
decision go back over two years. The Prototype 
Study programme was funded in FY 1972 and since 
then, funding had been received from Research and 
Development funds from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense. Also since then, the programme had 
developed into the Lightweight Fighter programme. 
However, in August 1972, the sequence of events 
for the Planning, Programming and Budgeting Sy, tem 
(PPBS) of the Fiscal Cycle were initiated for the 
271 
FY 1975 Budget. That was why the programme 
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was receiving its first consideration in the 1975 
DoD Budget. The Congressional review of the FY 
1975 Budget took place beginning in January 1974. 
Congress completed its work on the Budget in early 
August (to break for the summer recess) of 1974. 
The suggested reason for the decision was due to the 
fact that Congress had inserted language which 
stressed the commonality of aircraft for both the 
Navy and the Air Force. Further, and discussed 
below, Congress froze the funds for FY 1975 until the 
Air Force supplied information of its programme and 
choice of contractor. Thus it was necessary for the 
Air Force and the SECDEF to bolster the programme. 
Congressional Scrutiny and Its Effects 
The competition between the General Dynamics YF-16 
and Northrop's YF-17, which began in 1972, was 
intensified in 1974 by Congressional insistence 
on commonality between the Navy and Air Force 
Combat Fighter designs. Also, the decision to 
select the Air Force Combat Fighter by early 1975, 
followed the Secretary of Defense's announcement of 
the Air Combat Fighter programme (the US Air Force 
shortened its evaluation period by nearly six 
months). 
28] Obviously, the Air Force meant 
business, but more importantly this action enhanced 
the position of the Air Force in Congress' eyes 
for the following reasons : First, the Air Force 
(as opposed to the Navy) was in the prime position 
of holding prototypes, which had already exhibited 
their performance. Speeding up their trials, the 
Air Force would have an aircraft and contractor 
chosen by January 197.5. Considering the events of 
October 1973, the Air Force appeared to Congress 
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to be functioning well in its duties of translating 
new mission requirements from outside threat 
appraisals into hardware. Second, should 
commonality be the maxim exerted by Congress 
through the 1970s and 1980s, the Air force wanted 
its design accepted first before the Navy's. 
The Air Force advocating increased air-to-air 
combat capability, did not want to have to scale 
that down, as it did earlier when it had to accept 
the Navy's A-7 in 1965 and design their aircraft 
from it which evolved to become the F-5. 
Another factor for the increase in competition 
between Northrop and General Dynamics was their 
knowledge of NATO's interest in buying aircraft 
to replace the F-104 Starfighter. This will be 
discussed. Though, the. ma}ar concern here 
is Congressional reaction, the NATO factor was 
also a consideration. 
There was little opposition in Congress to the Air 
Force Air Combat Fighter programme and $32 million 
of DoD's $36 million Fit' 1975 request was provided. 
29] 
Congress was also in general agreement on the Navy's 
need for a Lightweight Fighter, but there was strong 
feeling in the House Appropriations Committee's 
Defense Sub-Committee that these Services should 
develop a common aircraft in regard to airframe, 
engine, avionics and weapons. The DoD's Director 
of Defense Research and 
ý" M. 
n, Dr John 
Foster, maintained, however, "that the differing 
characteristics and unique requirements of land 
and carrier-based aircraft would preclude such 
commonality". 
30] 
The Navy's request for $34 million 
in FY 1975 was opposed by the House Armed Services 
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Committee but approved by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, and an authorisation of $30 million was 
agreed to in conference. 
31) 
However, both the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees were 
critical of the Navy's position on the Lightweight 
Fighter, and the conference report on the 7 1975 
Defense Appropriations bill cut that request and 
stated: "The $20 million provided is to be placed 
in a new program element titled 'Navy Air Combat 
Fighter' rather than VFAX. Adaptation of the 
selected Air Force Air Combat Fighter to be capable 
of carrier operations is the prerequisite for use 
of the funds provided. "321 The report added that 
further funding would be "contingent upon the 
capability of the Navy to produce a derivative of 
the selected Air Force Combat Fighter design. " 
331 
The Air Force's strategy had paid off well. This 
complicated the issue for the Navy, for it meant 
that Navy officials must return to Congress and 
satisfy the mandate issued in the Appropriations 
Bill for maximum use of the Air Force's Air Combat 
Fighter technology before the $20 million in the 
Fiscal Year 1975 budget could be released for a 
Navy Air Combat Fighter development programme. 
Congress' intention here, and with good reason, 
was that in producing both lightweight fighters 
it would be better having the Air Force and the 
Navy working compatibly at this stage, than the 
Navy commencing again with an original design 
for the Navy. This was the outcome because the 
"Navy and the USAF have been working jointly to 
study the possibility of developing a variant of 
either the YF-16 or YF-17 for carrier operations. 
The wording in the appropriations concerned the 
Navy even though Defense officials believed that 
60-70% commonality in lightweight fighter 
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technology would satisfy Congressional intent". 
341 
However, it was subsequently realised that the 
intentions of Congress had an important effect on 
the part of the contractors. 
On 11 September 1974, the Department of Defense 
announced that the Air Force would buy 650 Air 
Combat Fighters of whichever design was selected in 
January 1975. The momentum of the programme had 
increased, because timing for the Air Force 
selection was crucial in order to keep the Navy 
at bay. The Navy would plan to buy some 800 Air 
Combat Fighters, but its final decision was not to 
be made until after the Air Force selection. 
(Also, remember that NATO's F-104 Starfighters 
were to be replaced. ) The contractors, 
mindful of Congressional hearings and the debates, 
were soon to discover that the commonality issue 
was of less importance than the reaction that it 
had heralded. The Navy's decision had more than 
doubled the amount to be manufactured for US 
inventory and if the orders to replace the 
Starfighters were included, the total package 
could be well over 3,000 aircraft, Certainly 
priorities within Northrop and General Dynamics 
changed, and-they did, but, no-one expected 
them to enter into alliances with the previous 
competition. On 7 October 1974, Northrop 
announced that "it had entered into agreement 
with McDonnell-Douglas for joint development and 
proposal for an air combat fighter for the Navy 
based on the YF-17 design". 
351 
McDonnell-Douglas 
would be the prime contractor for the carrier- 
based aircraft for the Navy Air Combat Fighter, 
and Northrop would have the responsibility for 
the US Air Force's Air Combat Fighter and other 
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variants for foreign sales. General Dynamics did 
not enter a formal agreement, but joined forces 
with LTV Aerospace to design jointly a Navy 
derivative of the YF-16. LTV would provide experience 
in design and production of carrier-suitable aircraft. 
"The joint design would make maximum use of the 
technology and hardware from the YF-16", company 
officials said. 
361 
There are some issues and points that resulted as 
spin-offs of special events that should be treated 
here. It is obvious that the decision centres 
shifted as the programme entered the hardware phase. 
Then, the programme followed a gradual evolution 
and became more politicised when it entered the 
public arena, for example, the Congress. Earlier, 
during the conception of the F-16, for example, 
the F-X study or FX2 study, the decisional centres 
were to be found within the corridors of the various 
DoD Components. This is because they were 
concerned with the routine tasks and research, and 
reported their activities to their superiors. During 
the non-hardware phase, those in authority, aside 
from being concerned with other programmes in their 
hardware stages, and the overall managing of the 
Department of Defense, only had time, if any, 
to review these new developments which attempted 
to match needs that were coming from the Components. 
This situation was further exacerbated with new arrivals 
to fill top positions - they were quite busy either 
learning the processes, or attempting to infuse their 
own personal management techniques than be concerned 
with new research and development. In other words, 
the DoD Components appeared to be perfectly capable 
of managing on their own, in the assessment of mission 
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needs, strategies and the research and development 
of new systems to match whatever new requirements 
were necessary. As witnessed, they were assisted 
in these endeavours with contractors who were either 
communicating or sharing new research or developments 
in weapons technology. Seemingly, the two worked 
very closely and complemented each other's needs. 
However, once the weapon system entered the hardware 
phase, the decisional centres not only shifted, but 
shifted in different directions quite frequently, 
which, aside from confusing a contractor as to the 
original mission needs (this must be a factor in 
driving up costs), created a picture that the 
acquisition process was indeed very risky and complex. 
But the assertion thus far has been to demonstrate 
that it is not a process riddled with uncertainties. 
it is a very compartmentalised process, but from the 
viewpoint of the contractor, that in itself lessens 
their risks, and also creates advantages for the 
contractor in that there are constantly many new 
mission requirements to fulfil. However, in this case, 
the decisional centres shifted upwards (Secretary of 
Defense) in order to secure monies to flesh out the 
necessary hardware and it was essentially money, and 
how that limited resource was spent, and on what, which 
politicised the process. At this stage, it became the 
role of the managers acting as politicians, to guide 
that programme through the maze of the acquisition 
process. There are two types of uncertainties 
from the viewpoint of the contractor - technological 
and political. These uncertainties have been 
lessened by the mechanisms within the acquisition 
process such as cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, 
_. . 
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Fiscal Cycle overlap, direct line of communication 
between DoD Components and contractors (re sharing 
R&D) and each mechanism tends to be reflected more 
than the other in various decisional centres. For 
example, the research and development and prototyping 
of the new developments of the F-16 were conducted 
in a less political arena, in relation to the later 
stages, by various DoD Components, who were involved 
in the mission needs. From the F-X study throughout 
1971, much of the technological uncertainties or 
problems had been solved and money was secured 
for the Lightweight Fighter programme. Although 
more technological problems surfaced during the 
actual building of the prototype, it appeared 
that the F-16 at this stage, began to travel down 
the continuum of the political uncertainties. To 
assist the programme in this endeavour, there were 
various means exerted both by those in authority 
and within the DoD Components to lessen these 
uncertainties. For example, as witnessed, the 
Secretary of Defense released funds at his 
discretion for continuing the funding for the 
programme, thereby side-stepping Congress. It 
would also be naive to assume that he actually 
reached this decision on his own, in the respect 
that the decisional centres of the DoD Components 
were exertin' their influence, in the form of 
their expertise, to secure more funds for the 
continuance of the programme. This was a 
relatively less political decision, but the 
Secretary of Defense was also the ex? ert in 
monitoring the mood of Congress, the NSC, 
Presidential Directives, the media and other 
outside influences such as the Department of State 
and balanced those variables against his decision 
to continue funding. In other words, during the 
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early days of the hardware stage there were two 
decisional centres, each influencing the other, 
in an attempt to secure the future-of a system. 
When this shift occurred, the political momentum 
increased, and from the viewpoint of the contractor, 
such variables (mood of Congress, commitments of 
the Secretary of Defense, its relationship in the 
programme with DoD Components) influenced. him to 
assess his position and shift his focus. For example, 
as witnessed, when the Lightweight Fighter programme 
was launched, Northrop had to shift its focus and.. 
design a new prototype. Another example was when 
the Navy announced that it would be looking for 
some 800 Lightweight Fighters, both Northrop 
(with McDonnell-Douglas) and General Dynamics 
(with LTV) entered into some type of arrangement 
to secure those contracts. 
Furthermore, although the political momentum 
increased, the suggestion herein was not that the 
responsibility of the programme was handed over 
from the DoD Components to the Secretary of Defense. 
Although the Secretary of Defense may be more expert 
in political affairs, he was reliant on the 
concerned DoD Components for the expert advice 
of the system, which he utilised to his advantage. 
For example, the Secretary of Defense eventually 
announced the decision of the F-16 versus the 
F-17, but for the right decision he was reliant 
on the concerned DoD Components who had: sifted 
through all the flight trials et al, and were 
the experts in evaluating the two. However, they 
were mindful of costs and effectiveness 
because their information, fed upwards to the 
Secretary of Defense, was crucial for the 
programme. It was then the endeavour of the 
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Secretary of Defense to use this information to the 
best of his abilities, and then adapt his rhetoric 
to a fine tune balancing cost savings, benefits, and 
the best in technological performance to meet the 
requirements. Much of this work had already been, 
completed by the DoD Components for him. For example, 
much of the information was initiated in Justification 
for Major System New Start or a Decision Co-ordinating 
Paper or in DODD 5000.1 documents. The politically 
aware Secretary of Defense used that to his advantage. 
However, that also further demonstrated the influence 
of the DoD Components in setting the parameters for 
augmentation within the political spheres. 
The point is that during the non-hardware stages the 
political risks for a weapon system are minimal 
compared to the technological uncertainties. As 
the system progresses through and into the hardware 
stages, the political uncertainties increase and 
the technological risks lessen. The suggestion is 
not that once a system is developed there are no 
technological risks or changes - there are - 
however, a means of lessening the technological changes 
that will certainly arise is to "design in potentials , 
37] 
that are amenable to the changes. This is one feature 
of modern weaponry, and it will be demonstrated later 
in this discussion. As one Armaments Systems Specialist 
for the F-16 (USAF) stated in June 1986, "It [the F-161 
is still a Virgin in the Sky". 
381 
Before turning attention to the Air Force's decision to 
choose the F-16, another point to be aware of was the 
timing of the decisions. Obviously enough, this was 
crucial in preparing any strategy o decision making, 
but all the more so when it came to securing funds in 
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the acquisition system. For example, it was due to 
pressure from NATO that the Air Force chose a 
Lightweight Fighter earlier than intended. (Choice 
was to be made by USAF originally in May 1975; 
pushed back to January 1975. ) Also, once the programme 
had gained momentum (the Air Combat Fighter) funds 
were required, and the Air Force had to be bargaining 
from an advantageous position to be included in the 
Fiscal Year 1976 Budget (the last window open for 
insertion into the Defense Budget was late December/ 
early January 1975). Moreover, formal hearings in the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees began in 
January/February 1975 for consideration of the Fiscal 
Year 1976 Budget. 
The above is an indication that as the weapon system 
becomes politicised, it succumbs to the time 
constraints of the Fiscal Cycle, and whether or not 
this might impede technological advances in weaponry 
would be interesting to research. The opinion herein 
is that in a broad sense, it is negligible in so much 
that there is evidence of designing in future 
potentials in modern weaponry, and further that the 
research and development of a system continues 
even after deployment. Nevertheless, the risks would 
increase for a specific weapon system by making 
shorter the time available for testing and evaluation. 
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Air Force Selects YF-16 as Air Combat Fighter 
On 13 January 1975, Secretary of the Air Force, 
John McLucas, announced that the General Dynamics 
Corporation, Forth Worth, Texas, YF-16 had been 
selected for full-scale engineering development 
as the Air Combat Fighter. Secretary McLucas 
said that the "award of a fixed-price incentive 
contract for $417,904,758 to General Dynamics to 
fabricate 15 engineering development F-16 aircraft. 
In addition, Pratt and Whitney received a fixed 
price incentive fee contract for $55,500,000 to 
produce the F100 engine used in the F-15. "39] 
The press release also stated that, "at the same 
time, the United States is negotiating co-production 
arrangements for the Air Combat Fighter with a 
multinational fighter consortium, comprised of 
Belgium, Denmark, Norway and The Netherlands. 
A decision by the Consortium is expected within 
the next 90 days. "401 Prior to 
examining the NATO question, which is partially 
responsible for the choice of the General Dynamics 
design, it would be helpful to focus upon the 
reasoning behind the Air Force's choice of the 
F-16. 
McLucas' comment to the Pentagon Press Corps was 
followed the next day, 14 January, when Defense 
Secretary James Schlesinger said, "that the main 
reason for choosing the YF-16 was its use of a 
single proven engine". 
411 
Another reason offered 
later by Secretary John McLucas was that the F-17 
was"2,000 pounds heavier and its transonic drag 
rise starts earlier and stays higher across the 
flight program. How are they going to fix these 
problems? "421 The underriding tone of that 
statement was that the Air Force would have had 
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to have spent more money, but more importantly, 
time to resolve the problems had they chosen 
the F-17. 
The general Dynamics F-16 iultirole Fighter was a 
single-seat, single-engine, supersonic fighter- 
attack aircraft, powered by the Pratt and Whitney 
F100 turbofan engine (25,000'thrust-pound class) 
which was already used by the F-15 (two engines). 
Both the YF-16 and the YF-17 were designed primarily 
as air-combat fighters, but with secondary 
air-to-ground attack capability as well. Both 
prototypes featured new aerodynamic designs to 
improve manoeuvreability (Boyd and Sprey) and 
carried the same armaments. The F-16 has "fly 
by wire" flight control where wires from four 
computers transmit electronic commands - as versus 
mechanical links - to the control surfaces of the 
aircraft. When the pilot gives the aircraft basic 
instructions with his controls, the computer 
changes the control surface to minimise wind drag 
and alter the centre of gravity of the aircraft. 
This gives the craft enormous manoeuvreability, 
a major asset for a fighter plane. 
The major difference between the YF-16 and the 
YF-17 involved the engine, weight and performance 
capabilities. For example, the twin-engine YF-17 
had a gross takeoff weight - including internal 
fuel, two Sidewinder missiles and 500 rounds of 
20mm ammunition - of 25,000 compared to the 
single-engine YF-16's 20,800 pound class including 
fuel and the same armaments. 
43] 
Also, the planes 
differed by one-engine (YF-16) versus two-engines 
(YF-17). "Regardless, the competitive fly-off 
"wý,. 
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between the two airplanes, conducted at Edwards 
AFB, California, throughout the latter part of 
1974, disclosed a pair of well-designed dissimilar 
fighters". 
44] 
Col. Heinl went on to say that 
"each model, in most cases, tested out at, or above, 
specifications and was significantly more 
manoeuvreable than currently operational first-line 
fighters". 
45] 
"There was not a whisker between the 
two aircraft in their arduous fly-off - both had 
done very well". 
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Both aircraft designs appeared to satisfy the 
mission needs and requirements - the only major 
differences being weight and the issue of one or 
two engines. For the "expert" DoD Component at 
Edwards AFB, weight did provide an advantageous 
edge to General Dynamics since it was a programme 
to design a Lightweight Fighter. However, the 
details of the decision were not complete. 
The "expert" DoD Component also realised that the 
other factor was the engine, the Pratt and Whitney 
F100, which was already in production for the F-15 
versus the General Electric YJ 101 engine, at that 
time still in the prototype stage, for the F-17. 
It was the engine (Pratt and Whitney F100), which 
was already being produced, that was the pivot 
in the decision, not so much for the expert DoD 
Component, but also for the political advantages 
that it would yield when trying to secure funds. 
"The Air Force nod went to the single-engine YF-16 
not only on marginally better performance than the 
Northrop entry, but mainly because the YF-16 is 
powered by the already operational Pratt and Whitney 
F100 engine the Air Force is using in its sophisticated 
long range F-15 fighter. "47] Although still a 
relatively apolitical statement, the undertones 
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which tie in cost, is of concern to Congress et al. 
"By sharing power plants, both the F-15 and the YF-16 
will reduce cost for each project [learning curve] 
and simplify maintenance". 
481 Earlier in January, 
Schlesinger had said "the main reason for choosing 
the YF-16 was its use of a single proven engine" . 
49] 
However, later in February (hearings were conducted 
in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees as 
well as the House and Senate Appropriations Committees), 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger claimed that 
"the YF-16 would save some $300 million in fuel bills 
over the YF-17 over a 15-year period". 
503 He 
suggested "something in the order of 36 percent fuel 
savings per flying hour" . 
51] 
Even General Dynamics' 
private opinion of this "guesstimate" was unprintable. 
Schlesinger later claimed "that over the 15 years 
planned life cycle, YF-16 selection would save the 
Air Force $1.3 billion" . 
52] 
Later too, US Air Force 
Secretary John McLucas added "that the YF-16 had 
actually been far in advance of the YF-17". 
531 
Originally, the fact that the engine for the F-16 was 
in an advanced state compared to the engine for the 
F-17 was the issue, but now the performances of the 
aircraft as a whole were being debated. Choosing an 
engine already in production, was a prudent decision 
in regard to lessening the risk of new technological 
systems. What was probably a good decision on the 
part of the DoD Components was now being politicised. 
Proof of this, from another perspective, was evidenced 
in the above statements. The consumer of such 
rhetoric would be led to believe that the F-17 was 
not really that good an aircraft. Why then, so shortly 
afterwards, did the Navy choose Northrop's YF-17 to 
become the F/A-18 which the Navy has in its inventory 
today? 
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Additionally, but to a lesser degree, the number 
of engines was a factor which had to be weighed 
against the preferences of NATO. Several US 
friends and allies reported that at the time they 
were "preferring a twin-engine plane". 
541 
In fact, 
"the General Dynamics entry has always been a dark 
horse. The favourites are the Cobra and the 
Mirage". 
55) 
If this were the case, the Air Force 
and the Department of Defense were jeopardising 
its political chances by choosing the F-16. More 
about NATO's involvement is necessary at this point 
to assess its influence on the decision to choose 
the F-16. 
There are interchangeable views of the F-16 
programme when considering NATO and its role in 
that programme, but the scheme of the programme 
remains clearer and more concise if both roles 
exist simultaneously. The F-16 wasa military 
programme created in order to develop and produce 
an advanced low-cost, multi-purpose fighter for 
the US Air Force and the Air Forces of four NATO 
Allies - Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Norway. Of equal importance, the F-16 programme was 
an economic programme designed to strengthen the 
NATO alliance through coproduction. The former 
viewpoint may be less political than the latter. 
Nevertheless, given the environment of the alliance 
it is most difficult to look at a coproduction 
effort involving NATO and ascertain whether or 
not it was military or political. "Since the 
mid-1960s, the real burden of achieving weapons 
standardisation has shifted to the civil authorities 
and institutions within NATO. This shift recognised 
that achieving co-operation in development, 
production and procurement is fundamentally a 
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political and economic problem and thus more than 
just a military problem". 
561 
Moreover, in the case of the F-16 to replace the ageing 
F-104s other factors must be considered. "The first 
is the need to replace weapon systems which have 
become obsolete. "573 There are a number of reasons 
why weapons must be regarded as obsolete, for example, 
the military requirement may have changed. "Closely 
related to the replacement factor is the effect of 
technological developments on the method of waging 
war itself. "58) The tendency is to introduce new 
weapon systems which supplement the old system, but 
do not immediately render it obsolete. 
"The next factor can be loosely described as industrial. 
There may be pressure from defense related industries 
or from politicians anxious to promote the economic 
interests of a particular region or industry". 
591 
What complicates this more so for NATO than the US, 
is that "connected with this is the political factor. 
The structure of any country's armed forces are, in 
the first instance, governed by the role which the 
government envisages for them". 
601 
Obviously, with 
so many different governments structuring their forces 
along the influences of the politicians, the 
industrial research of new technologies to replace 
systems can be a very risky business indeed. Also 
what further complicates the NATO connection for the 
decision of the F-16 is the fact-that many European 
defence industries are nationalised. 
Aside from this backdrop in the case of the F-16, another 
topic heavily weighing on those in the decisional 
processes, was the introduction of Rationalisation, 
Standardisation, Interoperability and Specialisation. 
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John F Kennedy declared, "that the United 
States will be ready for a declaration of 
interdependence; " 
61] "11 years later, Kissinger 
in his historic Atlantic Charter speech in 
April 1973 re-launched the idea ... 'For us 
European unity is what it has always been, not 
an end in itself, but a means to strengthening 
the West' ..., 
62] 
prompted a "misunderstanding" 
631 
as well as "recriminations over the lack of 
Alliance consultation during the Middle East 
War in October 1973; arguments on the recurrent 
theme of NATO burden-sharing which focused in 
particular on the Jackson-Nunn Amendment to 
the 1974 Defense Appropriations Authorisation 
Act requiring the United States Administration 
to reduce forces in NATO Europe to the extent 
that their foreign exchange costs were not met 
by the European allies. " 
641 
Although the 
intention of this Amendment was to head off more 
demands for a reduction of American forces, the 
Amendment was "widely resented in Europe for its 
mercenary overtones. " 
65] 
These dismal preoccupations diverted some of the 
attention and energies of NATO from more productive 
channels of co-operation mentioned above, namely : 
Rationalisation is making commitments and 
following through with the aim of making 
best possible use of available alliance 
resources. 
Standardisation is the achievement of using 
identical equipment and procedures in order 
to produce economic advantages as well as 
the military benefits. 
10 
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InteroQerability, which is to achieve 
compatible equipment and procedures 
designed to increase operational 
effectiveness. 
Specialisation is where countries carry 
out certain defence tasks on behalf of 
allies and rely on the latter for the 
performance of other tasks. The idea 
is not only to enable individual countries 
to save money, but to use it efficiently. 
66] 
Even though 1973 and 1974 seemed dismal, in June 
1975 the Governments of Norway, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Denmark selected the F-16 to 
replace their somewhat obsolete F-104s and F-5s, 
which was widely held as a milestone for NATO 
Standardisation. 
Seven years earlier, on 19 July 1968, West Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands had signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to develop jointly an 
advanced tactical fighter for the mid-1970s to 
replace the ageing F-104s, G-91s and other 
aircraft. Canada and Belgium were expected to 
participate creating a market for at least 1,000 
aircraft. Although Canada, Belgium and the 
Netherlands withdrew from the project, the 
MultiRole Combat Aircraft (MRCA) became one 
of the largest European industrial programmes 
ever undertaken. The first MRCA prototype flew 
in August 1974 and, in 1976, contracts were 
signed to produce the aircraft. Deliveries 
began in 1979. The aircraft was designed, 
researched, produced and deployed by British 
Aircraft Corporation, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm 
3G4 
and Aeritalia. This co-operation of the MRCA was 
quite dissimilar to that of the F-16. Arguably, the 
F-16 was a sales deal to European customers, and as a 
sales pitch to entice them to buy for their own 
inventory, jobs were promised to their own industries. 
It was co-operation but, it falls quite short of 
applying the intentions of Rationalisation, 
Standardisation, Interoperability and Specialisation 
(RSI&S); except to those who subscribe to the belief 
that, if all of NATO purchased American weapons, the 
problems of R, S, I and S would all disappear. Nevertheless, 
the "F-16 program was born on both sides of the Atlantic , 
671 
out of the same desire to replace ageing aircraft, but 
was pursued along different paths. In the US, a 
prototype demonstration programme was under way to 
evaluate the application of advanced. technology, low 
costs, a lightweight highly manoeuvreable aircraft. 
The US Air Force accelerated the Lightweight Fighter 
programme, and later the Air Combat Fighter programme. 
Based on the fly-off, the US Air Force chose the 
General Dynamics F-16, which launched a full-scale 
development programme. 
Prior to the US Air Force announcement of selection, 
the Belgian, Danish, Netherlands and Norwegian Governments 
were evaluating the need to modernise their 
tactical air forces. In May 1973, these four 
European states organised a steering committee to 
seek a common system for procurement. In 1974, the 
four co-operating Governments insisted that the US, 
Sweden and France offer them favourable co-operative 
production arrangements before a choice would be made 
from three competing tactical aircraft offered for 
sales : 
305 
1) Swedish JA-37 Viggen (Saab/Scania) 
2) French Mirage F-l/M53 (Avions Marcel- 
Dassault) 
3) US YF-16 and YF-17 (General Dynamics, 
Northrop) 68] 
The race was off and running - for example, toward 
the end of June, Sweden unveiled a massive 
$1 billion non-defence industrial package to 
establish factories in Holland and Belgium in a 
major effort to sell the Viggen fighter to the 
two countries. 
69] 
Interestingly enough, Britain 
also made an offer to the Belgians, with the 
approval of Marcel-Dassault, to share in the French 
Fl Mirage and mix in 110-118 Jaguars, and 
offered the Belgians 75% of the value of the 
contract in industrial offsets. At that stage, 
the Fl Mirage was still on paper and despite 
Britain's partnership with Dassault, made this 
comment to the Belgians in its formal presentation 
"The British may be forgiven for suggesting that, 
and not for the first time, Belgium is being 
invited to relieve the French taxpayer of much 
of the burden of inaugurating French projects 
of uncertain future and open-ended costs. "70] 
Needless to say, that partnership soon ended 
and neither did it help the French. The race 
reached such a frenzy that an executive of 
Northrop said, "Everybody is flying in everything 
he's got, including the Wright brothers ... it's 
a buyer's market like we've never seen before". 
711 
By the end of August 1974, it seemed fairly clear 
that the Swedish Viggen was ahead of the game 
along with the American companies. The British 
Jaguar was still considered in some circles, 
because like the Viggen, it was already under 
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production unlike the American fighter (the F-16 
had not yet been chosen), but the Jaguar's 
effectiveness in air-to-air combat was 
handicapped because it was initially intended as 
an air-to-ground aircraft. By September, the 
Mirage had moved ahead of the Viggen, not so much 
based on its performance, but because the Swedish 
traditional stance as a neutral nation began to 
affect its selection as a major arms supplier to 
NATO countries. "The Swedes wanted the new 
fighter contract so badly that they promised to 
build their planes in the Netherlands and 
Belgium" so as not to upset their neutrality 
stance. In fact, "they went so far as to promise 
to invest $1.2 billion in non-aeronautical 
ventures in Holland and Belgium over the next 10 
years including Saab auto and Volvo truck plants. " 
721 
(This upset the trade unions of these corporations 
in Sweden. ) 
The importance of all this lies in the fact that 
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, himself, 
travelled to Brussels on 12 December 1974 and, 
in an obvious reference to French and Swedish 
attempts to influence the NATO consortium to 
"buy European", Schlesinger said, "effective 
deterrence and low cost should be the overriding 
considerations". 
731 
A week earlier (5 December) 
Schlesinger had said that the US proposed to 
assure substantial amounts of offset work to the 
European sub-contractors on the Air Combat 
Fighter including the transfer of technology of 
the Pratt and Whitney F100 engine. A week 
later, he appeared to be stiffening his position 
when he said, "I think that to the extent that 
European equipment is superior to American 
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equipment, we should look at it. But the decision 
with regard to military equipment should not be 
to take care of parochial interest groups in any 
of the nation states, and it should not be to 
permit excess capacity to continue to flourish 
in any one of those nations". 
74) 
Although there 
is a degree of hypocrisy in Schlesinger's 
statement, still this was something the European 
nations concerned wanted to hear - especially 
those with a penchant for the "two-way street" 
approach to weapons procurement with the US. 
However, what the US says in such statements 
and how it acts are usually removed from one 
another. 
Following the decision to choose the F-16 over the 
F-17 (13 January 1975), several NATO countries 
favoured "the Northrop plane because it is a 
two-engine aircraft while the F-16 is a single- 
engine plane. A twin-engine fighter, it is felt, 
is safer to operate over densely populated areas 
of Europe. However, cost works in favour of the 
General Dynamics aircraft". 
751 
The major 
bargaining chip was that if the Europeans chose 
the General Dynamics F-16 instead of the F-17, 
or the French Mirage F-l, the US would take care 
of the $1.6 billion development cost, but if the 
Europeans chose Northrop's F-17, its developmental 
cost (slightly more than $1.6 billion) would have 
to be absorbed in the price. 
761 
Perhaps a "two-way 
street" but, somewhat stilted for a European 
choice. Pentagon officials adopted a plan to 
persuade the NATO countries to buy the F-16. 
Led by Defense Secretary James R Schlesinger, 
they worked out a production agreement under which 
the four countries would receive 10 percent of the 
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work on all US Air Force orders for the plane, 40 percent 
of the work on planes bought by European military forces 
(ergo 60 percent to US) and 15 percent of the work on 
all planes ordered by third nations. 
771 
This offer 
was made in mid-February 1975 and the Netherlands and 
Denmark opted for the F-16s. 
A further inducement was made on 24 February, whereby 
the US Government would not restrict the technology 
transfer to European engine manufacturers who would be 
involved in the Pratt and Whitney F100 engine in the 
event that the NATO consortium chose the F-16. This 
was the sweetener for the Dutch. They would receive, 
in engine work, "$149.5 million and gain about 1,400- 
1,600 jobs". 
781 
On 3 April 1975, the Defence Ministers of the four 
states agreed that the F-16 possessed "undisputed 
advantages in operational qualities and programme 
costs", 
791 
over the other competitors. In late May, 
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands801 signed 
preliminary contracts for the purchase of the F-16, 
and "pressures intensified for the Belgian Government 
to make the final plunge". 
813 Even though the Belgians 
had been "awarded thus far most of the sub-contracts 
for the Pratt and Whitney F100 engine"821 they 
appeared not to be impressed. This eventually changed 
when the Belgian Defence Minister, Paul Vanden Boeynants, 
met with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger on 
2 June 1975. This was the final inducement - 
Schlesinger agreed to purchase 16,000 machine guns 
from Fabrigue Nationale (the main sub-contractor 
for the F-16) for $32 million. 
831 
The Belgians 
had planned to sell 260,000 machine guns to 
the French, but the French were stalling because 
the French planned to buy the guns when 
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the Belgians opted for the Mirage. This not being 
the base, the Belgians then stalled on the F-16 issue 
until the agreement on the guns purchase was reached 
with Schlesinger. As Pentagon sources said, "there is 
no question that Schlesinger's encouragement helped to 
persuade Vanden Boeynants to decide in favour of the 
General Dynamics F-16". 
841 On 7 June 1975, the Belgian 
Government approved and joined the governments of 
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands in buying 348 F-16s 
(Belgium 116: the Netherlands 102; Norway 72; and 
Denmark 58). 
85] 
The purpose of this discussion concerning the European 
factor in relation to the F-16 is not to provide an 
historical account on decisions made within those NATO 
countries, but rather to provide insights that they 
were essentially persuaded through various means to 
buy and co-produce the F-16. They lacked direct 
participation in the decision to choose the F-16 over 
the F-17, however it is not suggested that the European 
connection was unimportant - it was, and it was in the 
minds of the Pentagon as well as those in General Dynamics. 
Six months before the US Air Force selected the F-16 
the contractors were also busy in Europe. On 7 June 
1974, it was "Otto Glasser, General Dynamics vice- 
president-international, and James Beggs, vice-president- 
aerospace, who briefed Belgium, Holland, Norway and 
Denmark on the plans for initial production of 318 
aircraft for the four countries". 
861 
Although the 
concern here was related to future sales and 
coproduction, it placed General Dynamics in a 
more advantageous position in the final decision 
to choose the F-16. The Buropean connection was 
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more indirect than direct. In all fairness, Northrop 
would be doing the same lobbying in Europe, however 
Northrop had a unique and unforeseen problem - Tom 
Jones, its chairman, president and chief executive. 
Amidst all the lobbying efforts, in May 1974, Tom 
Jones pleaded guilty to charges brought by the 
Watergate special prosecutor of making illegal 
contributions to the Nixon campaign. In itself, 
that would have been an embarrassment, however, the 
Watergate charges so angered a stockholder, New York 
corporation lawyer Jay Springer, that he hired a 
California public-interest law firm and sued Jones 
and the company. 
871 
At the same time the suit was 
filed, Northrop undertook a special audit. It 
revealed that at least one of a network of "worldwide 
consultants used by Northrop had been returning part 
of Northrop's fees to the US for political contributions 
for the past 12 years" . 
883 This damaged Northrop's 
image in its lobbying efforts for the NATO connection 
which hurt its position for future sales to Europe. 
It had an indirect effect on the choice of the F-16 
versus the F-17. Any direct effect of the guilty plea 
to the US Air Force in its decision was negligible, 
because had there been a cause and effect relationship, 
the Navy, also, would not have chosen the F-17 to 
become the F/A-18. 
The other issue which affected the choice of the 
F-16, yet to be mentioned, is jobs. Jobs are a 
very important issue in weapons procurement. 
However, at this stage (the competition between 
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Northrop and General Dynamics) it was less 
important simply because both companies were 
in a position to promise new jobs, should their 
design be selected. In fact, it was probably 
be a non-issue before the final selection by the 
USAF because, the US Air Force was searching for 
a low cost Lightweight Fighter. The position of 
either Northrop or General Dynamics was*not 
enhanced by the promise of even 2,000 jobs more 
than the competition. That sort of job commitment 
in numbers would cause the competitor the risk 
of being more expensive than the other, which 
would lessen their chances of securing the contract. 
On the other hand, during the lobbying efforts for 
NATO's participation, jobs were an issue. 
For example, David Lewis, Chairman and Chief 
Executive of General Dynamics, said in November 
1974, "We are looking at having talks with some 
80 to 100 European companies as possible sub- 
contractors on the F-16". 
89] 
On the other side of the Atlantic, jobs were-a 
heated issue immediately after source selection, 
as well as a significant factor in persuading 
Congress, with its fiscal responsibilities, not 
only to purchase the initial buy of the F-16, 
but also its future procurements. The day after 
the announcement to choose the F-16, jobs 
appeared in the headlines, for example, in the 
San Diego Union on 14 January 1975, the headline 
ran : "F-16 Fighter Contract Expected to Boost 
Jobs Here in Two Years", which stated that the 
"$417 million contract to build the first 15 
developmental engineering models ... is expected 
to generate between 55,000 and 65,000 new jobs 
overall ... with some coming to Convair and 
Electronics divisions in San Diego". 901 Also 
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the next day, 15 January, at Fort Worth, Texas, 
where the General Dynamics plant is located, "more 
than 1,000 unemployed workers were at the plant when 
the gates opened". 
913 
Furthermore, jobs were not only important in 
themselves, but also the location of jobs. In the 
case of the F-16, there were sub-contractors found in 
32 States, aside from the foreign co-producers (see 
Appendix 3). The importance of spreading sub-contracts 
throughout the US, although it increases production 
costs (costs of shipment, communications, et al) 
makes economic sense in the production of weapons, 
because it translates into votes from Congress. 
After the initial buy of 15 aircraft, if "55,000 - 
65,000 jobs" are created in 32 States (and more 
would be forthcoming in full production), Congressional 
members, especially on the House side, because they 
are elected every two years (6 years for Senators), 
are most concerned with the creation or maintenance 
of jobs. Another example is the F/A-18 for the Navy 
(which was the Northrop YF-17 design) whose main 
contractors are Northrop and McDonnell-Douglas. They 
are affiliated with "powerful names like O'Neill and 
Kennedy in Massachusetts where General Electric makes 
the engines. (The GE J101 used for the YF-17 was 
ultimately replaced by a derivative - the GE 404). 
There are a lot of jobs at stake : in Missouri where 
McDonnell-Douglas assembles the plane; in California, 
Northrop's home base; and in 41 other States where 
Hornet [F/A-18] parts are made, 
92] 
-a total of 44 States! 
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Obviously, jobs and the strategy of location were 
important, but in the case of a prototype fly-off 
competition, their importance, as stated, was less 
in influencing the Air Force to make the decision 
between the YF-16 and YF-17. However, before source 
selection, jobs were an important factor for the 
prospective contractors in their decisions regarding 
their choice of sub-contractors to later enhance 
their position if chosen. 
After the choice of General Dynamics, jobs also became 
an immediate issue for Northrop. It is suggested that 
the loss of jobs may have been a direct influencing 
factor for the Navy's selection of the YF-17. The 
choice reversed job losses, and the prevention of their 
loss, has the potential to translate into votes for the 
appropriation of funds. "Northrop,; iof course, has been 
bailed out by the F-18 fighter decision. . 
931 
As the loser of the Air Force competition, "Northrop 
faced elimination from the fighter plane market in the 
US and overseas. Current foreign orders for its F-5 
International Fighter - the only fighter it now turns 
out - suggest that it can keep production going only 
through 1977. But if the Navy picks up the development 
costs of the F-18, Northrop can look forward to 
substantial foreign sales during the 1980s". 
941 If 
indeed Northrop was bailed out, could the same argument 
be applied to General Dynamics considering that its 
production run on the F-111 would eventually end? 
Perhaps, but not in the sense of a bail out. 
Simply, General Dynamics is in the aircraft 
business to make money, profits and secure jobs. 
It entered the fighter competition along with 
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eight other aircraft companies, which eventually 
were narrowed down to two, and following various 
trials which were conducted on the two prototypes, 
General Dynamics won, and was selected as the 
prime contractor. Both General Dynamics and 
Northrop had devoted much of their energies on 
being awarded the prime contractor. Once Northrop 
had lost, it had to shift its priorities in 
research and development to secure future contracts 
from other DOD Components, as previously mentioned. 
However, this situation was unique in that 
Northrop had been heavily engaged in the programme 
since January 1971 with the introduction of its 
P-530 Cobra design. Aside from its production of 
the F-5, Northrop had been concerned with this 
programme for four years. Other aircraft companies 
had submitted designs in January 1971. However, 
to submit designs as opposed to committing 
oneself to the production of a prototype reflects 
a measurement of the differing involvement. For 
instance, LTV or Lockheed, whose designs were not 
accepted, were-able to shift their priorities 
with little, if any, loss. However, in the case 
of Northrop, the losses could well have been 
disastrous. 
On the surface, it appears that prototyping 
increases the risks and uncertainties of weapons 
procurement because it is ultimately a win or 
lose situation. However, it is suggested that it 
is a win-win situation. In the case of the F-16 
versus the F-17, Northrop was eventually bailed 
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out, using as its case the arguments for jobs et 
al. More importantly, though, Northrop had been 
working with the same DoD Components as General 
Dynamics and was "in the know" of the requirements 
for both the Air Force and the Navy in their 
aspirations for a Lightweight Fighter. Once the 
choice was made by the Air Force, General 
Dynamics would be concentrating its limited 
resources on its new contract, whilst allowing 
Northrop to shift to other requirements of other 
DoD Components, in this case the Navy. Meanwhile, 
General Dynamics was not in a position to sell 
the F-16 to the Navy after the Air Force had 
argued that it fulfilled a required need. Further, 
for the same reason, and also because of inter- 
service rivalry, the Navy diel not want the F-16. 
The point is that the more money, man hours, material 
and other resources invested by the contractor 
whilst working with DoD Components, the better 
the chances for that contractor to ultimately 
secure contracts or arrangements with a given 
Service. First, due to the increase in the 
complexities of high technology in new weapon 
systems, the DoD Components are heavily reliant 
upon contractors for new research and developments. 
In essence, it would not serve the interests of 
the DoD Components or Service to allow that 
source to "dry up". And the contractors are so 
well entrenched in the DoD, that the onus of 
keeping contractors economically healthy falls 
upon the DoD Component or Service. Not only are 
they reliant on the contractors but they also run 
the risk of their integrity as participants in 
the acquisition process being put to the question, 
if a major contractor should falter because of 
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decisions of that DoD Component. For example, a 
DoD Component or Service might place its 
"expertise" in jeopardy if job losses becomes a 
heated issue, especially in Congress. In the 
case of Northrop, had that occurred, Congress 
may have scrutinised the whole concept of 
prototyping, as Congress had done to the concept 
of Total-Package-Procurement for the F-111 after 
the cost overruns. 
There were other variables involved in the Air 
Force's selection of the F-16, particularly its 
rival - the Navy. Attention, to provide a better 
understanding of the selection of the F-16 and 
the consequences for Northrop, must now be 
diverted to some of the Navy's activities during 
this time period. 
Navy Opts for Northrop's YF-17, The F/A-18 
Earlier mention was made that in 1974, the Navy 
requested $34 million for FY 1975 for funds to 
develop the Navy's Air Combat Fighter. After 
opposition in the House, and following a Conference 
Committee, the Navy received $20 million from this 
request. Commonality advocates within Congress 
originally envisioned that the adaptation of the 
selected Air Force Air Combat Fighter to be 
capable also of carrier operations was the 
prerequisite of the funds provided. The report 
added that further funding would be "contingent 
upon the capability of the Navy to produce a 
derivative of the selected Air Force Combat 
Fighter design". 
951 
As stated earlier, this 
complicated the issue for the Navy because the 
Navy had to return to Congress and satisfy them 
that the maximum use of the Air Force's Air 
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Combat Fighter technology had been completed before 
the $20 million would be released to the Navy. 
Congressional intent was that the Navy would work 
closely with the Air Force instead of starting at 
zero point. The intent was that the Navy would 
also have to buy that which the Air Force decided 
upon, and adapt it to carrier performance. 
However, in this regard, Congress is relatively 
weak in dictating its wishes to the Services. 
In September 1974, the Air Force announced that it 
would purchase 650 Air Combat Fighters and the 
Navy 800 Fighters. In line with Congressional 
guidance, Northrop joined teams with McDonnell- 
Douglas and General Dynamics with LTV. This 
increased the competition between Northrop and 
General Dynamics. NATO's interest to replace its F-104 
Starfighters was also pressing. Originally, the 
Navy had not intended to make its decision until 
mid-1975 but with the Air Force's decision in 
January 1975, and to be followed shortly by the 
Europeans, the Navy reached its decision on 
2 May 1975. 
The Navy selected the F-17, known today as the 
F/A-18 or Hornet, which is a derivative of the 
US Air Force Northrop YF-17 Lightweight Fighter 
Prototype that was altered to adapt the aircraft 
for carrier operations. The. most significant 
change involved the engine - which was substituted 
by a more powerful engine manufactured by General 
Electric - the GE 404 (originally the YF-17 had 
the YJ 101(GE) prototype engine). Also, the 
Navy preferred the YF-17 with its twin engines 
because it "would mean Navy aviators over water 
would still have an engine going if one conked 
out". 
961 
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Congressional criticism of the proposed F-18 
focused on the Navy's failure to select a 
derivative of the Air Force/General Dynamics 
F-16 as required by the FY 1975 Defense 
Appropriations and also, on the cost of the F-18 
in comparison with the F-16 (Schlesinger's 
statements). Regarding the former, the Senate 
Appropriations Committee was told in early May 
by Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense, Research 
and Engineering, that the "three General Dynamics/ 
LTV Aerospace variants were not suitable for 
carrier operations". 
971 
On 9 May 1975, LTV 
Aerospace Corporation filed a formal protest 
with the General Accounting Office (GAO) charging 
that the Navy's action violated the Congressional 
mandate, and contended that the Navy Air Combat 
Fighter competition should be reopened to allow 
LTV to design a plane that could meet Navy 
requirements. GAO delivered a decision on 1 October 
1975 in the Navy's favour, stating that "Navy 
selection of particular aircraft design for its 
Air Combat Fighter and resultant award of 
sustaining engineering contracts cannot be regarded 
as contrary to law". 
981 
Regarding costs, the Office of Management and 
Budget sent DoD a "working paper" showing the 
F-18 and F-14 to be about equal in cost under 
certain conditions and suggested that it might 
be "more cost effective to buy more F-14s and 
A-7s, instead of initiating the proposed F-18 
programme". 
99] 
However, DoD challenged their 
cost estimates and programme assumptions, and the 
Navy expressed strong support for the F-18 in 
testimony before the House Appropriations 
Committee, citing the F-14's "high follow-on 
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operating and support costs", 
100] 
and the F-18's 
expected "performance capabilities as a less 
expensive fighter and attack plane". 
1011 
The 
F-18's operating costs were given as "36% less 
than the F-14s", and the F-18 was described as 
"superior to the A-7 in combat capabilities". 
102] 
On 8 October 1975, the Navy testified before the 
Senate Armed Services Tactical Airpower Sub- 
Committee and said that an "800-plane F-18 program 
supplementing 224 F-14s and 202 A-7s in the FY 
1976-90 period would cost $25.2 billion [FY 1975 
dollars] in investment and operating costs, 
compared to $27.8 billion for other possible 
combinations of aircraft using F-14s and A-7s", 
103] 
According to their calculations, the Navy 
indicated that the F-18 mix would at first be 
more expensive than the other two before FY 
1984/85 and then slip downwards after that, so it 
was less expensive over the entire 15-year period 
(1976-90). 
The reason for the mention of the Navy's F/A-18, 
aside from it being the derivative of the F-17 
which kept Northrop afloat, is that again, as 
witnessed in the F-16, the "expert" DoD Components 
are able to exercise their influence upwards. For 
example, the Navy was fully aware that 
its choice did not meet Congressional language in 
the Appropriations (FY 1975) Bill constraining 
the Navy to a variant of the Air Force/General 
Dynamics F-17 Fighter, and yet, the Navy, through 
its expertise testified to Congress that their 
intention did not produce the best result. 
Furthermore, when seeking $110 million in Fiscal 
Year 1976 for the F-18104] they werestill able 
to make it appear cost-effective (unit cost in 
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1975 - $9.6 million based on an order of 800 
including R&D)1051 set against its own inventory, 
thereby avoiding the issue of comparing the cost 
to the F-16 ($4.6 million unit cost for a 650 US 
order). 
The previous discussion illustrates that as the 
decision for the Air Force selection of the F-16 
drew closer, not only did the decisional centres 
begin to vacillate, but also a variety of internal 
and external variables were operative on these 
decisional centres. Also, these variables do not 
have to be contemporary with the events of the 
decision, but can be past events or future 
expectations from that decision. For example, 
some of the past events which played a role were 
earlier contractor actions, F-111 cost overruns 
and European sentiment to NATO's RSI(&S) which, in 
particular, also played a role for future enhance- 
ment of standardisation for the tactical air 
command structure in Europe. Examples of present 
pressures being exerted include Congressional 
commonality advocates, inter-service rivalry, 
again NATO RSI(&S), et al. Also, these variables 
can be seemingly unrelated events such as the 
Watergate scandal. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
personalities, individual preferences, internal 
organisational structures and other such variables, 
creates a list of pressures which seem endless. 
Regardless, the interesting feature is not so much 
how many pressures may be operative, but from 
whom or which centres they are directed, and 
toward whom, which provides a clearer picture of when 
the shifting occurs. The central character in 
ascertaining this shift is again the DoD Component. 
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During the earlier stages, it is the DoD Component 
working with the contractor, and receiving very 
few pressures from above, excepting overall 
management directions, whilst exploring the 
possibilities of new weapons. They are responsible 
for the documentation pertaining to the matching 
of requirements and technologies et al of a 
specific system, and usually avoid external 
pressures such as Congress (for example, monies 
received from R&D funds). The other major pressure 
that is exerted on the DoD Components or Services 
is a lateral one, commonly designated as inter- 
service rivalry. 
As the weapon system progresses through its Life 
Cycle, it also has been continuing through the 
Fiscal Cycle, to the degree that, Congress 
scrutinises the system. For example, the 
Prototype Study began from Congressionally 
authorised funds in FY 1972 and Congress debated 
in late 1974 funding for the Air Force purchase 
for FY 1975 - 26 months later since initiation for 
FY 1972 Thus the external pressure of Congress 
for the funding of the system necessitated a 
greater involvement of the SECDEF. 
Essentially what trat red was that in the 
earlier stages of development, the pressures 
placed on the DOD Component in its decision making 
were for the most part lateral. These came from 
contractors pushing for the alteration of 
requirements or from other Services. To a lesser 
degree the DOD Components received directives 
from above. Later, as the system requires more 
funding, those in authority enter the scene. 
But the interesting feature Was that, even so, the 
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DoD Components maintained their standing in the 
decisional processes to implement the programme. 
Further, the SECDEF, upon entering the scene was 
not alone. Lateral pressures from the Secretary 
of State were also applied to his office as well 
as pressures from above, for example, from the 
President, Congress, et al. Thus, the pressures 
seemingly emanated from three levels. Whether this 
was the case is the focus of the following Chapter. 
However, if this scenario bears credence, easily 
understood then it why weapons acquisition decision 
making is problematic for models. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PRODUCTION OF THE F-16 - ITS DEPLOYMENT 
FOR NATO, USAF AND THIRD PARTIES 
NATO Sale and the Cd-production Programme 
In 1974, four NATO countries - Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Norway - formed a consortium 
to select a common replacement for their F-104 
fighters in the 1980s. The General Dynamics YF-16 
and the Northrop YF-17 prototypes, at that time, 
contending for selection by the US Air Force (and 
the US Navy), were actively promoted by their 
manufacturers in this European market. Momentarily, 
the discussion has not continued with the production 
and deployment of the F-16. This is intentional, 
because the F-16 was not a weapon system solely 
intended for US consumption, with perhaps later 
sales to foreign countries. The F-16 programme was 
a "joint business effort to produce the F-16 in the 
United States and in Europe ... The ultimate goal 
of the programme [was] to place certain F-16 
production business in Europe to offset 100 percent 
of the cost of the Europeans' initial buy of 348 
aircraft" .1 
To coherently understand the production and 
deployment of the F-16, attention must again 
return to Europe and the activities of the 
manufacturers, the US Air Force, The Pentagon 
and the US Government. This will illustrate 
further, the shifting that had occurred from the 
decisional centres of the Air Force and DoD 
Components to those in authority in the Pentagon 
(JCS, SECDEF), as well as other participants of 
the US Government, involved in weapons acquisition, 
who entered the scene for the manufacturing, 
.. 
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deployment, and foreign sales of the F-16. The 
purpose is to promote the sugggstion herein that 
as the hardware phases continue (in the sense of 
along a continuum within limits of time), the 
, 
less apparent will be the activity,, of the DoD 
Components (unless, for example, they are called 
upon to testify to Congress as experts for choosing 
a system over another) whilst the role of the 
managers increases (Secretary of Defense), 
utilising their political skills. Although the 
DoD Components' activities have apparently 
subsided, in relation to the other participants, 
their influence in the decision making of the 
acquisition process has not waned, and remains 
the most constant throughout the life of a 
weapon system. Prior to a discussion of NATO 
and the F-16 co-production effort, a further 
discussion of Rationalisation, Standardisation 
and Interoperability of weapon systems is 
necessary within the context of NATO, to assess 
whether or not the F-16 was a collaborative 
effort. 
Standardisation of NATO forces was a goal set in 
the first year of the alliance, when in 1949, the 
signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty created 
a Military Production and Supply Board to promote 
"co-ordinated production, standardisation and 
technical research in the field of armaments". 
21 
In NATO's first few years, there was a "relatively 
high degree of standardisation based on American 
and British war surplus equipment a# , 
3) 
In 
retrospect, an effective standardisation of NATO 
forces "over the last quarter century might only 
have been maintained if the post-war vision of a 
united'Europe in alliance with the United States 
i 
* I 
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had turned to reality". 
41 
However, because the 
US and Europe lacked a "compelling military 
rationale for developing an integrated conventional 
defense, the United States and the West European 
Allies were unable to create the political, 
economic and military framework that would have 
been required to rationalise the NATO defense 
effort". 
5] 
The US interests in, and the trans-Atlantic 
"dialogue on, NATO Rationalisation/Standardisation/ 
Interoperability could be said to have begun in 
earnest in August 197461, with the passage and 
signing of the DoD Appropriation Authorisation 
Act for FY 1975, containing the first of a 
series of so-called Culver-Nunn amendments 
expressing Congressional interest in NATO 
standardisation". 
73 (This is the same FY 1975 
Appropriations in which the Air Force and Navy 
were attempting to receive funds for the Air 
Combat Fighter. ) Subsequent to the Culver-Nunn 
amendments, the American disengagement from Southeast 
Asia "removed a major hindrance to America's 
leadership role in the Atlantic Alliance and allowed 
American policymakers to focus attention on security 
interests in Western Europe". 
8] American forces 
in Europe, which had been undermanned and 
malequipped during the Vietnam conflict, "began 
to profit from the new policy focus and the 
resultant availability of manpower and equipment 
for the European Theater". 91 For example, in 
1975, Senator Mike Mansfield, an outspoken leader 
of attempts to reduce US forces in Europe, 
announced that he would "mount no such drive in 
the wake of American setbacks"101 in Southeast 
Asia. Essentially, the Congressional leadership 
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on NATO issues gradually shifted toward those 
members who were impressed by the necessity of 
maintaining a conventional capability in Europe 
which was militarily effective, and yet, as cost 
efficient as possible. 
In 1974, the first of a series of standardisation 
measures directed that the "Secretary of Defense 
assess the costs of the lack of standardisation, 
recommend corrective actions, and report semi- 
annually to the Congress", 
111 in progress toward 
standardisation. The Culver-Nunn amendment to 
the DoD Appropriations Authorisation Act of 1975 
made explicit the Congress' support for this 
objective : 
"It is the sense of the Congress that 
equipment, procedures, ammunition, 
fuel, and other military impedimenta 
for land, air and naval forces of the 
United States stationed in Europe 
under the terms of the North Atlantic 
Treaty should be standardised or made 
interoperable with that of other members 
of [NATO] to the maximum extent feasible. " 
12) 
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Interestingly enough, the original language of the 
bill stated that it is to be "the policy of the 
United States" 
13) 
instead of "It is the sense of 
the Congress ... ". 
However, this wording was 
amended when the House and Senate went into 
conference where the "House conferees, although 
in agreement with the goal of standardisation ... 
expressed grave concerns that the import of this 
language as presently constituted could be 
misconstrued and possibly used*to our disadvantage". 
14) 
1 
Congress was in itself ambiguous toward 
progressing standardisation because of the varied 
interests of its Members. 
Nevertheless, the following year, 1976, another 
Culver-Nunn Amendment to the DoD Appropriation 
Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 1977, inserted 
stronger language which stated it to be "the policy 
of the United States that equipment procured for 
[US troops in NATO] should be standardised or at 
least interoperable, "15] with equipment of other 
nations. This act provided for a waiver of the 
Buy American Act in the larger interest of NATO 
standardisation, and expressed the sense of 
Congress that "greater reliance on licensing and 
co-production agreements" 
161 
within NATO would 
facilitate standardisation. Congress also felt 
that this "encourages the governments of Europe 
to accelerate their present efforts to achieve 
European armaments collaboration among all 
European members of the Alliance" 
171 
so as to 
obtain more realistic co-operation in defence 
procurement on the basis of a two-way street 
concept. 
However, this "two-way street" never materialised. 
Although the Congressional support for weapons 
standardisation, armaments co-operation, and 
military trade on a two-way street was more or 
less rooted in the belief that such measures 
would maximise conventional defences and equalise 
defence burden-sharing; standardisation, arguably, 
was merely an "economic means to achieve a 
strategic end, namely to redress the conventional 
force balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. " 
18] 
There is also a political dimension of 
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standardisation, to which Congress reacted 
ambiguously at the outset, and perhaps neither 
the Department of State nor the Department of 
Defense adequately communicated that objective 
to the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Europe. 
For example, by 1979, the "strategic" purpose 
of co-operation had receded into the background. 
This frustrated Congress, the military and 
industry, and the House Armed Services Sub-committee 
on NATO Standardisation, Interoperability and 
Readiness issued a report which "found no redeeming 
value whatsoever in armament co-operation". 
191 
The Report said that, "the term 'two-way street' 
as applied by Europeans and some US defense 
officials is a political device to secure 
economic benefits for European industries and 
often has little or nothing to do with enhancing 
military effectiveness". 
20) 
Earlier though, in Europe, the Eurogroup Ministers21) 
called in November 1975 for greater efforts to 
rationalise European armaments planning and 
collaboration, and laid provisional plans for 
creation of a staff or secretariat that could 
collect and collate information on European 
research, development, and procurement programmes, 
to better facilitate weapons co-operation within 
Europe. Following the NATO ministerial meeting 
of December 1975, an Ad Hoc Committee on Equipment 
Interoperability was created 
22], 
and the Eurogroup 
initiative of November gave way to the creation 
of the Independent European Programme Group in 
February 1976.231 The Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG) has the distinct advantage 
in comparison to Eurogroup, of including France 
as an active participant in European weapons 
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co-operation at the political level. "In its 
brief life, the IEPG [Independent European 
Programme Group] has held several series of talks, 
but has not been able to establish specific 
projects or come to firm agreements". 
24) 
To achieve increased Alliance Rationalisation, 
Standardisation and Interoperability (RSI), the US 
has undertaken a triad of major initiatives. The 
first is the Memorandum of Understanding, which 
has been a principal means of promoting RSI 
within NATO through co-operative action. The 
Department of Defense enters into reciprocal 
defence procurement and offset agreements with 
NATO, individual NATO governments, and other 
friendly governments, to purchase and sell defence 
equipment. The objectives of these agreements 
may be of a general nature, for example, to 
provide for waiver of the "Buy National" 
restrictions; or to promote greater co-operation 
in research, development, production and 
procurement, to enhance standardisation and 
interoperability. The different types of 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) are : 
General and Reciprocal Procurement MOUs 
which essentially have the theme of 
eliminating barriers such as "buy 
national", and import tariff penalties, 
and opening defence markets to 
competition on a reciprocal basis. 
Umbrella Type Research and Development MOUs 
which are agreements with such countries 
as the UK, Italy, Germany and the 
Netherlands. This occurs where the 
Secretary of Defense has issued blanket 
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waivers of the "Buy America "25] for 
those countries with which the US has 
reciprocal Procurement MOUs. 
The Program Specific MOUs which differ 
from the General or Umbrella MOUs in 
that they only provide overall 
guidelines regarding programme 
objectives such as reciprocal or fair 
opportunity to participate in production 
agreements. A specific MOU is usually 
required to cover each particular 
programme. For example, in the case 
of the F-16 a specific MOU was signed 
in 1975 by the US, Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Norway relating to 
procurement, co-production and offset 
arrangements of the aircraft. A way 
of viewing all this is that each 
General and Reciprocal Procurement MOU 
sets the tone for reciprocity, but 
often the details must be presented in 
separate technical agreements, which 
perhaps might cover financial arrangements, 
cost sharing, or additional co-production. 
Thus, industries almost always require licences to 
manufacture parts, components, or other items. 
Industrial "know-how" or other technologies may 
be released to a foreign manufacturer with the 
appropriate restrictions on their use. These 
and other agreements (quality control, inspections, 
et al) are contained in technical agreements 
which are appended to the MOUs. Some examples 
of Program Specific MOUs are, Co-Operative 
Research and Development, a method by which 
330 . 
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governments co-operate to make better use of their 
collective resources to include technical 
information exchange, research, development, and 
agreement on standards. Another example is the 
Co-operative Test and Evaluation which allows 
one government to test and evaluate the 
performance capabilities of a system before buying, 
or, a government might wish to participate in the 
tests to obtain additional technical and 
operational data. Another example of a Program 
Specific MOU is Co-production. This is the type 
for the case of the F-16, where a specific 
co-production agreement occurred when Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway decided 
upon the F-16 to replace their ageing F-104s 
and other aircraft. As a consequence, a MOU was 
negotiated providing for European industrial 
participation in F-16 production. 
The second of the triad of major initiatives 
undertaken by the US to promote RSI is by dual 
production or co-production of developed, or 
nearly developed, systems. Under this approach, 
a nation that has already developed a system 
which is valuable to the alliance would permit 
others to produce this system, and thus avoid 
the undertaking of redundant developmental 
programmes. Here again, the case of the F-16 
comes to light when the US and the four European 
governments signed an MOU for the F-16 
Multinational Programme. The Europeans, who 
teamed with the US for the co-production and 
co-assembly of the F-16s, produce avionics, 
the engine, and the aircraft. 
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The last element of the triad is the concept of 
the family of weapons. It is a relatively new 
approach for promoting arms co-operation. 
Essentially, there is the belief that some of 
the shortcomings of individual weapon system 
collaborations can be eased or overcome by a 
collaboration that encompasses several systems in 
a specific functional or technological family. 
Before applying this background information to the 
case of the F-16, another suggestion is offered. 
In theory (and in some cases, in practice, for 
example, F-16), the triad of initiatives are 
to promote RSI. The real task is that each of 
the approaches involves the sharing of technologies, 
which hampers their effectiveness. Moreover, 
this is complicated by the fact that the 
agreements are between foreign governments and 
not between a foreign government and a contractor 
in another country. "The United States has a 
conflict between its desire for increased NATO 
collaboration to standardise weapons and the 
need to maintain control over weapons systems 
made from US technology. These two policies 
may not be able to co-exist if the United States 
is to move forward in standardisation". 
261 
The 
conflict is well founded. It is the product 
of the "importance of exports to the major 
European producers; different foreign policies 
and arms sales exporting patterns of the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany; the inability of the UK, France and 
FRG producers to compete with the US". 
271 
Aside from this, a GAP classified report on 
NATO collaboration in an unclassified-digest 
boldly states : 
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"For all major producers, exports fill 
both foreign policy and economic goals. 
Because transfer of weapons adds to the 
military capability of the recipient, 
all the producers treat arms exports as 
reflections of their foreign policies, 
and all look to exports to create 
economic benefits - to lower the unit 
costs of the national purchases, to earn 
foreign exchange, and to solidify 
economic relations with the recipient. "281 
Instead of "openness" in the sharing of new 
technologies, such attitudes have actually 
retarded RSI. An exchange of technology under 
the restrictions imposed by a Specific MOU can 
become a tool of leverage. (For example, if new 
stealth technology should be transferred to the 
UK for a new future bomber, that technology is 
under restriction. This would forbid the UK, 
if suppose she should develop new designs and 
graphite materials, from applying it to the 
British fleet of helicopters. Again that would 
have to be negotiated under a separate Specific 
MOU by government to government). Thus, "useless 
and needless duplication of effort in NATO can 
result from any conscious hiding of technology 
discovery among NATO allies. For propriety 
reasons, using military security as an excuse, 
nations seem to hold back the work of greatest 
consequence so as to establish a national 
product position. "291 This becomes further 
complicated when taking into account that the 
new technologies are the resultant of the 
collaborative effort of the DoD Components and 
the contractors. Thus, there appears to be a 
I 
two-tiered approach to RSI - namely that of a 
government to government competition to protect 
technologies and yet, at the same time, from 
the viewpoint of the contractors, there appears 
to be co-operation in competing for new 
technologies. The notion of DoD Components or 
professional bureaucrats versus the managers as 
politicians in their approaches to decision making 
is applicable to agreements between contractors 
compared to agreements between two governments. 
For example, "US firms co-operated with French 
and Swedish prime contractors in competing against 
the US F-16 and F-17 aircraft, before the F-16 
was chosen". 
301 Although Northrop lost to General 
Dynamics, after their (GD) win, they were not in 
the position to make foreign sales. "90 percent 
of US foreign military sales are via government 
to government agreements, not by agreements 
between foreign governments and US contractors". 
311 
It is the opinion herein, and also as a topic of 
further research, that Western Allied governments 
appear to be in direct competition with each 
other, while Western industries seemingly 
co-operate with each other in global arms markets. 
The point is, that during the non-hardware phases, 
contractors are researching new technologies 
and exchanging information. However, when money 
and resources are involved during the hardware 
phases, a competition with political dimensions 
based on economic criteria, pressures governments 
into acompetition which is justified on the 
321 
grounds of national security. 
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NATO Sale and the Co-production'Programme of the F-16 
In June 1975, after 13 months-of evaluation, the 
European Participating Governments (EPG) - Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway - selected 
the F-16 aircraft, from among the Swedish JA-37 
Viggen, the French Mirage F-1/M53 and the US 
Lightweight Fighter Prototypes, YF-16 and YF-17, 
as a replacement to modernise their current fighters. 
To capture the market, various strategies were 
pursued by the contractors - some illegal, to persuade 
the European Participating Governments (EPG). Also, 
other strategies with tangible offerings were 
pursued, for example the Belgian gun purchase. 
Regarding the loss of businesz integrity on the 
part of the contractors in promoting their aircraft, 
the capital cities of the European Participating 
Governments (EPG) were awash with rumours of bribes 
et al, or claims and-counterclaims of money 
passing from one hand to the next, to promote a 
certain contractor. The stakes being so high - 
$2 billion for the European sale and over $15 billion 
for the total market - it was not surprising for 
such events to have occurred. Also, eventually the 
US government appeared to play dirty ball or 
"steamrollered" the project. 
In the earlier stages of the F-16 programme, it 
was contractor versus contractor battling to 
receive the support of the EPGs. However, as the 
choice of the F-16 over the F-17 drew closer (chosen 
on 13 January 1975), the competition shifts and 
becomes a competition between governments. 
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For example, before the F-16 was selected by the 
US Air Force, Piet Denkert, a Dutch Member of 
Parliament, who at the time was a ruling 
Socialis, rty spokesman for foreign affairs, 
charged that he was "offered the equivalent of 
$1 million by a French agent to speak out in 
favour of one of the F-16's chief European rivals" 
331 
Another Dutch Liberal Parliamentarian, Mr W. Keja, 
charged that the French tried to bribe him into 
taking their case to the Dutch second chamber 
(House of Representatives). As he said, "I was 
telephoned by a French agent [Joop Botterman] 
who invited me to lunch. He said he would give 
me 30,000 guilders (about $10,000) if I would 
speak out in favour of the Mirage. I said I 
couldn't accept" . 
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Dassault meanwhile denied 
all allegations of bribery and demanded a chance 
to debate on television. Mr Piet Denkert (who 
made the earlier allegation) agreed to debate 
M. Pierre Francois, General Secretary of Dassault. 
"In other countries" M. Francois said, "such 
practices may exist, but not here in Europe, surely". 
351 
For more discussion of some of these contractor 
actions, see Ingmar Dorfer's account in his book, 
"Arms Deal - The Selling of the F-16". 
36] 
By retracing some of the developments in greater 
detail, demonstrates the increase of the political 
activity regarding future co-production. Thus it is 
necessary to return to when the NATO countries 
had agreed to try to co-ordinate their selection. 
Although Washington had remained uninvolved in 
the events of Europe until then, afterwards at- 
the State Department, Henry Kissinger became 
1 
involved and a message from him to the Defence 
Ministers of Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, 
Belgium, sent on 26 February 1974 conveyed the 
following : 
- European collaboration to expedite the 
development of certain aircraft 
components; 
- Support the transfer of air technologies; 
and 
- Provide logistical support for those 
program components. 
377 
The impact of the message was clear. The Secretary 
of State was-personally involved. Also 
involved was Secretary of Defense Schlesinger who, 
anticipating a European meeting on 2 May, wrote 
a letter to the four Chairmen of the Congressional 
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on 
27 April 1974 which stated : 
"While we clearly have not made a final 
decision to put into production of the 
ACF, I am convinced that the continuing 
need for modernisation not only of our 
tactical air forces but also those of 
our allies re-emphasises the importance 
of making available a lower cost fighter 
option ... I forsee significant potential 
for foreign sales of this type of aircraft 
particularly if we fully support such a 
program. ' 
381 
The significance of these events; was threefold : 
first, the seeds of the politicisation of the 
programme had been sown, just prior to production 
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(large amounts had already been appropriated by 
the Congress and from the SECDEF for R&D and 
prototyping since FY 1972). Second, the emphasis 
from the State Department was on co-production. 
Third, the emphasis from the DoD was for foreign 
sales - one argument for foreign consumption; 
the other for domestic. But most notable of all 
by mid-August 1974, a team headed by the Deputy 
Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and 
Logistics, Frank Shrontz, went to Europe to 
continue the negotiations - the import was in the 
composition of the team - neither the Defense 
Assistance Security Agency at DoD, nor the State 
Department, were to direct the negotiations from 
now on. "The Air Force in fact and the DoD in 
name was to make sure that the Europeans selected 
the USAF air combat fighter as their own. "391 
However, after the choice of the F-16 had been 
made by the US Air Force, US government spokesmen 
(managers/politicians) took control of the 
situation. Even the Secretary of State, 
instructed the American embassies in the European 
purchase countries to assist in the sale of the 
F-16, which led to what one American diplomat 
in Brussels termed "an effective demonstration of 
industrial-government partnership". 
401 A European 
aircraft industry official called it "a 
steamroller". 
411 The timing of the appearance 
of President Ford, 29 May 1975, to address the 
NATO Council, was also a consideration. If it 
were just a coincidence, the contents of his 
speech were not. Although President Ford never 
singled out the F-16, one of the serious problems 
about which he expressed concern was the increasing 
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pressure on Alliance members to reduce their 
levels of military commitment at a time when 
"the forces of our potential enemies are 
continuing to grow stronger". 
421 
This combination 
of "increased strength on the part of our 
adversaries and greater national demands for 
resources for non-defense needs makes it imperative 
that we use our defense resources more effectively". 
43) 
To this end, President Ford stated that the 
Alliance must, "become truly one in our allocation 
of defense tasks, support, and production" and 
challenged the Council to achieve "our longstanding 
goals of common procedures and equipment". 
44) 
The success of these standardisation "efforts 
will be an important element in maintaining a 
strong and credible NATO defense posture". 
45] 
Furthermore, as witnessed in the previous Chapter, 
pressure was also applied by the Secretary of 
Defense, Schlesinger. 
Aside from the bribery allegations of the 
contractors and the political pressures exerted 
by one government on another, tangible outputs 
were in the offering. For example, as mentioned 
earlier, Schlesinger by having authorised the 
Belgian gun buy, had arranged the final sweetener 
to persuade the Belgians to choose the F-16. 
However, a far more important inducement for all 
of the European Participating Governments (EPG) 
was in the works. This offering came from the 
Pentagon in clinching the deal and is referred 
to as "offset". Essentially "offset occurs, 
weapons traders explain, when one country buys 
something from another country to persuade that 
nation to buy something from it in return". 
46] 
I 
Defense Secretary Schlesinger described the deal 
as allowing the Europeans to recoup "at least 
100 percent or more of the value of their initial 
production". 
471 
Or, on the other hand, as a 
writer from the Chicago Tribune put it, "the 
Europeans get 348'fre`, jets worth $6 million 
each". 
481 
When the final pact had been drafted, 
in June 1975, the EPG entered into a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU). This agreement called 
for the EPG to share in the production of the 
European, US and third country aircraft on the 
basis of EPG industry receiving contract awards. 
The Europeans received : 
1) Assembly plants to be built in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, where 
40 percent of the 348 planes sold 
to Europe will be produced; 
2) the Europeans will produce 10 
percent of the 650 F-16s the US Air 
Force had ordered; 
3) sales to any third nations would 
also mean profit for the Europeans. The 
two European plants will produce 15 
percent of all aircraft to be built 
for sales outside the US and the EPG. 
491 
Captain Robert Carroll, a spokesman for Assistant 
Air Force Secretary Frank Schrontz, indicated 
that the final selling point, which most likely 
turned the Belgians around, was the consideration 
that even with the exclusion of the third country 
sales, Belgium's entire cost for the F-16s would 
be offset. Further, "if third country sales 
, exceed 
1,000 planes, the European assembly and 
340 
production plants could realise a profit of well 
over $500 million. They could actually make up 
to 130 percent of their original cost". 
50) 
Or, 
as Brigadier General James Abrahamson, USAF, 
said, "The ultimate goal of the program is to 
place certain F-16 production business in Europe 
to offset 100 percent of the cost of the 
Europeans' initial buy of 348 aircraft. The 100 
percent offset is to be completed with the sale 
of 2,000 aircraft. This buy represents about 
$2-3 billion measured in 1975 dollars. The 
offset goal is to be achieved in phases based 
upon the total number of aircraft produced, for 
example, 58 percent of the Europeans' outlay is 
to be offset during the production of the first 
998 F-16 aircraft (650 US, 348 European) and the 
target of 100 percent offset should occur when 
2,000 aircraft have been produced". 
51] 
Obviously, 
nothing being for free, someone or some government 
would have to absorb the costs elsewhere. 
Costs of Co-production 
On the other side of the Atlantic, a half-year 
before the US Air Force selected the F-16, Otto 
Glasser, vice-president-international of General 
Dynamics, projected that should the F-16 be 
chosen, because of the co-production effort and 
by virtue of the increases of units and applying 
the learning curve, the "price per unit would be 
in the $4.5 -5 million range". 
52] 
A month after 
the selection of the F-16, "the US prime contractor 
[General. Dynamics] agreed to a not-to-exceed price 
of $6.09 million in 1975 dollars", 
531 
per unit. 
The unit flyaway price was actually set at $5.16 
million in 1975 and General Dynamics was not to 
exceed $6.09 million. The following year in May 
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of 1976 a staff working paper from the Department 
of Defense projected that, due to the co-production 
effort, the F-16 would save a total of $126 million 
in Fiscal Year 1977 through 1981.54) See, table 
below : 
Estimated Future Savings FY 1977-81(in $ millions) 
Total Learning 
Savings R&D Curve Overhead 
F-16 126 67.7 43.7 14.6 
55] 
Also in May of 1976, US Air Force Col. William E 
Thurman, the F-16 system programme director, told 
the Senate Armed Services Tactical Air Power 
Sub-committee that, "The United States stands to 
recoup its entire investment in development funds 
through co-production and foreign military sales". 
56) 
To lessen any fears in Congress of a breach of 
security or if a crisis should arise, Thurman said, 
"We sha4 retain the ability to produce all of 
the aircraft in the United States, should the need 
arise". 
571 
By June of 1976, the price had climbed 
from $5.16 million (January 1975) to a fixed price 
of $5.69 million - not much of an increase - 
$530,000 in one-and-a-half years. However, 
"Defense officials of the four European Participating 
Governments were concerned that the increase would 
eventually threaten the fixed ceiling price of 
$6.09 million" 
58] 
per unit. They would never have 
imagined that by 1981 Congress agreed to buy "120 
F-16s in FY 1982 for $2,330.3 million!. "593 
Simple arithmetic shows the cost to be $19.41 
million per unit, or, a 376 percent increase from 
when the contract was first negotiated in 1975. 
Of course, one reason for an increase of such a 
price would be inflation. However, for the period 
of 1975-198160], the total rate of inflation in 
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the US was 64.3 percent, still leaving a 311.7 
percent increase to be accounted for. The 
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank 
in Washington DC, prepared a study depicting 
that for 28 weapons systems conceived in the 
1970s, "the Pentagon estimated that inflation 
would increase costs from 9 to 100 percent. 
In reality, inflation and design and program 
changes, plus the added costs of unstable 
production, increased costs by many times that 
estimate, from a minimum of 92 percent to as 
much as 400,500 or even 800 percent". 
61] 
It was envisioned that co-production would 
increase the orders and bring down the cost. To 
the "Americans, this program is a pragmatic 
arrangement for the US foreign military sales 
program to win over European competitors for 
export sales of tactical aircraft". 
621 
However, 
the desire here is to argue that the co-production 
effort itself, was actually an additional reason 
that costs of the F-16 programme were increased. 
First, there is the geographical aspect. The 
closer one's proximity is to another contractor, 
the lesser the costs (shipping, communication, 
travel, et al). Thus, having sub-contractors 
(see Appendix 3) on both sides of the Atlantic 
would drive up costs. Although these factors 
may increase costs, those increases, as 
illustrated domestically in the US, are negligible 
if they become necessary for the award of the 
contract. Perhaps this type of cost overrun 
should be classified as operating costs. Also, 
there is a cost on either side of the Atlantic 
due to the fluctuation of currency exchange. 
The "loss due to currency conversion is an 
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element of the F-16 multinational program over 
which the program manager has no control". 
631 
Furthermore, there is "less competition in 
Europe - differences exist with respect to 
competition in defense acquisition". 
641 
Such 
factors as "wages, which are higher in the US 
than Europe, and Europe's taxes higher than the 
US; the personnel in Europe are more craftsman 
product oriented than US technicians who are 
machine oriented; higher union orientation in 
Europe leading to less flexible and slower work 
schedules than in the US; vacations in Europe 
where plants shut down versus the individual 
preference to vacations in the States, are just 
some of the cultural and/or historical differences 
which frustrate savings in production costs" * 
65] 
"Costs in the proposals are coming in much higher 
than the US anticipated, and it is a serious 
problem. The Europeans are increasingly non- 
competitive and seem unable to sustain a 
production rate that will allow them to compete 
with US aerospace firms. It is almost across the 
board; just pick a proposal on an F-16 component 
and look at the price for co-production". 
661 
Relating co-production as a reason for cost 
overruns, one cost analysis found that as a 
"result of co-production, the Europeans are 
spending approximately $1.1 million more on each 
aircraft, while the US is, in effect, absorbing 
part of the cost of co-production and paying about 
$150,000 more per aircraft than it would without 
the European sale". 
671 
A second and more important reason for the cost 
overruns on the domestic side, but with 
consequences for the European co-production 
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effort was suggested earlier. It was stated that, 
DOD Components are as optimistic in their 
appraisals of costs in the earlier stages of a 
weapon system's development as are the 
contractors. In most headlines, blame tends to 
be passed on to the contractor, which is only 
half the truth, because not only is the DOD 
Component optimistic in its assessment, but 
given the time and organisational facets of the 
Fiscal Cycle (as well as its overlap) the DoD 
Component can use this to its advantage. The 
case of the F-16 substantiates this. "The cost 
estimates presented at DSARC III [Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council] were not approved by 
OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] until the 
budget review cycle was completed in December 
1977". 
68] 
Although DSARC III costs are subject 
to changes, they represented the Air Force's 
best estimate at that time and, we believe, 
should have been presented in the September SAR 
[Selected Acquisition Report] as an Air Force 
estimate not yet approved by OSD. Otherwise, 
the Congress is not notified of potential 
program cost growth in a timely manner. "691 
The F-16 programme cost estimate prepared in 
September 1977 and briefed to DSARC III in 
October 1977 and the September 1977 SAR itself 
are shown below : 
Total Program 
(in millions of 
SAR 
Program 30 Sept 1977 
Development 891.1 
Procurement 12,942.2 
Cost 
dollars) 
DSARC III 
Briefing Increase 
1,004.9 113.8 
14,142.3 1,200.1 
Total Program 13,833.3 15,147.2 1,313.9 70] 
i 
Certainly, Congress should have been informed of 
an increase of $1,313,900,000 when DSARC was 
already aware of the increase. However, this is 
not the füll picture. The above General 
Accounting Office Report to the Congress was dated 
24 April 1978, but a half year earlier a letter 
sent by Mr Gutmann, Director, Procurement and 
Systems Acquisition Division of the General 
Accounting Office, to General Lew Allen, Jr, 
Commander, Air Force Systems Command, stated that 
"indications are that the F-16 program cost will 
increase". 
71) 
The letter proceeds then to 
itemise the Armed Services Procurement Regulation 
which required that "contracting officers [DoD 
Components) obtain cost or pricing data from 
contractors to report proposed prices for such 
negotiated non-competitive contracts expected to 
exceed $100,000. Contractors are required to 
certify that cost or pricing data used as a basis 
for negotiating contract prices is accurate, 
current, and complete". 
72] 
General Dynamics 
complied with, and executed the required 
certificate as of 8 January 1975. However, "the 
Air Force did not strictly follow Department of 
Defense Regulations which provide that where 
cost or pricing data is obtained, a cost 
analysis shall be performed to assure the 
reasonableness of the price proposed ... No 
alternative methods of evaluation are authorised. 
In our opinion the departure from procedures 
developed over the years to increase assurance 
of negotiating fair and reasonable prices for 
needed goods and services was not warranted. " 
731 
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Aside from the importance of the letter regarding 
cost overruns, it also verifies that, by law, 
i 
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contracting officers and contractors should work 
together to arrive at a reasonable cost. 
To achieve a sound cost analysis for a 
non-competitive contract, both elements have 
been working closely together for quite a period 
of time, in researching new technologies and 
applying it to match the requirements. Further, 
the DoD Components have been assessing materiel, 
resources, technology, et al, and reporting 
upwards, and at the hardware stages of a weapon 
system, they are probably just as eager as the 
contractor, for different reasons, to be overly 
optimistic. Perhaps the reasons might not be 
too different remembering that many in the 
military "retire" at an early age and enter into 
private employment. 
74) 
Nevertheless, an Air 
Force Component should have been held accountable, 
for the letter also stated "that the decision to 
award the contract in January 1975 instead of the 
originally planned contract award date of May 
or June 1975 ... may have contributed to the 
Air Force's lack of strict compliance with 
established regulations and procedures in awarding 
the contract". 
751 
An excuse or outlet was provided 
to the Air Force perhaps due to the notion that 
very few comply. For example, "the Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) in almost all major 
force programs reflects unbridled optimism 
unsubstantiated by either an analysis of the 
economic and budgetary environment". 
761 
Another aspect of the cost overruns of the F-16 
was the contract on its own -a fixed-price, 
incentive fee contract was offered by the US 
Government to General Dynamics. The US offer 
was a "not to exceed" price of $6.09 million 
I 
with General Dynamics setting its price at $5.16 
million per unit. The "not to exceed price is 
only an upper limit; if the aircraft can be 
produced at a lower price, the lower price will 
be charged". 
771 
From the viewpoint of the 
Government, the "fixed price, incentive fee" 
contract "ensures that the manufacturers have an 
interest in the lowest possible costs". 
781 
A 
suggested argument is that such contracts are an 
impetus to cost overruns, since the contractor 
could add an amount on to the originally agreed 
price, and still be below the ceiling, and 
receive an incentive fee. As a staffer on the 
Senate Armed Services Committee once said, these 
"contracts allow the contractor to make up for 
791 its lies in the past". 
Before turning to a discussion on the production 
and deployment of the F-16, some issues should 
be mentioned as to whether or not the F-16 was/is 
a co-production effort. It was a co-production 
effort in the sense that other NATO countries 
participated in its production, which may have 
benefited RSI. However, the political gains 
of promoting RSI were not the only reasons for 
entering the co-production effort. "It seems 
reasonable to conclude that the F-16 project ... was 
how the Europeans could reduce their military 
technological dependency on the United States". 
80] 
The technological level in modern armaments and the 
ability to achieve a high level is crucial in 
the maintenance of a competitive industrial base. 
The Europeans wanted to participate to a greater 
degree than was finally permitted in the detailed 
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engineering of the F-16 - such was denied on the 
grounds that that information should be kept in 
the US. "Technology concerning four parts of 
the F-16 were not released: the radar processor, 
the electronic countermeasure equipment, the 
fire control system and the hot section of the 
engine". 
81] 
Regarding this, Frank Shrontz, 
Assistant Secretary of the US Air Force, stated : 
"At some point. in time when the technology 
ceases to be sufficiently advanced ... 
they ought to have the full capability 
of a joint program. They like to think 
that they are meaningful participants 
in the program, and I must admit it 
rankles them a bit when we withhold 
certain things that we think are 
important for our own security. "821 
This raises the fundamental issue of a "two-way 
street" and as to whether or not this was pursued 
in the interests of RSI. The suggestion offered 
here is that in the case of the F-16, "commonality" 
was more sought after to enhance not only sales, 
but to lessen the vulnerability of the entire 
programme by increasing the political stakes, 
should, say, Congress not agree to funding. And, 
the political ante would increase each year as 
the programme would continue and begin to 
materialise. Had the US developed the programme 
entirely on the basis to promote RSI, it would 
have been unnecessary for the US to keep a 
complete production run in the US, even though 
this results in higher costs than single source 
production. The contention here is that the 
European interests in a successor for the F-104s, 
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and the prospects of the European market, aided 
the Air Force and Pentagon in deciding on a 
production programme for the F-16. This assisted 
the Air Force and the Department of Defense in 
obtaining funds. However, their arguments of 
offset costs and learning curve implementation 
with a larger order have no merit. (For the last 
time, and for the purposes of emphasis, the 
author wishes to suggest that)those involved in 
the weapons acquisition process apply their own 
learning curve, and set themselves on a straight 
path, by realising that in weapons procurement 
the learning curve argument is only a political 
ploy to either "tool up" a project, and reach a 
threshold, whereupon it makes more economic sense 
to maintain that programme than re-shape it, or 
to secure funding for a larger number of units. 
Originally, the Air Force projected 650 aircraft 
for the US and 348 for the four NATO countries - 
a total of 998. In March of 1982, the order, 
with foreign sales and an increased US order 
(1,396), stood at 1,997 planes. The original 
programme in 1975 per unit was to cost $5.16 
million or, in 1982 dollars, $9.2 million. 
However, with a doubling of the orders by 1982, 
the unit cost of the low cost fighter was now 
$21.2 million! 
831 
Production Gets Under Way 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the basic 
charter for implementing the F-16 multinational 
programme, was finalised on 10 June 1975, six 
months following the selection of the F-16. The 
major commitments were issued through the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, and not through the 
i 
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Air Force. These commitments were subject to_. 
Congressional authorisation and appropriations, 
and were as follows : 
- Procure 650 F-16 aircraft and base a 
large number in Europe; 
- Manage the F-16 multinational programme; 
Utilise depot maintenance and overhaul 
facilities established and funded by 
the European Participating Governments 
(EPG) and industry in these countries 
on a mutually agreed basis for USAF 
F-16 aircraft operated in Europe; 
Release most elements of the F-16 
aircraft for technology transfer, 
"except certain specific ones that 
will be released later"; 
- Provide for EPG industrial participation 
in F-16 production to offset EPG 
procurement costs. 
84] 
The fifth commitment relates to the percentages 
mentioned earlier, that the Department of Defense 
directed the F-16 contractors to place with EPG 
industry : 
- 10 percent of the procurement value 
of the 650 US purchase; 
- 40 percent of the procurement value 
of all EPG aircraft programme purchase; 
- 15 percent of the procurement value 
of all third country purchases. 
I 
The European Participating Governments' (EPG) 
representatives made the following important 
commitments for their Governments : 
- Purchase 348 F-16 aircraft; 
Pay for all material and services 
necessary to their programme, and fund 
a pro rata share of the programme costs 
as required for acquiring production 
long-lead items and production 
implementation; 
- Pay a pro rata share of US Government 
non-recurring costs for developing 
the F-16 aircraft system; 
- Fund development and production costs 
for equipment peculiar to their aircraft. 
85] 
Although the US Government is ultimately 
accountable for the overall management of the 
multinational programme, and the European 
Governments are responsible for theirs, the key 
elements for the implementation and decision 
making of the programme remain the responsibility 
of the DoD Components and the contractor. The 
management of the F-16 programme is co-ordinated 
through the US Air Force's System Program 
Director (Programme Manager) for the F-16. He 
is advised by a Steering Committee. 
The MOU established a Multinational Fighter 
Program Steering Committee, composed of one 
principal member and one alternate member from 
each participating nation. The committee meets 
periodically to resolve issues and to provide 
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advice to the US Air Force's System Program Director. 
However, if the Steering Committee is unable to reach 
a decision, then the US Secretary of Defense may be asked 
to resolve the issue. The Steering Committee has also 
established sub-committees to monitor specific areas and 
make recommendations for resolution of disputes. The 
Steering Committee has also set up a full-time permanent 
Secretariat in Brussels, Belgium. 
861 
General Dynamics Corporation is the prime contractor for 
the F-16 airframe. It is responsible for the design, 
development and production of all F-16 aircraft and, 
except for engine performance, for total system performance, 
including all airframe co-production work. Pratt and 
Whitney, the engine prime contractor, is responsible for 
all F-100 engine performance, including those engines 
assembled in Europe. General Dynamics' sub-contractors 
also established co-production programmes with EPG 
industries for aircraft components. A way to view the 
organisational structure is set out in Figure 7-I. 
The purpose of this is to illustrate that during the 
hardware phase (Full-Scale Development and Production and 
Deployment), the decisions, in contrast to the earlier 
stages are now increasingly directed from above, as well 
as, working in an upwards fashion to other successive 
levels. For example, an increase in orders of the F-16s 
is negotiated between Governments. Once the order is 
confirmed, it is then passed on to the Steering Committee 
and the System Program Director. Then it makes its way, 
through new contracts with the prime contractors, who in 
turn place purchase orders with sub-contractors, which 
presents quite a different picture from the non-hardware 
phase of conception. Meanwhile, should the programme 
experience engine problems, or poorly designed avionics, 
those decisions and most other routine decisions are 
made by the DoD Components on a continuous basis. 
Figure 7-I 
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Although the diagram portrays an 
organisational system with decisions working their 
way downwards, this should not be confused with 
the overall acquisition system when it was 
witnessed that decisional centres shifted 
upwards as the programme was moving into and 
through the hardware phase. Prior to that, 
decisional centres were to be found at lower 
levels, * DoD Components, than at the higher levels, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the 
JCS. However, the shift upwards occurred when 
the survival of the programme was at stake -. in 
other words, when funding was necessary to 
produce the aircraft. Once the funding had 
been realised and the programme was now more 
secure following the efforts of the SECDEF, 
Secretary of State, and the President, a 
Memorandum of Understanding was agreed to 
linking the concerned nations in a co-production 
effort. Once this had happened, the decisional 
centres again shift, but not only in the direction 
which they were once. On the one hand, once the 
political manoeuvring has settled down - the jobs 
of the managers complete - there is a shift 
Downwards as the weapon system enters production 
and deployment. However, on the other hand, for 
the yearly funding required, those with the 
political skills are again called into action 
to secure the funding. Further, issues such 
as sales to third countries, production problems 
with the governments of the EPGs (not production 
problems with, say, General Dynamics and Fokker- 
VFW), Congressional scrutiny over cost overruns, 
and so forth fall within their domain. In 
essence, at this stage of a 'weapon's life, the 
decisional centres are two tiered : one tier 
354 
i 
concerned with the life of the weapon system, 
its performance, scheduling of tests, bettering 
-technology, et al, whilst 
the upper tier is 
concerned with politically sensitive issues, such 
as yearly funding, sales to Iran or Israel, high 
costs. If a value could be assigned to the 
weight or influence of decisions, the following 
diagram, although impressionistic, illustrates 
how the two decisional centres interact with 
one another. 
Figure 7-II 
Activity of DoD Components versus Managers/Politicians 
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Although dates have been supplied concerning the 
F-16 programme as examples, if supposing the 
events of the F/A-18 programme were supplanted, 
perhaps the diagram would appear similar. 
Although the diagram is provided purely as a 
hypothetical attempt to view the overall 
i 
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decisional process, it has been shown otherwise 
that the behaviour and influences of the DoD 
Components is more steady throughout the life of 
a weapon system. It is no wonder then, that 
contractors striving to lessen the uncertainties 
ahead of them, would prefer to do business with 
the Components. Actually, the preference is not 
really theirs, considering that it is the 
organisational process which has created the 
environment for the contractors to work within. 
Some further discussion of the production and 
deployment of the F-16 is necessary, and also a 
brief discussion of some of the foreign sales 
to illustrate the activities of the two 
decisional centres. Before this discussion, a 
most significant point must be suggested. 
If the activity of the DoD Components and the 
managers in the above illustration is proven 
as such, then an examination of decision making,.. 
regarding weapons procurement, must consider 
not only the organisational processes and the 
influence one might exert upon the other, or 
the outside influences and events which may 
result in a change of course, but also where 
the decision is taking place. Furthermore, it 
is necessary to be aware of where, or from which 
decisional centre, the decision is emanating, or 
which of the two is exerting more influence than 
the other, and why, at a certain point in time 
of a weapon system's life. This approach would 
help to divorce some of the political rhetoric 
from the decision. Thus it would be easier to 
ascertain whether a decision was politically 
or militarily motivated,. or a combination of 
both, depending on which centre, and at what 
1 
stage in its life the weapon system is resting. 
For example, the F-X and F-XX studies were more 
militarily oriented than politically; Congress' 
push for commonality of Air Force's and Navy's 
aircraft programme in hearings for FY 1975, and 
the instructions inserted in the Budget for FY 
1975, was more politically motivated than 
militarily, especially with the knowledge that 
the Navy's and Air Force's needs differed in the 
type of aircraft. The decisions to include the 
four European nations were both politically and 
militarily sound, thus, promoting the "two-way 
street" and enhancing the standardisation of 
aircraft in Europe and the US. All of the above 
decisions would have economic consequences, 
whether positive or negative, depending whether 
it is from the viewpoint of the contractor, the 
DoD Components or their managers, the Congress, 
et al. The intentions or consequences would 
differ, in accordance with whose best interest 
was at hand. It is naive and counter-productive 
to decision making, when the decisions are viewed 
with myopia, and theories such as a "conspiracy 
of the military-industrial complex" or "weapons 
simply mean jobs" are applied. Those theories 
are only part of the complete picture, and 
realising that the decisional centres are shifting 
during the development of a weapon system might 
provide a more clear image of the decision making 
process in weapons procurement. 
Production of the F-16 
Regarding the shift on the one tier downwards, 
the agreement on the part of the Europeans was 
finalised on 10 June 1975, after Secretary of 
Defense Schlesinger reached agreement with Defence 
357 
I 
Minister Paul van den Boeynants of Belgium, 
"promising to consider favourably an order for 
$32 million worth of submachine guns from the 
Belgian national arms factory", 
881 
amongst the 
offset pledges. The agreement was in the form 
of a MOU, signed by the governments' respective 
Defence Ministers which detailed offset costs 
and the amounts of aircraft on order at that 
time: 650 for USAF; 348 for Europe - Belgium, 116; 
The Netherlands, 102; Norway, 72; and Denmark, 58. 
There was also agreement that of the 348 European 
aircraft, 184 were to be assembled in the Fokker 
plant at Schiphol, in the Netherlands, and 164, 
by SABCA, at Gosselies in Belgium. 
891 
Preliminary contracts for the F-16 were placed 
in 1975 with European industry. It is impractical 
to detail all of the suppliers in a programme of 
this magnitude, however, the major contractors 
were as follows : (See, Appendix 3 for all 
European Contractors. ) The two aircraft assembly 
lines are set up at Fokker, who produce the 
airframes for the Netherlands and Norway, and at 
SABCA where the Belgian and Danish airframes are 
assembled. At the same time, the Belgian company 
SONACA (formerly Fairey SA) having been 
reconstituted with new management, is contracted 
to build the aft fuselage. 
90] 
Other components 
such as the. wings and centreline pylons are built 
in Denmark by Per Udsen, while the undercarriage 
is built by DAF in the Netherlands, and the wheels 
by RauFoss in Norway. 
911 
European assembly of 
the F100 engine is handled by the Belgian company 
Fabrique Nationale. Xongsberg of Norway builds 
the engine fan drive turbine module, while Phillips 
in Holland is responsible for the augmentor nozzle 
module. 
921 
Contracts for avionics are also widely 
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scattered throughout the four nations : MBLE of 
Belgium has overall responsibility for the APG-66 
radar, while Signaal and Oldelft of the Netherlands 
are responsible for the radar antennae. Also 
involved in the avionics is Kongsberg of Norway 
and the Danish company Ner Lindberg handles the 
inertial navigation system as well as in other 
contributions. 
931 
Indeed, it is a truly 
international effort to produce the European F-16s. 
To fully appreciate the magnitude and complex 
management involved in the task, in 1977 there 
were more than 3,000 suppliers and sub-contractors 
involved in the programme, and under the 998 
planned aircraft production run, some "20,000,000 lbs 
of raw material and three million individual 
manufactured items were due to cross the Atlantic". 
94] 
The programme director, Brigadier General James. 
Abrahamson, described the task he faced as a 
"management nightmare". 
95) 
General Dynamics, the 
prime contractor for airframe design and 
performance, and Pratt and Whitney, the prime 
contractor for the engine, were' responsible for 
entering into these sub-contracts under the 
direction of the European Systems Program office. 
On 28 September 1975, the Air Force (and not the 
Secretary of Defense) announced that the F-16 
European Systems Program Office in Brussels had 
begun operations. "The office will supervise and 
manage the day-to-day operations of the five 
nation portion of the co-production arrangements 
for the aircraft. "961 European personnel from 
the EPGs were integrated into the Brussels office 
and also into the System Program Office at Wright 
Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio. "These offices 
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will be responsible for logistic support, 
planning, production management, certification 
management, and engineering". 
971 
This office 
was responsible for trying to bring the whole 
process together, so that a common hardware would 
be produced by all of the participating nations. 
Before components and aircraft could be built, 
technical standards, procedures and working 
practices had to be agreed jointly. As mentioned 
earlier, cultural and traditional differences 
such as the US worker being more mobile versus 
European companies, delayed the performance of 
the many non-US F-16 contractors. Some of these 
were eventually overcome, however this led to a 
delay, "as well as increasing the cost, of the 
European F-16. Despite such problems and the 
inevitable political haggling over the 
distribution of offset work, the programme began 
to flow smoothly. Sub-contracts were negotiated 
in 1975-77 for European-produced components under 
the co-production agreement. The signing of 
"firm contracts with the four governments was 
delayed in early 1977, when the Danish government 
objected to the allocation of sub-contracts, but 
negotiations were finally concluded in May 
1977.981 
Due to some of the delays and problems, it was 
agreed that-General Dynamics, as prime contractor, 
would assist the EPG co-producers in their initial 
launch by providing parts, sub-assemblies, and 
components, until their parts fabrication could 
sustain their assembly lines. 
99] 
The initial 
plan was for General Dynamics to assemble the 
first two EPG aircraft at their headquarters in 
Fort Worth, Texas, disassemble them, and ship one 
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to SABCA, and one to Fokker. These manufacturers 
would then reassemble them on their production 
lines. However, due to delays in Europe, General 
Dynamics agreed to manufacture almost all the 
parts for "at least the first 11 EPG aircraft and 
ship them to Europe for assembly". 
100] 
The 
procedure was intended to keep the EPG programme 
on schedule until EPG produced parts were 
available. (This additional burden would be paid 
back to General Dynamics by the EPG manufacturers 
later in the programme. ) The European programme 
called for the first European F-16 aircraft to be 
delivered to Belgium in January 1979. Thus, 
whatever the initial extra costs, the programme 
was to remain on schedule. 
Meanwhile, General Dynamics was testing the aircraft 
and its performance at Fort Worth, Texas. The 
Air Force had awarded General Dynamics a full-scale 
development contract on 13 January 1975 to build 
15 (later changed to 8) pre-production F-16s, 
the first of which was rolled out at Fort Worth 
in October 1976, after the design review and 
testing had been completed in July 1976.1011 The 
first flight followed in December 1976. The eight 
aircraft were used for various testing, for example, 
the third full-scale developmental aircraft was 
used for avionics testing. 
At the end of 1976, the US Air Force, and not the 
SECDEF, announced plans to purchase an additional 
738 aircraft bringing the total US purchase to 
1,388.1021 The FY 1978 funding (conducted 1977) 
was to provide $1,695.5 million for the procurement 
of 105 F-16s -a reduction of $165.2 million on 
what was originally requested. 
1031 
The House 
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Armed Services Committee based these reductions 
on the "excessive and unsupported cost growth 
in [the F-16] programme during the year", citing 
a programme cost increase of nearly $1.4 billion, 
and expressed "caution that the Air Force control 
the cost of this aircraft to ensure that it remains 
a capable aircraft that provides the low end 
capability of the 'high-low mix' concept". 
104] 
The problems were apparently catching up with the 
programme, but the announcement of the full 
production plan was near at hand. 
The F-16 DSARC III (Defense Systems Acquisition 
Review Council) briefing was held on 11 October 
1977. (Remember DSARC had not informed Congress 
of the increase in cost in a "timely manner" in 
their SARs. ) On 13 October 1977, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (and not the Secretary of 
Defense) announced "while recognising program 
accomplishments and concerns" approved "F-16 full 
production". 
105) 
It was recognised that the "Air 
Force had a large amount of development and 
operational test and evaluation to be accomplished, 
but that on the whole the program was ready to 
enter full production". 
1061 
The F-16 full-scale 
development test programme was constructed to 
prove that the advanced technology features of 
the prototype F-16 could be incorporated into the 
F-16 at low-risk, and that the F-16 weapons system 
could meet its performance goals and minimise 
acquisition costs. To reduce risks to a point 
where a "realistic production decision could be 
made, DSARC II established test milestones that 
has to be accomplished before the DSARC III 
decision". 1073 In the DSARC III technical 
assessment the Systems Programe Office "concluded 
i 
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that using preliminary flight test data, the F-16 
will meet or exceed all the performance thresholds". 
1081 
However, the Test and Evaluation period "was not 
completed until mid-1980"1091 even though in January 
1979, the first full production aircraft was 
delivered, after the first flight of a full- 
production F-16 in August 1978 at Fort Worth. 
Returning to Europe, by February 1978, the Belgian 
production line had opened followed by the Dutch 
line in April. The first F-16 to arrive in Europe 
arrived at Gosselies, Belgium, on 9 June 1978,1101 
having come from General Dynamics. It was used 
for assembly tests at the SABCA plant. The following 
month, the first European built F-16 components - 
a set of wings - were fitted to a USAF aircraft on 
the Fort Worth line. 
111] 
The two-way flow of 
components across the Atlantic had become a reality. 
Meanwhile, in April of 1978, the General Accounting 
Office published a report which drew attention to 
a number of development problems : structural 
cracks, minor problems with the radar, instability 
at high angles of attack and engine malfunctions 
with the Pratt and Whitney F-100.1121 One of the 
major reasons for the selection of the YF-16 over 
the YF-17 was that it had incorporated an engine 
that was already in production for the F-15, and 
thus, there would be less costs and risks than 
selecting the developmental GE J101 for the YF-17. 
However, in 1978, the "F-100 engine experience 
shows the following engine deficiencies which are 
causing operational effectiveness, safety and 
maintenance problems : 
- Turbine blade failures and non-containment 
of turbine blades in engine; 
I 
- Engine stalls (in mid-air); 
- Engine stagnations; 
- Main fuel pump malfunctions; 
- Ground starting problems; 
- Augmentor malfunctions and durability 
problems. " 
1131 
Indeed, these are serious problems for the F-16, 
especially considering that it is a single-engine 
aircraft. The GAO further stated, "historically, 
twin-engine aircraft have maintained a major 
engine-related safety advantage over single-engine 
aircraft due to the redundance offered by the 
second engine". 
114] 
Even though this was a most 
serious problem, the GAO went on to state that, 
"although the F-16 program is experiencing problems, 
they do not seem to be any more severe than those 
previously experienced in other major systems. 
And, experience with other systems shows that 
these problems are resolved over time. The most 
critical concerns at this time include performance 
of the F-100 engine and the deployment and support 
schedule". 
115] 
To assist the Air Force to solve this problem 
"over time", a total of $39.5 million was funded 
under the FY 1979 procurement budget for the F-100 
Component improvement Program with an additional 
$38.7 million requested for FY 1980.116] The 
funds received, in 1979 the Air Force initiated 
a joint programme with the Navy to develop a new 
fighter aircraft engine which could provide an 
alternative to the F-16's F-100 power plant, if 
re-engining should be necessary. However, a 
documentary by Granada, an independent British 
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television group, was shown in Washington 
(WETA Ch. 26) on 16 March 1979. The one-hour 
documentary outlined various problems of the 
co-production effort and of the F-16's design, 
specifically, the engine. They reported that 
the "rate of loss for the F-16 due to malfunction 
of the single Pratt and Whitney F-100 engine 
is currently estimated by the Air Force to be 
three times higher than that called for". 
117] 
Moreover, on 1 October 1979, a crash occurred 
at Hill AFB, Utah, after a "sudden pitch-up" 
and the pilot ejected safely. The reason for 
the crash was the "fuel center-of-gravity 
problem", which led General Dynamics to reword 
its flight manual to inform pilots that its 
"flight control system does not provide the same 
level of protection for air-to-surface operations 
as it does for air-to-air combat". 
1181 
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It would be expected that Congressional action and 
inquiry would be imperative, however, it was muted 
for two reasons, first, the Air Force already 
appeared to be trying to resolve the problem having 
initiated the F-100 Component Improvement Program. 
Second, it must also be emphasised that General 
Dynamics, with the F-16 contracts, was now the 
"largest Defense Contractor and also one of the best 
protected in Congress -'the company builds its 
fighter planes in Texas [Fort Worth division] 
the home of [Senator] John Tower, who is Chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The F-16 
factory is in the district of House Majority Leader 
Jim Wright". 
1191 Although this would have been an 
additional influence in the selection of the F-16, 
it was of no assistance to Pratt and Whitney. (Note: 
General Electric is in Massachusetts, with names like 
Edward Kennedy and Tip O'Neil, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives. ) 
I 
Eventually, after the GE F101 was designed and 
tested, it was fitted to an F-16, and the 
General Dynamics F-16 fighter, powered by a 
General Electric F101 derivative fighter engine, 
made its first flight at Edwards Air Force Base 
on 19 December 1981.120] Presently, all F-16s 
are scheduled to be equipped with the new GE F101 
engines that will be more reliable than the F-100s. 
A gain for GE, but a loss for Pratt and Whitney. 
However, Pratt and Whitney are presently designing 
and testing an engine replacement for the F/A-18 - 
a complete swapping of contractors in mid-stream. 
What had once been a reason for the choice of 
the F-16 became a nightmare - the F-16 programme 
was vulnerable - after somewhat heightened 
political activity, the problem of the engine 
was resolved by selecting another engine and, 
the dust having settled, the programme continues. 
In fact, in February 1982, the Air Force 
announced another buy of 945 F-16s - the new 
schedule, described by the "Air Force as 'fluid', 
calls for the Air Force to purchase a total of 
2,333 F-16s through fiscal 1991. Previously, 
1,388 F-16s had been planned through 1987". 
121] 
Relating all of this discussion to the point 
made earlier of a two-tiered system of decisional 
centres, it is evident that shifts downwards or 
upwards do occur. Consider that after 
governments had signed the MOU, and a Steering 
Committee was formed, much of the responsibilities 
were upon the prime. contractor and the Air Force 
Components to implement the contracts. The 
European side would differ slightly though, in 
the respect that the majority of the contractors 
(SABCA, Fabrique Nationale) are nationalised 
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industries which might be subject to closer 
control than their US counterparts. Also it was 
the Air Force, and not the Secretary of Defense, 
who arranged for and announced that the F-16 
European Systems Program Office in Brussels was 
operational. Regarding some of the delays 
encountered on the European side, although the 
Congress was made aware of them and the increase 
of costs, from the GAO, it was not Congress or 
the Secretary of Defense who made proper 
arrangements to resolve the problem. It was the 
contractor working with the Air Force to maintain 
its schedule programme who entered into agreements 
with the European contractors to provide parts or 
aircraft until their assembly lines were complete. 
It was also the Air Force who announced an 
increase of orders of 738 aircraft, and again 
later in 1982 an increase of an extra 945. 
Although the Secretary of Defense did not make 
these announcements, he would have been briefed 
all throughout the process to be fully aware of 
all the arguments to increase the numbers, because 
it would be he who would steer that request for 
funding under the scrutiny of Congress. It is 
a wise strategy on the part of the SECDEF, to 
allow a given Service to make such announcements, 
so as to_appear that the experts are the best 
judges as to its needs. In other words, such 
announcements are best to be as apolitical as 
possible. If this was the case, perhaps this 
strategy was applied to the engine problems, which 
could have had disastrous effects on the programme 
had nothing evidently been done by the Air Force 
at the time of Congressional inquiry. Consider 
the following, the Air Force announced the F-100 
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Component Improvement Program, after the GAO 
report in the Sorina of 1978, and having received 
funding for 1979 began to resolve the problem. 
(No inference is heina made that the Air Force 
was not aware of the problem before the GAO 
report - the inference is the Air Force would 
have to work hard and fast to lessen Congressional 
criticism. ) Following the crash, political 
pressures rose, but the Air Force was already in 
the process of solving the problem and the 
political activities that could have weighed 
heavily were muted by doing so, as well as having 
friends in the right places of Congress. 
However, it is not to be envisioned that it is a 
system where, for example, the Air Force is 
continually trying to depoliticise every aspect 
of the programme - it is, in the sense that it 
will strive to stave off criticisms which might 
jeopardise of' set back or even cancel a programme. 
, (In the case of the engine, major problems could 
have arisen for the programme, simply because 
aircraft are dependent upon their engines, more 
so with a single engine aircraft. ) But any Service 
also realises that there are huge benefits from 
the political system as well - the obvious one 
being funding. There are other political 
dimensions at this stage in the programme which 
can enhance the programme itself - foreign sales 
to third countries. Such sales are arranged on 
a government to government basis and are conducted 
by the respective political actors/managers 
responsible because such negotiations fall within 
a political arena, under the auspices of 
Congressional scrutiny. Thus, it is within the 
domain of the accumulated political skills of, 
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the President, the NSC, the Secretaries of Defense 
and State, and the JCS, to conduct such 
negotiations and have them approved by Congress. 
A discussion of the foreign sales will illustrate 
the ups and downs of the political activity found 
during the production and deployment phases (aside 
from yearly cyclical funding required from Congress). 
Foreign Sales to Third Countries 
Whilst the co-production effort was advancing 
somewhat on schedule, the first European assembled 
F-16 flew from Gosselies, Belgium, on 11 December 
1978.122] However, a year and a half before that, 
another aspect in the programme was being 
considered. In August of 1976, the Department of 
Defense agreed to sell Iran 160 F-16s for $3.8 
billion, beginning deliveries in 1980.123] 
However, before discussing the foreign sales of the 
F-16, some general points and issues relating to 
foreign sales must be made. "The United States 
uses foreign military sales to provide military 
assistance to foreign countries". 
124 3 The 
principal objective of foreign military sales, 
established by the Arms Export Control Act of 
30 June 1976, is to : "... facilitate the common 
defense by entering into international arrangements 
with friendly countries which further the objective 
of applying agreed resources of each country to 
programs and projects of co-operative exchange of 
data, research, development, production, procurement 
and logistical support to achieve specific national 
defense requirements and objectives of mutual 
concern". 
1251 
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To this end, the Act authorises the US to sell 
defence articles and services to countries that 
are able to pay to equip their military forces 
without undue burden to their economies, when 
it will "further the security objectives of the 
US and it will be consistent with the objectives 
of the United Nations". 
1261 
Numerous departments and agencies within the 
Executive Branch such as the NSC, Agency for 
International Development, Departments of State, 
Defense, Commerce and Treasury, have various 
responsibilities for foreign military sales. 
However, aside from the President, "who has final 
determination", the principal responsibilities 
established by legislation have been assigned to 
the Secretaries of State and Defense. 
127] 
The 
President has delegated foreign military sales 
to the Secretary of State. He, in turn, has 
delegated it to the Under Secretary for Security 
Assistance. The action has been assigned to the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and its 
operating bodies. 
1. Office of Security Assistance and 
Sales, which assesses political economic 
and legal factors associated with foreign 
sales. 
2. Office of Munitions Control, which 
regulates commercial exports of arms, 
and related technical data. 
The Under Secretary for Security Assistance also 
chairs the Security Assistance Program Review 
Committee, which resolves the major policy issues 
and formulates security assistance programmes by 
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country. The Committee includes representatives 
from DoD; Office of Management and Budget; 
National Security Council; and Departments of the 
Treasury, Commerce and Labor. 
1281 
Although overall responsibility for foreign 
military sales is vested with the Secretary of 
State, the offices of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (International Security Affairs ISA); 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Security Assistance); 
and the Defense Security Assistance Agency are the 
major action offices within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. These are the major actors 
in the DoD concerned with foreign sales, and as 
in weapons procurement, authority has been 
delegated downwards to other departments in the 
DoD as well as the Department of, State. Within 
the DoD, the step by step management of foreign 
military sales is co-ordinated through the 
procurement and logistic offices at the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense level and their 
counterparts in the individual service headquarters 
and their subordinate commands. The purpose of 
these last few pages is not to describe the 
overall process of foreign sales. It is to 
demonstrate that, in general, in weapons 
procurement even a specific function like foreign 
sales, requires the same compartmentalisation 
and specialisation. Further, it demonstrates 
the complexity of decisions and the delegation 
of authority downwards, and as in the case of 
a foreign sale within the State Department, the 
decisional centres perhaps also shift within that 
Department. 
i 
Foreign military sales have grown from $952.6 
million in 1970129] to $21.07 billion in 1982.130] 
Although according to the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, the US controls almost one- 
half of the world arms market, there is competition 
between major industrial powers, which creates 
somewhat of a buyer's market. For example, if one 
nation will not sell, there are others waiting in 
the wings with comparable arms who will. One 
market advantage for the US is the "high technology 
embodied in its arms and the demonstrated 
capability to provide support. However, other 
nations, such as the Soviet Union, West Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, are striving to 
close these technological and support gaps". 
131) 
Although there are economic and technological 
considerations in arms sales transfers, "the 
ultimate decision on any arms transfer proposal 
is necessarily political in nature. Those who 
make the final judgments must ask themselves ... 
[if the sales] will produce a commensurate 
advance in American national well-being". 
132] 
As Henry Kissinger pointed out, "those in 
authority must also weigh the effects of 
denial ... moreover, arms transfers - like the 
other exercises in international relations - 
cannot be viewed in isolation". 
1331 
The 
decision to order a particular weapon system 
is "a complex choice involving the interaction 
of economic and political considerations as well 
as purely national security interests". 
1341 
Regarding the political nature of foreign arms 
sales, at-the time decisions were being made to 
choose the YF-16 over the YF-17, Congress was 
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increasing its role through legislation. Before 
1975, Congressional approval was required for 
the annual military aid proposals, however, until 
1975, not only did Congress not vote on the 
Foreign Military Sales Program, but it was not 
even officially notified of such transactions. 
D ring the 1950s and 1960s, Congress usually 
approved military aid programmes which the 
Executive Branch recommended. In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, "largely in response to the 
Executive Branch's conduct in the Indochina War, 
many Members of Congress began to take a more 
active interest in the foreign policy implications 
of US arms transfers". 
1351 
In 1975, Congress took 
the first steps to gain some control. It passed 
legislation requiring the Department of Defense 
to inform Congress of all foreign military sales 
transactions over $25 million. Congress could 
then veto these sales if both Houses voted to do 
so within 30 calendar days. Congress further 
expanded its control in 1976. It proposed and 
voted in legislation that would have placed a 
$9 billion ceiling on all US arms sales abroad, 
commercial and government-to-government combined. 
President Ford vetoed this legislation and 
Congress reached a conproinise by-extending 
its veto power over each proposed foreign sale 
of $7 million for major weapon systems. 
1361 
As opposed to the government agreements for 
co-production, foreign sales are not solely 
conducted by government-to-government. "When 
a foreign government spends its funds [on a 
weapon system], it is arguable that it should be' 
allowed to choose its contractors by any method 
it chooses". 
137) 
US corporations actively 
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promote sales of American weapon systems and 
services abroad through their use of sales 
agents, commissions and tours of their weapon 
systems through foreign countries. "US 
co-production, licensing and offset agreements 
and sales add a complicated dimension to American 
arms transfers, practice and policy". 
1381 
Although contracts vary from one to the other, 
agreements usually permit the manufacture of US 
arms in foreign countries. In other words, they 
permit the export of military technology along 
with the weapon system itself, or, there may be 
an agreement for a direct sale of a US system 
to a foreign buyer. 
The Iranian order was the first major sales 
arrangement for the F-16.139] The order can be 
traced back as far as 1972, when "President 
Richard M Nixon and Henry Kissinger promised Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, during a May 1972 visit 
to Tehran, that he could buy virtually anything". 
140] 
This created confusion later for the Iranians, 
for they had thought they had received blanket 
authorisation for future purchases. This issue 
surfaced on 10 September 1976, when Lt. General 
Howard Fisk told the Senate Sub-Committee on 
Multinational Corporations, that Iran had been 
told that its interests in acquiring a total of 
300 of the F-16s was under study. 
141] 
According 
to the Sub-Committee Staff, a letter from General 
Dynamics, dated 13 August 1976, was delivered to 
General Hassan Toufanian, Chief of the Iranian 
military procurement, which--quoted a price of 
$2.1 billion for 300 of the planes and some. 
spare parts. 
1421 
This caused some irritation 
and confusion to the Iranians because the price 
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quoted by the US Government for 160 aircraft was 
$3.8 billion - nearly half the number for twice 
the price. Needless to say, General Dynamics 
had no comment, but Lt. Gen. Fisk pointed out 
that the "General Dynamics figure did not take 
into account anticipated inflation over the 
years of any such contract, nor did it include 
the years worth of spare parts and training", 
143) 
Some US officials as well as Iranians felt that 
the company had deliberately tried to bid low on 
the order, hoping to raise the price later. 
144] 
Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee 
on Foreign Assistance, another sub-committee 
reviewing the Ford administration's plan to 
approve the sale of 160 F-16s to Iran, was 
expressing concern that 1,000 additional American 
civilians would be assigned to Iran in the 1980s, 
for long term support of the F-16s. Under 
Secretary of State, Philip Habib, told the 
Sub-Committee, "We agree with the Shah's recent 
comment that if Iran should become involved in 
hostilities, the Americans in Iran would be 
completely free not to become involved". 
145) 
Habib urged the Sub-Committee (headed by Hubert 
Humphrey) to approve the F-16 sale to Iran on 
grounds of US national interest. Habib called 
Iran, "a major ally both able and willing to 
stand on its own two feet, pay its own way and use 
its influence in a highly responsible manner". 
1461 
Also testifying was Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robert Ellsworth who said that the sale of 160 
F-16s would serve as a "center of strength and 
stability in the area; withstanding Soviet 
designs in the region which are carried out 
directly or through surrogates; and joining 
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with Saudi Arabia in providing a strong defense 
for the Persian Gulf area". 
147) 
And, further, 
Robert Ellsworth told the Sub-Committee that "the 
sale should have a favourable impact on the USAF 
program since the purchase of these F-16 aircraft 
by the Government of Iran should reduce our unit 
cost per aircraft ... ". 
148] Also in September, Iran 
announced its interest in buying 250 land based 
F-18s, (to complement its order of 300 F-16s - 
the US Government was still only considering 160 
F-16s), which were still being developed by Northrop. 
However, in June 1977, the Carter Administration 
disapproved Iran's pending F-18 request, on the 
grounds that arms sales policy prohibits the foreign 
sale of advance weapons "until they are operationally 
deployed with US forces". 
1491 
The August 1976 approval by the DoD to sell Iran 
160 F-16s made its way through Congress without 
change to the programme. The only change in the 
programme came in February 1977, when the Air Force 
decided to push back the delivery date of the first 
F-16 from March 1979 to January 1980, partly because 
some of the European delays, and also US Air Force 
planners argued that the accelerated delivery would 
introduce very high risks to the programme and 
could adversely affect the co-production programme 
involving the United States and the four participating 
European Governments. 1501 Also, after the turndown 
of the F-18 order, Iran increased its order to a 
total of 460 F-16s. 
ýý 
i 
However, in May 1977, another political dimension 
entered the controversy of the sale of F-16s to 
Iran - one which the Administration may have 
brought on itself. Growing out of a series of 
campaign promises, President Carter outlined a 
policy on 19 May 1977 to curb the sales of 
weapons abroad. Mr Carter announced that overseas 
arms sales would henceforth "be considered as an 
exceptional tool of foreign policy subject to 
very specific controls and Justified only by 
national security needs". 
151] 
By September 1977, 
Carter's credibility was being challenaed over 
the proposed sale - critics in both the House 
and the Senate compiled statistics showing that 
the Administration had already approved 45 
foreign arms and services transactions totalling 
more than $4.1 billion in the four months 
following the May proclamation. 
1521 
Prior to President Carter's policy, the Israelis 
submitted a formal request to buy 250 F-16s and 
the order. A State Department spokesman, Robert 
Funseth, confirmed that the US had received the 
request, and the Ford administration was 
seriously considering it "specifically concerning 
how many planes would be provided and when". 
153] 
On 22 February 1979, the Department of Defense 
notified the Congress that "75 F-16s would be 
sold to Israel for $1.5 billion in estimated 
value if the Administration's plan to sell F-5s 
to Egypt and F-15s to Saudi Arabia and Israel 
is not blocked by Congress . 
154) 
An effort to 
defeat the plan was rejected in the Senate by 
a vote of 54 to 44 on 15 May 1978.155] 
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Momentarily backtracking to Iran, the first 55 
F-16s of the 160 were on firm order, and being 
produced when the Shah of Iran was toppled and 
replaced by the transitional Bakhtiar Government. 
In February 1979, the Bakhtiar Government 
cancelled an order of $7 billion worth of US 
military equipment. Included in the list was 
the entire lot of 160 F-16s. 
1561 
Immediately, 
the Administration had to alleviate any burden 
to General Dynamics and other contractors, and 
requested in a supplemental defense budget for 
FY 1979 nearly $2.2 billion to absorb (for the 
Pentagon's use) the Iranian orders - $765 million 
of that for the F-16s. 
1571 The US takeover of 
the 55 F-16s, not yet built, would allow Israel 
to take early delivery of its 75 F-16s out of 
the production run that had been allocated to Iran. 
Moreover, the Department of Defense estimated that 
the cancellation of the Iranian order might increase 
the cost of the US Air Force's F-16 programme by 
about $245 million, and that of NATO's programme 
by $45 million. 
1581 On 22 February 1979, Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown notified Congress that 75 
F-16s would be sold to Israel for $1.5 billion as 
part of the package deal mentioned above. Israel's 
first F-16s were to be delivered in late 1981, but 
in connection with the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
settlement of 26 March 1979, the delivery date 
was advanced to early 1980, when the first planes 
originally built for Iran were available. The 
first Israeli F-16 was delivered on 31 January 
1980, and over 50 of the 75 were already 
delivered by the date the Israelis should have 
received their first. 
159] 
They also had this 
i 
inventory of 50 F-16s when eight were used in an 
attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor near Baghdad on 
7 June 1981. The F-16 had performed well, and 
the Israelis (and the USAF), pleased with its 
evaluation, requested another purchase. On 27 
May 1982, the White House announced the sale of 
another 75 F-16s to Israel to begin delivery in 
1985 which encountered little opposition from 
Congress. The submission to Congress had been 
timed to appeal Israel (Reagan would be meeting 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin in June) in the 
hope that notice of the new sale would tone down 
the Israeli anger at the US for considering the 
sale of F-16s to Jordan. 
1601 
Ironically, Reagan 
would be meeting Begin in New York at a special 
United Nations session on disarmament. 
161] 
Earlier in 1982, the Administration was also 
considering selling 18 to 24 F-16s to Jordan. 
Proponents of the F-16 sale claimed it was the 
only fighter which could perform against the 
Soviet MiG-23s flown by Syria. However, opponents 
pointed out Israel's fears that such weapons 
could challenge Israeli dominance of Middle East 
airspace. 
1621 
In the end, a Concurrent Resolution 
was passed disapproving the sale of the F-16 
aircraft and mobile missile launchers to Jordan. 
The Resolution stated : "Resolved by the 
Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
that the Congress objects to the sale to the 
Kingdom of Jordan any of the following defense 
articles, together with any associated spare 
parts and equipment and related services : 
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(1) F-16 aircraft; and 
1 (2) mobile anti-aircraft missile launchers. p63] 
I 
I 
In March 1982, the Department of Defense notified 
Congress of the sale of F-16s to Egypt. Two 
years earlier, on 22 February 1980, Egypt, 
partly as a gesture of the Camp David peace 
accord between Israel and Egypt, and because of 
a "sharp turn in US policy in reaction to events 
in Iran [holding of hostages - day 112] 
1641 
and 
Afghanistan"165, was the beneficiary of a 
$1 billion request by the Carter administration 
in military credits. This cleared the way for 
Egypt to acquire the F-16. The March 1982 
announcement by the Department of Defense, 
notified Congress of its intent to sell Egypt 
40 F-16s. Lt. General James Ahmann, Director 
of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, (they 
were not involved in getting Europe to select 
the US ACF), said that, "Egypt will receive its 
first F-16s this month and the remaining 34 by 
mid-1984". 
1661 
The agency handles US arms sales 
to other nations. Notice should be taken that 
six aircraft would be delivered within days of 
the announcement - the F-16 was at full 
production - "sources indicate that General 
Dynamics' Fort Worth production line [in itself] 
is capable of handling a rate of up to 45 
aircraft per month". 
1671 
Other nations which considered and ordered the 
F-16 in 1981 were South Korea (36), Pakistan (40) 
and Venezuela (24). 
168] 
The Administration 
sought for, and received, approval from Congress 
to advance the sales, and either the aircraft 
have been delivered or are in the process of 
being delivered at this time (Korea started 
to receive in February 1986). And, there were 
other nations who considered the F-16 for 
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purchase but ultimately, the F-16 lost out to the 
Navy's F/A-18. The Canadian government decided 
on 10 April 1980 to buy 137 of the latter twin- 
engine fighter/attack aircraft, after a five 
year competition. 
1691 The Royal Australian Air 
Force also selected the F/A-18 over the F-16 in 
October 1981 for a buy of 75 aircraft; and in 
July 1982, the Spanish Government agreed to 
purchase 84 F/A-18s. 
1701 
SUMMARY 
The decisional centres appear to shift upwards 
during foreign sales, but why this happens is more 
important than a description as to whom was involved. 
Assuming that arms transfers serve national political 
aims, whether US or foreign, permits the argument to 
be suggested that, inherently arms transfers are 
political and "they must be subject to political 
control, ie ultimate sanction by policy makers, whose 
final decisions are responsive to sound policy 
arguments". 
171] 
Thus, those at the top are responsible 
because the "ultimate sanction by policy makers" is 
required. The suggestion here is for three reasons 
- They are conducted for the most part on a 
government-to-government basis; and, if 
not, on-a foreign government to contractor 
basis. 
- The initiating of a foreign sale begins at 
the top. 
- Because of the organisational process where 
Congress has legislated itself into the 
organisation to review such requests, the 
political activity is heightened and the 
managers/politicians of DoD are called upon 
to exercise their skills. 
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Perhaps the greatest difference to weapons procurement 
in general is that foreign sales, for the most part, 
are conducted between the US government and a foreign 
government. The reasons why foreign nations (and 
international organisations) prefer to deal with the 
US government instead of directly with commercial 
sources are : 
- Foreign procurements receive the increased 
protection of the US procurement regulations. 
- Foreign nations are assured that the items 
supplied will meet standard US government 
configurations. 
- Many foreign nations are inexperienced in 
procurement procedures but have had long- 
standing diplomatic experience. 
Thus, the greatest difference (to weapons procurement) 
specifically is the origin of a sale. Whatever the 
decisional organisations of a foreign country, it can 
be safely assumed that, for the most part, someone in 
top management of that country (Shah of Iran, Hussein 
of Jordan) requests a buy, if not directly through the 
contractors, then through an equally high component in 
the US government. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing discussion, it should be 
apparent that no single conceptual approach or 
model suffices in the study of decision-making 
found within the environment of US armaments 
Procurement. As witnessed, there are too many 
different variables and influences operative 
from within the organisational decisional centres 
as well as upon them. Moreover, the importance 
of these respective decisional centres are in a 
state of flux, which permit decisions to be the 
resultant of an individual or group advocating 
the decision not based or dependent upon his/their 
position of authority. Also these decisions can 
be affected by variations in'-organisational, 
bureaucratic, or personal factors, and by 
structural influences, (legal or extra-legal, ) and 
by manufacturers' associations, -program managers 
in DoD, and so forth, all of which are interacting 
at different stages of the development of a weapon 
system. 
Moreover, the entire process becomes more complex 
when accounting for the shifting between various 
decisional centres. The determination of the influence 
of decisions from those in authority is further 
complicated following the review of organisational/ 
structural roles. Those at the top tend to be 
managers, chosen for their managerial and political 
skills. Obviously, given the size of the 
organisations within the defence establishment, it 
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is virtually impossible for those in authority to 
be cognisant of, and be able to comprehend, every 
weapon system at each and every stage. It is not 
the purpose of this exercise to prove that point. 
The focus is that the decisional centres within 
the defence establishment shift and the actual 
shifting which occurs can act as an influencing 
factor it itself. This is further exacerbated by 
the structure of the organisational processes which 
promote this notion, for example, Fiscal Cycle 
Overlap, Five Year Defense Plans, the diversification 
of Congressional Committees (all having some form of 
jurisdiction), Selected Acquisition Reports, DoD 
Components, assistance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and so forth. Given this, it is seriously misleading 
to apply one conceptual model to the'whole of the 
decision making process. 
Throughout the life of a weapons system the constant 
which exists within this overlapping of jurisdictions 
is found within the levels of the DoD Components. 
But, what becomes apparent is that those at the top 
possess a great deal of"influence when their managerial 
and political skills are called upon at various stages 
of the weapon systems development. For example, 
consider the roles of Congress and the Secretaries 
of Defense and State during the sales of the F-16 
to foreign countries.. However, it should not be 
perceived that once a specific role (e. g. foreign 
sale) is completed, that their influence diminishes 
quickly regarding a specific weapon system. They may 
be actively involved in other decisions regarding 
other systems which complement that system in the 
force structure. Decisions on other systems may have a 
negative or positive impact on decisions already made or soon 
385 
to be made on another given system. Consider the 
outcomes of the sale of the F-16s to Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan (negative) and Iran (at first 
positive, later negative). 
Although there are a countless number of scenarios 
to be pursued in the development of a given system, 
the point is that the decision making involved is 
a continuous . pher ýi i on over the vagaries of 
time. 
Moreover, those at the top may also exert some 
influence. during the earlier stages of the development 
of a weapon system. For example, Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara and his policy of cost 
effectiveness, which set the parameters 
which perhaps influenced his decision to push for 
the commonality of aircraft, both for the Navy and 
the Air Force. Congress also exerted pressures by 
informing the Navy that funds would be frozen 
until they had chosen a derivative of the Air Force's 
choice of a Light Weight Fighter (LTV working with 
General Dynamics on Navy version of F-16). However, 
today, the outcome of these influences are arguably 
negative in that there is still no common aircraft 
in the inventories of the Air Force and the Navy. 
Why? 
The conjecture herein is that the DoD Components, 
although they are looselX defined in themselves, 
are the constant found in the development of a weapon 
system. Due, to the organisational structure and 
the decentralisation. of decision making within the 
defence establishment, it was the, DoD Components 
exerting pressures from- below,, 'which placed 
constraiTitss on the. 'Latitudes available to those 
, at the top. Regarding the coinnona, lity isstie., - 
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this was most pronounced by the interservice 
rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy, in 
which the Navy managed to convince the Congress 
that the Navy should choose its own aircraft - 
the F/A-18. Also, as demonstrated in the discussion 
of the Fiscal and Life Cycles, it was these DoD 
Components, who whilst enjoying a close working 
relationship with contractors were consistently 
preparing, outlining, and arranging the necessary 
documentation and evidence required by the decisional 
processes. Especially pronounced in the earlier 
stages of weapons development, this substantiated 
the point that decisions tend to radiate upwards 
'hich. permitted the DoD Components to exert a 
-greater input in the decision than those in authority. 
For example, the research of new avionics and 
engineering testing was conducted at the lower 
levels and influenced greatly by the "Fighter Mafia". 
The behaviour'of the DoD Components exhibited;. 
traits of Graham Allison's organisational and 
bureaucratic politics models. For example, within 
the organisation of the Navy, and given its esprit 
de corps, how it reacted, and the outcomes produced, 
could have been an organisational output. Also, the 
interservice rivalry between the Air Force and the 
Navy, on this issue, or the rivalry and arguments between 
the Navy and the Congress could be indicative of the 
bureaucratic politics model. Allison's Model II 
based on Governmental action as organisational 
output from standard operating procedures, clashed 
with his other Model III, known as Government or 
Bureaucratic Politics Model based on government 
action as a political resultant. The suggestion 
herein, however, is an approach that government 
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action as a political resultant may also act as an 
input to government action as organisational output. 
In other words., aside from Model II influencing 
Model III, the opposite applies and this substantiates 
the view that Allison himself subsequently developed. 
Consider the discussion of the Air Force shortening 
the trials of the YF-16 to fit within the timetable 
of events concerning the European choice for a new 
fighter aircraft. 
Moreover, considerations of rationality at times 
influenced both Models II and III. For example, 
decision making can be very rational (without 
organisational pressures) considering the influences 
exerted by Col. John Boyd or Pierre Sprey (who 
worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Systems Analysis (OASD/SA)) in their 
theories regarding aircraft design and their choices 
of engine, radar and avionics. Or the choices 
could be argued to have been an organisational 
output in the case that the OASD/SA prepared the 
Systems Concept Paper which became part of the 
Defense Guidance (DG). The DG is a basic element 
of the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) which in itself follows the standard 
operating procedures seen within the Fiscal Cycle. 
Or, it could have been the bureaucratic pressures 
exerted on that organisation (OASD/SA) by another 
organisation (Congress) who asked for his support 
for the protection and maintenance of that 
organisation's decisions. Endless arguments could 
be provided to support any of the above, and in a 
sense an attempt to differentiate between them is 
subjective. All three paradigms are useful as 
long as a specific decision is viewed along all 
I 
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three lines. and the paradigms are viewed as 
complementary rather than alternatives. 
However, what is limiting in the application of 
these models, and other models (Incrementalism, 
sequential decisions, Groupthink, etc. ) is that 
they are not comprehensive enough to encompass 
the shifting that occurs within the decisional 
centres. The decision making of weapons procurement 
is an ongoing phenomenon whereby decisions should 
not be judged in isolation by perceptual frameworks. 
For instance, new technologies are constantly 
emerging which may change or redefine the 
requirements of a given service (for example, 
Cheyenne Helicopter), even at the stage of deployment. 
And, following Operational Suitability Testing, a 
system's requirements are continually amended to fit 
into the overall force structure. 
Decision making for the acquisition of weapons in 
this regard may exhibit some of the traits of 
Charles Lindblom's model of Incrementalism. 
Decision making as a never ending sequence of 
compromises has its place in policymaking, but the 
inference is that drastic changes are avoided, or 
that the importance of rational decisions is diminished 
due to the pressures exerted by the organisation. This 
has been shown otherwise when considering the demands 
of new avionics and the technological advances to 
support such avionics in the decisions to procure 
the F-16. Perhaps the relevance of the incremental 
model to the decisions of weapons procurement lies 
in the nature of its environment, namely that the 
decisions follow a sequential pattern in the Planning, 
Programming,. and Budgetary System. 
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For US military products there are the demands für 
technologically advanced systems which may require 
or result in large programmes. in addition, Charles 
Lindblom's theory of Incrementalism advocates the 
notion of "muddling through" whereby decision making 
should be viewed as a slow evolution of policies 
by cautious incremental changes. Thus, this 
perspective would. incorporate trappings of satisficing 
which have been demonstrated not to be the case by 
examples of the "Fighter Mafia" pushing for new 
technologies in avionics, and not willing to compromise 
in their opinions for the designs of the F-X programme. 
Returning to Graham Allison for a moment, this example 
substantiates the idea that Pierre Sprey could have 
used ttii-minfluence of his office (OASD/SA) to make 
sure compromises (inn avionics for YF-16) would be 
kept to a minimum. 
The decisions of weapons procurement could strictly 
be defined as incremental over a period of time 
but the use of this perceptual framework in the 
sense of muddling through distorts many relationships 
exhibited throughout the thesis. For example, the 
relationships of the DoD with the contractors would 
have to be seen as'each trying to strive for consensus 
with one another during the stages of the development 
of a system. For the most part defence contractors 
enjoy a close working relationship with DoD Components 
to research new technologies and match these with a 
Service's requirements. Also the DoD Components 
maintain this partnership with the contractors 
throughout the entire life of a system, as demonstrated 
by the repeated testing and evaluation performed on 
the systems. However, consensus. failed to-play a 
390 
role when Ling Temco Vought lodged an inquiry 
within the General Accounting Office. This was to 
pressure the Navy, who it had been working with 
to accept its (LTV) designs of the General Dynamics 
derivative of the F-16 to meet the Congressional 
demands for commonality. 
This not only demonstrated the upheavals and drastic 
changes within the progression of events, but also 
showed the relative weakness of Congress. Despite 
the various roles which Congress apparently plays throughout 
the defence planning process, its principal 
weakness is that it does not participate directly 
in that process. As a resource allocator and critic 
of defence procurement, and with A. multiplicity 
of decisional centres within it (Committee system, Ad 
Hoc groups, etc. ). Congress perhaps best approximates 
the notion of incremental decision making. However, 
the outside organisations or consumers have various 
means to obtain what they want. An interesting 
mechanism by which to accomplish this is to 
subcontract for components in as many states as 
possible, as was seen in the cases of the F-16 
and F/A-18. Although. more structured, another 
example is the budgetary process itself, whereby 
DoD Components are able to constantly trade off 
within the environment of three consecutive budgetary 
processes, all of which are operative simultaneously. 
Further, as consumers, the DoD Components, who define 
the requirements inherently possess the expertise 
which has a function in Congressional deliberations. 
Congressional technical competence is reflected in 
that many congressmen may feel that they are expert 
on most, ýdomestic issues (for public consumption). 
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However, regarding defence issues, they depend 
on the "experts" in uniform. This not only means 
that the SECDEF-or the Joint Chiefs of Staff appear 
before Congress,!, btxt also that the DoD Components testify 
continuously. Beyond them, other related interest 
groups and contractors spend billions dfildbllars 
each year to expound on their expertise on defence 
related issues. It can, therefore, be seen how conflicts 
in Congress are resolved more often than not by 
political pressure, not by a rational presentation 
of the issues. Regarding the commonality issue and 
considering the pressures imposed by the Navy, Air 
Force, individuals, other DoD Components, SECDEF, 
JCS, contractors. --. and so forth, it is arguable that 
'consensus in Congress was attained from influences 
from below and those at the top. 
Furthermore, although the thesis highlighted a 
majority of the organisational and decisional centres, 
there are an endless number of subgroups within the 
defence establishment, Executive Agencies regulations, 
Public Laws, Manufacturing Associations lobbying for 
contractors and so forth,, -all of whom'exert influence at 
various stages and throughout the development of a 
weapon system. The same applies for the case study 
of the F-l61where other subgroups, etc. were-alto active. 
The exhaustive and detailed aecouht of all'such elements 
would*have-resnited''in'either an extensive Government 
manual or a 'historical 'account of 'the . F-l6 . Thus 
the reality-of decision.: making'is`even'more complex 
than written herein. However, what. emerges is that 
theorists of'decision'makina should move away from 
Simple conceptual approaches. 
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Early on the thesis criticized Graham Allison 
because his leaders are never clearly defined as 
to whether they are politicians, political appointees 
or civil servants. "Herein, this thesis may be 
subject to the same criticism in that DoD Components 
are never clearly defined. DoD Components were 
referred to as professional bureaucrats, civilian 
as well as military, working at the DoD/Pentagon. 
The label of DoD Components. does not include the 
political appointees to the DoD, for example, the 
SECDEF, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and so forth 
(see, footnote 63 of Chapter 2). The criticism may 
be that it is a case of political appointees versus 
the professional bureaucrats or Services. However, 
it is not that clear cut since the arguments provided 
in this thesis are still solvent when momentarily 
treating one chosen for his managerial and political 
skills as a DoD Component. Take for example, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, a political 
appointee who also was a. strong advocate of the 
Light Weight Fighter Programme. As witnessed he 
was instrumental in lobbying Congress, et al, for 
the support of that programme -a managerial role. 
But it is arguable that he would exhibit the role 
of a DoD Component in his relationship with the 
SECDEF as Chairman of the Defense Resources Board. 
However, other DoD Components below him would have 
been instrumental in shaping and perpetuating his 
advocacy of the programme. An example was the 
Office of the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR & E) (Dr. John Foster) which was 
the Acquisition Executive for the Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) and whose office 
(DDR & E) also prepared the Decision Coordinating 
Paper which ultimately became the basis for the 
PPBS. Also the Decision Coordinating Paper is the 
contract between the SECDEF and a given Service. 
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Or another office which influenced David Packard 
was the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Systems Analyses (Pierre Sprey) which 
produced the Systems Concept Paper. 
Although the line of demarcation between DoD 
Components and managers is artificial, decision 
making in the US defence establishment tends to 
radiate upwards. Weapons procurement is inherently 
a heterogeneous activity which may, in itself be 
a causal factor for decisions to be made in this 
fashion. As witnessed, that activity varies 
considerably over many dimensions, some not even 
mentioned herein (for example, the top secret 
"Black Budget" which Congress approves each year 
without knowing wh t it is even approving - in FY 
1988, $24 billion)Y. Nevertheless, it is the 
hope that the theme of this thesis expresses the 
reality of the decision making process in weapons 
procurement unhindered by the handicap of applying 
simplistic conceptual models. 
1 '"Cost of Stealth Bonters 'Soars to $4'50 million 
Each", Washington Post, 21 May, 1988, pp. A-1. 
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(c) DoD Directive 5000.30, "Defense Acquisition 
Executive, " August 20,1976 (hereby canceled) 
(d) through (g), see enclosure 3 
A. R: ISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 
This Directive reissues reference (a), cancels references (b) 
and (c), and updates the statement of acquisition policy for major 
systems within the Department of Defense. This Directive also im- 
plements the concepts and provisions of Office of Management and 
Budget (0MB) Circular A-109 (enclosure 2). 
B. APPLICABILITY 
The. provisions of this Directive apply to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Organi- 
zation of"the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the Defense Agen- 
cies. As used in this Directive, the term "DoD Components" refers 
to the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
Each DoD official who has direct or indirect responsibility for 
the acquisition process shall be guided by the objectives of OMB 
Circular A-109 (enclosure 2) and shall make every effort to: 
1. Ensure that an effective and efficient acquisition strategy 
is developed and tailored for each system acouisition program. 
2. Minimize the time from need identification to introduction 
of each system-into operational use, including minimizing time gaps 
between program phases. 
3. Achieve the most cost-effective balance between acquisition 
and ownership costs and system effectiveness. 
4'. Correlate individual. program decfsioas with the Planning, 
Programing, and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
S. haxitite collaboration with United States allies. 
6. Integrate support, manpower, and related concerns into the 
acquisition process. 
D. POLICY +: ` 
1. Generil. The provisions of this'Directive and OMB Circular 
A-109 (enclosure ; )'apply to the acquisition of -major systems within 
the Department of Defense. The principles in this Directive should 
also be applied, where appropriate, -to the acquisition of systems not 
designated as major. Responsibility for the management of system 
acquisition programs shall be decentralized to DoD Components except 
for the decisions retained by the Secretary of Defense. 
2. Specific 
a. Analysis of Mission Areas. As part of the routine planning 
for accomplishment of assigned missions, DoD Components shall conduct 
continuing analyses of their mission areas to identify deficiencies in 
capability or more effective means of performing assigned tasks. During 
these ongoing analyses, a deficiency or opportunity may be identified that 
could lead to initiation of a major system acquisition program. 
b. Alternatives to New System Development. A system acquisi- 
tion may result from an identified deficiency in an existing system, a 
decision to establish new capabilities in response to a technologically 
feasible opportunity, a significant opportunity to reduce the DoD cost of 
ownership, or in response to a new emphasis in defense. Development of 
a new system may be undertaken after assessment of alternative system cou- 
cepts including: 
(1) Change in United States or North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) tactical or strategic doctrine. 
{2) Use of existing military or commercial systems. 
(3) Hodification or product improvement of existing 
systems. 
c. Designation of Major Systems. The Secretary of Defense shall 
designate those systems -to 
be managed as major systems. Normally, this 
shall be done at the time the Mission Element Need Statement (11, ENS) is 
approved by the Secretary of Defense. In addition to the criteria set 
forth in 0MB Circular A-109 (enclosure 2), the decision to designate any 
system as major may be based upon: * 
(1) Development risk, urgency of need, or other items of 
iaterest to the Secretary of Defense. 
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(2) Joint acquisition of a system by the Department of 
Defense and representatives of another motion or by two or more DoD 
Components. 
(3) The estimated requirement for the system's research, 
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), and procurement finds. 
(4) The estimated requirement for manpower to operate, 
maintain and support the system in the field. 
(5) Congressional interest. 
d. Affordability. Affordability shall be considered at every 
milestone. At Milestone 0, the order of magnitude of resources the DoD 
Component is willing to commit and the relative priority of the program 
to satisfy the need identified will be reconciled with overall capabilities, 
priorities, and resources. A program normally shall not proceed into Con- 
cept Exploration unless sufficient resources are or can be programed for 
Phase 0. Approval to proceed into the Demonstration and Validation phase 
shall be dependent on DoD Component assurance that it plans to acquire and 
operate the system and that sufficient RDT&E resources are available or 
can be programed to complete development. Approval to proceed into 
the Full-Scale Development phase shall be dependent on DoD Component 
assurance that resources are available or can be programed to complete' 
development and acquisition and to operate and support the deployed 
system in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. This 
assurance will be reaffirmed by teo component prior to receiving 
approval to proceed into the Production and Deployment phase. Afford- 
ability, a function of cost, priority, and availability of fiscal and 
manpower resources, shall be established and reviewed in the context 
of the'PPBS process. Specific facets of affordability to be reviewed 
at milestone decision points are set forth in DoD Instruction $000.2 
(reference (d)). 
e. Acquisition Time. A primary objective of management 
shall be to minimize the time it takes to acquire materiel and 
facilities to satisfy military needs. Particular emphasis shall be 
placed on minimizing the time from a commitment to acquire an operable 
and supportable system to deploying it with the operating force. Com- 
mensurate with risk, such approaches as developing separate alternatives 
in high-risk areas, experimental prototypings of critical components, 
combining phases, or omitting phases should be explored. In those cases 
where combining or omitting phases are appropriate, authority shall be 
requested from the Secretary of Defense. 
f. Tailoring. OSD and DoD Components shall exercise judgment 
and flexibility to encourage maximum tailoring in the acquisition pro- 
cess, as described in OHB Circular A-109 (enclosure 2),. this Directive, 
and DoD Instruction 5000.2 (reference (d)), while stimulating a competi- 
tive environment. Tailoring of the acquisition process shall be docu- . 
mented in the t ZENS or the Decision Coordinating Paper. Approval of such 
to:; o: ing shall be included in the Secretary of Defense Decision Hemorandur. 
3 
t. Standardization and Inte: operabilitýº 
(1) Equipment procured for the use of personnel of the 
Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of 
the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or at least be-interoper- 
able with equipment of other members of NATO. Accordingly, NATO ration- 
alization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) shall -be basic 
considerations in acquisition of systems having a partial or total 
application to Europe. Refer to DoD Directive 2010.6 (reference (e)). 
(2) Acquisition of equipment satisfying DoD Component 
Deeds should also include consideration of intraservice and interser- 
vice standardization and interoperability requirements. 
h. Logistic Suvportability. Logistic supportability shall be 
a design requirement as important as cost, schedule, and performance. A 
continuous interface between the program management office and the ran- 
power and logistics communities shall be maintained throughout the acquisi- 
tAon process. 
i. Directed Decisions by Higher Authority. When a line offi- 
cial above the program manager exercises decision authority on program 
matters, the decision shall be documented as official-program direction 
to the program manager. The line official shall be held accountable for 
the decision. 
" 3. Milestone Decisions and Phases of Activity. Four milestone 
decisions and four pbases of activity comprise the normal DoD acquisi- 
tion process for major systems. 
a. Milestone 0 Decision. Approval of ? LENS and authorization to 
proceed into Phase O--Concept Exploration--which includes solicitation, 
evaluation and competitive exploration of alternative system concepts. 
Approval to proceed with Concept Exploration also means that the Secretaity 
of Defense intends to satisfy the need. " 
b. Milestone I Decision. Selection of alternatives and author- 
ization to proceed into Phase I--Demonstration and Validation. 
c. ! Sales: one iI Decision. Selection of alternative(s) and 
authorization to proceed into Phase II--Full-Scale Development--w: ach 
includes limited production for operational test and evaluation. A-- 
p: oval to proceed with FL-11-Scale (Development also means that the 
Secretary of Defense intends to deploy the system. 
d. Milestone I: I Decision. Authorization to p oceed into 
Fese 111--? roduction and Deployment. 
L 
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4. Documentation for Hilestone Decisions 
a. hilettone 0 
Mission Element Need Statement (? ENS). Each major system 
acquisition program requires a HENS approved by the Secretary of Defense. 
DoD Components shall prepare ? ff. NS to document major deficiencies 
in their ability to meet mission requirements. Joint ?. NS shall be pre- 
pared to document major deficiencies in two or more DoD Components. OSD 
and the OJCS may also prepare ? ENS in response to perceived mission area 
deficiencies. These MEN'S shall recommend a lead DoD Component to the 
Secretary of Defense. The ? NS, as described in enclosure 2 to DoD 
Instruction 5000.2 (reference (d)), shall be limited to five pages, 
including annexes. 
D. Vilestones ?, II. and III 
(1) Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP). The DCP provides 
basic documentation for use by Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(DSARC) members in arriving at a recommendation for the Secretary of 
Defense. It includes: a program description, revalidation of the 
mission need, goals and thresholds, a summary of the DoD Component's 
acquisition strategy (including a description of. and tailoring of standard 
procedures), system and program alternatives, and issues affecting the 
decision. The DCP, as described in enclosure 3 to DoD Instruction 
5000.2 (reference (d)), shall be limited to 10 pages, including annexes. 
(2) Integrated Program Summary (IPS). The IPS summarizes 
the DoD Component's acquisition planning for the system's life-cycle and 
provides a management overview of the program. The IPS, as described in 
enclosure 4 to DoD Instruction 5000.2 (reference (d)), shall be limited 
to 60 pages, including all annexes except Annex B, Resources - Funding 
Profile. 0 
(3) Milestone Reference File (PRF). The MRF shall be tem- 
porarily established within OSD to provide a central repository for 
existing program doc=entation and references for referral during each 
Qilestone review. 
c. milestones 0,1.11, aDd III 
Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum (SDDy). The SDDy 
documents each milestone decision, establishes program goals and thresh- 
olds, reaffirms established needs and program objectives, authorizes 
exceptions to acquisition policy (when appropriate), and provides the 
di: ecticn and guidance to OSD, OJCS, and the DoD Component for the next 
p': ase of acquisition. 
ItZSPONSI EI1TTIES 
a 
1. The Defense Systee, s AcQuisition kevieb Council (DSARC) sball 
advise the Secretary of Defense on ailestoe decisions for major systems 
and such other acquisition issues as the Defense Acquisition -Executive determines to be Decesssry. 
2. The Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 
" I. The Da sbi11: 
(1) Be the principal advisor and staff assistant-to the 
Secretary of Defense for the acquisition of defense systems and equip- 
oent. 
(2) Be designated by the Secretary of Defense and shall 
serve as the permanept member and Chairman of the DSARC. 
the DSARC: 
(3) In coordination w itb the other permanent members of 
(a) Integrate and unify the management process, poli- 
ties, and procedures for defense system acquisition. 
(b) bocitor DoD Component compliacce with the policies 
and practices in OS Circular A-309 (enclosure 2), this Directive, 
and DoD Instruction 5000.2 (reference (d)). 
(c) Ensure that the requirements and viewpoints of the 
functional areas are given frill consideration during staff and DSARC 
deliberations, and are integrated in the recommendations sent to the 
Secretary of Defense. 
(d) Ensure consistency in applying the policies regarditg 
NATO RSI for all major systems. , 
b. The DAE is specifically delegated authority to: 
(1) Designate action officers who shall be responsible for 
the processing of the milestone documentation and who shall monitor 
the status of major systems in all phases of the ac4uisition process. 
(2) Issue instructions and one-time, Directive-type memo- 
randa in accordance 4itb DoD Directive SO2S. I (reference (f)). 
(3) Obtain such reports sod information, consistent with 
the provisions of DoD Directive 5000.19 (reference (g)), as may be. neces- 
sa-in the perforaance of assigned functions. 
3. The Lader Secretary of Defense for Policy (t'SSP) shall be a pe: - 
=s_ez: me=he: os the DS. RC. On o: cas_on, the ESL? =i desilmalze "s . s^s": s- 
se :: a ive to attt .da even ISAAC neetirtS. 
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4. The Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering (USDRE 
is a permanent member of the DSARC and shall be responsible for policy 
and review of all research, engineering development, tecänolop, test 
and evaluation, contracting, and production of systems covered by this 
Directive. On occasion, the USDRE may designate a representative to 
attend a given DSARC meeting. In addition, the USDRE shall. 
a. Monitor, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) (ASD(PAK)), DoD Component 
procedures for analysis of mission areas. 
b. Coordinate review of HENS provided by DoD Components. 
c. Coordinate, together with Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and ASD(PA& ), the interface of the acquisition process 
with the PPBS. 
S. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (lfanpover, Reserve Affairs, 
and Logistics) (ASD(: L2A&L)) is a permanent member of the DSARC and shall 
be responsible for policy on logistic, energy, environment, safety, and 
manpower planning for new systems and for ensuring that logistic planning 
is consistent with system hardware parameters, logistic policies, and 
readiness objectives. 
6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD(C)) is a 
permanent member of the DSARC and shall coordinate, together with USDRE 
and ASD(PA&E), the interface of the acquisition process with the PPBS. 
7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evalua- 
tion) (ASD(PA&E)) is a permanent member of the DSARC and shall: 
a. Monitor, is conjunction with USDRE, DoD Component pro- 
cedures for analysis-of mission areas. 
b. Evaluate cost-effectiveness studies prepared in support of 
milestone decisions for major system acquisition. 
c. Coordinate, together with USDRE and ASD(C), the interface 
of the acquisition process with the PPBS. 
S. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), or a representative 
designated by CJCS shall be a permanent member of the DSARC. 
9. The principal advisors to the DSARC are listed in DoD Instruction 
5000.2 (reference (d)). 
O. The Head of Each DoD Component shall manage each major system 
rcc s tion assigned by the Secretary of Defense and shall establish 
cltar lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability.. 
1 
DoD Component Heads shall also: 
a. Appoint a DoD Component acquisition executive to serve as 
the principal advisor and staff assistant to the Head of the DoD Com- 
ponent. 
b. Establish a System Acquisition Review Council. 
c. Ensure that a program manager is assigned and that a program 
manager's charter is approved as soon at feasible after Milestone 0. 
d. Establish career incentives to attract, retain, motivate and 
reward competent program managers.. 
e. Provide a program manager the necessary assistance to 
establish a strong program office with clearly established lines of 
authority and reporting channels between the program manager and the 
Head of the DoD Component. Where functional organisations exist to assist 
the program manager, the relationship of the functional areas to the 
program manager shall be established. 
f. Monitor major system acquisitions to assure compliance with 
OMB Circular A-109 (enclosure 2), this Directive, and DoD Instruction 
5000.2 (reference (d)). 
11. The Program ? I4nager shall acquire and field, in accordance with 
instructions from liA'e uthority, a cost-effective solution to the approved 
mission need that can acquired, operated, and supported within the 
resources projected is he SDD. 4. 
F. ORDER OF PRECEDENCE 
This Directive and /)oD Instruction $000.2 (reference (d)) are first 
and second in order of precedence for major system acquisitions except 
where statutory requir"ments override. All DoD issuances 'shall be re- 
viewed for conformity "ith this Directive'or DoD Instruction 5000.2 
(reference (d)) and sb 11 be changed or canceled, as appropriate. Con- 
flicts remaining after 90 days from issuance of this Directive shall be 
brought to the attenti, n of the originating office and the DAE. 
5000.1 
G. £FTECTIVZ DATE AND IflPLEP . NTATION 
This Directive is effective iooediately. Forward one copy of 
implementing documents to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research 
and Engineering within 120 days. 
., ýiGt{,. 
nýýº . ley w. Graham Clayton, Jr. Deputy 
Enclosures "2 
1. References 
2.0.113 Circular A-109, "Major System Acquisitions, " April 5,1976 
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE 'OF THE PRESIDENT 
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 
WASHINGTON. D. C.: osoi 
A-i 
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO 
April S, 1976 CIRCULAR NO. A-109 
TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS 
SUBJECT: Major System Acquisitions 
1. Purpose. This Circular establishes policies, to be 
followe y executive branch agencies in the acquisition of 
ima j or systems. 
2. Background. The acquisition of major systems by the 
Federal Government constitutes one of the most crucial and 
expensive activities performed to meet national needs. Its 
impact is critical on technology, on the Nation's economic 
and fiscal policies, and on the accomplishment of Government 
agency missions in such fields as. defense, space, energy and 
transportation. For a number of years, there has been deep 
concern over the effectiveness of the management of major 
system acquisitions. This Circular establishes approaches, decis- 
ion milestones, and program phäses which are considered appropriate 
for development and ac uq isition o major ! ystems.. Howeveqit is recog- R 
nized that flexibility is necessary in the acquisition Process to accommo- 
date varying national emergence and unigüe program situations ý_ jn auch 
cases, the basis for deviations from the practices described herein will 
be reflected in the program acquisition atrat_gy and made visible through- 
out t planning an ecision process. 
3. Responsibility. Each agency head has the responsibility ®R to ensure that the intent of the provisions of this Circular are followed. This Circular provides administrative guidance to headsof 
-g-ncies and does not establish and shall ndtbe önstrued 
co create any substantive or procedural basis for any person 
to challenge any agency action or inaction on the basis that 
such action was not in accordance with this Circular. 
4. Coverage. This-Circular covers and applies tot . 
a. Management of the acquisition of including: " Analysis of agency missions " 
mission needs " Setting of program 
Determination of system requirements " 
planning " Budgeting " Funding ' Research 
Development " Testing and evaluation " 
Production " Program and management control 
major systems, 
Determination of 
objectives -" 
System program 
Engineering " 
Contracting " 
" Introduction 
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of the system into use or otherwise successful achievement 
of program objectives. 
b. All programs for the acquisition of major systems 
even though: 
(1) The system is one-of-a-kind. 
(2) The agency's involvement in the system is 
limited to the development of demonstration hardware for 
optional use by the private sector rather than for the 
agency's own use. 
5. Definitions. As used in this Circular: 
a. Executive agency (hereinafter referred to-as agency) 
means an execut ve department, and an independent 
establishment within the meaning of sections 101 and 104(1), 
respectively, of Title 5, United States Code. 
b. Agency component means a major organizational 
subdivis on o an agency. For example: The Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Defense Supply Agency are agency components of 
the Department of Defense. The Federal Aviation 
Administration, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, 
and the Federal Highway Administration are agency components 
of the Department of Transportation. 
c. Agency missions means those responsibilities for 
meeting national needs assigned to a specific agency. 
d. Mission need means a required capability within an 
agency's overall purpose, including cost and schedule 
considerations. 
e. Program ob ectives means the capability, cost and 
schedule goals being sought by the system acquisition 
program in response to a mission need. 
f. Program means an organized set of activities 
directed toward a common purpose, objective, or goal 
undertaken or proposed by an agency in order to carry out 
responsibilities assigned to it. 
g. System design concept means an idea expressed in 
terms of general performance, capabilities, and 
characteristics of hardware and software oriented either to 
(No. A-109) 
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operate or to be operated as an integrated whole in meeting 
a mission need. 
h. Ma or system means that combination of elements that 
will function together to produce the capabilities required 
to fulfill a mission need. The elements may include, for 
example, hardware, equipment, software, construction, or 
other improvements or real property. Major system 
acquisition programs are those. programs that (1) are 
directed at and critical to fulfilling an agency mission, 
(2) entail the allocation of relatively large resources, and 
(3) warrant special management attention. Additional 
criteria and relative dollar thresholds for the 
determination of agency programs to be considered major 
systems under the purview of this Circular, may be 
established at the discretion of the agency head. 
i. System acquisition process means the sequence of 
acquisition activities starting from the agency's 
reconciliation of its mission needs, with its capabilities, 
priorities and resources, and extending through the 
introduction of a system into operational use or the 
otherwise successful achievement of program objectives. 
J. Life cycle cost means the sum total of the direct, 
indirect, recurring, nonrecurring, and other related costs 
incurred, or estimated to be incurred, in the design, 
development, production, operation, maintenance and support 
of a major system over its anticipated useful life span. 
6. General policy. The policies of this Circular are 
designed to assure the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
process of acquiring major systems. They are based on the 
general policy that Federal agencies, when acquiring major 
systems, will: 
a. Express needs and program objectives in mission 
terms and not equipment terms to encourage innovation and 
competition in creating, exploring, and developing 
alternative system design concepts. 
acquisition process c 
ve new system design 
the 
at- 0 
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C. Communicate with Congress early in the system 
acquisition process by relating major system acquisition 
programs to agency mission needs. This communication should 
follow the requirements of office of Management and budget 
(OMB) Circular No. A-10 concerning information related to 
budget estimates and related materials. 
d. Establish Ilea; 
and accountability 
acquisition programs. 
in decisionmaking, and 
decision points in 
program. 
r lines of authority, responsibility, 
for management of major system 
Utilize appropriate managerial levels 
obtain agency head approval at key 
the evolution of each acquisition 
e. Designate a focal point responsible for integrating 
and unifying the system acquisition management process and 
monitoring policy implementation. 
f. Rely on private industry in accordance with the 
policy established by OMB Circular No. A-76. 
7. Major ssrstem ac uisition management objectives. Each 
agency acquiring major systems sou : 
a. Ensure that each major system: Fulfills a mission 
need. Operates effectively in its intended environment. 
Demonstrates a level of performance and reliability that 
justifies the allocation of the Nation's limited resources 
for its acquisition and ownership. 
b. Depend on, whenever economically beneficial, 
competition between similar or differing system design 
concepts throughout the entire acquisition process. 
c. Ensure adequate risk assessment and appropriate trade-off 
OR 
among investment costs, ownership costs, schedules, and 
performance characteristics. 
d. - Provide strong checks and balances by ensuring 
subsystem and system test and evaluation, as appropriate for the risks 
in the program. Plan and conduct oy such tests as are necessary to 0 
verify system feasibility and performance. Such tests will be conducted 
jointly but may be evaluated independently by the developer and the user. 
e. Accomplish system acquisition planning, built on 
analysis of agency missions, which implies appropriate 
resource allocation resulting from clear articulation of 
agency mission needs. 
(No. A-109) 
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f. Tailor a flexible acquisition strategy for each specific program, 
soon as the agency decides to solicit alternative system 
design concepts, that could lead to the acquisition of a new 
major system and refine the strategy as the program proceeds 
through the acquisition process. Encompass test and 
evaluation criteria and business management considerations 
in the strategy, The s rategy could typically include: ' 
Use of the contract. 
_ ... 
process as an important tool in the 
acquisition program 'S eduling of essential elements of 
the acquisition process recognising that the evenutal cost and 
Demonstration, 
evaluation criteria " Content of solicitations for proposals 
" Decisions on whom to solicit " Methods for obtaining and 
sustaining competition " Guidelines for the evaluation and 
acceptance or rejection of proposals " Goals for design-to- 
cost " Methods for projecting life cycle costs " Use of data 
rights " Use of warranties " Methods for analyzing and 
evaluating contractor and Government risks " Need for 
developing contractor incentives " Selection of the type of 
contract best suited for each stage In the acquisition 
p. ocess " Administration of contracts. 
as 
D 
g. Maintain a capability to: " Predict, review, assess, 
negotiate and monitor costs for system development, 
engineering,. design, demonstration, test, production, 
operation and support (i. e., life cycle costs). Make 
provision for risk margins in all cost, schedule, and performance 
estimates to allow for resolution of unforeseen risks. " Assess 
acquisition cost, schedule and performance experience 
against predictions, and provide such assessments for 
consileration by the agency head at key decision points 
" 
Make new assessments where cos 1 schell IA, crpetfQrxa_n. c. e variances 
occur beyond the pre-planned tolerances. " Estimate life cycle costs 
during system design concept evaluation and selection, full- 
scale development, facility conversion, and production, to 
ensure appropriate trade-offs among investment costa, 
r nPrshio costs. schedules. and performance " Use 
D 
0 
independent cost estimates, where feasible, for comparison 
purposes, and weigh them more heavily than contractor or agency esti- 
mates where the condifion of comvetition or advocate make that appropriate. 
S. Management structure. 
a. The head of each agency that acquires major systems 
will designate an acquisition executive to integrate and 
unify the management process for the agency's major system 
acquisitions and to monitor implementation of the policies 
and practices set forth in this Circular. 
b. Each agency that acquires--or is responsible for 
activities leading to the acquisition of--major systems will 
(No. A-109) 
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establish clear lines of authority, responsibility, and 
accountability for management of its major system 
acquisition programs.. 
c. Each agency should preclude management layering and 
placing nonessential reporting procedures and paperwork 
requirements on program managers and contractors. 
d. A program manager will be designated for each of the 
agency's major system acquisition programs. This 
designation should be made when ä decision is made to 
fulfill a mission need by pursuing either alternative system 
design concepts or a major chance to an existing 
system. It is essential that the program manager have an 
understanding of user needs and constraints, familiarity 
with development principles, and requisite management skills 
and experience. Ideally, management skills and experience 
would include: " Research and development ° Operations " 
Engineering " Construction " Testing " Contracting " 
Prototyping' and fabrication of complex systems ° Production 
" Business " Budgeting " Finance. With satisfactory 
performance, the tenure of the program manager should be 
long enough to provide continuity and personal 
accountability. 
e. Upon designation, the program manager should be 
given budget guidance and a written charter of his 
authority, responsibility, and accountability for 
accomplishing approved program, objectives. 
f. Agency technical management and Government 
laboratories should be considered for participation in 
agency mission analysis, evaluation of alternative system 
design concepts, and support of all development, test, and 
evaluation efforts. 
g. Agencies are encouraged to work with each other to 
foster technology transfer, prevent unwarranted duplication 
of technological efforts, reduce system costs, promote 
standardization, and help create and maintain a competitive 
environment for an acquisition. 
9. Ke decisions. Technical and program decisions normally 
will-TZ made at the level of the agency component or 
operating activity. Normally. each evstem acouisitionorocram 
will require the 
e retaine bvt 
cas 
gfirs our key ec si 
cy head. The fifth deci 
een events and program 
(No. A-109) 
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öns, authörityorw}ich sliQuld 
sign is retained by the agent'. 
lverturbations! 
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a. Identification and definition of a specific mission 
need to be fulfilled, the relative priority assigned within 
the agency, the ran e of competitive s stem conce s to be eglAored. the general cons ra s within which a solution is sought, and the 
general magnitude of resources that may be invested. 
b. Selection of a chosen design concept to be developed, or O 
competitive system design concepts to be demonstrated and tested. 
c. Commitment of a systOM program to (1) full-scale develop- 
ment R only, or (2) to full-scale development, pro uction, and deployment. 
O 
d. Commitment of a system ; program to production/deployment. 
e. Immediately delay or stop, any vrogram determined to be in 
trouble due to unforeseen events or where ere-determined tolerances 0 
for cost, schedule, or performance estimates have been exceeded. 
10. Determination of mission needs. 
a. Determination of mission need should be based on an 
analysis of an agency's mission reconciled with overall 
capabilities, priorities and resources. When analysis of an 
agency's mission shows that a need for a new major system 
exists, such a. need should not be defined in equipment 
terms, but should be defined in terms of the mission, 
purpose, capability, agency components involved, schedule 
and cost objectives, and operating constraints. A mission 
need may result from a deficiency in existing agency 
capabilities or the decision to establish new capabilities 
in response to a technologically feasible opportunity. 
Mission needs are independent of any particular system or 
technological solution. 
b. Where an agency has more than one component 
involved, the agency will assign the roles and 
responsibilities of each component at the time of the first 
key decision. The agency may permit two or more agency 
components to sponsor competitive system design concepts in 
order to foster innovation and competition. 
. c. 
Agencies should, as required to satisfy mission 
responsibilities, -contribute to the technology base, 
effectively utilizing both the private sector and Government 
laboratories and in-house technical centers, by conducting, 
supporting, or sponsoring: " Research " System design 
concept studies " Proof of concept work " Exploratory 
subsystem development " Tests and evaluations. Applied 
technology efforts oriented to system developments should be 
performed in response to approved mission needs. 
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11. Alternative systems. 
a. Alternative system design concepts will be explored 
within the context of the agency's mission need and program 
objectives--with emphasis on generating innovation and 
conceptual competition from industry. Benefits to be 
derived should be optimized by competitive exploration of 
alternative system design concepts, and trade-offs of 
capability, schedule, and cost. Care should be exercised 
during the initial steps of the acquisition process to 
include the exploration and comparison of the full potential of improve- 
ments to existing systems as well as new systemdesi n concep s to satis- 
y mission needs. However,. - mission needs or program objectives should not conform to known systems or products that might 
foreclose consideration of alternatives. 
b. Alternative system design concepts will be solicited 
from a broad base of qualified firms. In order to achieve 
the most preferred system solution, emphasis will be placed 
on innovation and competition. To this end, participation 
of smaller and newer businesses should be encouraged. 
Concepts will be primarily solicited from private industry; 
and when beneficial to the Government, foreign technology, 
and equipment may be considered. 
c. Federal laboratories, federally funded research and 
development centers, educational institutions, and other 
not-for-profit organizations may also be considered as 
sources for competitive system design concepts. Ideas, 
concepts, or technology, developed by Government 
laboratories or at Government expense, may be made available 
to private industry through the procurement process or 
through other established procedures. Industry proposals 
may be made on the basis of these ideas, concepts, and 
technology or on the basis of feasible alternatives which 
the proposer considers superior. 
d. Research and development efforts should emphasize 
early competitive exploration of alternatives, as relatively 
inexpensive insurance against premature or preordained 
choice of a system that may prove to be either more costly 
or less effective. 
e. Requests for alternative system design concept 
proposals will explain the mission need, schedule, cost, 
capability objectives, and operating constraints. Each 
offeror will be free to propose his own technical approach, 
main design features, subsystems, and alternatives to 
schedule, cost, and capability goals. In the conceptual and 
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leas than full-scale development stages, contractors should 
not be restricted by detailed Government specifications and 
standards. 
f. Selections from competing system design concept 
proposals will be based on a review by a team of experts, 
preferably from inside and outside the responsible component 
development organization. Such a review will consider: (1) 
Proposed system functional and performance capabilities to 
meet mission needs and program objectives, including 
resources required and benefits to be derived by trade-offs, 
where feasible, among technical performance, acquisition 
costs, ownership costs, time to develop and procure; and (2) 
The relevant accomplishment record of competitors. 
g. During the uncertain period of identifying and 
exploring alternative system design concepts, contracts 
covering relatively short time periods at planned dollar 
levels will be used. Timely technical reviews of 
alternative system design concepts will be made to effect 
the orderly elimination of those least attractive. 
h. Contractors should be provided with operational test 
conditions, mission performance criteria, and life cycle 
cost factors that will be used by the agency in the 
evaluation and selection of the system(s) for full-scale 
development and production. Contractors should be given the flexi- 
bility to offer testin stern-performance, and cost o tions (backed by 
äýequate substantiating trade stüay result or r1T-sca e develo2ment 
eý Pöten.. is of reiýucea övera1_prögram cöst and_%r accel- wc offer 
erat d system ed ployment. 
i. The participating contractors should be provided 
with relevant operational and support experience through the 
program manager, as necessary, in developing performance and 
other requirements for each alternative system design 
concept as tests and trade-oafs are made. 
j. Development of subsystems that are intended to be 
included in a major system acquisition program will be 
restricted to less than fully designed hardware (full-scale 
development) until the subsystem is identified as a part of 
a system candidate for full-scale development. Exceptions 
may be authorized by the agency head if the subsystems are 
long lead time items that fulfill a recognized generic need 
or if they have a high potential for common use among 
several existing or future systems. 
0 
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12. Demonstrations. 
a. Advancement to a competitive test/demonstration 
phase may be approved only when the agency's mission need and 
program objectives are reaffirmed and- nd it can be shown that a 
OR 
competitive test /demonstration phase is required before concept selection 
can be made. 
b. Where the need for a competitive test /demonstration phase 
has been substantiated, the agency head will. authorize the phase to 
rop ceed. Major system acquisition programs will be structured 
and resources planned to demonstrate and evaluate competing 
alternative system design concepts that have been selected. 
c. Development of a single system design concept that 
has not been competitively selected should be considered 
only if justified by factors such as urgency of need, or by 
the physical and financial impracticality of demonstrating 
alternatives. Proceeding with the development of a 
noncompetitive (single concept) system may be authorized by 
the agency head. Strong agency program management and 
technical direction should be used for systems that have 
been neither competitively selected nor demonstrated. 
13. Full-scale development and pröduction. 
a. Full-scale development, production, and deployment may 
be approved when the agency's mission need and program ob- 
jectives are reaffirmed and results verify that the chosen system, 
R 
design concept is sound. 
b. Production and deployment may proceed following full-scale 
engineering development in those cases where development test and 
analysis results verify a system design whch will satisfy the need in 
an operational environment. In those cases, a production schedule will 
be established with the initial production rate lower than the ex ectei 
pea rate, and formal operational test and evaluation may take place 
concurrently with initial production. 
c. Selection of a syste4(s) and contractor(s) for full- 
scale development and production is to be made on the basis 
of (1) system performance measured against current mission 
need and program objectives, (2) an evaluation of estimated 
acquisition and ownership costs, and (3) such factors as 
(No. 'A-109) 
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contractor(s) demonstrated management, financial, and 
technical capabilities to meet program objectives. 
d. The program manager will monitor system tests and 
contractor progress in fulfilling system performance, cost, 
and schedule commitments. Significant actual or forecast 
variances-` will be brought to the attention of the 
appropriate management authority for corrective action. 
14. Bud etin and financing. Beginning with FY 1979 all 
agencies will: as part of the budget process, present 
budgets in terms of agency missions in consonance with 
Section 201(i) of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as 
added by Section 601 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, and in accordance with OMB Circular A-11. In so 
doing, the agencies are desired to separately identify 
research and development funding for: (1) The general 
technology base in support of the agency's overall missions, 
(2) The specific development efforts in support of 
alternative system design concepts to accomplish each 
mission need, and (3) Full-scale developments. Each agency 
should ' ensure that research and development is not 
undesirably duplicated across its missions. 
15. Information to Congress. 
a. Procedures for this purpose will be developed in 
conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget and the 
various committees of Congress having oversight 
responsibility for agency activities. Beginning with FY 
1979 budget each agency will inform Congress in the normal 
budget process about agency missions, capabilities, 
deficiencies, and needs and objectives related to 
acquisition programs, in consonance twith Section 601(1) of 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 
b. Disclosure of the basis for an agency decision to 
proceed with a single system design concept without 
competitive selection and demonstration will be made to the 
congressional authorization and appropriation committees. 
16. Implementation. All agencies will work closely with the 
Office of Management and Budget in resolving all 
implementation problems. 
17. Submissions to Office of Management and Budget. 
Agencies wi submit E Fe ollowina to OMB: 
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a. Policy directives, regulations, 
they are issued. 
and guidelines as 
b. Within six months after the date of this Circular, a 
time-phased action plan for meeting the requirements of this 
Circular. 
c. Periodically, the agency approved exceptions 
permitted under the provisions of this Circular. 
This information will be used by the OMB, in identifying 
major system acquisition trends and in 'monitoring 
implementations of this policy. 
18. Inquiries. All questions or inquiries should be 
submitted to the OMB, Administrator for Federal Procuremeht 
Policy. Telephone number, area code, 202-395-4677. 
. z4r. 
ol 
HUGH E. WITT 
ADMINISTRATOR FOR 
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY 
jýpproved : 
JAMES T. LYNN 
DIRECTOR 
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